Barrett v Weir
[2009] QLC 28
•20 February 2009
LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:Barrett v Weir & Anor [2009] QLC 0028
PARTIES:In the matter of renewal of Mining Lease 70211 – Application by Rodney Keith Barrett for determination of compensation payable by Kelven John Weir and Gregcarbil Pty Ltd
FILE NO:MLC00132/2008
DIVISION:Land Court of Queensland
PROCEEDING: Application for disqualification of Member
DELIVERED ON: 20 February 2009
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
MEMBER:Mr PA Smith
ORDERS:1. Member Smith disqualifies himself from determining compensation in the matter of MLC 00132/2008.
2.The matter be referred to the President of the Land Court for allocation to another Member for determination.
CATCHWORDS: Bias – Apprehended Bias – hearing of Appeal in previous compensation renewal matter – legal principles – the prejudgment principle – previous hearing at first instance
APPEARANCES: Mr G Houen, agent for the applicant
Mrs C Graham, agent for the respondents
Background
Rodney Keith Barrett (the landholder) is the owner of a property known as ‘Mount Clifford’ which is located in the County of Clermont, Parish of Keilambete. Mining Lease No. 70211, currently held by Kelven John Weir and Gregcarbil Pty Ltd (the miners), is partly situated on Mount Clifford. ML 70211 initially commenced on 1 July 2002 for a period of 3 years. It was subsequently renewed for a further term of 3 years commencing 1 July 2005 and expiring on 30 June 2008. The miners have sought a further renewal of ML 70211. A consequence of the miner’s application for renewal of ML 70211 is that, pursuant to the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (the MRA) compensation is payable by the miners to the landholder for the renewal of the mining lease.[1]
[1] See MRA ss 279 and 281.
Under the scheme of the MRA, compensation payable by miners to landholders can be determined by agreement between the parties or by determination of the Land Court.[2] In the matter at hand, there was no agreement between the landholder and the miners as to compensation, as a result of which the landholder wrote to the Mining Registrar, Emerald, on 25 July 2008 requesting that compensation be determined by the Land Court.
[2] See s.279(1)(a) MRA.
The matter came on for directions hearing before me (by way of telephone attendance of Mr Houen, agent for the landholder and Mrs Graham, agent for the miners), on 12 February 2009. During the course of the directions hearing, Mr Houen made submissions that the determination of this matter should be undertaken on the papers and that I should disqualify myself from undertaking the determination of this matter.
As regards the application by Mr Houen that the matter be determined on the papers, Mrs Graham was strongly of the view that a hearing of this matter was required in order for there to be a proper consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the miner’s view as to the quantum of compensation payable to the landholder. Mrs Graham was also strongly of the opinion that the Court needed to undertake a view of the relevant land in order to gain a proper appreciation of the evidence.
I note in this matter that both parties have engaged valuation evidence, and that the valuers reach quite different conclusions as to their respective views of the amount of compensation properly payable pursuant to the MRA by the miners. In light of the submissions by Mrs Graham that a hearing and view were necessary in this matter, combined with the fact that there is a differing view of the facts and circumstances properly applicable to the determination of compensation, including differing views of valuers, I consider it appropriate that the matter should not be heard on the papers and that the miners and the landholder should have the opportunity to test the evidence in a formal hearing.
Mr Houen then pressed his submission that I should disqualify myself from hearing the matter. Both Mr Houen and Mrs Graham agreed to a short timeframe for the exchange of submissions as to the question of whether or not I should disqualify myself from hearing this matter. All submissions have now been received and Mr Houen’s application that I disqualify myself remains the key question for determination, which I am undertaking with the agreement of both parties, on the papers.
Contentions by Mr Houen
In his written submissions of 13 February 2009, Mr Houen provides a useful summary of his contentions as to why I should disqualify myself from hearing this matter when he states that:[3]
“9.It is submitted that an adverse finding on appeal must be more definitive as to bias than a decision at first instance.
10.It is submitted that the question is whether there is a reasonable apprehension of apparent bias. In the circumstances, would a fair minded and well informed lay person reasonably apprehend that Member Mr. Smith might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the current case?
11.Less that 2½ years ago Mr. Smith, on appeal, unequivocally found in favour of the holders of this lease and against Mr. Barrett where the issues and facts were effectively identical with those in the current case. In the current case the Court will be deciding between the miners’ expert evidence which closely follows Mr. Smith’s 2006 finding, and a contrary opinion. It is respectfully submitted that in these circumstances, if the Court is constituted by Mr. Smith, the fair minded and well informed lay person would apprehend apparent bias.”
[3] At paragraphs 10 and 11.
Mr Houen notes that the current matter concerns compensation for renewal of ML 70211, and a previous matter, determined in the Land and Resources Tribunal, also concerned the compensation payable for renewal of ML 70211. The first renewal of ML 70211 was initially determined by Mining Referee Windridge of the Land and Resources Tribunal on 2 June 2006.[4]
[4] See Re Barrett v Weir & Anor [2006] QLRT 51.
Pursuant to the provisions of s.282 of the MRA then in force, the landholder appealed the determination of compensation by Mining Referee Windridge to the Tribunal (appeal).[5] The Tribunal (appeal) for the hearing of this appeal was constituted by the then President Koppenol of the Land and Resources Tribunal and myself, then Deputy President of the Land and Resources Tribunal.[6]
[5] See Re Barrett v Weir & Anor [2006] QLRT 96.
[6] It should be noted that jurisdiction generally with respect to mining lease applications under the MRA, et al, transferred from the Land and Resources Tribunal to the Land Court in September 2007 at the same time, s.282 of the MRA was amended to provide that appeals against determinations of compensation by the Land Court are to the Land Appeal Court.
Mr Houen in his written submissions had this to say specifically as regards my involvement in the Tribunal (appeal):[7]
“4.The issues addressed in the valuations in the current matter are effectively the same as those upon which Mr. Smith found against Mr. Barrett in the 2006 matter. This time, however, the Court is faced with deciding between two widely divergent expert opinions on those issues in a situation where one of those valuers, Mr. Lyons for the miners, has openly followed the 2006 decision of Mr. Smith. That is shown both by his reasoning and by the fact that he annexed that 2006 Tribunal (Appeal) decision to his report.
5.Mrs. Graham’s arguments for the Respondent in her affidavit sworn 19th November 2008 also rely upon the Tribunal’s 2006 finding at first instances (her Exhibit 4) and the Tribunal (Appeal) decision involving Mr. Smith (her Exhibit 5).
6.The reasons set out in the Tribunal (Appeal) 2006 decision bear very directly on the Court’s task of deciding between the opinions of the two valuers in the current matter.”
[7] Submissions, Mr Houen 13 February 2009 paragraphs 4 – 6.
Contentions by Mrs Graham
In her written submissions on behalf of the miners,[8] Mrs Graham contends that Mr Houen’s submissions of any actual or apprehended bias on my part are without foundation. In this regard, she has this to say:
“There are many decisions handed down by the Courts every day, the outcome of the majority of these decisions in most cases does not please either side. In this case in all, there were three Judicial minds (Mr Windridge in the initial Decision and President Koppenol and Mr Smith in the Appeal). This certainly is not a bias decision handed down by Mr Smith alone.
Mr Lyons has not at any stage of his valuation assessment followed nor mentioned the two determinations one of Mr. Windridge QLRT 51 or President Koppenol & DP Smith QLRT 96, that he attached as annexure. It is my opinion because I Carol Graham instructed the Valuer to ‘assess the compensation payable under the provisions of the Mineral Resources Act 1989 for the renewal of ML70211 over the area of Mt Clifford’ that it would be prudent for him to research the history of this lease and others. Mr Jinks (the valuer for the Landowner) copied a statement verbatim from Mr. Windridge’s decision QLRT 51 [13]. In his valuation page 4 under Deprivation of Possession, so valuer Jinks for the applicant was definitely referring to those decisions when he valued the area. Using a precedence from previous Court Cases is not uncommon.
There are many more decisions that I had relied upon that has been handed down not only by the Lands Tribunal but by the Lands Court, using the actual disturbed area of a mining leases as a basis for compensation. I was remiss in not using these further decisions in my arguments, which now I will be submitting as past precedence for the upcoming Court hearings.”
[8] Dated 16 February 2009.
Mrs Graham then went on to make the following additional observations:
“Mr. Windridge handed down the (renewal) Decision on compensation on ML70211 QLRT 51 Not Mr. Smith.
Mr Houen, by his own admission states ‘each renewal is a separate matter’Which in my opinion suggests there is no legal reason for Mr. Smith who was a member of the Land & Resources Tribunal and who now presides in the Land Court, and one of his duties is determination of Compensation under the current Mining Act. Proves this is a separate matter and a different Court.”
Further, Mrs Graham pointed out that there are currently two matters before the Court for determination with respect to Mining Lease 70211. As ML 70211 is over land on two properties owned by different landholders, compensation has to be determined with respect to each landholder and separate compensation files are currently before the Land Court for determination of compensation. The other matter involves Mr and Mrs Sloan as landholders. That matter was also the subject of a directions hearing before myself on 12 February 2009. It was clear from the directions hearing in that matter that a view of the Sloans’ property is seen as essential by at least one of the parties and both Mrs Sloan and Mrs Graham (who again appeared as agent for the miners) both considered it a sensible use of the Court’s resources that any inspection of ML 70211 on the Sloans’ property be timetabled to occur either immediately before or immediately after any inspection of Mr Barrett’s property, and that both matters, whilst clearly separate matters before the Court, could be timetabled so as to be heard in close proximity to each other in Emerald, saving all parties concerned considerable time and expense. Mrs Sloan and Mrs Graham were also content to examined ways in which there would be no need for doubling up of evidence from the Barrett matter into the Sloan matter. No orders were made as to the future conduct of the Sloan matter pending the direction hearing in the Barrett matter which occurred later on 12 February 2009 and as a result of which the application by Mr Houen that I disqualify myself was made.
As regards the interaction of the Sloan and Barrett compensation matters, Mrs Graham submitted as follows:
“This lease renewal involving two different landowners, I feel should be heard by the one Judge. I am not a legal officer but I can find no legal reason why Mr. Smith cannot hear this.
Mr. Smith has experience in compensation with regard to Mining Leases. Mr. Smith has knowledge of this area. In my opinion it would be wrong to have one Judge to hear and hand down a decision on one half of Mining Lease No. 70211 and another Judge to hand down a decision of the other half. It would also then need to different court hearings. The other Landowner Sloan has not objected to Mr. Smith hearing their compensation which was also adjudicated by Mr. Windridge and their appeal was also disallowed by President Koppenol and Mr. Smith, therefore it is only Mr Barrett’s opinion that Mr. Smith will be bias in his decision.”
Mr Houen’s reply submissions
Both in his original submissions and in his reply submissions, Mr Houen went into some detail regarding the valuation evidence of the respective valuers who have already filed their valuation reports in this matter in the Land Court. In my view, given the contentious nature of the valuation evidence it would not be proper or appropriate for me to make comment on the respective views of the valuation evidence nor, in my view, is such an assessment necessary for my determination of Mr Houen’s application.
As regards the desirability of having both the Sloan and the Barrett matters heard together, Mr Houen points out strongly that the two cases involve their own facts and issues and have at all times in the past been determined separately. Whilst conceding that “it might be possible to combine the two”, Mr Houen submits that “there is no legal or administrative reason why they must be heard by the same member, notwithstanding that the concern the same mining lease”.[9]
[9] Submission in reply, Mr Houen 17 February 2008 page 2.
In referring to authorities annexed to one of the valuation reports, Mr Houen made the following important submission:
“By also annexing a copy of the 2006 appeal decision to his report he clearly demonstrated that he relied upon it as authority. There are other contrary decisions which he might have considered and annexed if he had given consideration to an alternative view, including Mr. Smith’s decision of December 2001 awarding Mr. Barrett $10,890 compensation for the original 3-year term of this same mining lease (Weir & Rasmussen v. Barrett [2001] QLRT 95).”
Legal principles of apprehended bias
Unfortunately in this matter, neither Mr Houen nor Mrs Graham provided the Court with any authorities relating to apprehended bias to assist the Court in determining Mr Houen’s application. I note that neither Mr Houen nor Mrs Graham have legal qualifications.
There are of course a number of significant authorities relating to the law of apprehended bias. The principles were clearly enunciated by the High Court of Australia in the case of Ebner & Ors v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy & Anor[10] where Gleeson CJ and McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ, stated as follows:
“ ‘[6]Where, in the absence of any suggestion of actual bias, a question arises as to the independence or impartiality of a judge (or other judicial officer or juror), as here, the governing principle is that, subject to qualifications relating to waiver (which is not presently relevant) or necessity (which may be relevant to the second appeal), a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. That principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done, a requirement which reflects the fundamental importance of the principle that the tribunal be independent and impartial. It is convenient to refer to it as the apprehension of bias principle…’
‘[7]… There are, however, some other aspects of the apprehension of bias principle which should be recognised. Deciding whether a judicial officer (or juror) might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of a question that has not been determined requires no prediction about how the judge or juror will in fact approach the matter. The question is one of possibility (real and not remote), not probability. Similarly, if the matter has already been decided, the test is one which requires no conclusion about what factors actually influenced the outcome. No attempt need be made to inquire into the actual thought processes of the judge or juror.
[8]The apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. Its application is as diverse as human frailty. Its application requires two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The bare assertion that a judge (or juror) has an ‘interest’ in litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of no assistance until the nature of the interest, and the asserted connection with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is articulated. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed.” ’
[10] (2001) 205 CLR 337 at 344.
It would seem that a key element of the test set down by the High Court in Ebner had its genesis in the earlier High Court decision of Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association[11] where the High Court stated the principle in the following terms:
“ ‘… That principle is that a judge should not sit to hear a case if in all the circumstances the parties or the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that he might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question involved in it.’ (Emphasis added.)”
[11] (1983) 151 CLR 288.
The inclusion of the word might in the principle has been the subject of some judicial consideration. As Meagher JA said in Australian National Industries Ltd v Spedley Securities Ltd (In Liq) and Others:[12]
“The novel doctrine for which Livesey’s case is responsible is that where a judge determines either an issue or the credibility of a witness in one case and the same issue or the credibility of the same witness arises in a later case, he disqualifies himself from hearing that later case if a hypothetical observer might possibly suspect that he will be biased in embarking on the later case. It is a Spartan doctrine. It has been rendered increasingly so both by constant judicial narrowing of the scope of ‘necessity’ as an exception to the rule, and by the developing law on the attributes of the hypothetical observer. The High Court has decided several times that the knowledge of the individual does not extent to the knowledge that a judge is capable of putting aside evidence heard and findings made in previous case and deciding the case before him only on the evidence led in that case: Vakatua v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 at 573 and 585, Livesey (at 298), Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1 at 21, Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70 at 87-88, and Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 at 357 and 370. With the greatest respect for the authorities which undoubtedly bind me, I should have thought that any reasonable observer who was acquainted with the idea of a judge at all would assume that a judge had precisely that capability, whatever other virtues or defects he might have.”
[12] (1992) 26 NSWLR 411 at 448-9.
The difficulties encountered in considering the principles to be applied in matters relating to apprehended bias were succinctly spelt out by Kirby P (as he then was) in Spedley where he said:[13]
“It is no disrespect to the judges who have ventured their opinions … to identify a certain ambivalence in the expression of the tests which are to be applied. One decision upholds the asserted apprehension of bias. The next dismisses it. … different judges considering the same facts reach different conclusions. To say this merely acknowledges the unique features of each case; the differing composition of the courts and tribunal concerned; the inescapably different predilections and sensitivities of judges seeking to interpret the response of the hypothetical reasonable or fair-minded observer; and the ebb and flow of judicial opinion over time. There is no final or ultimate formula which can be easily applied to dispose of cases such as the present. In each case [the judge] must apply the well-worn words. But in the end, the response which each gives may be more instinctive and less deductive than the reasoning of the courts has tended to suggest.”
[13] At 417.
No consideration of the tests applicable to issues relating to apprehended bias would be complete without reference to the words of Mason J in Re Renaud; ex parte CJL[14] where he said:
“It seems that the acceptance by this Court of the test of reasonable apprehension of bias in such cases as R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong … has led to an increase in the frequency of applications by litigants that judicial officers should disqualify themselves … It needs to be said loudly and clearly that the ground of disqualification is a reasonable apprehension that the judicial officer will not decide the case impartially … [and not] that he will decide the case adversely to one party … Although it is important that justice must be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial officers discharge their duty to sit, and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of the judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour.”
[14] (1986) 60 ALRJ 528 at 531-532.
Applying the tests and observations set out in the cases above to the submissions made by Mr Houen, even given the wide ranging use of the word might in considering questions of an apprehension of bias in a matter, in my view Mr Houen has failed to show sufficient link between the decision of the Tribunal (appeal) in the previous compensation renewal case and the facts and circumstances which are before the Court for determination of the current compensation matter. A close reading of the Tribunal (appeal) reasoning in the previous compensation renewal appeal shows that that appeal related to three discrete issues, which were that compensation should have been determined for 10 years rather than three years; the determination of Mining Referee Windridge should have included a component the effect of the mining activities on cattle yards and associated facilities; and the compensation should have included a component for severance and loss of value and injurious affection to the balance lands. Of course, the Tribunal (appeal) was conducting an (appeal) under the then provisions of s.282 of the MRA and the decision of the Tribunal (appeal) was confined to the three contentions of the appellant as set out above. The actual determination of the compensation for the first renewal was made by Mining Referee Windridge, on the papers, without the assistance of any valuation evidence and, it would seem, with little other evidence to assist him. The Tribunal (appeal) of course dealt with the appeal on that basis. That situation is in stark contrast to the current circumstances where both parties have engaged expert valuation evidence and further where the area of the mining lease on Mr Barrett’s land has, it would appear on my perusal of the evidence, been reduced. There may of course also be significantly different evidence as to the mining to be carried out on the area of Mr Barrett’s land subject to the renewal application as well as a consideration of the mining already undertaken by the miners pursuant to the mining lease on such land and the rehabilitation thereof. I make no conclusions or finding one way or another with respect to any of these issues except to point out that the facts and circumstances of the current renewal application are substantially different to those considerations which I had to take into account in determining an appeal as a member of the Tribunal (appeal) in the Land and Resources Tribunal.
Were there no other relevant facts in this matter, I would have no hesitation in determining that Mr Houen has failed in his application to show that there is an apprehension of bias on my part due to my sitting as a Member of the Tribunal (appeal) in a previous decision involving this mining lease. However, as Mr Houen mentioned in passing in his reply submissions, my involvement in the Tribunal appeal is not my only previous involvement in ML 70211.
On 18 December 2001, as a then Deputy President of the Land and Resources Tribunal, I handed down a determination of compensation in the matter of Weir & Rasmussen v Barrett.[15] This determination of compensation related to ML 70211 and was the first determination made of compensation subsequent to the recommendation by the then Mining Warden Windridge in the Warden’s Court of 31 May 2000 recommending that ML 70211 be granted. In my 2001 determination, Mr Houen represented the landholder Mr Barrett and Mr Barlow of Counsel represented the miners. I note that Mr Weir has remained one of the miners throughout although his mining partner has changed. My 2001 determination was in real terms only one of four cases which, whilst not strictly heard together, were the subject of like proceedings, with the same representatives in each matter, and, most importantly expert evaluation evidence in one matter, that of Richardson v Barrett[16] was relied upon in the Weir and Barrett matter. My 2001 determinations of compensation in both the Weir and Barrett and other matters was the subject of detailed evidence and significant submissions by the parties. A site inspection was also conducted.
[15] [2001] QLRT 95.
[16] [2001] QLRT 89.
It is noteworthy that in the 2001 Weir v Barrett matter the miners sought an award of compensation in the sum of $971, whilst the landholder sought a determination of compensation of $124,520. The determination I made was for total compensation in the sum of $10,890. As such, it can be seen that my determination of compensation was much more than that contended for by the miner, and much less than that sought by the landholder.
It is curious that Mr Houen does not rely upon my decision in Weir and Rasmussen v Barrett from 2001 as a basis for seeking that I disqualify myself on the basis of apprehended bias. Nonetheless, as the existence of my 2001 decision has now been brought to my attention, it is incumbent upon me to take my determination of compensation in 2001 into account in deciding Mr Houen’s current application.
In Spedley, Mahoney JA gave a detailed assessment of the authorities relating to apprehended bias and stated what he referred to as “the prejudgment principle”.[17] In His Honour’s view, there were four elements to consider in deciding whether or not the prejudgement principle applied, these being:[18]
“(a) the disqualification of a judge for apprehended pre-judgment depends on form rather than substance; (b) whether there is an unacceptable appearance of pre-judgement is to be decided, not according to likelihood, but according to possibility; (c) it is to be judged, not according to what the court and the parties know, but according to the impressions of a lay person who does not know the facts; and (d) there will be an unacceptable appearance of pre-judgement if the judge has previously dealt with the issue of fact or credibility which is before him in the instant case.”
[17] (1992) 26 NSWLR 411 at 437.
[18] At 438.
In the matter at hand, point (d) made by Mahoney JA in Spedley is determinative. As the High Court pointed out in Livesey:[19]
“Necessity and the extraordinary case (see, e.g., Ex parte Lewin; Re Ward (30)) make it impossible to lay down an inflexible rule; each case must be determined by reference to its particular circumstances. It is, however, apparent that, in a case such as the present where it is not suggested that there is any overriding consideration of necessity, special circumstances or consent of the parties, a fair-minded observer might entertain a reasonable apprehension of bias by reason of prejudgment if a judge sits to hear a case at first instance after he has, in a previous case, expressed clear views either about a question of fact which constitutes a live and significant issue in the subsequent case or about the credit of a witness whose evidence is of significance on such a question of fact. The consideration that the relevant question of fact may be conceded or that the relevant person may not be called as a witness if the particular judge sits would not, of course, avoid the appearance of bias. To the contrary, it would underline the need for the judge to refrain from sitting.”
[19] 151 CLR 288 at 299-300.
Conclusion
As I have previously undertaken a detailed hearing at first instance of a determination of compensation with respect to Mr Barrett’s land as regards ML 70211, and as the current application for determination of compensation with respect to the renewal of ML 70211 involves the same landowner and one of the same miners carrying out mining activities on the same mining lease which will also require a detailed evaluation of the evidence of expert valuers and others in light of the compensation provisions of the MRA, an application of the fourth limb of the prejudgment principle as expounded by Mahoney JA in Spedley, based on significant High Court authority, leads me to the view that one of the parties or the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that I might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question involved. Accordingly, on this basis alone, in my view I have no option but to disqualify myself from the further hearing of this matter.
It is rather unusual that I have come to this conclusion when none of Mr Houen’s submissions were based on my involvement in the 2001 compensation matter. Mr Houen is indeed fortunate that he made passing reference to my determination of compensation in 2001 in his submissions. As a Member of the Queensland Judiciary for almost 9 years, I have of course been involved in countless matters both before the Land and Resources Tribunal and the Land Court. My involvement in the matter of Weir & Rasmussen v Barrett in 2001, some 8 years ago, had escaped my memory. However, Mr Houen’s passing reference to that case refreshed my memory and, following a re-reading of my 2001 decision, I consider that I have no choice but to disqualify myself from determining compensation in the matter at hand.
Orders
1. Member Smith disqualifies himself from determining compensation in the matter of MLC 00132/2008.
2. The matter be referred to the President of the Land Court for allocation to another Member for determination.
PA SMITH
MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT
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