Barton and K and S Freighters Pty Ltd (Compensation)

Barton and K & S Freighters Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2017] AATA 2170 (14 November 2017)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2016/4977
Re:Wayne Barton
APPLICANT

AndK & S Freighters Pty Ltd
RESPONDENT

DECISION
Tribunal:Egon Fice, Senior Member
Date:14 November 2017
Place:Melbourne

The decision made by K & S Freighters Pty Ltd on 3 August 2016 denying Mr Barton’s application for an extension of time within which to lodge an application for reconsideration of a determination made on 28 April 2015 is set aside and in substitution the Tribunal determines that Mr Barton’s request for reconsideration received by
K & S Freighters Pty Ltd on 2 August 2016 be granted.
[sgd]........................................................................
Egon Fice, Senior Member
COMPENSATION – application for extension of time - spinal injuries arising out of or in course of employment – subsequent determination that liability to pay compensation ceased – applicant did not apply for reconsideration of determination within 30 day statutory time limit – applicant hospitalized and required to seek treatment for condition - applicant pursued permanent impairment and non-economic loss claims – reasonable explanation for delay – lack of prejudice to respondent – respondent’s decision to deny extension of time set aside and substituted with decision to grant extension
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunals Act 1975 s. 25
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ss. 16, 19, 22, 24, 60, 62(3)
Cases
Comcare v Willems (1996) 70 FCR 244
REASONS FOR DECISION
Egon Fice, Senior Member
14 November 2017

Mr Wayne Barton, an employee of K & S Freighters Pty Ltd (K & S), sustained two discrete injuries to his back in the course of his employment. The first occurred on 10 September 2011 when he suffered a fracture of the T11 vertebra. A second accident occurred on 22 July 2013 which resulted in Mr Barton having sustained a fracture of the

T10 vertebra. K & S accepted liability for both injuries.
Although Mr Barton returned to work after the first accident, it was not without some difficulty due to episodes of severe pain. After the second accident, he returned to work for a period of about one month in 2014 but experienced severe pain and had to stop working. To compound matters, Mr Barton had been diagnosed with multiple myeloma which has been present in his system since 2007. After a soft tissue mass was identified in the sacrum, Mr Barton had additional treatment including an episode of chemotherapy.
Associate Professor Peter Steadman, an orthopaedic surgeon, examined Mr Barton on 25 January 2016. After reviewing the history of problems Mr Barton has experienced, particularly with his spine, Associate Professor Steadman said Mr Barton suffered from a constitutional spinal condition known as ankylosing spondylitis which has led to him having a very stiff spine with significant osteoporosis. The condition is known as bamboo spine due to the stiffness from ankylosing spondylitis. While Mr Barton had no spinal problems prior to sustaining the first fracture of the lower thoracic spine, because of the nature of his spine, the fracture became gradually worse with increasing pain due to the long stiff spine above and below the fracture.
According to Associate Professor Steadman, the second injury began the process of further problems which ultimately resulted in Mr Barton never being able to return to truck driving. Associate Professor Steadman explained:
He sustained another fracture at the level above the previous fracture and again for the same reason, because of the long lever arm of the fixed “bamboo spine” from the constitutional ankylosing spondylitis condition, that leads to large forces across T9 that never allow the vertebra to heal. This ultimately leads to spinal fusion surgery. However the fusion is only over a few segments and again because of the same “long lever” reasons the fusion results in further collapse and fractures at each end. He travels to Melbourne to have a fusion extended and finally the problem almost solves itself as fusion is in the shape of his deformed spine. The fixed nature of the ankylosing spondylitis deformity, associated vertebral osteoporosis, and the lever arms associated with the fractures lead to this progression throughout the case. This is a well recognised biomechanical phenomenon in this condition and in medicine in general.
On 15 December 2014 K & S received a report from Dr Terry Hillier, a spinal surgeon, regarding Mr Barton’s ongoing compensation payments in respect of his thoracic fracture at T10. Dr Hillier based his report on a bone scan which was performed on

9 December 2014. Dr Hillier noted that Mr Barton was healing well across the area where the fracture had occurred but the recent bone scan disclosed problems at the T8 and T9 levels raising the possibility that Mr Barton had bone inflammation at that level. In Dr Hillier’s opinion, the cause of Mr Barton’s bone pain at levels T8 and T9 was not related to his work conditions. He referred to the fact that Mr Barton had several significant underlying conditions, particularly ankylosing spondylitis and also myeloma malignancy of the bone marrow. He said the bone scan indicated that the lesions at T8 and T9 were related to his myeloma. Dr Hillier concluded that he did not consider that Mr Barton’s employment with K & S continued to contribute to his condition.
On 17 December 2014 a Senior Workers Compensation Claims Manager with K & S informed Mr Barton that it had received a report from Dr Hillier, that report being enclosed with the letter. The Claims Manager said that relying on Dr Hillier’s report, it appeared Mr Barton no longer had an entitlement to workers compensation benefits in respect of the T10 fracture sustained on 22 July 2013. Nevertheless, the claims manager explained to Mr Barton that prior to a final decision being made, he should provide K & S with any further information which supported his claim. The letter indicated that a period of 28 days from the date he received the letter would be allowed to provide that additional information. If no further information was provided within that time, K & S would assume that he did not wish to provide further information and the matter would be determined at that time.
On 12 January 2015 Mr Barton telephoned K & S and spoke with Mr John Reppin, the claims manager who had sent him the letter of 17 December 2014. Mr Barton had requested an extension of time within which he could make further submissions or provide further reports. Mr Reppin replied in a letter dated 13 January 2015 in which he quoted the time limitations imposed by s. 62(3) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (SRC Act). Section 62(3) provides:
(3) A request for reconsideration of the determination shall:
(a)set out the reasons for the request; and
(b)be given to the determining authority within 30 days after the day on which the determination first came to the notice of the person making the request, or within such further period (if any) as the determining authority, either before or after the expiration of that period, allows.
Mr Reppin then said that he had decided to grant an extension of time for Mr Barton to provide supporting information until the close of business on 23 February 2015.
With respect to Mr Reppin, he appears to have misunderstood the application of s. 62(3) of the SRC Act. That section of the SRC Act applies, as it states, to a request for a reconsideration of a determination. At that stage, no determination had been made. The purpose of allowing Mr Barton to make submissions and/or to provide further reports was to enable Mr Barton the opportunity to state why a determination under s. 62 of the SRC Act should not be made. There is no statutory time limit of which I am aware in these circumstances. K & S could have proceeded to make the determination under s. 62 regardless of any further input from Mr Barton. It appears to have been done out of fairness.
On 20 February 2015 Mr Barton sent an email to Mr Reppin requesting a further extension of time within which he could provide supporting information before a determination was made. According to Mr Barton’s written statement of evidence, he said he requested the further extension of time because he had a doctor’s appointment in mid-March 2015. In a letter of the same date, Mr Reppin agreed to a further extension of time up to the close of business on 16 March 2015.
When Mr Barton did not provide any further information or medical reports by 16 March 2015, in a letter dated 28 April 2015, Mr Reppin informed Mr Barton that K & S had made a determination that he no longer suffered from the effects of the T10 fracture which arose out of or in the course of his employment on 22 July 2013. Accordingly, K & S’s liability to pay compensation under ss. 16 and 19 of the SRC Act had ceased. The determination was made based on Dr Hillier’s report. The letter from K & S also advised Mr Barton that if he failed to provide a request for reconsideration within 30 days, he may lose his right to request reconsideration.
Mr Barton did not seek reconsideration within the 30 day statutory time limit. It was not until K & S received a letter from Mr Barton’s solicitors dated 28 July 2016 that

it was notified that Mr Barton was requesting reconsideration of the determination dated 28 April 2015. Given that the statutory time limit expired on or about 28 May 2015, the request was about 14 months or, as calculated by K & S, 432 days out of time.
Although K & S could have allowed Mr Barton an extra 432 days in which to lodge a reconsideration request, it chose not to do so, as was its right. That was plainly set out in its letter of 3 August 2016.
The only issue before me on this application is whether the preferable decision was to grant Mr Barton an extension of time within which to make a request for reconsideration of the determination made on 28 April 2015.
In the event that there is any question remaining about whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine a decision made not to extend time for an applicant to request reconsideration of the determination, I should also briefly address this matter.
TRIBUNAL’S JURISDICTION
Section 25 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the AAT Act) establishes the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear applications by persons disaffected by decisions made by Commonwealth government departments. Relevantly, it provides:
(1) An enactment may provide that applications may be made to the Tribunal:
(a)for review of decisions made in the exercise of powers conferred by that enactment; or
(b)for the review of decisions made in the exercise of powers conferred, or that may be conferred, by another enactment having effect under that enactment.
The enactment referred to in this case is the SRC Act. Section 64 of the SRC Act relevantly provides:
(1) Application to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of a reviewable decision may be made by:
(a)a claimant; or
(b)if the decision affects the Commonwealth – the Commonwealth; or
(c)if the decision affects a Commonwealth authority – the Commonwealth authority; or
(d)if the decision affects a corporation that holds a licence under Part VIII – the licensed corporation.
K & S is a licensed corporation under Part VIII, having become licensed under a declaration of eligibility made in Notice No 1 of 2005.
The application in this case is made by the claimant, Mr Barton, seeking review of a decision made pursuant to s. 62(3)(b) of the SRC Act. The expression reviewable decision is defined in s. 60(1) in the following way:
reviewable decision means a decision made under subsection 38(4) or section 62.
It is clear that the decision made by K & S not to grant a further period within which Mr Barton could make a request for reconsideration of the determination made on 28 April 2015 was a decision made under s. 62 of the SRC Act. It falls within the definition of reviewable decision and is therefore reviewable by this Tribunal. This accords with the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Northrop, Wilcox and RD Nicholson JJ) in Comcare v Willems (1996) 70 FCR 244, 250.
EXTENSION OF TIME TO REQUEST RECONSIDERATION
There is no statutory guidance which provides a basis for making this decision. Nevertheless, there is a body of common law developed by the courts dealing broadly with discretionary provisions in statutes which permit statutory times for commencing proceedings to be extended. On a merits review before this Tribunal, the decision-maker may exercise all the powers and discretions conferred by any relevant enactment on the person (which includes a corporate entity) who made the decision (see s. 43(1) of the AAT Act). Therefore, the discretionary power set out in s. 62(3)(b) conferred on K & S may also be exercised by this Tribunal on a review of the primary decision.
While the Tribunal is not a court, it is nevertheless required to act judicially. That includes being guided by and, when necessary, following, decisions made by the Federal Court in circumstances where it is appropriate to do so. In this case, in my opinion, that includes applying those principles recognised by the Federal Court as being relevant when considering whether discretion to extend a statutory time limit should be exercised.
Willems case, to which I have referred above, dealt precisely with that point. It was an appeal from the decision of the primary judge who set aside a decision of the Tribunal regarding the question of extension of time to lodge a request for reconsideration under the SRC Act. That case also raised a question about the nature of the claim for reconsideration and whether an applicant was required to lodge a separate application for the granting of a further period within which to make a request for reconsideration. That issue does not arise in Mr Barton’s case. The Court set out four observations made in respect of s. 62(3). Three of those observations are relevant in this case.
The court described those observations in the following way, at 251 – 252:
…
Secondly, the requirements of s. 62(3) (b) must be understood in the context of

s. 69 by which Comcare is called upon to make determinations “accurately and quickly” and s. 72(a) by which Comcare must act “without regard to technicalities”; and the provisions of the paragraph itself.
Thirdly, the purport of s. 62(3)(b) is that the issue of allowance of a further period is to be determined in the context in which it arises – namely the content of the request – it must set out reasons – and must be made within 30 days of the notice of determination “all within such further period (if any) as the determining authority… allows”. If the request for reconsideration fails to set out reasons – understanding that requirement in the beneficial and non-technical manner explained above, it may not comply with the requirements of the paragraph. However, there is no reason why, in appropriate circumstances, the defect could not be cured by amendment which gave the required reasons. Further reasons could be added. It would be unwise for the determining authority to ignore what may be a defective request. Any further delay from conduct of that kind could be relevant in the consideration of whether a further period of the making of the request for reconsideration should be allowed. Likewise, a request for reconsideration given after the 30-day period remains a request but the delay requires the determining authority to consider whether to allow the further period. That will be a matter for the determining authority to decide, having regard to all relevant circumstances up to the date of the making of the request for reconsideration.
Where delay is involved, those reasons might encompass an explanation for delay. If no explanation was included, this could be sought by Comcare. …
In Maric v Comcare (1993) 40 FCR 244 eight 249, O’Loughlin J, after considering the cited passage in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v: (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-350, said the precondition for the exercise of that the discretion of time in s. 29 of the AAT Act “is not limited to the question of delay but extends to aspects of fairness and equity”.
Fourthly, it is clear the determining authority’s decision in relation to extension of time is a “reviewable decision”; that is a decision susceptible to review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. …
The Full Court also referred to the primary judge’s decision with which it agreed. The primary judge said (recorded at page 250):
In coming to its decision Comcare, properly, should have regard (I) to the cause of, and the explanation for, the delay in submitting the request; (II) to [the respondent’s] conduct in this; and (III) to the consequences to Comcare of the delay and [the respondent’s] conduct.
While the Full Court referred to the decision in Hunter Valley Developments, notably absent from its decision is a reference to the merits of the substantive claim which figures prominently in that case. It seems to me it should also be considered, if possible, in cases such as this in respect of Mr Barton. I accept that the bar in the assessment of the merits is set at a very low level, requiring an applicant for the extension of time to effectively demonstrate there is an arguable case. If the substantive claim is un-meritorious, it is a waste of everybody’s time and money to grant an extension of time.
MR BARTON’S EXPLANATION FOR THE DELAY
The delay in this case occurred between 28 April 2015 when Mr Barton was notified of the decision and 28 July 2016 or 2 August 2016 upon K & S’s receipt of Mr Barton’s solicitor’s letter requesting reconsideration. As the court noted in Willems case, matters arising after 28 July 2016 or perhaps 2 August 2016 should not be taken into consideration.
According to Mr Barton in his witness statement, he sought advice from his solicitors regarding his compensation entitlements. However that statement does not expressly state he sought advice from his solicitors regarding seeking reconsideration of the determination to cease liability in respect of his injury. In fact Mr Barton said he attended the offices of his solicitors on 20 February 2015, that is, about two months before he received the determination, and was advised that he might have a claim for permanent impairment. However, that is a discrete matter. Mr Barton’s solicitors lodged a claim seeking compensation for permanent impairment on 28 May 2015. I had no evidence before me of any advice being given by Mr Barton’s solicitors at or around that time regarding a reconsideration of the 28 April 2015 determination.
Mr Barton testified that in July 2015 he was admitted to hospital for a procedure to extend the fusion of his back. Following that surgery, he spent a month at the Epworth Hospital and was then transferred to Albury Hospital where he remained for two months. He was an inpatient until November 2015.
On 25 January 2016 Mr Barton was examined by Associate Professor Steadman who provided a further report dated 15 April 2016. The purpose of that examination and assessment was for Associate Professor Steadman to clarify his calculation of Mr Barton’s whole person impairment according to the Comcare Guide regarding the degree of permanent impairment he had suffered. Once again, it had nothing to do with Mr Barton’s claims under ss. 16 and 19 of the SRC Act but rather, ss. 24 and 27. That much is clear from K & S letter dated 15 December 2015 addressed to Associate Professor Steadman requesting an assessment of the degree of permanent impairment suffered by Mr Barton and also an assessment of his claim for non-economic loss. The following report prepared by Associate Professor Steadman, which is dated 15 April 2016, addressed a request for clarification from K & S regarding the degree of whole person impairment of the purposes of the permanent impairment claim.

Mr Barton referred to the determination made by K & S in a letter dated 6 May 2016. That determination was in respect of Mr Barton’s permanent impairment claim. The Senior Claims Manager, Mr Reppin, determined Mr Barton’s permanent impairment to be 15% whole person. K & S determined that the compensation payable amounted to $52,080.35 consisting of $26,996.29 for permanent impairment in accordance with s. 24 and $25,084.07 for non-economic loss in accordance with s. 27. Mr Barton’s solicitors wrote a letter to K & S on 26 May 2016 seeking reconsideration of the 6 May 2016 determination in respect of permanent impairment. K & S responded by letter dated 14 June 2016 affirming the determination made on 6 May 2016. That decision is reviewable by this Tribunal and Mr Barton lodged an application with the Tribunal on 28 July 2016 seeking review of the 14 June 2016 determination.
Mr Barton’s evidence was that following K & S’s determination regarding his permanent impairment claim, he discussed with his advisors (I assume legal advisers) Associate Professor Steadman’s 17 February 2016 report and in particular, that he remained incapacitated for work as a result of his work related injuries . With respect to Mr Barton, that statement is not entirely accurate. It appears to arise out of the answers Associate Professor Steadman gave to questions he was asked by solicitors for K & S. In answer to the question: Any need for medical and like expenses cease or resolve?, Associate Professor Steadman said:
The spinal condition ultimately has never ceased. The second injury has occurred which has aggravated the first but is really a gradual progression of the underlying problem. The recent spinal fusion is also related due to the aberrant biomechanical forces present in the bamboo osteoporotic spine.
The effects of the injury have not ceased.
The incapacity remains permanent and is one medical continuum in this case with two injuries.
The second injury has taken over as being more severe as it has resulted in further surgical outcomes but in reality they are all causally linked. That is, if he had not had the fracture of T12, the second injury may have been the same as the first fracture but then resulted in further progression.
In answer to the question: What restrictions would you place on his duties and hours worked?, Associate Professor Steadman said :
He is incapacitated and would not be able to work in his pre-injury job because of both his pre-existing condition and because of his injuries.…
I am however of the opinion that he would be able to return to work to do simple office duties.
Mr Barton said that after discussion with his solicitors, he asked them to take further steps to secure his compensation rights based on Associate Professor Steadman’s evidence. It is not clear whether that included seeking a reconsideration of the 28 April 2015 determination in addition to the permanent impairment and non-economic loss claims. In any event, on 28 July 2016, that seemed to trigger Mr Barton’s solicitors into lodging an application with K & S requesting reconsideration of the 28 April 2015 determination.
There seemed to be no dispute about the fact that Mr Barton had discussed his compensation claim with his then solicitors, Nevin Lenne Gross, on 20 February 2015. At that time, Mr Barton had obtained an extension of time to 16 March 2015 for the purpose of seeking reconsideration of the 28 April 2015 decision. However that seemed to trigger his solicitors into making an application for permanent impairment and non-economic loss. Nothing was advanced regarding his existing compensation claims pursuant to ss. 16 and 19 of the SRC Act. I did not have before me an explanation by Mr Barton’s solicitors regarding the instructions they received in February 2015 or why it was decided to only pursue the permanent impairment and non-economic loss claims without consideration of the incapacity claims. It may be that they considered the report from Dr Hillier dated 15 December 2014 in which Dr Hillier said that he did not consider that Mr Barton’s employment with K & S continued to contribute to his condition.
While it is difficult to come to a positive conclusion regarding the reasons for the delay in Mr Barton’s application for reconsideration of the 28 April 2015 determination, there is sufficient material for me to accept that Mr Barton had not abandoned the initial determination regarding his compensable condition and that he had sought legal advice following K & S’s decision to cease liability for that claim.
THE MERITS OF MR BARTON’S CLAIM
In my opinion, a significant factor in determining whether an extension of time ought to be granted is whether Mr Barton’s claim has merit. If his claim cannot possibly succeed on the evidence before me at this stage; and taking into account the law as it is currently framed; then an extension of time should not be granted.
If I were to limit my consideration to the report prepared by Dr Hillier on 15 December 2014, then I would not be confident that Mr Barton could succeed. However, the subsequent reports from Associate Professor Steadman cast a different light on Mr Barton’s spinal condition. Unlike Dr Hillier, Associate Professor Steadman viewed the extensive radiology performed on Mr Barton’s spine. The conclusion he reached about the progress of Mr Barton’s constitutional spinal condition is compelling on the evidence. Associate Professor Steadman’s summary statement is set out at [4] above.
I find that Mr Barton has a meritorious claim on the basis that if Associate Professor Steadman’s report is accepted over and above that provided by Dr Hillier, Mr Barton does have prospects of success.
If that were insufficient, following Mr Barton’s application for compensation as a result of permanent impairment and non-economic loss, on 6 May 2016 K & S appeared to accept Associate Professor Steadman’s opinion and made a determination that Mr Barton had a permanent impairment pursuant to s. 24 of the SRC Act. On that basis, it is probable that Mr Barton continued to suffer the effects of the T10 fracture which it was accepted arose out of or in the course of his employment with K & S. The determination, made under

s. 62 of the SRC Act, was based on the report provided by Dr Hillier on 15 December 2014 where he said :
There is no issue with Mr Barton’s personality but his condition is unrelated to his employment at K & S Freighters and is a relapse of an underlying bone marrow condition which Mr Barton has known about and has had medical treatment for in the past.
However, as Associate Professor Steadman stated in both of his reports, his second injury (fracture of T10) began a process which never allows his vertebra to heal. The second injury aggravated the first but is really a gradual progression of his underlying spinal problem. In that way, the effects of the injury cannot be said to have ceased.
PREJUDICE
The final consideration is whether K & S will suffer prejudice by reason of the lengthy delay between the determination made on 28 April 2015 and the date of lodgement of an application by Mr Barton’s solicitors for a reconsideration of that determination.
I had no evidence from K & S indicating it would suffer prejudice as result of the delay. In submissions prepared by K & S’s solicitors, it is stated that the fact that there was no apparent prejudice to the Respondent was not sufficient to satisfy the grant of an extension of time. Although I have no difficulty in accepting that proposition, it also infers that K & S has suffered no prejudice. There being no contrary evidence, I find that to be the case.
CONCLUSION
There was no dispute between the parties that Mr Barton did not request reconsideration of the determination made by K & S pursuant to s. 60 to the SRC Act within the 30 days after the day on which the determination first came to Mr Barton’s notice as required by subsection (3). K & S granted Mr Barton two extensions as he had requested. However, Mr Barton did not comply within the extended time he was granted and therefore K & S made a determination on 28 April 2015 to the effect that Mr Barton no longer suffered from the effects of the T10 fracture to his spine.
Mr Barton’s delay in lodging an application for reconsideration of the determination was significantly beyond the final extension date granted by K & S, in fact some 432 days late. However, Mr Barton’s evidence regarding this application, which was not contradicted, indicated he had approached his solicitors prior to the expiry of the second extension granted by K & S regarding the further conduct of claims resulting from his back injury. His solicitors lodged an application for permanent impairment and non-economic loss. It is not clear whether Mr Barton understood that claim was discrete from his existing claim for compensation and medical expenses or that he requested reconsideration of the determination made on 28 April 2015. His evidence indicated that he was experiencing a very difficult time with the medical procedures he was required to undergo in respect of his failing spine. I find that the history given by Mr Barton in his statement of evidence indicates he did not rest on his claim but rather provided a reasonable explanation for the delay in seeking reconsideration of the determination in question.
I have also found that Mr Barton’s claim for reconsideration of the determination made on 28 April 2015 has, on its face, merit. The medical evidence supports a claim for ongoing incapacity and medical expenses for the injury sustained by Mr Barton arising out of or in the course of his employment. If the evidence provided by Associate Professor Steadman in his written reports is sustained under cross examination at the hearing of the matter, Mr Barton has reasonable prospects of success. A claim which has prospects of success should not, without sound reason, be dismissed without a hearing of its merits.
Finally, the strong inference is that K & S would not suffer prejudice if the extension were granted, even though there has been a significant delay in bringing the application for reconsideration. That matter can be heard concurrently with the remaining matters which are before the Tribunal.
Given the findings I have made in this matter, I find that the decision made by K & S on
3 August 2016 denying Mr Barton’s application for an extension of time within which to lodge an application for reconsideration of a determination made on 28 April 2015 was not the preferable decision. I set aside that decision and in substitution determine that Mr Barton’s request for reconsideration received by K & S on 2 August 2016 be granted.

I certify that the preceding 47 (forty-seven) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Egon Fice, Senior Member

[sgd]........................................................................
Associate
Dated: 14 November 2017

Date of hearing:

Counsel for the Applicant:

18 August 2017

Mr Mark Carey

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr Daniel De Marte, Nevin Lenne Gross

Mr John Wallace

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Mr Mark Seymour, Clarke Legal

[2017] AATA 2170

14 November 2017

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Administrative Law

Statutory Interpretation

Legal Concepts

Appeal

Jurisdiction

Procedural Fairness

Remedies

Standing

Statutory Construction