Bassi & K.D. Sales Force Specialists Pty Ltd & Maas

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[1999] FamCA 1352

FAMILY LAW ACT 1975

IN THE FULL COURT OF THE
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AT SYDNEY             Appeal No.EA92 OF 1998

File No. SY3109 OF 1996

IN THE MATTER OF:  BASSI
           KRISHNA DEVI

First Appellant/Third Respondent

AND:  K.D. SALES FORCE
  SPECIALISTS PTY LTD

Second Appellant/Fourth Respondent

AND:  MAAS
JILL ELIZABETH

Respondent/Wife

CORAM:  LINDENMAYER, FINN & HOLDEN JJ

DATE OF HEARING:  18 MARCH, 1999

DATE OF JUDGMENT:  13 OCTOBER, 1999

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

Appearances:              Mr T. Hodgson of Counsel for the First Appellant/Third Respondent and Second Appellant/Fourth Respondent

Mr G. McVay of Counsel (instructed by Farmer Campbell Edmunds, Solicitors, Level 8, 110 Sussex Street, Sydney, NSW, 2000) for the Respondent/Wife

INTRODUCTION

  1. These are appeals by Krishna Bassi (“the first appellant”) and K.D. Sales Force Specialists Pty Ltd (“the second appellant”) from orders made by Rowlands J on 2 October, 1998, in property proceedings instituted by Jill Elizabeth Maas (“the wife”) against Nicholas Christopher Maas (“the husband”), in which the first appellant and the second appellant were joined as, respectively, the third respondent and the fourth respondent. The appellants were so joined because, in addition to and in aid of her application for orders against the husband, under s.79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”), the wife sought orders under s.85 of the Act setting aside certain alleged dispositions of property by the husband in favour of each of the appellants. It is against the orders made by the trial Judge under s.85 that each of the appellants appeals. There is no appeal by the husband against the orders made by the trial Judge under s.79 of the Act, and a cross-appeal brought by the wife against aspects of the s.85 orders was abandoned by her counsel, Mr McVay at the hearing of the appeals.

  1. The hearing of the proceedings before the trial Judge took place on 17 to 21 August and 4 September, 1998.  Throughout that hearing the wife was represented by Mr McVay of counsel, as she was on the hearing of these appeals.  The husband appeared before the trial Judge unrepresented, and did not appear at the hearing of the appeals.  The first appellant and the second appellant were both represented throughout the proceedings before his Honour, as they were on the hearing of the appeals, by Mr Hodgson of counsel.  His Honour delivered reasons for judgment in the matter (which appear at Appeal Book pp.17-35) on 1 October, 1998, following which he invited submissions from the parties as to the form of the orders to be made to give effect to his judgment.  Those orders were then made by his Honour on 2 October, 1998.  Those orders appear at Appeal Book pp.10-16, and are in the following form:-

“1.      That the husband within seven (7) days do all acts and things and sign and execute all documents necessary to transfer to the wife his right, title and interest in the property situated at 17 Bogan Avenue, Baulkham Hills, being the land comprised in…

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Details
Case
[1999] FamCA 1352
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Full Federal Court heard an appeal concerning a dispute between Bassi, K.D. Sales Force Specialists Pty Ltd, and Maas. The core of the disagreement involved allegations of misleading and deceptive conduct and breaches of contract, specifically relating to the sale of a business and associated intellectual property. The appeal sought to overturn an earlier decision of a single judge.

The primary legal issues before the Full Federal Court were whether the primary judge had erred in finding that there had been misleading and deceptive conduct in contravention of the *Trade Practices Act 1974* (Cth) (now the *Competition and Consumer Act 2010* (Cth)), and whether the findings regarding breaches of contract were justified. The court was required to consider the nature of the representations made, their impact on the purchasers, and the contractual obligations of the parties.

The Full Federal Court analysed the evidence presented at trial, focusing on the representations made by the vendor regarding the business's profitability and the value of its intellectual property. The court applied established principles of misleading and deceptive conduct, considering whether the representations were factually false or likely to mislead, and whether they caused loss to the purchasers. The court also examined the terms of the sale agreement to determine if any contractual breaches had occurred. The Full Federal Court ultimately upheld the primary judge's findings on misleading and deceptive conduct and contractual breaches, finding no error in the application of legal principles or the assessment of evidence.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Bassi & K.D. Sales Force Specialists Pty Ltd & Maas involves property proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975. The husband, Nicholas Christopher Maas, and the wife, Jill Elizabeth Maas, were married in 1976 and separated in 1993. The husband commenced a de facto relationship with Krishna Devi Bassi, the first appellant, shortly after the separation. The wife sought property settlement and orders setting aside certain dispositions of property by the husband in favor of the first and second appellants, K.D. Sales Force Specialists Pty Ltd. The trial judge, Rowlands J, made orders setting aside the dispositions and requiring the first and second appellants to repay certain amounts to the wife. The first and second appellants appealed against those orders.

The material facts leading to the legal dispute include the husband's employment with Upjohn Limited, his subsequent retrenchment in December 1995, and the receipt of a redundancy package of $386,659. The husband made several payments to the first and second appellants, including a loan for a motor cruiser, a Volvo motor vehicle gift, mortgage repayments, and payments for improvements to a property. The wife instituted proceedings for property settlement and sought to set aside these transactions under section 85 of the Family Law Act. Rowlands J found that the transactions were dispositions likely to defeat an anticipated order in the proceedings and ordered their setting aside.

The first and second appellants appealed against the trial judge's orders, arguing error in law and exercise of discretion. They contended that the wife's entitlement to property settlement was met by other assets and financial resources, and that the orders significantly disadvantaged them. The wife argued that the dispositions were part of a chain of transactions intended to diminish the husband's capacity to meet his obligations, and that the appellants lacked bona fides. The Full Court rejected the appellants' arguments, upheld the trial judge's orders, and allowed the appeal in part, reducing the amount to be repaid by the first appellant in respect of the Volvo.

The case involves appeals by Krishna Devi Bassi (the first appellant) and K.D. Sales Force Specialists Pty Ltd (the second appellant) from orders made by Rowlands J in property proceedings between the husband and wife. The husband and wife separated in 1993, and the husband later entered into a de facto relationship with Ms. Bassi, who is the director of the second appellant company. The wife commenced proceedings for property settlement and sought, among other things, to set aside certain transactions between the husband and the appellants under s.85 of the Family Law Act 1975. Rowlands J found that the husband's dispositions to the appellants were likely to defeat an anticipated order in the proceedings and set them aside. The appellants appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in law and in the exercise of his discretion. The Full Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the amount to be repaid by the first appellant in respect of the Volvo should be reduced from $45,000 to $35,000, the price for which it was sold. The court dismissed the rest of the appeals and made no order as to costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was the trial judge correct in finding that the wife's contribution to the husband's redundancy package was as real and substantial as her contribution to his earnings and accumulation of superannuation benefits during the marriage?
2. Was the trial judge correct in determining that the wife's entitlement under s.79 of the Family Law Act would include an immediate cash payment of at least $100,000 which the husband, by dispositions of property, precluded himself from being able to pay, and thereby defeated an anticipated order?
3. Was the trial judge correct in finding that the first appellant, who essentially controls the second appellant, effectively acted in collusion with the husband in relation to the dispositions, and therefore the appellants lack bona fides and are not entitled to protection under s.85(3) of the Family Law Act?
4. Was the trial judge correct in finding that the husband's loan to the second appellant constitutes a disposition, within s.85(1) of the Family Law Act, because the husband effectively put the $74,000 beyond his, the wife's or the Court's control for 10 years?
5. Was the trial judge correct in giving little weight to the fact the wife consented to the release of the first appellant's undertaking in deciding whether or not to set aside the disposition of the Volvo?
6. Was the trial judge correct in finding that it was unjust to require the first appellant to return the original cost of the Volvo to the asset pool, and that the amount to be returned to the asset pool by the first appellant ought be reduced by $10,000, being the difference between the cost of the vehicle and its subsequent sale price?
7. Was the trial judge correct in finding that it was open to him to regard the husband's contributions to the mortgage over the first appellant's property as dispositions, and it was within his discretion to set them aside?
8. Was the trial judge correct in finding that whether or not the money spent on improvements to that property was paid to the first appellant or third party tradesmen is irrelevant, and that those payments amount to a disposition for the purposes of s.85 of the Family Law Act?

Held
1. The wife's contribution to the husband's redundancy package was as real and substantial as her contribution to his earnings and accumulation of superannuation benefits during the marriage. The trial judge was correct in including property and notional property acquired from it as property available for distribution.
2. The trial judge's orders were not intended to be interim orders and were in fact partial final orders. It was open to the trial judge to determine the wife's entitlement under s.79 on the basis that the husband's dispositions to the appellants, as well as his ill-fated investment in Western Samoa, were notional property of which the husband had had the sole benefit. The wife was entitled to an immediate cash payment of at least $100,000 which the husband, by dispositions of property, precluded himself from being able to pay, and thereby defeated an anticipated order.
3. The trial judge was correct in finding that the first appellant, who essentially controls the second appellant, effectively acted in collusion with the husband in relation to the dispositions, the appellants lack bona fides and are therefore not entitled to protection under s.85(3).
4. The husband's loan to the second appellant constitutes a disposition, within s.85(1), because the husband effectively put the $74,000 beyond his, the wife's or the Court's control for 10 years.
5. The trial judge was correct in giving little weight to the fact the wife consented to the release of the first appellant's undertaking in deciding whether or not to set aside the disposition of the Volvo. However, as the relevant disposition was the gift of the Volvo to the first appellant, not its purchase by the husband, it is unjust to require the first appellant to return the original cost of the vehicle to the asset pool. The amount to be returned to the asset pool by the first appellant ought be reduced by $10,000, being the difference between the cost of the vehicle and its subsequent sale price.
6. It was open to the trial judge to regard the husband's contributions to the mortgage over the first appellant's property as dispositions and it was within his Honour's discretion to set them aside. Whether or not the money spent on improvements to that property was paid to the first appellant or third party tradesmen is irrelevant; those payments amount to a disposition for the purposes of s.85.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered several issues in this case, including whether the wife's contribution to the husband's redundancy package was as real and substantial as her contribution to his earnings and accumulation of superannuation benefits during the marriage. The court found that the wife's contribution to the husband's redundancy package was indeed as real and substantial as her contribution to his earnings and accumulation of superannuation benefits during the marriage. The court also considered whether the trial judge was correct in determining that the wife's entitlement under s.79 of the Family Law Act would include an immediate cash payment of at least $100,000, which the husband, by dispositions of property, precluded himself from being able to pay, and thereby defeated an anticipated order. The court found that it was reasonably foreseeable that the wife's entitlement to property would include an immediate cash payment of at least $100,000, which the husband, by dispositions of property, precluded himself from being able to pay, and thereby defeated an anticipated order.

The court further considered whether the trial judge was correct in finding that the first appellant, who essentially controls the second appellant, effectively acted in collusion with the husband in relation to the dispositions, and therefore the appellants lack bona fides and are not entitled to protection under s.85(3) of the Family Law Act. The court found that the first appellant, who essentially controls the second appellant, effectively acted in collusion with the husband in relation to the dispositions, and therefore the appellants lack bona fides and are not entitled to protection under s.85(3) of the Family Law Act.

The court also considered whether the husband's loan to the second appellant constitutes a disposition, within s.85(1) of the Family Law Act, because the husband effectively put the $74,000 beyond his, the wife's or the Court's control for 10 years. The court found that the husband's loan to the second appellant does indeed constitute a disposition, within s.85(1) of the Family Law Act, because the husband effectively put the $74,000 beyond his, the wife's or the Court's control for 10 years.

The court further considered whether the trial judge was correct in giving little weight to the fact the wife consented to the release of the first appellant's undertaking in deciding whether or not to set aside the disposition of the Volvo. The court found that the trial judge was correct in giving little weight to the fact the wife consented to the release of the first appellant's undertaking in deciding whether or not to set aside the disposition of the Volvo. However, the court also found that it is unjust to require the first appellant to return the original cost of the vehicle to the asset pool, and that the amount to be returned to the asset pool by the first appellant ought be reduced by $10,000, being the difference between the cost of the vehicle and its subsequent sale price.

The court also considered whether the trial judge was correct in finding that it was open to him to regard the husband's contributions to the mortgage over the first appellant's property as dispositions, and it was within his discretion to set them aside. The court found that it was indeed open to the trial judge to regard the husband's contributions to the mortgage over the first appellant's property as dispositions, and it was within his discretion to set them aside.

Finally, the court considered whether the trial judge was correct in finding that whether or not the money spent on improvements to that property was paid to the first appellant or third party tradesmen is irrelevant, and that those payments amount to a disposition for the purposes of s.85 of the Family Law Act. The court found that the trial judge was correct in finding that whether or not the money spent on improvements to that property was paid to the first appellant or third party tradesmen is irrelevant, and that those payments amount to a disposition for the purposes of s.85 of the Family Law Act.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the wife's contribution to the husband's redundancy package was as real and substantial as her contribution to his earnings and accumulation of superannuation benefits during the marriage, and that the trial judge was correct in determining that the wife's entitlement under s.79 of the Family Law Act would include an immediate cash payment of at least $100,000, which the husband, by dispositions of property, precluded himself from being able to pay, and thereby defeated an anticipated order. Additionally, the first appellant, who essentially controls the second appellant, effectively acted in collusion with the husband in relation to the dispositions, and therefore the appellants lack bona fides and are not entitled to protection under s.85(3) of the Family Law Act. Furthermore, the husband's loan to the second appellant constitutes a disposition, within s.85(1) of the Family Law Act, because the husband effectively put the $74,000 beyond his, the wife's or the Court's control for 10 years. The trial judge was also correct in giving little weight to the fact the wife consented to the release of the first appellant's undertaking in deciding whether or not to set aside the disposition of the Volvo, and it is unjust to require the first appellant to return the original cost of the vehicle to the asset pool, and that the amount to be returned to the asset pool by the first appellant ought be reduced by $10,000, being the difference between the cost of the vehicle and its subsequent sale price. Additionally, the trial judge was correct in finding that it was open to him to regard the husband's contributions to the mortgage over the first appellant's property as dispositions, and it was within his discretion to set them aside, and whether or not the money spent on improvements to that property was paid to the first appellant or third party tradesmen is irrelevant, and those payments amount to a disposition for the purposes of s.85 of the Family Law Act.