Barnes v Northern Land Council

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barnes v Northern Land Council
[2002] FCA 901

RODNEY BARNES v NORTHERN LAND COUNCIL and AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL CO. LTD and NORTHERN TERRITORY POLICE and ABORIGINAL & TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER COMMISSION and CENTRAL AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL LEGAL AID SERVICE

D.7 of 2002

MANSFIELD J
31 JULY 2002
ADELAIDE (HEARD IN DARWIN)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

D.7 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

RODNEY BARNES
APPLICANT

AND:

NORTHERN LAND COUNCIL
FIRST RESPONDENT

AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL CO.
SECOND RESPONDENT

NORTHERN TERRITORY POLICE
THIRD RESPONDENT

ABORIGINAL & TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER COMMISSION
FOURTH RESPONDENT

CENTRAL AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL LEGAL AID SERVICE
FIFTH RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 JULY 2001

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE (HEARD IN DARWIN)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is refused.

2.          The applicant pay to the respondents costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

D.7 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

RODNEY BARNES
APPLICANT

AND:

NORTHERN LAND COUNCIL
FIRST RESPONDENT

AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL CO. LTD
SECOND RESPONDENT

NORTHERN TERRITORY POLICE
THIRD RESPONDENT

ABORIGINAL & TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER COMMISSION
FOURTH RESPONDENT

CENTRAL AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL LEGAL AID SERVICE
FIFTH RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

31 JULY 2002

PLACE:

ADELAIDE (HEARD IN DARWIN)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application under O 52 r 15(2) of the Federal Court Rules for an order extending the time within which the applicant may appeal from a decision of a Federal Magistrate given on 10 April 2002 reported as Barnes v Northern Land Council & Ors [2002] FMCA 54. The magistrate summarily dismissed an application by the applicant against each of the respondents made on 17 August 2001 under r 13.10 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules, the parallel rule to O 20 r 2 of the Federal Court Rules. The magistrate also ordered the applicant to pay costs of the application to the respondents.

  2. An appeal lies from a decision of a Federal Magistrate to the Court: s 24(1)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Under O 52 r 15(1) of the Act, an appeal must be instituted within 21 days of the date of the decision from which the appeal is brought. In this instance, the time within which the applicant could appeal expired on 1 May 2002. The applicant did not institute any appeal by that time. Subsequently, when presenting his proposed notice of appeal to the Court out of time on 10 May 2002, it was necessary for him to obtain an extension of time within which to file and serve his proposed notice of appeal under O 52 r 15(2) of the Federal Court Rules. He made the application on 10 May 2002. Although the appeal is to the Full Court, unless the Chief Justice directs otherwise: s 24(1)(d)and 25(1A), an application for an extension of time to appeal may be heard by a single judge: s 25(2)(b) of the Federal Court…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 901
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Barnes v Northern Land Council, the applicant, Mr. Barnes, sought to appeal against the Federal Magistrates Court’s decision to dismiss his application on the basis that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed. Mr. Barnes had filed complaints against several respondents, alleging racial discrimination. The court was tasked with determining whether the application for an extension of time to appeal the dismissal should be granted. The legal issues revolved around whether there was an arguable basis for the appeal and whether special circumstances justified an extension of time.

The court considered the magistrate's reasoning, which concluded that Mr. Barnes had not provided specific details about how any of the respondents had discriminated against him on the basis of his race. The magistrate highlighted that the connection between the complaints and any racial discrimination was essential for the success of the claim. Given the lack of sufficient connection and detail in Mr. Barnes's complaints, the magistrate dismissed the application. The court noted that the jurisdiction to dismiss a claim for lack of reasonable cause of action should be exercised sparingly and only when the claim is unarguable and almost incontestably bad.

The court found that Mr. Barnes’s proposed notice of appeal did not identify any specific grounds for appeal beyond general references to racial and social discrimination. The accompanying affidavit and oral contentions also failed to indicate any possible grounds for review. Consequently, the court concluded that there was no arguable basis upon which the magistrate’s decision might be successfully appealed. The application for an extension of time was therefore refused.

In summary, the Federal Court upheld the dismissal of Mr. Barnes’s application and denied his request for an extension of time to appeal. The court found that Mr. Barnes had not provided sufficient detail to establish a reasonable cause of action based on racial discrimination. Consequently, the application was refused, and Mr. Barnes was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is refused.

2. The applicant pay to the respondents costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J
Each of the respondents applied pursuant to r 13.10 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules for an order dismissing the application in so far as it respectively concerned each of those respondents on the ground that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed in the material presented by the applicant. Those applications were heard on 6 March 2002. Judgment was given on 10 April 2002 when, as I have noted, those applications were successful. It was ordered that the application filed on 17 August 2001 be dismissed with costs. Detailed reasons for the decision were published at the time.THE MAGISTRATE’S REASONS FOR DECISION The learned magistrate identified as best he could, from a careful consideration of the materials which the applicant had provided to HREOC and had filed in the Court, the nature of the complaints. He then observed that the applicant had not provided specific details as to how he said any of the respondents had discriminated against him on the basis of his race. The applicant asserted generally that each of the respondents had acted in concert against him, but the general complaints did not descend to any particularity concerning any individual respondent or any individual incidents. The learned magistrate observed:“However the genesis of his grievances against the various organisations seems to stem from his failure to be granted a living area on Brunette Downs Station pursuant to the Community Living Areas Act (NT) or some other piece of legislation; his failure to be granted legal aid in respect of claims in respect of this matter; the subsequent issue of a trespass notice against him by the manager of Brunette Downs Station and general claims of harassment by the Northern Territory Police.” The learned magistrate then identified an issue critical to the determination of the application. He said:“Clearly the connection of any of these matters to any act taken or not taken by any of the respondent organisations on the basis of the applicant’s racial origin is essential to the success or otherwise of the propagation of his claim. It is the position of each of the respondents that on the material so far put forward by the applicant that there is no such sufficient connection between the complaints as made by the applicant and any action that each of them has or has not taken in respect of the applicant and certainly nothing to indicate that any of them has taken any action on the basis of his racial origins.” In considering the respondents’ applications to have the applicant’s claim dismissed, the magistrate was mindful that the jurisdiction to dismiss a claim on the basis that it discloses no reasonable cause of action is to be sparingly exercised: see e.g. per Weinberg J in MacKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 409 at 415-417. The magistrate directed himself that the claim should only be dismissed on that ground where it may properly be described as unarguable and almost incontestably bad.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J

Thus the learned magistrate at first instance dismissed the application against each respondent principally on the basis that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed either in the applicant’s material or in any other material before the Court. There was, the magistrate found, no material upon which the applicant might make out that any conduct of any of the applicants of which he complained was based upon the applicant’s race, so as to enliven s 9 of the Racial Discrimination Act. It also appears from his Honour’s reference to the Tribunal’s observations about unfairness to each of the respondents, that the learned magistrate may also have dismissed the proceeding against each of the respondents as an abuse of the process of the Court, on the basis that the applicant was simply unable to identify his complaints with sufficient particularity to ensure that each of the respondents was able to know the allegations against it so as to be able to have a fair trial, and so should not be exposed to the proceeding ongoing.CONSIDERATION OF APPLICATION As I have indicated, in my view, having regard to the short period of time in respect of which an extension of time is sought, and the applicant’s personal circumstances, the Court should grant an extension of time if there is any arguable basis upon which an appeal from the magistrate’s decision might succeed. Those factors, together with an arguable ground upon which he might succeed in having the decision of the learned magistrate overturned, would in my view constitute “special reasons” for granting the extension of time. The proposed notice of appeal identifies as the ground of appeal:“Racial and social discrimination as above.”There is no other reference to such discrimination except in the section containing the orders sought, namely:“That a hearing is continued regarding my complaints against those respondents named, … (and) that my complaints are upheld.” The application for extension of time was accompanied by an affidavit, the only relevant part of which asserts:“That the Court proceed to hear out my complaints and is dealt properly against the respondents.”Those references do not indicate any possible ground of appeal. In addition, I endeavoured in the course of the applicant’s oral contentions on this application to identify with precision the alleged error or errors on the part of the magistrate of which he complained. His contentions included gratuitously offensive assertions against the learned magistrate, the respondents, and Court staff. It is not necessary to repeat them, unless they might possibly indicate a ground of review of the magistrate’s decision. As best I can discern from the applicant’s contentions, he asserted:· that his complaint had never been honestly dealt with,· that the learned magistrate had simply ignored his complaints, and·that the learned magistrate had decided in advance that he would dismiss the complaints and so did not approach them with a mind open to persuasion.