Barrows and Barrows (Child support) - [2024] AATA 875

Barrows and Barrows (Child support) [2024] AATA 875 (12 March 2024)

DIVISION:Social Services & Child Support Division
REVIEW NUMBER:  2023/SC026802
APPLICANT:  Ms Barrows
OTHER PARTIES:  Child Support Registrar
Mr Barrows

TRIBUNAL:Member C Breheny
DECISION DATE: 12 March 2024
DECISION:

The decision under review is affirmed.

CATCHWORDS

CHILD SUPPORT – departure determination – school fees of the child – a ground for departure established – decision to depart - decision under review affirmed

Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from this decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by subsections 16(2AB)-16(2AC) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

REASONS FOR DECISION

BACKGROUND

Ms Barrows and Mr Barrows are the separated parents of [Child 1], born March 2007. There is an older child not subject to this review. A child support case has been registered (for collection) with Services Australia – Child Support (Child Support) since 3 June 2019. Mr Barrows is assessed as liable to pay child support to Ms Barrows on the basis that Ms Barrows has 95% and Mr Barrows has 5% care of [Child 1].
There has been a previous departure determination in this case. On 16 September 2021 Ms Barrows had lodged an application for a change of assessment based on private school fees for [Child 1] and the income, property and financial resources of Mr Barrows. In a decision of 15 December 2021, the rate of child support payable by Mr Barrows was increased by $17,055 per annum from 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2022, being 50% of private school fees for [Child 1]. This resulted in an annual child support liability of $24,197.
Mr Barrows objected to the decision and on 17 March 2022 a Child Support objections officer affirmed the decision. Mr Barrows sought a further review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) and on 21 November 2022 the Tribunal (differently constituted) also affirmed the decision.
The previous departure determination ended on 31 December 2022 and from 1 January 2023 Mr Barrows’s child support liability was administratively assessed as being $3,774 per annum, based on his 2021/22 adjusted taxable income of $51,137 and Ms Barrows’s provisional 2021/22 income of $191,547.
On 9 January 2023 Ms Barrows contacted Child Support to lodge another change of assessment application seeking an increase in child support payments due to the high costs of private school fees for [Child 1] and Mr Barrows’s income, property and financial resources. Mr Barrows disagreed that there should be a change to the administrative assessment. He noted that he had not worked since September 2019 and could not afford to pay the school fees.
On 12 March 2023 decision-maker (DM) [A] decided that grounds to depart from the administrative assessment had been established in relation to the private school fees and Mr Barrows’s income and financial resources and determined that for the period 1 January 2023 to 9 March 2025 Mr Barrows’s adjusted taxable income was set at $271,334 and that the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Barrows was increased by $22,104 per annum, for the 2023 and 2024 calendar years, being 50% of the private school fees for [Child 1]. This resulted in an annual child support liability of $42,364 from 1 January 2023.
On 22 June 2023 Mr Barrows lodged an objection to DM [A]’s decision, stating that he did not intend for [Child 1] to attend a private school and he could not afford to pay the fees and that he was unemployed and did not have such a high income.
On 18 August 2023 a Child Support objections officer partly allowed Mr Barrows’s objection. The objections officer determined that from 1 January 2023 until a terminating event ends the assessment Mr Barrows’s adjusted taxable income was set at $139,500 (with annual CPI increases) and the annual rate of child support was increased by $18,920 for the 2023 calendar year and by $19,341 for the 2024 calendar year, being Mr Barrows’s contributions to private school fees for [Child 1].
On 20 September 2023 Ms Barrows applied to the Social Services and Child Support Division of the Tribunal for an independent review of the objection decision. A hearing into Ms Barrows’s application for review was held on 12 March 2024. Ms Barrows attended the hearing by telephone and gave evidence on affirmation. Mr Barrows advised that he was overseas and elected not to participate in the hearing.
I had before me the Statement and Documents provided by Child Support pursuant to subsection 37(1) and section 38AA of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 received on 25 October 2023 and 28 February 2024 respectively and numbered 1–666. I also considered additional documents provided by Ms Barrows (marked A1–A35) as a result of written directions issued on 30 January 2024.

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AND ISSUES

The legislation relevant to this review is contained in the child support law, in particular the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (the Act) and the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.
The rate of child support payable by a liable parent is usually based on an administrative assessment under Part 5 of the Act. This requires the application of a statutory formula, which takes into account factors such as the number of children, the level of care provided and the income of each parent. Either the liable parent or the carer entitled to child support may apply to the Registrar for a determination to depart from the child support administrative assessment under Part 6A of the Act (section 98B). Section 98C provides that the Registrar may make a determination to depart from the formula assessment and establishes a three-step process. The Registrar, and the Tribunal standing in place of the Registrar, must be satisfied that a ground for departure exists and that it is just and equitable and otherwise proper to make a departure determination.
The grounds for departure from an administrative assessment of child support are those set out in subsection 117(2) of the Act. If satisfied that a ground or grounds exist, and that it would be just and equitable and otherwise proper to make a particular determination, the Tribunal may make one of the determinations prescribed in section 98S of the Act.
In the legislation, each ground for departure is prefaced by the words “in the special circumstances of the case”. Therefore, when considering whether one or more grounds exist, the Tribunal must be satisfied that there are “special circumstances” in the case. The phrase “special circumstances of the case” is not defined in the legislation. The Family Court, in the case of Gyselman and Gyselman,[1] stated that:
it is intended to emphasise that the facts of the case must establish something which is special or out of the ordinary. That is, the intention of the Legislature is that the court will not interfere with the administrative formula result in the ordinary run of cases.
[1] (1992) FLC 92–279
Subsection 98C(3) of the Act provides that subsections 117(4) to (9) of the Act apply and the Tribunal must consider these when deciding whether it would be just and equitable or otherwise proper to make the departure decision.

PRELIMINARY MATTER

In this case there has been a previous decision by the Tribunal, differently constituted, on 21 November 2022 (folios 157–166). The decision considered whether [Child 1] was “being cared for, educated and trained in the manner expected” by Mr Barrows and Ms Barrows and thus whether both parents ought to contribute to [Child 1]’s private school fees, as well as Mr Barrows’s and Ms Barrows’s financial circumstances at the time.
The Tribunal’s findings included:
·      That the parents intended for [Child 1] to be educated at [School 1] ([School 1]), and
·      That the costs of educating [Child 1] at [School 1] were significantly more than the costs of maintaining the child reflected in the assessment, and
·      That Mr Barrows had sufficient financial resources to meet an increase in his child support liability for his 50% contribution to [Child 1]’s private school fees, based on a share portfolio of $550,000 and savings of $213,940.
Ms Barrows’s current application for a new departure determination was triggered by the end of the previous departure determination (as affirmed by the Tribunal). She indicated that [Child 1] continues to be educated at [School 1] and Mr Barrows ought to continue to contribute to the costs and that Mr Barrows now has access to even greater financial resources.
To some extent it is inevitable that the issues raised in relation to the current application will encroach on matters previously considered by the earlier Tribunal. Where that does occur, I am of the firm view that I will not reconsider matters determined by the previous Tribunal, but will instead adopt the findings made by the previous Tribunal when making my own decision.
There is ample case law to establish that a tribunal, having made a particular decision, cannot review it again. This is the common law doctrine of functus officio, that a tribunal with a power to conduct a particular review has spent that power when the review is completed, barring some jurisdictional error (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597, [2002] HCA 11).
Neither Ms Barrows nor Mr Barrows are seeking a review of the earlier decision; the decision under review is different to the one considered by the Tribunal previously. In this case, the doctrine does not prevent me from conducting a review of the new decision. However, it is silent as to the extent to which I can, in conducting my review, inquire into (and potentially reach a different conclusion on) the matters determined by the Tribunal previously constituted.
There is no express prohibition on a tribunal re-examining matters previously decided by it in the context of reviews of other decisions. However, if the Tribunal was to do this, an obvious mischief is possible; a person receiving an unfavourable outcome, even one affirmed by the Tribunal, can repeatedly apply for a fresh decision involving the same matter, until and unless a decision-maker makes a decision favourable to him or her, regardless of the previous decisions to the contrary.
I note here the following comments of Downes J (then the President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) in the case of Michael and Secretary, Department of Employment, Science and Training and Edwards and Secretary, Department of Health and Ageing [2006] AATA 227. His Honour was considering applications for review of exactly the same decisions previously considered and decided by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. However, after considering the case of Bhardwaj (cited above), his Honour made the following comments which have some significance in the present matter:
except in the clearest case, the making of a second decision by a tribunal will only lead to uncertainty of result. This is, at the least, a sound reason for a tribunal to act with extreme caution before reconsidering a matter which has already been decided.
At common law, the doctrines of issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel prevent matters being repeatedly reconsidered or litigated. There are several cases[2] bearing directly on the applicability of these doctrines, or of some similar principle, to decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
[2] Bogaards v McMahon (1988) 80 ALR 342, Comcare Australia v Grimes & Anor (1994) 33 ALD 548, Re Cooper and Repatriation Commission (1995) 38 ALD 164
In Cooper, Deputy President Blow essentially found that the authorities, considered together, created a prohibition on the Administrative Appeals Tribunal reconsidering the matter previously determined by that Tribunal:
If cause of action estoppel is applicable to the decisions of the tribunal, as held in Bogaards v McMahon, the applicant has no right to relitigate the issue of his entitlement to a higher rate of pension, at least up to and including 4 July 1995. If cause of action estoppel does not operate in relation to the decisions of the tribunal, then the applicant should still not be permitted to relitigate these questions, for the reasons given by Wilcox J, in Comcare Australia v Grimes.
I agree with the reasoning in Cooper. I do not rely on cause of action estoppel, or indeed issue estoppel, but prefer to rely on the principle expressed by Wilcox J in Grimes (quoted above) that as master of my own proceedings (which I am pursuant to section 33 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act), I will not allow the issues determined by the earlier Tribunal on 21 November 2022 to be re-agitated.
I am also concerned that by allowing the same matters which were the subject of the previous decision of this Tribunal (differently constituted) to be re-agitated under the guise of a new administrative decision having been made by Child Support, the Tribunal would be placed in a position of effectively sitting in appeal of itself. This is neither desirable nor appropriate. If the parties were dissatisfied with the decision of the previously constituted Tribunal in relation to the matters agitated in those proceedings, it is open to them to avail themselves of their right to appeal to the Federal Circuit Court on an error of law. I note that neither Mr Barrows nor Ms Barrows have done so.
The consequence of this reasoning for the current matter is that I have decided that I will not allow previously decided aspects of the case relating to the issue of the private school fees for [Child 1] to be relitigated.

CONSIDERATION

Ms Barrows asked for a departure from the administrative assessment because [Child 1] continues to attend [School 1] and Mr Barrows ought to continue contributing to the school fees. Mr Barrows rejected this argument, stating that he never intended for [Child 1] to attend [School 1] because it was a very expensive school, and he could not afford to pay the fees.
Ms Barrows also submitted that Mr Barrows had access to significant additional financial resources.

Private school fees

Subparagraph 117(2)(b)(ii) of the Act provides that a ground for departure exists where, in the special circumstances of the case, the costs of maintaining the child are significantly affected because the child is being cared for, educated or trained in the manner that was expected by his or her parents.
Ms Barrows confirmed that [Child 1] has been attending [School 1] since 2019. He is currently in Year 12 and expected to finish his secondary education at the end of 2024. Ms Barrows provided evidence that the school fees amounted to $36,840 for Year 11 in 2023 (folio 359) and they are $39,950 for Year 12 in 2024 (folio A19). Ms Barrows said that Mr Barrows should pay 50% of these fees, being $18,420 in 2023 and $19,975 in 2024.
Mr Barrows did not attend the hearing but submitted a response to the issue as part of his objection (folios 571/572). He agreed that he and Ms Barrows discussed sending [Child 1] to a private school of which [School 1] was one option. They applied for a place at [School 1] in about February 2018, but by mid-2018 he told Ms Barrows that he could not afford to pay the school fees. Ms Barrows subsequently enrolled [Child 1] at [School 1] without his (Mr Barrows’s) participation.
I note that these are the same arguments previously examined by the Tribunal (differently constituted) in their decision of 21 November 2022. As noted above that Tribunal found that the parents expected [Child 1] to be educated privately and that “in the special circumstances of the case, the cost of maintaining the child is significantly affected” because of the child’s education.
Nothing has changed regarding the private school fees in the present application for review. Ms Barrows wishes the school fees to be included as part of Mr Barrows’s child support liability, Mr Barrows relies on the same arguments against the inclusion of private school fees in 2023, as he did previously. He contends that the previous Tribunal decision “was flawed” (folio 577) and did not consider his circumstances properly. As noted above, if Mr Barrows was dissatisfied with the previous Tribunal’s decision, he had the option of lodging a further appeal. He did not do so, and therefore the earlier decision still stands and is still applicable to his circumstances.
As stated above I will not permit this Tribunal’s processes to be co-opted by Mr Barrows in an attempt to get issues previously determined by the Tribunal relitigated. I therefore find that [Child 1] is being educated in a manner expected by his parents.
A ground for departure cannot exist, however, unless I am further satisfied that “in the special circumstances of the case, the cost of maintaining the child is significantly affected” because of the child’s education. The term “special circumstances” requires that there is something special or out of the ordinary apparent in Ms Barrows’s case for the period from 1 January 2023 onwards (i.e. after the end of the previous departure determination).
Ms Barrows’s evidence is that the school fees in 2023 are $36,840 and $39,950 in 2024. Ms Barrows provided a completed Statement of Financial Circumstances, indicating a weekly gross income of $3,801, plus rental income of $555 per week (folio A4). Her most recent payslips show that she is paid on a fortnightly basis and earns about $7,602.12 per fortnight, about $3,801 per week (folio B22). Her 2021/22 taxable income was $181,461 (folio A16).
Ms Barrows further indicated that she does not receive family tax benefit, but child support payments from Mr Barrows and $150 per week for “room and board” from her daughter. Based on payslips, Ms Barrows’s net earnings are about $2,471 per week. Her expenses are about $4,917 per week (including education costs for [Child 1] of $730 per week).
Child Support records show that Mr Barrows was assessed to pay child support of $3,774 per annum for [Child 1] from 1 January 2023 (folio 154). The amount would barely cover 10% of the total school fees ($36,840 in 2023).
I am thus satisfied that the costs of educating [Child 1] for the 2023 academic year are of such magnitude as to significantly affect the costs of maintaining [Child 1], and that special circumstances exist as those fees are not taken into account in the administrative assessment. I therefore find that the cost of [Child 1]’s continuing education at [School 1] from
1 January 2023 onwards provides a ground to depart from the administrative assessment.
Subparagraph 98C(1)(b)(i) of the Act is satisfied if “one, or more than one” of the grounds for departure are established. Having found one ground for departure established, I will now consider whether it is just and equitable to make a departure determination.

Just and equitable

The requirement to consider whether a departure would be just and equitable directs that my attention is turned to what is fair to the parents and their children. To do so I must have regard to a number of factors set out in subsection 117(4) of the Act, such as the needs of [Child 1], the parents’ commitments, and any hardships that would be caused by departing, or not departing, from the statutory formula.

Ms Barrows

Ms Barrows works full time as a [manager]. Her 2020/21 adjusted taxable income was $186,419 and her 2021/22 adjusted taxable income was $181,461 (folio 656).
Ms Barrows’s most recent payslips show that her net income is $2,471 per week (folio A35). As noted above, she indicated on her Statement of Financial Circumstances that she also receives payments from her daughter (about $150 per week) and child support payments from Mr Barrows (folio A5). Ms Barrows stated that Mr Barrows last made lump sum child support payments in July/August 2023, before he departed for overseas. He has not made any payments since. Child Support is currently disbursing $380 per week to her.

Ms Barrows also noted that she has a rental property for which she receives $555 per week rent. The rental property also incurs expenses. Ms Barrows stated that income and expenses “just break even”. I have therefore disregarded income and expenses relating to the rental property and find that Ms Barrows’s total weekly net income is currently about $3,001 (comprising of salary, child support payments and financial contributions from her daughter).
Ms Barrows listed household expenses of $4,917 per week but I have disregarded council rates/strata fees and house repair amounts relating to the rental property. On this basis Ms Barrows’s weekly expenses are $4,492, including mortgage payments of $1,950 per week and $730 per week for [Child 1]’s private school fees. Her expenses thus exceed her income by about $1,500 each week.
Ms Barrows stated that she is unable to meet her expenses by herself and has had to borrow money from her elderly parents to make ends meet.

Mr Barrows

Records before me indicate that Mr Barrows last worked in September 2019, when an employment contract he had in [Country 1] ended. Mr Barrows stated that he had been unable to find employment upon returning to Australia, despite being a qualified and experienced [occupation], and that he was living off his savings (folios 572/573).
At the time of the previous Tribunal decision in November 2022, Mr Barrows indicated that he had “assets totalling $773,940” comprising of savings and an investment portfolio (folio 161). He also indicated “total weekly household expenses of $3,445, with $1,880 per week relating to (his) personal expenses, including rental of $800 per week, and additional expenses relating to (his) children” (folio 164). On 3 July 2023 Mr Barrows told Child Support that his “expenditure per annum is around $100,000” (folio 578). I note this appears to correspond to the evidence Mr Barrows gave in November 2022 ($1,880 per week personal expenses = $97,760 per annum).
Ms Barrows stated that she and Mr Barrows finalised their property settlement on 16 March 2023. She noted that on the day the final court order was signed, Mr Barrows received $730,000 into his bank account (no. [deleted]) and he transferred $720,000 of this amount into his savings account (no. [deleted]) on the same day (folio 536). Ms Barrows contended that Mr Barrows had previously “hidden” this money and it was “unhidden” once the property settlement was finalised (folio 538).
Mr Barrows stated on several occasions in May 2023 (e.g. folios 540/541) that this money was “a loan from his family” and that it was given to him to purchase a home for himself. He noted that as he was not in a position to purchase a property at that point, he invested the money in the meantime. Mr Barrows wrote in his objection on 20 June 2023 (folios 573/574) that the money was “capital and not income and it will need to be repaid” and that he had “essentially been penalised for being unable to re-enter the property market”.[3]
[3] The original decision-maker apportioned the amount of $730,000 to the remaining days in the child support case (982 at the time of the decision) to arrive at a daily rate of $743.38. This results in an annual amount of $271,334
I asked Mr Barrows to provide evidence supporting his claim that the amount of $730,000 was a loan from his family, which needed to be repaid. I also asked that he provide evidence about his current financial circumstances (bank statements, tax returns, share portfolio). He was given ample time to submit the evidence, but he did not do so. He also did not participate in the hearing.
Mr Barrows has an obligation to make full and frank disclosure of his financial affairs to assist me to come to the correct or preferable decision.[4] The onus is on Mr Barrows to present his financial affairs and records in a manner that is both transparent and readily understandable.[5] Mr Barrows did not meet his obligations in this regard.
[4] Humphries and Berry [2008] FMCAfam 409
[5] Morse and Potts [2010] FMCAfam 1305
Ms Barrows told Child Support that Mr Barrows left Australia for [overseas] in early July 2023 and that he was not going to return to Australia (folio 579). Ms Barrows said in the hearing that she does not know where Mr Barrows now resides; she suggested that it may be “somewhere in Africa”. Ms Barrows submitted that the initial decision made on 12 May 2023 was correct and should be reinstated. The lump sum of $730,000 should be included in calculating Mr Barrows’s income for child support purposes.
I consider that converting a capital sum into an annual income amount for child support purposes is difficult and I note in this regard the case of Cazet,[6] in which Halligan FM observed at [35]:
The fact a parent meets their day to day living expenses from capital does not change the nature or character of the funds expended from capital to income…
Simply and simplistically equating capital with income ignores the fact that once expended, capital is gone. Income usually has some element of continuity about it, so that income received in one period may be spent, but there may be further income received in subsequent periods…
[6] Cazet & Faulkner & Anor (SSAT Appeal) [2011] FMCAfam 1157
A relatively common approach is to consider the interest earned from a capital sum as “income” for child support purposes. Mr Barrows noted that he had invested the capital sum in an interest-bearing account, but he did not provide any further details to allow me to ascertain how much interest the capital sum is currently earning.
The objections officer relied on Mr Barrows’s statement that he is meeting personal expenses of about $100,000 per year and calculated that an annual taxable income of $139,500 was needed to arrive at a net income of about $100,000 per annum.
Given the lack of any information about Mr Barrows’s current financial circumstances, I will also adopt this approach and find that Mr Barrows has income and financial resources amounting to $139,500 per annum from 1 January 2023.

[Child 1]

Ms Barrows indicated that her expenses for [Child 1] included education expenses of $730 per week, but apart from the private school fees she did not indicate any other out of the ordinary expenses for [Child 1]. Ms Barrows submitted that Mr Barrows ought to pay his share of the school fees.
[Child 1] is now 17 years old and attending his last year of school. He has no income, property or financial resources relevant to my determination.

Otherwise proper

The requirement to consider whether it is “otherwise proper” to depart from the administrative assessment directs attention to what is fair to the community. It is necessary to consider the effect of any departure from the administrative assessment on entitlements to income tested pensions, allowances or benefits (subsection 117(5) of the Act).
It is a prime objective of the child support legislation that parents should be obliged to support their own children to the extent of their real capacity, and that that obligation should not be unnecessarily abrogated to the public welfare system when the parents themselves have the capacity to maintain their children.
Ms Barrows does not appear to be in receipt of government payments which are affected by maintenance payments such as child support. Any increase or decrease in child support payments would thus not affect the extent to which the community is supporting [Child 1]. I find that such a result is proper in these circumstances.

Conclusion

Section 98S of the Act describes the determinations that the Registrar, and the Tribunal standing in the shoes of the Registrar, may make if it decides to depart from the administrative assessment. It is open to the Tribunal to set a rate of child support payable or set some of the variables used in the administrative assessment formula (for example, varying one or both parents’ adjusted taxable income).
At the time of Ms Barrows’s application, the child support liability was $3,774 per annum based on Mr Barrows’s 2021/22 adjusted taxable income of $51,137 and Ms Barrows’s deemed 2021/22 income of $191,547. Ms Barrows lodged her change of assessment application as soon as the previous determination ended because she believes that Mr Barrows ought to continue to contribute his share of [Child 1]’s private school fees. She further noted that Mr Barrows had access to much greater financial resources than he had previously indicated.
Mr Barrows essentially argued that he should not be paying for private school fees for [Child 1] because he never agreed to enrolling [Child 1] at [School 1] and could not afford to pay the high fees. He did not provide any information about his current financial circumstances for the purposes of this review.
Ms Barrows acknowledged that Mr Barrows has moved overseas indefinitely and that his whereabouts are unknown. She agreed that she would probably not receive any more child support from Mr Barrows. She noted that Mr Barrows’s payments were significantly in arrears.
I will note here that Mr Barrows stated in his objection letter (folio 575) that he understood that [Child 1] could be removed from his class at [School 1] if the fees were not paid and that this would be “traumatic for him and would have a negative influence on his academic performance and general wellbeing”. Mr Barrows noted that if he had to pay his share of school fees, he would prefer for the money to be paid directly to the school, rather than to Ms Barrows. This is not however a matter that I can take into account in making my decision.
I am cognisant that section 3 of the Act states that the parents of a child have the primary duty to maintain the child and that this duty has priority over all commitments of the parent other than commitments necessary to enable the parent to support him/herself (and any other child they may have a duty to maintain).
Ms Barrows earns a significant income, but she also has significant expenses and is unable to meet all the expenses on her own. Mr Barrows has moved overseas indefinitely. It is unclear whether he is working or living off his savings/investments. He did not provide evidence as to the value of his financial assets and whether any amount is a loan which needs to be repaid.
Given the complete lack of evidence about Mr Barrows’s present situation I am persuaded that the current objection decision ought not to be disturbed. I have accepted the finding of the previous Tribunal’s decision that [Child 1] is being educated in the manner expected by both parents and that both parents ought to contribute to the costs. Mr Barrows also appears to acknowledge that it would be detrimental to [Child 1]’s wellbeing if he should have to leave his school due to non-payment of fees.
I also find that an income amount of $139,500 per annum, as calculated by the objections officer based on Mr Barrows’s evidence of his personal expenditure is reasonable in this case.
Child Support records indicate that Mr Barrows’s arrears to the end of January 2024 are $16,563.93 (folio 665). I have estimated, based on the current departure determination (folios 647 and 650) that Mr Barrows’s total child support liability until the case ends on 10 March 2025 would amount to approximately $49,464 (including arrears).
I note Mr Barrows’s financial assets amounted to about $773,940 at the end of 2022. If Mr Barrows’s personal expenditure is about $100,000 per year (as he has previously stated), I see no reason why Mr Barrows would not be able to meet these child support payments, even without resorting to the purported loan amount of $730,000. The payments would certainly assist Ms Barrows in meeting [Child 1]’s expenses.
I am therefore not persuaded that either parent will be in financial hardship as a result of my decision and, as I have reached the same conclusion as the objections officer, I affirm the decision under review.

DECISION

The decision under review is affirmed.