Bateman Project Engineering Pty Ltd v Pegasus Gold Australia Pty Ltd
[2000] NTSC 34
•6 June 2000
Bateman Project Engineering Pty Ltd & Ors v Pegasus Gold Australia
Pty Ltd [2000] NTSC 34
PARTIES: BATEMAN PROJECT ENGINEERING
PTY LTD & ORSv PEGASUS GOLD AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
(ADMINISTRATORS APPOINTED)ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE
NORTHERN TERRITORY AS
INTERVENERTITLE OF COURT: FULL COURT OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE NORTHERN
TERRITORYJURISDICTION: FULL COURT FILE NOS: 306 of 1997 (9728220), 21 of 1998
(9801771), 81 of 1998 (9809080)DELIVERED: 6 June 2000 HEARING DATES: 19 April 2000 JUDGMENT OF: MARTIN CJ, ANGEL & THOMAS JJ CATCHWORDS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Legislative powers of Commonwealth parliament in relation to Territories –
whether proceedings in a Territory court be validly transferred to the Federal
Court of Australia and can that court hear and determine the proceedings
under the provisions of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987(Cth).
Held:
Full Court concluded in the affirmative
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s 122
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth), s 5 and s 9
Northern Territory of Australia v GPAO & Ors (1999) 196 CLR 553,
applied.Spinks v Prentice (1999) 163 ALR 270, considered.
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Plaintiffs: D Alderman Defendant: D Grieves Intervener T Pauling QC Solicitors:
Plaintiffs: Hunt and Hunt Defendant: Ward Keller Intervener: Solicitor General for the NT on behalf of
the Attorney-GeneralJudgment category classification: A Judgment ID Number: mar20009 Number of pages: 5 Mar20009 IN THE FULL COURT OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE
NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWINBateman Project Engineering Pty Ltd & Ors v Pegasus Gold Australia Pty
Ltd [2000] NTSC 34
Nos. 306/97 (9728220), 21/98 (9801771), 81/98 (9809080)
BETWEEN:
BATEMAN PROJECT ENGINEERING
PTY LTD
First Plaintiff
AND:
KINHILL PACIFIC PTY LIMITED
Second Plaintiff
AND:
KILBORN ENGINEERING PACIFIC
PTY LIMITED
Third Plaintiff
AND
PEGASUS GOLD AUSTRALIA PTY
LTD (ADMINISTRATORSAPPOINTED)
Defendant
AND
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE
NORTHERN TERRITORY
Intervener
CORAM: MARTIN CJ, ANGEL & THOMAS JJ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 6 June 2000)
The Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act of the Commonwealth 1987
provides in s 5 that in the circumstances prescribed this Court shall transfer
proceedings pending in the court to the Federal Court of Australia or the
Family Court of Australia as the case may require. The Act further provides
in s 9 that each of those courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine a
proceeding so transferred.
Pursuant to s 21 of the Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT) a Judge of the court,
Justice Mildren, hearing proceedings between these parties, referred part of
them to this Court. The reference accepted by this Court is:
“Can these proceedings be validly transferred by this Court to the
Federal Court of Australia and can that court validly hear and determine the proceedings under the provisions of the Jurisdiction of
Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 of the Commonwealth.”
In summary, the proceedings involved claims by the plaintiffs for work
carried out at the request of the defendant and for orders for enforcement of
statutory liens under the Workmens Liens Act 1893 (NT). There are a
number of defences pleaded, including breach of contract, negligence and
breaches of the Trade Practices Act.
The reference arises in the context of the decisions by the High Court in re
Wakim ex parte McNally & Anor (1999) 163 ALR 270 and other cases
decided at the same time. It was there held that the purported conferral of jurisdiction on the Federal Court by the Corporations Laws of the States to
hear and determine proceedings are invalid. That is so notwithstanding that
the Corporations Laws of the Parliament of the Commonwealth provide that
the Federal Court can exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it by the law of
a State. Such a scheme foundered on Ch III of the Constitution.
Amongst that group of decisions, however, was Spinks v Prentice arising
from proceedings in the Federal Court under the Corporations Law of the
Australian Capital Territory. It was unanimously held that the appeal
challenging the Corporations Law cross-vesting scheme by the conferral of
jurisdiction on the Federal Court under Territory law and the power to
exercise that jurisdiction under Commonwealth law is valid.
Their Honours Gummow and Hayne JJ at pp 318 – 321 survey the
authorities and relied in particular on the Northern Territory of Australia v
GPAO and Others (1999) 196 CLR 553, Gleeson CJ and Gaudron J
separately agreed with those reasons at p 281, McHugh J said that since the
decision in GPAO the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to make the order in
question cannot be challenged, Kirby J agreed with the decision of the Full
Court of the Federal Court from which the application for special leave to
appeal was brought, p 339, and Callinan J at p 353 applied GPAO in coming
to his decision that the Federal Court had jurisdiction to make the orders in
question.
The result in GPAO did not flow from a unanimous decision. However, the
majority, comprising Gleeson CJ and Gummow J. at p 591, Hayne J
concurring at p 650 and Gaudron J at p 605 held it was within constitutional
power for a law of the Parliament of the Commonwealth to confer
jurisdiction on a Federal Court in matters arising under laws made for
Territories under s 122 of the Constitution.
The decisions of the High Court in Wakim and the related cases demonstrate
that the provisions of the cross-vesting scheme there under consideration are
severable so as to render conferral of jurisdiction by State Parliaments on
the Federal Court invalid, but conferral by a Territory Parliament on a
Federal Court valid. There is no reason why the provisions of the
Commonwealth law here being considered should not be dealt with in the
same manner. In so far as they deal with the general power to transfer
proceedings from this Court to the Federal Court and the power of that court
to hear and determine them, it is a law enacted under s 122 of the
Constitution. It stands aside from the provisions held to be invalid and can
thus be regarded quite separately.
The plaintiffs did not seek to be heard upon the reference, but counsel for
the defendant, and the Solicitor General for the Northern Terr itory
intervening, submitted that upon those authorities the answer to the question
was yes.
At the conclusion of the hearing we answered the reference in the
affirmative and these are the reasons for that order.
-------------------------------------------------
0
2
0