Bass and Bass and Ors
[2015] FamCA 186
•12 March 2015
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BASS & BASS AND ORS | [2015] FamCA 186 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPLICATION FOR A STAY – Where the applicant seeks a stay of orders in order to preserve funds in a trust – Whether the trial judge has the power to order an injunction in relation to financial orders pending the hearing of the appeal against those orders –Whether a refusal to grant the injunction would render the appeal nugatory – Whether the cost orders made previously should be stayed pending hearing of the appeal – Where there is no evidence of a dissipation of the funds in the trust in the short term – Where it is appropriate for some protection to be afforded to the applicant with regard to the trust funds pending the determination of the appeal – Where appropriate for second trustee to be joined to the proceedings –Where the applicant is to the lodge a written undertaking as to damages. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 114 Family Court Rules 2004 (Cth) r 22.11 Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) s 102(1) |
| Trahn & Long (No. 2) [2008] FamCAFC 194 Guinness & Guinness (No. 2) [2008] FamCAFC 100 Gamser v Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 CLR 145 DJL v The Central Authority (2001) 201 CLR 226 Paringa Mining & Exploration Co PLCv North Flinders Mines Ltd (No.2) (1988) 165 CLR 452 |
| APPLICANT: | Mr Bass |
| FIRST RESPONDENT: SECOND RESPONDENT: | Ms Bass Mr DN |
| CASE GUARDIAN: | Ms Shaw |
| FILE NUMBER: | PAC | 5029 | of | 2012 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 12 March 2015 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Aldridge J |
| HEARING DATE: | 2 March 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Tilley Family Law & Mediation |
| COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: | Mr Kearney SC |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: | Broun Abrahams Burreket | ||
COUNSEL FOR THE SECOND RESPONDENT: | No appearance | ||
| SOLICITOR FOR THE SECOND RESPONDENT: | No appearance | ||
| COUNSEL FOR THE CASE GUARDIAN: | Mr Meek SC | ||
| SOLICITOR FOR THE CASE GUARDIAN: | Abrams Turner Whelan |
Orders
Mr DN, in his capacity as a trustee of the trust created by the orders made between the applicant and respondent on 17 July 2008 (“child support trust”), be joined as a party to these proceedings.
Leave is granted to Mr DN to apply to be removed from the proceedings or to seek to be heard on these orders on 48 hours’ notice.
Conditional upon the applicant filing within 24 hours a written undertaking as to damages, pending determination of the appeal (EA 172/2014) or further order of the Court, Ms Shaw and Mr DN, as trustees of the child support trust, are not to make a payment over $3 000.00 from that trust, or to make payments in excess of total payments of $30,000.00, other than for their costs and expenses, without giving the applicant 21 days prior notice, in writing, of their intention to do so.
That the Case Guardian be indemnified in full by the child support trust in respect of her costs and expenses for appearing as Case Guardian and that the trustees of the child support trust forthwith pay those costs.
That the costs of the applicant and first respondent are reserved.
Liberty is granted to the Case Guardian and the parties to apply to have the parties, or either of them, reimburse the Case Guardian for her costs and expenses, such application to be heard and determined at the time of the determination of any reserved costs.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Bass & Bass and Ors has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
FILE NUMBER: PAC 5029 of 2012
| Mr Bass |
Applicant
And
| Ms Bass |
First Respondent
And
| Mr DN |
Second Respondent
And
Ms Shaw
Case Guardian
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
On 2 December 2014 final orders were made in this matter. The applicant has appealed and now seeks a stay of some of the orders that were made on 2 December 2014 pending hearing of that appeal.
The primary proceeding before the court was an application by the applicant in relation to a child support trust that had been created pursuant to consent orders of the court made on 17 July 2008. He unsuccessfully sought the return of the funds remaining in the trust.
Those orders required the husband to pay to himself and the respondent Ms Bass, as trustees for their child B, the sum of $350 000. That sum was then to be used principally, but not entirely, for the educational support of the child. Whilst it was hoped that he would attend private schools he did not do so. Thus at the time of the hearing, approximately $300 000 remained in the trust.
Order 22.4 of the orders made on 17 July 2008 provided:
22.4The terms of the child support trust must include the following terms:
22.4.1Until the CST is wound up, its capital must be applied to meet the obligations referred to in Order 16 [payment of certain expenses for the benefit of the child].
22.4.2The trustee shall pay educational or tutoring expenses additional to those specified in Order 16 as agreed between the parties in writing.
22.4.3The trustee shall cause the CST to be wound up on 31 December 2015, unless the parties agree in writing to extend the date for the winding up of the trust.
22.4.4Upon the winding up of the trust, the trustee shall hold any residual corpus in the CST for the child absolutely.
Thus, absent a variation to the trust, or the orders, any sum remaining unspent would vest in the child at the end of 2015.
It was an unusual feature of the trust that the applicant was entitled to all of the income of the trust but he was responsible to pay all the costs associated with its administration and any income tax.
The basis for the husband’s proceedings was that the purpose of the orders was to provide for the private school education of the child and that, as that had not occurred, the unused funds should be returned to him. He sought the following orders:
1.Pursuant to Section 129(1) of the Child Support (Assessment) Act (the CSAA), order that Orders 16 – 24 of the Orders made by this Court on 17 July 2008 (the Orders) be discharged.
2.If order 1 is made, and order that funds standing to the credit of the National Australia Bank Limited (NAB) in the joint names of the parties and styled [Mr and Ms Bass] of the [B] Child Support Trust, (the account) be paid to HB.
3.An order that the issue of child support for [the child], ([B]) born … 1997 be determined by the Child Support Agency (CSA) by way of administrative assessment pursuant to CSAA.
4.A declaration that no trust came into existence by reason of the making of the Orders.
5.Alternatively, if a trust is found to exist, a declaration that the purpose of the trust pursuant to the Orders has failed and there be a reduction on the corpus of the trust to $30,000.00 and the surplus funds in the account be paid to [Mr Bass].
6.An order that [Ms Bass] be removed as a trustee of the trust.
7.Alternatively an Order that both [Mr Bass] and [Ms Bass] be removed as trustees of the Trust and be replaced by a corporate trustee or alternatively two suitable trustees.
8.An order that [Ms Bass] pay the costs of [Mr Bass], of and incidental to the Application.
I found that the purpose of the orders of 17 July 2008 was not limited to the private school education of the child and thus the purpose of the orders, or any trust created by them, had not failed. I declined to vary the orders under s 129 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) (“CSA Act”) to provide for the return of the corpus to the husband.
I did however consider it appropriate to vary the terms of the trust to enable non-educational expenses of the child to be paid by it. I also removed both parents as trustees. On 2 December 2014 I made the following orders:
1.That Order 16 of the Orders made on 17 July 2008 by this Court be modified pursuant to s 129 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act1989 (Cth) by:
(a) inserting in clause 16 of the orders:
16.11 By way of payment for the maintenance, welfare and support of the child other than as to be provided by the parties pursuant to Order 16.9 herein.
(b) inserting Order 22.4.6 as follows:
As from 31 October 2014 the trustees may charge costs associated with the administration of the CST at a rate of $250 per hour.
2.That [Mr Bass] (“the husband”) and [Ms Bass] (“the wife”) be removed as trustees of the Trust created pursuant to the Orders of 17 July 2008 and in their place [Ms Shaw] and [Mr DN] be appointed as trustees.
3.That the husband and wife do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to implement Order 2 above.
4.That in the event that either party refuses or neglects to execute any deed, document or instrument necessary to give effect to these Orders, the Registrar of the court be appointed pursuant to s 106A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to execute such deed, document or instrument in the name of the said party and do all acts and things necessary to give validity and operation to the deed, document or instrument upon the Registrar being provided with verification of such refusal or failure by way of affidavit.
5.That the Case Guardian be indemnified in full by the CST (“Child Support Trust”) in respect of her costs and expenses for appearing as case guardian and that the trustees of the CST forthwith pay those costs.
6.That the husband indemnify the CST in respect of the costs and expenses of the case guardian and pay to the trustees of CST such sums that the trustees have paid to the case guardian pursuant to Order 6 hereof.
7.That the husband is to pay one half of the costs of the wife as agreed or in default of agreement as assessed.
8.That all applications and cross applications be and are hereby otherwise dismissed.
9.That all issues be removed from the Active Pending Cases List.
10.That all material produced on subpoena shall be returned to the persons or institutions from which they emanated and all exhibits are returned to the person or persons who tendered the same not before fifty-six (56) days from the date of these Orders.
The lawyer for the applicant informed me that there is no appeal against the variation of the child support trust to provide for the non-educational support for the child. There seems to be no appeal as to the removal of the parents as trustees. The notice of appeal was filed on 23 December 2014. The grounds of appeal identified were:
1.The trial judge erred in principle by making orders providing that the corpus of the child support trust which his Honour found had been created in July 2008 in reliance upon orders made pursuant to the provisions of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 Cth. (“the CSA Act”) be settled upon the child of the parties upon the vesting of the trust in the absence of jurisdiction or power to make such orders;
a.pursuant to the terms of the 2008 orders, or;
b.the provisions of the Trustee Act 1925 NSW, or;
c.general equitable principles, or;
d.the provisions of the CSAA.
2.If the appeal against the orders made by the trial judge in the substantive proceedings is successful, the appellant submits that the order for costs in favour of the first respondent cannot stand, as the fundamental foundation for such order, namely the appellant’s lack of success at trial, will have dissolved.
3.The trial judge erred in principle of ordering that the appellant pay the whole of the costs of the case guardian.
4.The trial judge erred in principle by ordering that the costs of the case guardian be paid on an indemnity basis.
5.The trial Judge earned in principle by failing to determine the appropriate amount of Child Support to be paid or remitting the issue of Child Support for determination by the Child Support Agency.
[As per original Notice of Appeal filed 23 December 2014]
Grounds 2 to 4 relate to the costs orders. Ground 5 relates to the continuing order for child support. Thus the only ground of appeal directed towards the substantive matters concerning the 2008 orders is ground 1.
When regard is had to that ground a number of difficulties emerge.
First, I did not make any orders providing that the corpus of the child support trust “be settled upon a child of the parties upon the vesting of the trust”. That, to the contrary, was a specific term of the orders made on 17 July 2008.
Secondly, since I did not make the order identified by ground 1 there could hardly be a complaint about the court lacking jurisdiction to make it.
Thirdly, if that ground of appeal is correct and the court did not have jurisdiction to amend, vary or set aside the 2008 orders, on the grounds identified in ground 1, then the July 2008 orders would continue in force. One of those orders provides for the child to receive the corpus when he turns 18.
In response to these difficulties being identified, the lawyer for the applicant indicated that the real mischief to which the ground of appeal was directed was the court’s refusal to order, by whatever mechanism, the return of the corpus to the applicant.
In order to make that ground good there would need to be jurisdiction to make such an order, which ground 1 of the present notice of appeal denies.
I found that the court did have jurisdiction to vary the orders of 17 July 2008 pursuant to s 129 of the Child Support Assessment Act1989 (Cth) but declined to do so in the manner sought by the applicant. It would, of course, be valid to appeal against that refusal. That, however, is not the present state of the appeal and the lawyer appearing for the applicant did not articulate any basis upon which it was said that refusal constituted an appealable error.
In the absence of a ground directed to that asserted error and in the absence of any identification of the error upon which the refusal of the relief sought by the applicant relied, it is very difficult to have any basis to consider the strength of any appeal.
The stay application was filed 18 February 2015 and seeks the following orders:
1.An Order that the following Orders of the Court be stayed pending hearing of the Notice of Appeal filed on the 23rd December 2014;
1.1 Orders 6 and 7 made on the 2nd December 2014.
1.2 Orders 22.4.3 and 22.4.4 made on the 17th July 2008.
2.An Order that pending hearing of the Notice of Appeal filed on the 23rd December 2014, the Trustees of the Child Support Trust be restrained from distributing the corpus of the Trust.
Quite appropriately, the application in an appeal does not seek a stay of any refusal of the husband’s application.
There is no appeal against the orders made on 17 July 2008. There is no application to set those orders aside, other than that as was determined by me. That being so there is no basis for a stay of those orders. If there was such an application, the fact that they were by consent and the delay in lodging such an application would be powerful considerations against a stay.
Order 3 of the orders sought in the appeal is an order that the child support orders made on 17 July 2008 be discharged and the money standing in the child support trust be paid to the applicant.
Order 2 of the stay application is an injunction designed to preserve those funds pending hearing of the appeal and to avoid order 3 sought in the appeal being rendered nugatory. It is submitted by the applicant, and accepted by the respondent and the case guardian, that if the corpus presently held in the trust was spent other than on an asset that could easily be sold to recover its purchase price, any payments out of the corpus most likely would not be recovered. Thus, if the applicant ultimately succeeded in his appeal, any order for the return of the funds may be meaningless.
The applicant did not call any evidence on the stay application. He did, however, refer to material that was before the court in the substantive proceedings.
There are thus two applications to be considered. The first is whether the cost orders, being orders 6 and 7 made on 2 December 2014, be stayed pending hearing of the appeal.
The second is whether the injunction sought in paragraph 2 of the application in an appeal should be granted.
In dealing with a stay application the court will have regard to the principles that were conveniently summarised in a Trahn & Long (No. 2) [2008] FamCAFC 194 at [38]:
38.These principles, both in the general law and in respect of parenting proceedings, are well settled (see The Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Myer Emporium Limited (1986) 160 CLR 220 at 230; Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation (1985) 2 NSWLR 685. Jennings Constructions Limited v Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 681; Clemett and Clemett (1981) FLC 91-013; JRN & KEN v IEG & BLG (1998) 72 ALJR 1329 at 1332). The authorities stress the discretionary nature of the application which should be determined on its merits. Principles relevant to this matter included the following:
·the onus to establish a proper basis for the stay is on the applicant for the stay however it is not necessary for the applicant to demonstrate “special” or “exceptional” circumstances;
·a person who has obtained a judgment is entitled to the benefit of that judgment;
·the person who has obtained a judgment is entitled to presume the judgment is correct;
·the mere filing of an appeal is insufficient to ground a stay;
·the bona fides of the applicant;
·a stay may be granted on terms that are fair to all parties – this may involve a court weighing the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties;
·a weighing of the risk that an appeal may be rendered nugatory if a stay is not granted – this will be a substantial factor in determining whether it will be appropriate to grant the stay;
·some preliminary assessment of the strength of the proposed appeal - whether the appellant has an arguable case;
·the desirability of limiting the frequency of any change in a child’s living arrangements;
·the period of time in which the appeal can be heard and whether existing satisfactory arrangements may support the granting of a stay for a short period of time; and
·the best interests of the child the subject of the proceedings.
The basis of this application is that there would be little utility in the process of quantifying and recovering costs as the costs order is likely to be set aside if the substantial appeal succeeds and that no prejudice will arise from any stay.
The present position with the case guardian’s costs and expenses is that they are to be paid by the Child Support Trust on an indemnity basis. There is no appeal against that order and the case guardian will accordingly be paid.
The appeal by the applicant is against the orders requiring him to indemnify the trust against the whole of those costs on an indemnity basis.
The applicant is asset rich but, at least at the time of the substantive hearing, income poor. The judgment of 11 September 2014 said at [120]:
120.The husband says that he has an average weekly income of $150 with expenditure of $7,901 per week. He owns property valued at $8,577,400 with liabilities of $3,229,000. His tax returns for the last four years show his income to have been:
2010 $882,741
2011 $218,025
2012 $318,362
2013 $32,132
Given his net asset position and in the absence of any evidence that he would be prejudiced in that he could not afford to pay the costs when duly quantified, there can be no finding that the applicant would find it difficult to pay the costs from his assets. The argument really comes down to whether or not, if the costs are paid to the trust as required, those funds will then be dissipated by the trustees leading to the inability of the applicant to recover them if his appeal is successful.
As was submitted by senior counsel for the case guardian, unless there was a change in circumstances, and none was identified, the present trustees would need to obtain a valid discharge of their obligations as trustee. Pursuant to the present terms of the trust the trustees are obliged to wind the trust up on 31 December 2015. That does not, however, mean that those funds will be immediately paid to the child. the child suffers from a mild intellectual disability and it is more likely than not that the funds will continue to be held for the child’s benefit but not by him. It is likely that an application will be made to the Public Guardian for an appointment of a manager of his funds. That may or may not be the present trustees but until such an application is made the present trustees would be well justified in retaining the funds because they may not obtain a valid discharge by paying them to, or at the direction of, the child.
There is no evidence of likely dissipation of the funds held by the trustees. There is force in the submission of the case guardian that any significant dissipation is not likely to arise. When one takes into account that the child is presently entitled to the benefit of the Judgment, that the funds are there to be used for his benefit and weighing the approximately $260 000 presently in the hands of the trustees against the wealth of the applicant and the needs of his disabled child the application for a stay is not persuasive.
The courts need to be wary as to basing a stay upon their opinion of the likely prospects of success of the appeal. This is particularly so when it is the trial judge who is determining the stay. Generally speaking however, appeals from costs decisions are in a different position to other appeals and appeal courts are often reluctant to interfere with such orders.
In taking all of these matters into account I am not satisfied that a stay should be granted.
It would, however, be appropriate to consider an order which would provide some protection to the applicant and for there to be an order that the trustees not disburse funds exceeding $3 000.00, other than for their costs and expenses, without giving the applicant 21 days’ notice, in writing, of their intention to do so, as dissipation of the funds would render the appeal nugatory. This would also preserve, for return to the applicant if he is successful on his costs appeals, the costs of the case guardian he is obliged to reimburse to the trust.
That is, of course, an injunction. As it has been submitted that I lack the power to grant an injunction pending the appeal I shall now turn to that issue.
It was submitted that I do not have jurisdiction to grant the injunction sought as that is an injunction in aid of an appeal and must be made in the appeal proceedings. Thus it is submitted that judges of the appeal division would have jurisdiction but not a judge of the trial division.
A court is limited in the orders that can be made after it has made final orders and they have been entered. In Guinness & Guinness (No. 2) [2008] FamCAFC 100 the Full Court said at [17]:
17. The principles relevant to this application are subject of well settled law. The Court is functus officio when it has determined a case and orders are regularly entered. However the doctrine has well recognised exceptions. It has long been recognised that an accidental slip or omission or an ambiguity or infelicity of expression in an order can be amended under the so called “slip rule” (see now r 17.02 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (“the rules”)). The other exception to the doctrine is if a consequential order (referred to as a machinery order) is required to give effect to the orders made. A court is not at liberty to amend orders if the new order would affect substantive rights (a substantive order).
This is as true of courts of appeal as it is of trial courts (Gamser v Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 CLR 145; DJL v The Central Authority (2001) 201 CLR 226 at 245-8) but that is of no relevance here.
I am not being asked to vary the orders I have made earlier or to enter upon a reconsideration of them. Rather, I am being, by way of a stay or injunction, to preserve the subject matter of the proceedings pending the determination of the appeal.
In Paringa Mining & Exploration Co PLCv North Flinders Mines Ltd (No.2) (1988) 165 CLR 452 Mason C.J., Brennan and Gaudron JJ said at 459:
Although the judge appealed from has jurisdiction to maintain the status quo pending an appeal, that jurisdiction is concurrent with the jurisdiction of the appellate court to grant similar relief as an incident of its substantive appellate jurisdiction.
Rule 22.11 of the Family Court Rules 2004 (Cth) (“the Rules”) provides for stays of orders pending appeals. Rule 22.11(3) says that the stay application may be heard by the judge who made the order under appeal.
Section 114 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) empowers the court to grant an injunction. Whether under that section or the implied jurisdiction of the court, the court has power to makes orders to preserve the subject matter of a proceeding pending its determination. That is so even if the proceeding is an appeal as the High Court made clear. I was not referred to any provision in the Act or Rules that prevents a trial judge from making such an order.
I am satisfied that I have the power to grant the injunction sought if I am satisfied that it is appropriate to do so.
I have already discussed the matters relevant to the injunction. There is no evidence of likely dissipation of the fund, at least in the short term. However, at the end of this year, the trustees will need to consider what they will do with the fund. Even so, immediate dissipation would be unlikely. The consequence of disposing of the fund would be that the applicant’s appeal would be rendered nugatory. This consideration points strongly for there to be some protection of the fund pending the determination of the appeal.
The difficulties with the notice of appeal identified earlier, the needs of the child and the financial position of the applicant all point against granting an injunction.
Balancing these considerations points to an injunction which permits some of the funds to be used for the child’s benefit but offering protection to the applicant so as to ensure his appeal is not nugatory. At the hearing he was prepared to leave $30 000 in the fund for the child’s benefit. Thus it is appropriate in all of the circumstances for a variation of the injunction foreshadowed earlier to be made. The trustees will be permitted to pay to or for the child’s benefit sums up to $3 000, to a total of $30 000, but will need to give the applicant 21 days’ notice in writing of any other payments, other than for payments of their costs and expenses.
The precise form of the order I will be making was not canvassed with the parties during the hearing. Accordingly, they were advised that the court was considering making this order and were invited to lodge submissions “in regard to these orders or their form”. Neither the case guardian nor the applicant sought to oppose the making of these orders.
The respondent lodged submissions opposing the proposed orders. Contrary to the nature of the submissions sought, she repeated the submissions made earlier as to jurisdiction and the appeal. In addition, it was submitted that any power to grant an injunction lay in the CSA Act and that, as there was no application before the court based upon it, no injunction could be granted. Additionally, it was said that the applicant had failed to seek leave to appeal under s 102(1) of that Act. It was also submitted any power in the court to deal with the funds will abate when the child turns 18 as jurisdiction under the CSA Act will then be lost. Finally, it was said that there was no evidentiary basis for the cap of $30 000.
The first three matters go beyond the submissions sought, had not been previously raised and ought not be entertained.
In any event, the first is answered by the finding that the court has implied jurisdiction to preserve the subject matter of a suit pending appeal. As to the second, the applicant sought to recover the funds he had on a number of legal means, one of which was the CSA Act. It is not clear from the appeal whether the applicant continues to press the provisions of the CSA Act as the basis of the appeal. If he does he may well need leave but not otherwise. I have taken the obvious difficulties with the Notice of Appeal into account in making the orders. This raises another potential, but not fatal, difficulty. Further, leave could be sought out of time and could be granted.
As to the third, it is by no means obvious that an appeal against a refusal to vary a child support order abates upon the child the subject of the support turning 18. Whilst it is correct that no order can then be made under the CSA Act, the purpose of an appeal is to correct orders that were made when the child was under 18 and the court had jurisdiction. That is a matter to be dealt with in the appeal, most likely at a final hearing.
As to the fourth, the amount of $30 000 is not based on evidence of needs but on the orders sought by the applicant. He was prepared to leave that sum in the trust for the child’s benefit so cannot complain about it being spent. Any further payments, however, erode the efficacy of his appeal if it turns out to be successful.
No undertaking to damages was proffered. The above order will be conditional upon the applicant lodging a written undertaking as to damages within 48 hours.
Whilst the case guardian, who is one of the trustees appointed by me, is a party to these proceedings the other trustee is not. I will make an order joining him as a party for the purpose of making an effectual order. He, of course, has not been heard on this issue. An order will thus be made giving him liberty to apply to be removed from the proceedings or make such submissions as to the these orders as he wishes.
The appropriate order is to reserve the costs of this application with regard to the applicant and first respondent. It is an application in aid of an appeal and the costs of this application are effectively part of the appeal. Its outcome is likely to be persuasive on the issue of costs. In the primary proceedings there was an order that the Case Guardian be indemnified out of the trust for her costs. For the same reasons as given there, that order should also be made here. Any application for those costs to be reimbursed to the trust by either of the parties can be determined at the time the remaining costs issues are determined.
I certify that the preceding fifty-nine (59) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Aldridge delivered on 12 March 2015.
Associate:
Date: 12 March 2015
2
9
3