Bayne v Blake (No 3) - [1909] HCA 60

BAYNE AND ANOTHER

BLAKE AND OTHERS

RESPONDENTS. DEFENDANTS,

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Practice-Summary judgment-Action frivolous or vexations-Action arising out

of matters already litigated-Honelessness of re-opening the matters-Rules of the Supreme Court of Victoria 1906, Order XIV. (A), r'. 1. MELBOURNE,

The plaintiffs having brought an action against the defendants in respect of matters which had been already litigated between the plaintiffs and some of the defendants when the plaintiffs were defeated, and the Court being of opinion, in view of all the probabilities and of the judicial history of the case, that any attempt to re-open the matters would be hopeless:

Held, that summary judgment for the defendants had been properly given. Decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Hood J.) affirmed.

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of Victoria.

An action was brought in the Supreme Court of Victoria by Mary Bayne and Lila Elizabeth Bayne against Arthur Palmer Blake, William Riggall, Robert Murray Smith and Grace Bayne in respect of a transaction arising out of the matters litigated in Bayne v. Blake 1; Blake v. Bayne 2. The plaintiffs in this action alleged that Grace Bayne had in breach of trust purchased

14 C.L.R., 1. 2(1908) A.C., 371; 6 C.L.R., 179.

9 CLR 367

certain real estate, the purchase money being borrowed from the defendant Murray Smith and another person, to whom a mortgage for £10,000 over that property and other of the trust estate already mortgaged was given; that the defendant Murray Smith was subse- quently registered as sole proprietor of the mortgage, and, default having been made in payment, became registered as sole proprietor of the land, which was thereby wholly lost to the estate; and that the land was on 5th December 1902 transferred to the defendants Murray Smith and Riggall, who were still the proprietors of it.

It was further alleged that Blake and Riggall were the solicitors of the mortgagees, and that they and the mortgagees knew that the transaction was a breach of trust on the part of Grace Bayne.

A further claim was made in respect of a mortgage given by Grace Bayne over certain other of the trust properties which afterwards were wholly lost to the estate, it being alleged that Blake and Riggall, as solicitors for Grace Bayne, knowing that the transaction was in breach of trust, received payment for services rendered in respect of the transaction out of the trust estate. The plaintiffs claimed consequential relief.

An application was made by the defendants by summons for summary judgment, and, on 19th April 1909, Hood J. made an order for judgment for the defendants with costs, on the ground that the action was frivolous or vexatious and that the defen- dants had a good defence on the merits, holding that substantially the action had already been decided in the previous litigation.

From this decision the plaintiffs now appealed to the High Court. The appellant Lila Elizabeth Bayne in person. Mann,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Bayne v Blake (No 3)

Details

AGLC: Bayne v Blake (No 3) [1909] HCA 60
Case: [1909] HCA 60
Decision Date: 30 September 1909

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiffs, Mary Bayne and Lila Elizabeth Bayne, appealed to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The appeal concerned an action brought by the plaintiffs against Arthur Palmer Blake, William Riggall, Robert Murray Smith, and Grace Bayne. The dispute arose from a transaction involving alleged breaches of trust by Grace Bayne in her capacity as administratrix of her mother's estate, of which the plaintiffs were beneficiaries. The plaintiffs claimed that certain real estate was improperly purchased and mortgaged, leading to its loss to the estate, and that other defendants, Blake and Riggall, acted with knowledge of these breaches of trust.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the Supreme Court had properly granted summary judgment to the defendants. This involved determining if the action was frivolous or vexatious, and if the defendants had a good defence on the merits, particularly in light of previous litigation concerning the same or substantially similar matters between the parties. The plaintiffs argued that the doctrine of res judicata did not strictly apply as the claims were not identical in form to those previously decided.

The High Court, affirming the decision of Hood J., held that summary judgment was correctly granted. The Court reasoned that while the strict doctrine of res judicata might not be applicable, it was entitled to consider "the whole probabilities of the case, and the judicial history of the claim," as stated in *Lawrance v. Norreys (Ld.)*. Given that the core issues and facts had been extensively litigated in prior proceedings, including before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, any attempt to re-open these matters would be hopeless and without any possibility of success for the plaintiffs. The Court found it would be absurd to allow the dispute to be litigated again.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders