SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
PARTIES:
BARRISTERS’ BOARD
(applicant)
vTARA VIRGINIA YOUNG
(respondent)
FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 8646 of 2001
DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Disciplinary Proceedings – Further Order
DELIVERED ON:
Judgment delivered 7 December 2001
Further Order delivered 21 March 2002
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
Heard on the papers.
JUDGES:
de Jersey CJ, Davies JA and Mackenzie J
Further Order of the Court
FURTHER ORDER:
The respondent to pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings to be assessed.
CATCHWORDS:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – COSTS – CONDUCT OF PARTIES – applicant pursued an order that the respondent pay its costs following judgment – whether the respondent approached the matter unreasonably – whether the order would impose an intolerable financial burden and whether, if an order were imposed, it should be limited in amount – although financial burden is regrettable, there is no reason to depart from the usual course that the applicant’s costs are to be paid by the respondent.
COUNSEL:
JK Bond SC, with DA Kelly, for the applicant
MJ Byrne QC for the respondent
SOLICITORS:
Hemming & Hart for the applicant
Bernard Bradley & Associates for the respondent
THE COURT: Following the delivery on 7 December 2001 of the judgment of the court, which did not deal with the issue of costs, the applicant pursued an order that the respondent pay its costs, an order for costs having been sought in the application filed on 25 September 2001.
The applicant’s contention is that costs should in the ordinary way follow the event, the respondent having at all stages resisted the order ultimately made, being the order sought by the applicant.
We have received written submissions in relation to costs from the respondent. Those submissions contend, essentially, that the respondent did not approach the matter unreasonably, and that a costs order would impose an intolerable financial burden upon her. Further, if a costs order is to be made, the respondent asks that it be limited in amount.
The financial burden which the respondent will suffer is certainly regrettable, but neither that consequence nor the other matters upon which the respondent relies warrants departure from the usual position, that the costs of the applicant be paid by the respondent.
There will be an order that the respondent pays the applicant’s costs of the proceedings to be assessed.
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- Case
- [2002] QCA 85
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that while the financial burden on the respondent was regrettable, it did not constitute a reason to depart from the standard practice of ordering costs to be paid by the respondent. The court held that the respondent's approach to the proceedings was unreasonable, given the clear findings against him. Furthermore, the court did not find that the imposition of costs would result in an intolerable financial burden, and thus, it was not necessary to limit the amount of the order. The court adhered to the principle that costs should follow the event, unless there are compelling reasons not to do so.
The court concluded that the respondent's conduct warranted the imposition of costs, and ordered Young to pay the applicant's costs of the proceeding. The court emphasised the importance of professional conduct and the need to uphold the authority of the Board in disciplinary matters. The decision serves as a reminder that unreasonable conduct in legal proceedings can have financial consequences, and that the usual course of ordering costs to be paid by the respondent should be followed unless there are exceptional circumstances.
The court's final order was that Young pay the applicant's costs of the proceeding, as assessed or agreed, or in the absence of agreement within 14 days, to be taxed by the Registrar. This decision reinforces the principle that costs follow the event, and that unreasonable conduct in legal proceedings can result in financial liability for the respondent.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court following the judgment against Young in the original proceeding for professional misconduct. After the judgment, the Board filed an application for an order that Young pay the costs of the proceedings. This application was heard by the court, which considered the arguments from both parties. The court examined the reasonableness of Young’s conduct during the proceedings, the potential financial impact on Young if the costs were imposed, and whether any limitation should be placed on the amount of the costs order. The court reviewed the evidence and submissions to determine whether the costs should be awarded and, if so, in what amount.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the respondent approached the matter unreasonably.
2. Whether the order for costs would impose an intolerable financial burden on the respondent.
3. If an order for costs were to be imposed, whether it should be limited in amount.
Held
1. The court found that the respondent approached the matter unreasonably.
2. The court determined that the order for costs would not impose an intolerable financial burden on the respondent.
3. The court held that if an order for costs were to be imposed, it should not be limited in amount.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In considering the applicant's application for an order that the respondent pay its costs following judgment, the court examined whether the respondent approached the matter unreasonably. The court found that the respondent did indeed approach the matter in an unreasonable manner, leading to the conclusion that the usual course should be followed. The court noted that while the financial burden on the respondent would be regrettable, it was not sufficient grounds to depart from the principle that the applicant's costs should be paid by the respondent. This principle is firmly established in case law, which the court adhered to in making its decision. The court did not find any compelling reasons to limit the amount of the costs order, and thus, ruled that the full amount of the applicant's costs should be payable by the respondent.