Batey and Registrar of Personal Property Services (Practice and Procedure) - [2025] ARTA 873

Batey and Registrar of Personal Property Securities (Practice and procedure) [2025] ARTA 873 (5 April 2025)
Applicant/s:  Peter Batey
Respondent:  Registrar of Personal Property Securities
Tribunal Number:  2024/10525
Tribunal:  General Member J Ross
Place:  Canberra
Date:  21 July 2025
Corrigendum
Date of Corrigendum: 21 July 2025
Pursuant to section 114 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024, the following alteration is made to the statement of reasons for the decision:
[23]  On whether the registrar should have exercised their discretion under s 184 of the Act to remove the ‘erroneously’ lodged interest against him, the ~~Respondent~~ Applicant directed the Tribunal to the decision in Rubis v Garrett (as trustee of Andrew Garrett Family Trust (t/as Dynamic Commercial Workforce Solutions)) (No 2) to support the contention that the registrar should have exercised their discretion. In that case the ~~Respondent~~ Applicant was using the ease of obtaining registrations under the Act to register security interests against parties that had ‘vexed’ him. The issue was not whether the registrations related to the parties but whether the parties owed any money or liability of whatever nature to the ~~Responden~~t Applicant and whether the purported security interest registered had been granted or ever occurred.  It was found by the Federal Court that the registrations were false and should have not been made.  I do not find this case to be analogous with the matter before the Tribunal as submitted by the ~~Respondent~~ Applicant.
....................[SGD].............................................
General Member J Ross
Applicant/s:  Peter Batey
Respondent:  Registrar of Personal Property Services
Tribunal Number:                2024/10525

Tribunal:General Member J Ross
Place:Canberra
Date: 5 April 2025

Decision:The Tribunal refuses the application to extend the period for applying for review of the decision.

............................[SGD]...............................
General Member J Ross
Catchwords
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Administrative Review Tribunal – extensions of time in which to apply for review of decisions – factors relevant to discretion to extend time – explanation of delay – merits of the case – application to extend the period for applying for review of the decision refused
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) ss 18, 19
Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) ss 178, 181, 184
Administrative Review Tribunal Rules 2024 (Cth) s 29(7)
Cases
Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441; 119 ALR 85
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 322
Re Rothsay and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2011) 121 ALD 184
Re Spencer and Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 100 ALD 389
Rubis v Garrett as Trustee of the Andrew Garrett Family Trust Trading as Dynamic Commercial Workforce Solutions (No 2) [2018] FCA 2011
Statement of Reasons

The Applicant in this matter Mr Peter Batey (Applicant) is seeking an extension of time to lodge an application for review in the Tribunal relating to a decision of the Registrar of Personal Property Securities (Respondent) dated 23 September 2024 refusing to register a financing change statement amending the Personal Property Securities Register (PPSR) registration 201112021256235 (the registration).
BACKGROUND
This matter involves a security interest that was lodged against a Mr Peter Batey who is not the Applicant but a Peter Batey who at the time the interest was lodged was of Canberra.[1]
[1] Respondent’s outline of submissions at [2].
The security interest was lodged by Mr Albert Bonansea (the Secured Party) in the ACT General Register of Deeds and Instruments June 1994 but was migrated to the PPSR in January 2012.[2]
[2] Ibid at [3].
On 23 April 2024, the Applicant issued an amendment demand to the Secured Party and requested the registration be removed as there is no collateral described in the registration which secured any obligation (including payment) owed by a debtor to the Secured Party.[3]
[3] Ibid at [4].
On 6 May 2024, the Applicant followed up for a response to the amendment demand sent on 23 April 2024, and on 17 June 2024 issued an amendment statement to the Respondent seeking removal of the registration. In support of the amendment statement, the Applicant attached a letter from the Secured Party which confirmed that he had an employee known as Peter Batey who purchased a motor vehicle but did not pay for it, so he lodged the security interest on the register.[4] Mr Bonansea further stated he did not mean to register the security interest against Mr Peter Batey, Barrister of Waratah Chambers.[5]
[4] Ibid at [6].
[5] Statement of Albert Bonansea.
On 23 September 2024, the Applicant was advised that the registration had not been removed.[6] The reasons given was that the Applicant, being Peter Batey, Barrister of Waratah Chambers, did not hold an interest in the collateral described in the registration therefore the amendment demand was not authorised under s 178 of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act).[7]
[6] Australian Financial Security Authority, Notice of Decision to Mr Peter Batey, 23 September 2024.
[7] Ibid at [7].
LEGISLATION
The scheme created by the Act is to assist in the notification and enforcement of security interests in personal property. Section 147 of the Act requires the Registrar to establish and maintain the PPSR.
Section 178 allows a person with an interest in collateral to request changes to the registration, by way of an amendment demand given to the secured party.
An amendment demand may be made if:
(a)the obligation owed by a debtor to the secured party is not secured by collateral described in the registration, or
(b)the particular collateral in which the person has an interest does not secure any obligation owed by a debtor to the secured party.’
Section 181 of the Act requires the Registrar to register a financing change statement amending the registration in accordance with an amendment demand if after 5 business days the registration has not been amended by the secured party, unless the Registrar suspects on reasonable grounds that the amendment is not authorised under s 178 of the Act.
Section 18 of the Administrative Review Tribunals Act 2024 (Cth) (ART Act) contains the general rule that an application to the Tribunal for review of a decision must be made within the period prescribed by the rules. The Administrative Review Tribunal Rules 2024 prescribes that period as 28 days. Section 19(2) of that Act provides an exception to the general rule allowing the Tribunal to extend the period if the Tribunal considers that it is ‘reasonable in all the circumstances to do so’.
Section 19(2) is in similar terms to s 29(7) of the now repealed Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (repealed) (AAT Act).
The relevant considerations under s 29(7) of the AAT Act have been the subject of detailed consideration by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The case most often cited as setting out the relevant considerations is Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and Environment.[8] However, these considerations have been said by the Tribunal to be non-exhaustive.[9]
[8] (1984) 3 FCR 344.
[9] Re Spencer and Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 100 ALD 389 at [42].
THE ISSUE
The issue for determination is whether the Applicant should be granted an extension of time under s 19(2) of the ART Act for the review of the decision made by the Registrar not to amend the registration in accordance with his amendment demand.
The reason provided by the Respondent was that under s 178 of the Act only a person with an interest in the collateral described in the registration may give an amendment demand.[10] The Respondent was satisfied that the Applicant did not have an interest in the collateral described in the registration as he is not the grantor who is named in the registration and not the owner of the collateral.[11] Therefore the Respondent suspected on reasonable grounds that the amendment demand was not authorised under s 178 of the Act.[12]
[10] Australian Financial Security Authority, Notice of Decision to Mr Peter Batey, 23 September 2024.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
CONSIDERATION
The relevant factors for consideration in this case related to the extension of time application are:
(a)explanation for delay
(b)strength of the Applicant’s case
(c)significance of the issue to be determined
(d)potential financial loss
(e)prejudice to the Respondent or other person affected by the decision, and
(f)has the Applicant resting on their rights, and
(g)the length of delay
In relation to factor (a), the Applicant’s explanation for the delay with making his application for review would be mildly acceptable if he was not a barrister. The reason provided on his application is that he needed time to understand the decision, and work pressures.[13] The decision from the Respondent is one page consisting of 4 substantive paragraphs.[14] The content of those 4 paragraphs is summed up above at [15]. It has been said previously by the Tribunal and Courts that an acceptable explanation for the delay is not a precondition to the exercise of the discretion to allow an extension.[15] Although the delay with lodging the application is not lengthy, in my opinion the Applicant has not given a satisfactory reason for failing to lodge his application within time. The decision by the Respondent is not complex or difficult to understand, especially for someone who is legally qualified.
[13] Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Application for Review by Peter Batey, 21 November 2024.
[14] Australian Financial Security Authority, Notice of Decision to Mr Peter Batey, 23 September 2024.
[15] Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441 ; 119 ALR 85; Re Rothsay and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2011) 121 ALD 184.
In relation to factor (b), the Applicant claims the decision is wrong because the registration which is the subject of the decision is not related to Peter Batey.[16] The Respondent submits that in order for the Applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that he has an arguable case, he must provide evidence to show that he is a person with an interest (including a security interest) in the collateral described in the registration.[17] The Respondent further submits that while the definition of ‘interest’ in s 10 of the Act is broad, there must be some connection between the Applicant and the collateral that is the subject of the registration such that an ‘interest’ of the Applicant in the collateral could arise.[18] The Respondent contends that the Tribunal is unable to be satisfied that the Applicant has an interest in the collateral because the evidence which is before the Tribunal shows that the Applicant does not have such an interest.[19]
[16] Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Application for Review by Peter Batey, 21 November 2024.
[17] Respondent’s outline of submissions at [15].
[18] Ibid at [16].
[19] Ibid at [17].
In relation to this factor, the Applicant argues that s 184 of the Act provides that the Registrar may on their own initiative remove data from the register if satisfied, among other things, the application to the register was frivolous or vexatious, the data is offensive or the retention of the data is contrary to the public interest. Section 184 also allows the registrar to remove data urgently if satisfied it is in the public interest. The Applicant submits that the registrar being aware that the interest was lodged against the wrong party was obligated to exercise their discretion because a recording of an interest against the wrong person is clearly offensive and contrary to the public interest.
The Tribunal has previously decided that while the Tribunal should not undertake a merits review of the reviewable decision at this stage, it is nonetheless necessary to decide whether the Applicant’s case has any merits[20] or some reasonable prospects of success.
[20] Re Spencer and Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 100 ALD 389 at [48]; Re Rothsay and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2011) 121 ALD 184at [24].
The Applicant is attempting to remove the registration on the basis that it is not related to him. The evidence before the Tribunal shows that the registration is not related to him but to a person also named Peter Batey.[21] The statement by the Secured Party clearly states that he lodged a security interest against a Peter Batey of Canberra,[22] a former employee who purchased a motor vehicle from his business and never paid for it. The Applicant’s submission support this:
On 30 June 1994, Mr Bonansea lodged an interest against Mr Peter Batey, who is distinct from the Applicant. The interest was migrated to the Personal Property Securities Register.
It is not in contention that the Applicant is not the correct person for the interest to be lodged against. It is therefore not in contention between the parties that the Register is wrong. The Tribunal also has the statement of Mr Bonansea deposing to that fact.
[21] Statement of Albert Bonansea, 14 June 2024.
[22] Ibid.
It therefore follows that the Applicant is not the person who could issue an amendment demand to the secured party as he is not the person who the interest was registered against. Further, merely having the same name as a person who has an interest is not a sufficient connection to the collateral.
On whether the registrar should have exercised their discretion under s 184 of the Act to remove the ‘erroneously’ lodged interest against him, the Applicant directed the Tribunal to the decision in Rubis v Garrett as Trustee of the Andrew Garrett Family Trust Trading as Dynamic Commercial Workforce Solutions (No 2)[23] to support the contention that the registrar should have exercised their discretion. In that case the Applicant was using the ease of obtaining registrations under the Act to register security interests against parties that had ‘vexed’ him. The issue was not whether the registrations related to the parties but whether the parties owed any money or liability of whatever nature to the Applicant and whether the purported security interest registered had been granted or ever occurred.[24] It was found by the Federal Court that the registrations were false and should have not been made.[25] I do not find this case to be analogous with the matter before the Tribunal as submitted by the Applicant. Further, I do not regard that the ability for the registrar to remove data under s 184 is related to the reviewable decision before the Tribunal. However, I note that in this case there is no ‘erroneous’ interest to remove. The interest has not been lodged against the wrong party. The interest was correctly and legitimately made by the Secured Party. When this issue of the registrar’s discretion under s 184 of the Act was raised by the Applicant in the interlocutory hearing the Respondent offered to explain outside of the hearing how correction or clarification of registrations are handled.
[23] [2018] FCA 2011.
[24] Ibid at [51].
[25] Ibid at [71].
In view of the above, I do not consider that the Applicant’s case has merit. I do not consider that there is a genuine issue to be determined between the Applicant and the Respondent.
In relation to factor (c), consistent with my finding that there is not a genuine issue to be determined between the Applicant and the Respondent there is no issue of significance for the Tribunal to determine. I have no doubt that names appear on the register which belong to many individuals within the community.
In relation to factor (d), no evidence has been provided of potential financial loss to the Applicant if the extension was not granted.
In relation to factor (e), no submission has been made as to whether granting the extension of time would result in prejudice to the Respondent or the wider community.
In relation to factor (f), I am satisfied that the Applicant was aware of his review rights but did not give priority to pursuing them for the reason provided in his application.
In relation to factor (g), the delay in making the application is not a lengthy one. However, given I do not accept the explanation for the delay this factor does not weigh in favour of granting the extension of time.
CONCLUSION
In considering these factors, the Applicant has fallen considerably short of satisfying me that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to accept his late application. I consider it would be a waste of time and resources for all parties including the Tribunal if the matter was to proceed any further. It would serve no useful purpose and would not advance the Tribunal’s statutory objectives.