Barnes v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barnes v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1088

ADRIAN RANENDRA BARNES  v  MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

V 459 of 1999

RYAN J

10 AUGUST 2001
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 459 of 1999

BETWEEN:

ADRIAN RANENDRA BARNES
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 AUGUST 2001

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 459 of 1999

BETWEEN:

ADRIAN RANENDRA BARNES
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE:

10 AUGUST 2001

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicant, Adrian Ranendra Barnes, appeals against a ruling made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), affirming the refusal by a delegate of the respondent Minister of the applicant’s application for a Protection Visa under s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). The applicant advances two grounds of appeal. First, it is contended that the Tribunal failed to observe procedures that were required by the Act or the Regulations in that it failed to make findings of material fact as required by s 430(1)(c) of the Act. Secondly, it is said that the Tribunal’s decision involved an error of law of a kind specified in s 476(1)(e) of the Act “in conjunction with s 420(2)(b) in that the [Tribunal] incorrectly interpreted and applied the applicable law”.

    Factual Background

  2. The applicant was born in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 1970.  He is a member of the Tamil minority.  The applicant stated in his Protection Visa application that his father had moved the family from Colombo to Batticaloa in the late 1970s over concerns about safety arising from the civil strife in the country.  (For reasons that are not clear, the Tribunal said that the family had moved to Batticaloa because of the father’s work.)  While living in Batticaloa, the applicant’s older brother, Ajit Barnes, became an armed cadre member of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO).  This group, amongst others, called for the creation of a new Tamil state and for violent resistance to the Sri Lankan government controlled by the majority Sinhalese. 

  3. Ajit’s activities created a conflict of loyalties for the applicant’s father who was working for the Sri Lankan government trying to re-establish administrative control of the region around Batticaloa.  The Sri Lankan armed forces raided the family home on several occasions looking for Ajit.  As a result of these pressures, the family returned to Colombo in about 1986.  The applicant himself had arrived in Colombo in 1985 to commence college studies.  However, Ajit continued his involvement with TELO in the Batticaloa region from the mid-to-late 1980s.

  4. In November 1989, after a brief visit…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 1088
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Adrian Ranendra Barnes, appealed against a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal which upheld a delegate's refusal of his application for a Protection Visa under the Migration Act 1958. The applicant argued that the Tribunal failed to make findings of material fact as required by the Act and that it incorrectly interpreted and applied the law in its decision. The Tribunal had concluded that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Sri Lanka. The applicant argued that the Tribunal rejected factual assertions without basing those rejections on probative evidence.

The court had to determine whether the Tribunal committed an error of law by misapplying the test of a "well-founded" fear of persecution and whether it failed to base factual findings on probative evidence. The court found that the Tribunal was not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence and had to act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case. The Tribunal was free to weigh whatever evidence was before it and the court could not re-evaluate the probative value of the evidence because to do so would be to review the merits of the case.

The court held that the applicant had failed to show that the Tribunal committed an error of law in either of the ways identified in the grounds of appeal. The Tribunal had reviewed the evidence as it thought fit and expressed itself to be satisfied that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution. The court could not disagree with the Tribunal's view of the merits of the case.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs. The court held that the Tribunal had not committed an error of law and that the applicant had failed to show that the Tribunal's decision was legally erroneous.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, Adrian Ranendra Barnes, appeals against a ruling made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), affirming the refusal by a delegate of the respondent Minister of the applicant’s application for a Protection Visa under s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). The applicant advances two grounds of appeal. First, it is contended that the Tribunal failed to observe procedures that were required by the Act or the Regulations in that it failed to make findings of material fact as required by s 430(1)(c) of the Act. Secondly, it is said that the Tribunal’s decision involved an error of law of a kind specified in s 476(1)(e) of the Act “in conjunction with s 420(2)(b) in that the [Tribunal] incorrectly interpreted and applied the applicable law”.Factual Background The applicant was born in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 1970. He is a member of the Tamil minority. The applicant stated in his Protection Visa application that his father had moved the family from Colombo to Batticaloa in the late 1970s over concerns about safety arising from the civil strife in the country. (For reasons that are not clear, the Tribunal said that the family had moved to Batticaloa because of the father’s work.) While living in Batticaloa, the applicant’s older brother, Ajit Barnes, became an armed cadre member of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO). This group, amongst others, called for the creation of a new Tamil state and for violent resistance to the Sri Lankan government controlled by the majority Sinhalese. Ajit’s activities created a conflict of loyalties for the applicant’s father who was working for the Sri Lankan government trying to re-establish administrative control of the region around Batticaloa. The Sri Lankan armed forces raided the family home on several occasions looking for Ajit. As a result of these pressures, the family returned to Colombo in about 1986. The applicant himself had arrived in Colombo in 1985 to commence college studies. However, Ajit continued his involvement with TELO in the Batticaloa region from the mid-to-late 1980s. In November 1989, after a brief visit to his family, the applicant’s brother Ajit left Colombo for Batticaloa. However, he was never seen by his family again. The evidence indicated that the applicant’s father has been very active in trying to find out what had happened to Ajit. Despite those efforts no satisfactory account has emerged of what befell Ajit, although one theory is that he was kidnapped by a rival organisation, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It has also been suggested that the Sri Lankan government may have been involved in his disappearance. After graduating from college in 1990, the applicant embarked on a four month computer training course. During that time, he met another Tamil named Kannan who was a member of the LTTE in Colombo. He told the applicant that it was probable that government troops that had taken Ajit . At the same time, however, Kannan promised to see if Ajit was being held by the LTTE. Implicit in this offer of assistance was that the applicant, in turn, would assist Kannan in LTTE activities.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In summary, the arguments advanced on behalf of the applicant do not show that the Tribunal committed an error of law by misapplying the test of a “well-founded” fear of persecution. Therefore, this challenge fails.B. Failure to base factual findings on probative evidence Like the first ground of appeal founded on par (a), the second ground of appeal also invokes s 476(1) but relies on par (e) “in conjunction with s 420(2)(b)”. Sub-section 420(2) provides;“(2)The Tribunal, in reviewing a decision [of the Minister’s delegate]:(a)is not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence; and(b)must act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case.” The applicant gave these particulars of this ground;“The Tribunal made conclusions on the basis that any fact not proved to the standard imposed by the Tribunal is “far fetched” without making such decision upon evidence which has probative value and on material which logically showed such existence.”This formulation is not very clear but I take it to mean that the Tribunal allegedly rejected as far-fetched factual assertions made by Mr Barnes without basing those rejections on probative evidence. First, it is be noted that the applicant does not say that there was no evidence for the Tribunal’s conclusions. Such a claim could be made under s 476(1)(g) if “there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision”, subject to the limitations of s 476(4). As the applicant has not relied on par (g), it is unnecessary to consider it further. However, by refraining from contending that there was no evidence to justify the Tribunal’s decision, the applicant implicitly concedes that there was some evidence to support its conclusions on factual matters. As a result, the applicant’s contention goes to the weight and method that the Tribunal used to evaluate the evidence. That affords no ground for asserting the Tribunal has committed an error of law. As Gleeson CJ and McHugh J said in Minister for Immigration v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 629 (regarding criticisms levelled by two Judges of this Court at the Tribunal for failing in its reasons to answer certain questions and for disregarding particular alleged facts):“These may or may not be valid criticisms of the Tribunal. The Tribunal concentrated its attention on Mr Eshetu's explanation of his fears. Having rejected that explanation, it did not embark upon a search for some alternative explanation which he did not advance. Once again, different minds could form different views about the reasonableness of that approach. However, it involves no error of law. The ultimate question was whether the Tribunal was satisfied about something. The approach adopted by the Tribunal does not manifest a legally erroneous view as to what it was about which it needed to be satisfied. For the Tribunal to conclude that, although it was satisfied that Mr Eshetu feared persecution, an examination of the reasons he advanced as to why he held that fear failed to satisfy the Tribunal that the fear was well-founded, does not reflect any misunderstanding as to the meaning of the concept of a well-founded fear. No error of law was shown. What emerged was nothing more than a number of reasons for disagreeing with the Tribunal's views of the merits of the case. The merits were for the Tribunal to determine, not for the Federal Court.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

In Mr Barnes’s case, the Tribunal reviewed the evidence as it thought fit and expressed itself to be satisfied that he did not have a well-founded fear. It was free to weigh whatever evidence was before it from whatever source. This Court cannot re-evaluate pursuant to s 476(1)(e) the probative value of the evidence because to do so would be to review the merits of the case. Accordingly, this challenge fails.Conclusion For the reasons which I have endeavoured to explain, the applicant has failed to show that the Tribunal committed an error of law in either of the ways identified in the grounds of appeal. The appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.