Barras and Gifford & Anor
[2017] FamCAFC 250
•24 November 2017
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BARRAS & GIFFORD AND ANOR | [2017] FamCAFC 250 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPLICATION IN AN APPEAL – where the mother filed an application to summarily dismiss the father’s appeal – where the orders impacted upon the father as a parent in a serious way – where the interests of justice pointed to the hearing of oral argument – application by the mother dismissed – where the father filed an application that the Court pay for the provision of transcripts – application by the father dismissed. FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – CHILDREN – parenting orders – where the father had a significant history of family violence and mental illness – where the primary judge ordered that there be no contact between the father and children – where no error was demonstrated – appeal dismissed. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) |
| Bondelmonte v Bondelmonte (2017) 341 ALR 179 Pelerman v Pelerman (2000) FLC 93-037 |
| APPELLANT: | Mr Barras |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Gifford |
| INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Carter Farquar Mediation and Family Law |
| FILE NUMBER: | BRC | 4684 | of | 2014 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | NOA | 31 | of | 2017 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 24 November 2017 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Brisbane |
| PLACE HEARD: | Brisbane |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Murphy J |
| HEARING DATE: | 21 November 2017 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Federal Circuit Court of Australia |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 11 July 2017 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2017] FCCA 1611 |
REPRESENTATION
| FOR THE APPELLANT: | In person |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr George |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Service (Qld) Ltd |
| COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Ms Downes |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Carter Farquar Mediation and Family Law |
Orders
The respondent mother’s Application in an Appeal filed 30 October 2017 is dismissed.
The appellant father’s Application in an Appeal filed 24 October 2017 is dismissed.
The appeal is dismissed.
Each party pay their own costs of and incidental to the appeal.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Barras & Gifford and Anor has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| IN THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
Appeal Number: NOA 31 of 2017
File Number: BRC 4684 of 2014
| Mr Barras |
Appellant
And
| Ms Gifford |
Respondent
And
| Independent Children’s Lawyer |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The father of three children now aged 14, 12 and 11 years appeals final parenting orders made by Judge Cassidy on 11 July 2017 (as amended 12 July 2017). Pursuant to Order 5 of those orders, the father is “not … permitted to spend time with or communicate with the children”. Her Honour also ordered the children live with the mother and that she have sole parental responsibility for them.
Counsel for the mother has filed an application seeking summary dismissal of the father’s appeal. The application is premised on the father’s failure to supply a full copy of the transcript and failure by the father to comply with the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) (“the Rules”); the nature and non‑compliance of the father’s Summary of Argument; and the failure of the father’s Notice of Appeal and Summary of Argument to identify any recognisable errors of fact or law or the findings by her Honour which are challenged.
The father has also filed an application seeking that this Court pay for the full transcript of proceedings below, or that the Court dismiss the requirement for payment, or that the amount of $488.49 (an amount presumably charged for an extract of the transcript obtained by the father) be refunded back to the father.
It is noted that the father is self-represented in the proceedings before this Court and was self-represented below.
On 24 October 2017 the Chief Justice made a direction pursuant to s 94AAA(3) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) that it was appropriate for the jurisdiction of the Family Court in relation to the appeal to be exercised by a single judge and it is heard by me today on that basis.
The Context for the Proceedings
History of Family Violence
The primary judge’s order denying time between the children and their father is made against a background of a relationship marked by very serious family violence, criminal behaviour by the father for which he has been imprisoned and a serious psychiatric illness which has seen him hospitalised on three occasions, including for one period of at least ten months.
Her Honour found at [27]:
… the father in this matter has a very, very serious history of breaching domestic violence orders and violent conduct generally as evidenced by the summary contained in these reasons and the extent of criminal history set out in exhibit 1.
The summary to which her Honour refers is set out at [19] and details a 20 year history of family and other violence, including against police officers. The table refers to four sentences of imprisonment, including two periods some six months apart in 2011. Each involved the mother as complainant. The first of the two was based on a factual summary as follows:
The defendant went to the address of complainant ([Ms Gifford]) and kicked her while in bed, yelled at her and called her a slut. He threatened her with a pair of scissors. She ran outside and he kicked her again. He was the subject of a DVPA order at the time.
(As per original)
The most recent incident as noted by her Honour occurred in mid-2012. Her Honour’s findings are as follows, at [24] – [25]:
The events that occurred [in mid-] 2012 that the father pleaded guilty to had him entering the mother’s home and going into her bedroom while she was asleep. The father placed his hands over the mother’s mouth forcefully while she was lying on the bed and told the mother to “shut up, shut up, just shut up”. The following is recorded in relation to this incident in the subpoenaed material from the police:
“The offender pushed his hand so hard on the aggrieved’s mouth that it caused her skin to split and bleed around her lips. Offender then dragged the aggrieved with his hands still over her mouth onto the bedroom floor beside the bed. The offender let go of his grip and reached over to grab a pillow. During which the aggrieved cried out “please stop, please stop”. THe [(sic)] offender then placed the pillow over the face of the aggrieved and pushed hard against her face. The aggrieved kicked and fought with the offender in which loosened his grip onto the pillow, allowing the aggrieved to yell out “[…] call the police.” Upon yelling this out this has spooked the offender and the offender has then stood up and turned around and walked out the bedroom and then walked out the front door.”
The mother had bloody injuries to her mouth and a swollen lip. The police also noticed a hole in two layers of clothing that the mother wore when the offence occurred and a small cut to her stomach that was consistent with a sharp object such as a knife penetrating through and a puncture mark on her arm. The mother’s evidence was that these injuries occurred during the incident.
(Italic in original)
The father was charged with a number of offences following this incident – described in the proceedings as a “home invasion” which the children had witnessed – which culminated in him receiving a concurrent head sentence of three years.[1] The father was in presentence custody for approximately 20 months and following his sentencing in early 2014, was released on parole. The father was also sentenced to probation for three years for a charge of assault occasioning bodily harm.
[1]A head sentence of three years imprisonment was imposed for burglary and 18 months imprisonment for deprivation of liberty. Her Honour at [23] records that “[a] number of summary offences were dealt with at the same time in the District Court and a conviction was recorded but the defendant was not further punished”.
The father denies any family violence. This is despite having pleaded guilty on the last occasion and on earlier occasions.
The Father’s Mental Health
In addition to the significant domestic violence history, her Honour records at [28] “that the father has a long history of contact with mental health services” and according to his medical history, suffers from a serious psychiatric illness. He has been hospitalised on a number of occasions and, counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) points out he has been the subject of upwards of seven Involuntary Treatment Orders.
Her Honour noted at [41]:
... Of concern during the trial was the father’s conduct in relation to his issues of mental health. The father indicated during the course of evidence that he had no mental health problems and that the medical evidence was untrue, although he conceded that he continued to take medication prescribed for [a serious psychiatric illness] despite his view that he did not have that medical problem.
Her Honour also canvassed other concerns during the hearing indicative of the father’s mental state. For example, the father asserted that there were different family reporters. The father told me during these appeal proceedings that the second reporter was “two inches taller than the other one”. There was only one family reporter.
Time spent with the children
Although the parties commenced a relationship in about 2002 which ended completely about six years later, her Honour noted that “the mother and the father did not ever have what could be described as a de facto relationship” (at [12]). Her Honour stated at [16]:
It seems that the mother has always been primarily responsible for the care of [the] children and the father has come and gone from the mother’s home from time-to-time and spent varying amounts of time there.
Both parties have adult children from previous relationships. The father also has a child with his current wife and the mother has a two year old whose father, at the time of trial, was on remand facing a serious criminal charge.
Her Honour did not record the time that the father had erstwhile had with the children.
It seems that about a year after the father’s release from prison the Court ordered that the children spend supervised time with the father organised through a contact centre. It seems that this contact was for two hours every fortnight.
In her affidavit filed 14 March 2017, the mother deposes that pursuant to a private agreement made in late 2015, the parties agreed to a further two hours of time at the home of the paternal grandmother in addition to the time at the contact centre. From March 2016 the mother agreed to time being wholly supervised at the paternal grandmother’s home. It seems that unsupervised time at the father’s home was subsequently agreed to (with the caveat that all children needed to be available for unsupervised contact to occur) and from May that year, there was unsupervised time in the father’s home.
In early 2017 time spent with the father was suspended by the mother. The mother deposed to ongoing concerns arising from the father forcing the boys to have their hair cut by him against their will. The mother deposed to the children returning from time with their father visibly upset and asking not to attend school because they were embarrassed by their appearance.
The father was charged with, but acquitted of, grievous bodily harm in respect of his two sons from a previous relationship. Those charges arose out of an assertion that the father had arranged for their circumcision without the consent of, and contrary to the wishes of, their mother. The mother in these proceedings is concerned that the same will occur in respect of their two sons. In fact, in the father’s Notice of Appeal he seeks orders that “[t]he court make an order that my two sons be circumsised [sic]”.
The ICL’s Amended Case Outline filed the day prior to the commencement of the trial sought an order for supervised time one day each fortnight “for the maximum number of hours available at [the contact centre]”. That order was conditional upon the father “properly demonstrat[ing] that his mental health is stable and has regularly responded to drug testing”. The minute of orders provided that if that did not occur within six months, “[t]he Father shall not spend further time with the children”.
The mechanism for the operation of those orders and the consequent enforceability of them is, with respect, elusive but their underlying intention reflects difficulties encountered by the mother in obtaining details of the father’s current mental health and any treatment of it. That is important because the father’s lengthy criminal history, essentially coterminous with his serious mental health issues, shows apparently unpredictable sequences of serious mental ill health and violent behaviour.
By the commencement of the trial the mother had altered her existing position seeking supervised time to one whereby she sought an order that “the children spend no time with the father” albeit that weekly telephone time was proposed (or otherwise as agreed with the children telephoning the father “whenever they reasonably request to do so”). The mother also proposed that there be “Family Dispute Resolution” once per year between February and April “to enable the mother to update the father on the progress of the children throughout the preceding year”.
Ultimately, however, each of the mother and the ICL submitted that there be no time or communication by the father with the children. Although, as will be seen, this Court has not had the benefit of other than a short extract of the transcript, the alteration in each of the mother’s and the ICL’s positions can, in light of what is said in her Honour’s reasons, be seen to be referable to concerns arising from the evidence of the father during the trial.
The Father’s Grounds of Appeal and Argument
It is important, I think, to quote verbatim both the father’s grounds of appeal and his Summary of Argument. The grounds are in these terms:
Unfair decission is made
Contact with my children is disrupted
My and my childrens rights to spend time together has been restricted.
The decision made is only to cause harm to a relationship between a father and his children
I will not agree to such a perverted order that has no possitive outcome.
Such an order has been made to purposely cause stress to myself and my children.
The decision made is only based on abuse towards myself and my children.
(Errors as per original)
The father’s Summary of Argument is, in its entirety, as follows:
My appeal is against the order made by judge Cassidy on 11 July 2017 numbering 1-11 & her reason for judgment numbering 1-98. Her reasons show accusations she relied upon & the judgment she made holds no benefit for me or my children.
Her judgment clearly shows only to cause Emotional & Physiological harm to myself & my children by ordering only restrictions even though we were enjoying limited contact time (rationed out) by their mother
All facts that I put forward in this case were ignored.
(As per original)
The Mother’s Summary Dismissal Application
The mother applied for summary dismissal of the appeal and was supported in that respect by the ICL.
I determined that the interests of justice pointed to hearing such oral arguments as the father might have in respect of the appeal and indicated to the father that the application would be dismissed with reasons to be given. These reasons are as follows.
The application is made pursuant to r 10.12 of the Rules. Subparagraph (d) of r 10.12 allows an application for summary dismissal to be made where “there is no reasonable likelihood of success”.
Paragraph 20 of an affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent on 30 October 2017 gives the following reasons for seeking dismissal:
a.a full copy of the transcript is required and has not been supplied;
b.the “Outline” filed by the Appellant does not comply with the Rules of Court nor with Practice Direction 1 of 2017 - as identified by Registrar Kane in her letter dated 28 September 2017; and
c.the Notice of Appeal and Outline fails to identify any specific finding made by the Trial Judge which is the subject of challenge - by reference to the evidence before the Trial Judge or to any of the findings of the Trial Judge.
The principles governing an application for summary dismissal are well known and have been traversed by numerous decisions of this Court. Of particular relevance is the following summary by the Full Court in Pelerman v Pelerman:[2]
(a)The power for summary dismissal is a discretionary one.
(b)Relief “is rarely and sparingly provided”.
(c)The parties seeking summary dismissal must show that the application is “doomed to fail” or as has been otherwise described “that the opponent lacks a reasonable cause of action or is advancing a claim that is clearly frivolous or vexatious”.
(d)A weak case or one that is unlikely to succeed is not “sufficient to warrant termination”.
(e)“If there is a serious legal question to be determined, it should ordinarily be determined at a trial.”
(f)“If notwithstanding the defects of pleadings, it appears that a party may have a reasonable cause of action which it has failed to put in proper form, a court will ordinarily allow that party to reframe its pleadings.”
[2](2000) FLC 93-037 at 87,582 referring to Bigg v Suzi (1998) FLC 92-799.
It can be seen that there is ostensible merit in the submissions by both the mother and the ICL that the appeal lacks merit on its face. I would not, though, describe it as frivolous or vexatious in the sense in which those expressions are usually understood.[3]
[3] See, for example, Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516.
The application is being heard at the same time as the appeal in which all parties appear. The father represents himself. As will be clear from what I have earlier outlined, he has suffered from significant mental health issues. The orders made impact upon the father as a parent in the most serious way.
I determined that the interests of justice pointed to hearing such oral arguments as the father might have in respect of the appeal and indicated to the father that the application would be with reasons to be given. These reasons are as follows.
I will formally order that the mother’s application be dismissed.
Application to Provide Transcript
The application filed by the father has been earlier referred to. It seems that he paid the sum specified in order to obtain part of the transcript and he seeks to be reimbursed for that payment. He otherwise applies for the Court to fund the provision of the balance of the transcript.
The father’s affidavit in support of his application consists of two lines. He says he is on a Centrelink pension and “[t]he amount quoted for Transcripts is not affordable”.
Neither such error as might be discerned from the Notice of Appeal nor any oral argument advanced is persuasive of the need for the father to have a transcript to advance his case or for the mother or ICL to meet his case.
The provision of a transcript by the Court might occur only when the necessity for that to occur in the interests of justice is made out as an exception to parties funding the same. No such case is made out here.
The application will be dismissed.
The Substantive Appeal
The Primary Judge’s Reasons
At [2] – [6] her Honour set out the proposals of the father, mother and ICL. These are summarised as follows:
a)The mother sought orders that she have sole parental responsibility, that the father have no time with the children and that an injunction be issued restraining the father from having any contact with the children (at [2]);
b)The father sought orders for equal time and equal shared parental responsibility (at [3]); and
c)The ICL sought, inter alia, that the children live with the mother, that the mother have sole parental responsibility, the children live with her and that the father not be permitted to spend time with, or communicate with the children (at [4] – [6]).
Evidently, her Honour ultimately adopted the ICL’s proposal.
In coming to that conclusion, her Honour outlined in detail the facts and circumstances relevant to the Act’s mandatory considerations.
Her Honour’s reasons refer to evidence of family violence; her Honour was, with respect, correct to describe it as being of the most serious kind. Her Honour also refers to the father’s significant mental illness; his denial of responsibility for family violence proven by his pleas of guilty or otherwise proven to the criminal standard; and to little or no insight by the father into the impact upon the children of his behaviour.
Her Honour said at [47]:
These are issues that continue to concern me given the father’s conduct during the trial where he did not acknowledge that he had any mental health problems and was not prepared to acknowledge the aggression and conduct that he had engaged in in the past. The lack of insight is the single most significant troubling aspect of this case from my point of view. While it is documented all the way through the medical notes, it was very obvious in the court room as well.
Her Honour then addressed specifically the relevant “Primary Considerations”:
a)Whilst “it is important that the children have a meaningful relationship with their mother”, it is not “necessarily important that they have a meaningful relationship with their father” because of “the need to protect the children from being exposed to the risk of family violence, harm or abuse” (at [60]);
b)The father “spent a significant time in prison for breaches of a domestic violence order … [and] a term of imprisonment for deprivation of liberty and breaking and entering at night while armed” (at [61]);
c)The father during the trial “was not prepared to concede that [the violence] had occurred nor was he prepared to demonstrate any insight into the harm that that could cause the children if they were exposed to further family violence” (at [62]);
d)The father had “cut the children’s hair on three occasions” against the mother’s wishes. This caused the boys distress (at [63]); and
e)The father wants to circumcise the boys against the mother’s wishes (at [63]) and there is a “risk in terms of exposing the children to that procedure when the mother is opposed to it” (at [64]).
Having considered these matters, her Honour then turned to the additional considerations delineated in s 60CC(3):
a)Section 60CC(a) – the children “seem to be enjoying the time that they spend with their father, but want it to be fairly limited and seem to be more confident when it is in the presence of the grandmother” (at [77]);
b)Section 60CC(b) – “the children are primarily attached to their mother” and “seem to have a developing relationship with the father and a fairly positive [relationship] with the paternal grandmother” (at [79]);
c)Section 60CC(c), (ca) and (f) – the father has not and cannot “provide for the needs of the children including their emotional and intellectual needs” and that his failure to “acknowledge that he has any mental health issues and … that there has been serious domestic violence … impact on the father’s capacity to provide for the needs of the children”. However, her Honour found that “the mother can provide for these needs” and has been doing so (at [81] – [82]);
d)Section 60CC(d) – the mother’s proposal “would result in a fairly minor change” in circumstances where the children had “only recently started spending time with their father after a gap of approximately three years when he was unable to have any contact as he was incarcerated” (at [84]). On the other hand, the father’s proposal would dramatically change the circumstances for the children and “it would [not] be in the children’s best interest to consider” such an arrangement (at [85]); and
e)Section 60CC(l) – “[i]t is not apparent that the proposal of the mother or father would be less likely to lead to further proceedings”.
Obviously enough, given the context of family violence and the existence of Domestic Violence Orders stretching back over many years, her Honour considered relevant subparagraphs (j) and (k). It seems clear that the provisions of s 60CG were very much in her Honour’s mind in the orders that were made.
The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility plainly did not apply (s 61DA(2)) and her Honour so found, ordering the mother have “sole parental responsibility”.
Her Honour then concluded as follows:
92.The real choice is whether to allow some limited supervised time or no time between the father and the children. I appreciate that the children’s views would support having a relationship with their father. The father’s conduct at the hearing where he had no insight into the issues that were significant in the trial, being his mental health and his history of domestic violence against the mother, in my view mitigate against the father having any time with the children.
93.These observations that I made about the father during the trial, were also made by the family report in the family report filed on 15 June 2016. It is recorded that:
“[Mr Barras] was previously, in 2015, said to be seeking to be empowered by Court Orders to form an inclusive co-parenting relationship with [Ms Gifford] in a context where he denied assaulting her and refuted assessments that he had mental health issues.
In this context he was proposed to have demonstrated no insight into his issues and having taken no responsibility for them.”
94.I accept that the mother seeks to be protected from the father with the Court orders, which would address the sense of being disempowered in dealings with the father and on behalf of the children.
95.In the present case the mother has had to deal with significant domestic violence and her evidence is that the father simply treated her home as his and came and went as he pleased. These circumstances ultimately ended up in what could only be described as a horrific incident of domestic violence. For these reasons I do not consider that it is in the children’s best interests at this stage to have any contact with their father.
I consider, with respect, that her Honour was correct in identifying the central issue confronting the Court in the manner in which she did. It is clear that the findings made by her Honour as to the children’s best interests, referrable to s 60CC, informed a difficult choice between two potential outcomes; given the evidence and findings they were the only two outcomes that reasonably presented themselves. Either outcome was open to her Honour and her Honour explained why she chose one option rather than the other.
For the benefit of the self-represented father, what was said in CDJ v VAJ[4] bears repeating:
The evidence in [parenting] cases is often such that the same body of evidence may produce opposite but nevertheless reasonable conclusions from different judges. It is a mistake to think that there is always only one right answer to the question of what the best interests of a child require. Each judge is duty bound to make the order which he or she thinks is in the best interests of the child. But the fact that other judges think that the best interests of that child require a different order does not necessarily prove that the first order was not in the best interests of the child. Best interests are values, not facts. They involve a discretionary judgment in respect of which judges can come to opposite but reasonable conclusions …
[4] (1998) 197 CLR 172 at 219 per McHugh, Gummow, Callinan JJ.
The three children were aged 13, 10 and nine when interviewed for a report by a family consultant. Her Honour was at pains to record and assess their views (at [66] – [77]) concluding with the passage at [77] earlier quoted.
Her Honour was plainly cognisant of the fact that the children had expressed a view, (albeit an understandably cautious view), that they wished to see their father. Her Honour was not on any view bound by those wishes. As the High Court said very recently:[5]
… In some cases, it may be right, in the exercise of a primary judge's discretion, to accord the views expressed by a child [something approaching a decisive status], but s 60CC(3)(a) does not require that course to be taken. They are but one consideration of a number to be taken into account in the overall assessment of a child’s best interests.
The terms of s 60CC(3)(a) itself may be taken to recognise that, whilst a child’s views ought to be given proper consideration, their importance in a given case may depend upon factors such as the child’s age or maturity and level of understanding of what is involved in the choice they have expressed. Children may not, for example, appreciate the long term implications of separation from one parent or the child’s siblings. Section 60CC requires that attention be given by the court to these matters.
[5] Bondelmonte v Bondelmonte (2017) 341 ALR 179 at [34] – [35].
Again, her Honour’s assessment of the children’s views was an important factor, but only one such factor. It is evident from the reasons that her Honour gave that factor careful consideration.
Conclusion
The father has not articulated any appealable error either in his written material or in his oral submissions. Those submissions each, in essence, denied family violence and focussed on his perception of the “unfairness” of the orders.
Quite apart from any articulated appealable error this Court has a duty to correct appealable error when such error is manifest. No such error is manifest.
The appeal will be dismissed.
Costs
At the conclusion of the hearing submissions were sought as to costs in respect of each possible outcome. The appeal has failed. In that event the mother’s counsel has submitted that a costs order should be made in her favour. He advises that she is funded by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Service (Qld) Ltd (“ATSILS”) and he is obliged to seek costs. He submits that the amount of costs is “$1,500 to $2,000”. The ICL did not seek costs.
The father has been wholly unsuccessful and it can be argued that the appeal had little merit from its outset. Yet, the father’s appeal was against an order that has him effectively excluded from his children’s lives.
Such evidence of the father’s financial circumstances as is before the Court suggests that he has no income save for a pension and no assets save for a car. Impecuniosity is not a bar to an order for costs; it is but one factor that might be considered in deciding if the position dictated by s 117(1) of the Act is to be displaced.
Here, when combined with the father’s significant mental illness, I cannot see there is any realistic prospect the husband could meet any costs order, including in the very modest amount sought. The failure to meet any costs order has the potential to not only lead to further litigation but, as importantly, might together with the result in this appeal, serve as a catalyst for deterioration in the father’s mental health.
In all of the circumstances I consider that each party should bear their own costs.
I certify that the preceding sixty-four (64) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Murphy delivered on 24 November 2017.
Associate:
Date: 24 November 2017
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