BARONGLOW PTY LTD v WILLING (THOMAS Intervener)
[2004] SADC 37Judge Lee
Civil
This is an appeal from the decision of a Master.
The appellant (Baronglow) is the present plaintiff in the action. The previous plaintiff (Jordan) brought the action against the defendant (Willing) for unpaid fees for work which he performed for Willing as a legal practitioner. Jordan engaged the intervenor (Thomas), who was also a legal practitioner, to perform solicitor’s work in the action. Later, Willing paid a sum of money into Court to abide the result of the action, Jordan became bankrupt, and his trustee assigned his interest in the action to Baronglow. Then Thomas sought and obtained a charging order over the fund in Court with respect to his costs. Eventually Baronglow obtained a judgment by consent in the action, and applied to Master Norman under Rule 84.12 for an order setting aside the charging order. Rule 84.12 provides: “The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order at any time if the justice of the case so requires”. Master Norman concluded that it would be unfair and inappropriate for Thomas to be denied the opportunity to recover his proper costs from the fund, and refused the application.
The chronology of relevant events is as follows:
15/2/94
Jordan institutes action against Willing for unpaid legal fees.
30/3/98
Jordan engages Thomas to perform solicitor’s work in the action.
7/7/98
Willing pays $60,000 into the suitor’s fund of the Court to abide the result of the action.
24/8/98
Jordan is declared bankrupt and a trustee of his estate (Huppatz) is appointed. By this date, Thomas had rendered invoices to Jordan totalling $2,283.
21/9/98
Thomas lodges a proof of debt with Huppatz. The proof of debt was for a total of $5,711.03, inclusive of the abovementioned sum of $2,283. In his proof of debt, and in answer to the following questions, Thomas wrote:
“Property over which security is held NIL”
“Type of security NIL”
“Value of security NIL”
28/9/98
A meeting of creditors is held, and attended by Jordan and Thomas. No action is taken to recover any assets of the estate. The meeting resolves not to indemnify Huppatz.
10/11/98
Huppatz assigns Jordan’s interest in the action to Baronglow.
16/2/99
Baronglow files an application to be substituted for Jordan as the plaintiff in the action.
3/3/99
Thomas files an application for a charging order over the fund in Court.
12/8/99
Master Berry makes a charging order over the fund in Court. Paragraph 1a of the order provides:
“1. That so much of the sum of sixty thousand dollars ($60,000-00) plus interest thereon (“the fund”) now standing to the credit of this action in the Suitors’ Fund of this Court as shall be payable to Neville John Jordan or to any person claiming a right to it or the assigned benefit of it pursuant to any judgment order or allocatur be and is hereby charged with:
a. the payment of all professional fees and disbursements properly due on…
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- Case
- [2004] SADC 37
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the charging order was contrary to the policy of the Bankruptcy Act. The policy is to distribute the assets of the insolvent debtor in the interests of creditors generally, to prevent one creditor obtaining an undue advantage, and to prevent the scheme of the Act from being defeated. A charging order to enforce a solicitor’s lien against an asset of a bankrupt’s estate is not contrary to the policy of the Act. The common law lien of a solicitor prevails notwithstanding the bankruptcy of his client. There is no reason to suppose that an application by Thomas for leave to obtain a charging order would have been unsuccessful. Baronglow’s reliance on s.118(9) of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides that a charging order made within the relation back period is void against the trustee, is misplaced because the charging order was made after the bankruptcy.
The court held that the charging order should not be set aside, and the appeal was dismissed. The court also noted that the trustee had not admitted or rejected the proof of debt, and it would not now be appropriate for the trustee to admit the proof.
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