Barnes v GOKANI-ROBINS Pty Ltd
[2014] FCCA 351
•4 April 2014
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BARNES & ANOR v GOKANI-ROBINS PTY LTD & ANOR | [2014] FCCA 351 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Application to set aside bankruptcy notice – whether the debt the subject of the notice had been paid considered – consideration of guarantees provided by the debtors and their company and use of those guarantees by the creditors. |
| Legislation: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 |
| Baxter v Obacelo (2001) 205 CLR 635 Wong v Huisman [2010] QSC 192 |
| First Applicant: | ROBERT IVOR BARNES |
| Second Applicant: | CHRISTOPHER DAVID BARNES |
| First Respondent: | GOKANI-ROBINS PTY LTD |
| Second Respondent: | ACG & KCK INVESTMENTS PTY LTD |
| File Number: | SYG 2417 of 2013 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Driver |
| Hearing date: | 26 February 2014 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 4 April 2014 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Robertson |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Cordato Partners |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Hynes |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Gokani & Associates Legal |
ORDERS
Bankruptcy Notice 164562 of 2013 served on 19 September 2013 is set aside.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2417 of 2013
| ROBERT IVOR BARNES |
First Applicant
CHRISTOPHER DAVID BARNES
Second Applicant
And
| GOKANI-ROBINS PTY LTD |
First Respondent
| ACG & KCK INVESTMENTS PTY LTD |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction and background
By application filed on 8 October 2013, the applicants seek orders that bankruptcy notice 164562 of 2013[1] be set aside on the grounds that the debt has been paid in full. The applicants also sought interim relief that time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice be extended, which I have granted, up until the date of judgment in the matter. The application is supported by the affidavits of Robert Ivor Barnes made on 12 November 2013 and Shelly Agnes Barnes (the mother of the applicants) made on 12 November 2013, on which they were cross-examined. A further affidavit of Fiona Ta‑akimoeka (their solicitor) made on 29 November 2013 was overtaken by events[2].
[1] served on the applicants on 19 September 2013
[2] that affidavit related only to an interlocutory issue of the production of documents
The respondents rely upon their Notice of Grounds of Opposition to the application, filed on 21 October 2013, which is supported by three affidavits by Anand Kantilal Gokani made on 21 October, 19 November and 2 December 2013. Mr Gokani was cross-examined on his affidavits.
I also received the following exhibits:
·A1 Letter from Cordato Partners to Anand Gokani, 02.12.2013;
·A2 Jungle Gym Health and Fitness P/L bank statement;
·A3 Email from Gokani & Associates to Morney and Nichole Schlebusch, 03.06.2013;
·A4 Email from Gokani & Associates to Henry Grech, 10.09.2013;
·A5 Letter from Cordato Partners to Gokani & Associates, 18.06.2013;
·A6 Email from Nichole Schlebusch to “Alex”.
The parties made oral and written submissions.
Consideration
The non contentious facts relating to this matter are as follows[3].
[3] the statement of facts is derived from the submissions of the parties
The respondents are the owners of a property in the Lexington Corporate Norwest Business Park on Lexington Drive, Bella Vista, New South Wales, more particularly described as Lots 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 48, 49, 93, 94, 95 and 96 on Strata Plan 77109 (Property).
On or about 16 January 2013, the respondents entered into a lease in respect of the Property (Lease) with Jungle Gym Health & Fitness Pty Ltd (Jungle Gym)[4].
[4] Ex RB1, tab 3
At all material times, both of the applicants were the only directors of Jungle Gym.
The applicants were personal guarantors (guarantors) under the Lease[5].
[5] see clause 19, schedule 1 item 10 and the execution page of the Lease
Clause 18.1(a) of the Lease also required the “Tenant” (ie. Jungle Gym) to give a banker’s guarantee in the sum of $117,500. Clause 18.1(b) of the Lease provided that the respondents could enforce the banker’s guarantee “if the Tenant [ie. Jungle Gym] does not (i) pay the Rent … or any other money payable under this Lease; or (ii) perform all the Tenant’s obligations under this Lease.”
A bank guarantee was obtained and provided to the respondents by Jungle Gym for the sum of $117,568[6].
[6] Ex RB1, tab 4
Jungle Gym failed to pay rent due under the Lease and the Lease was terminated on 21 May 2013[7].
[7] Gokani (21/10/13) at [17] and Annexure “C” (pg 12)
On 6 June 2013, the respondents sent a letter of demand to the applicants, referring to their obligations as guarantors, and demanding payment of the sum of $173,375[8].
[8] Gokani at [17] and Annexure “C” (pgs 13-14)
The applicants did not pay the amount demanded and, on 26 June 2013, the respondents commenced proceedings against the applicants in the District Court of New South Wales, claiming the sum of $173,375[9]. Jungle Gym was not a party to those District Court proceedings.
[9] Ex RB1, tab 2
On or about 1 July 2013, the applicants served an Offer of Compromise under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 which stated[10]:
1. The first and second defendants [ie. the Applicants] offer to compromise these proceedings on the basis that there be judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $139,340.45.
[10] Ex RB1, tab 5
By letter dated 8 July 2013, the respondents accepted the applicants’ offer to compromise the District Court proceedings for the sum of $139,340.45[11]. On 24 July 2013, a consent judgment was entered in the District Court in the following terms[12]:
[11] Ex RB1, tab 6
[12] Ex RB1, tab 7
TERMS OF JUDGMENT MADE BY THE COURT BY CONSENT
Judgment against the First and Second Defendants [ie. the Applicants] in favour of the First and Second Plaintiffs [ie. the Respondents] in the sum of $139,340.45.
The First and Second Defendants pay the First and Second Plaintiffs costs of the proceedings until 1 July 2013, assessed on the ordinary basis.
On 8 July 2013, the respondents called on the bank guarantee which had been provided by Jungle Gym pursuant to clause 18 of the Lease[13]. On 19 July 2013, the respondents received the proceeds of the bank guarantee – an amount of $117,568[14].
[13] Gokani at [24]
[14] Gokani at [24]
On 1 August 2013, the solicitor for the respondents wrote to the solicitor for the applicants, enclosing a copy of the judgment, and requesting payment of the sum of $139,340.45 by 21 August 2013, with the payment to be made either by way of direct deposit or bank cheque[15].
[15] Ex RB1, tab 9
On 20 August 2013, the respondents received a direct deposit of $21,772.45 from “Jungle Gym H&F P/L”[16]. The bank statements of the respondents[17] demonstrate that the same payer details “Jungle GYM H&F P” appear for that payment as for earlier rental payments by Jungle Gym.
[16] Ex RB1, tab 10
[17] Gokani, Annexure “D”, pgs 15, 16 and 19
On 12 September 2013, the respondents caused the bankruptcy notice to be issued and it was served on the applicants on 19 September 2013.
Issue for determination
The applicants seek to have the bankruptcy notice set aside on the grounds that the debt has been paid in full.
The dispute relates to two payments that were made to the respondents:
a)the proceeds of the bank guarantee - $117,568; and
b)the payment made by direct deposit on 20 August 2013 - $21,772.45.
The questions for determination are whether the two payments were payments made by the applicants in reduction of their personal liability to the respondents which arose from their compromise of the District Court proceedings, or whether the applicants are otherwise entitled to the benefit of those payments against their personal liability.
The payments
The applicants submit that the judgment debt fixed the quantum of the loss sustained by the respondents arising from the termination of the Lease and that that amount has been paid. Additionally, they submit that, by virtue of the principle against double recovery, the respondents cannot seek to enforce the judgment in respect of any liability satisfied by the proceeds of the bank guarantee. Lastly, they submit that the payment of $21,772.45 made on 20 August 2013 was governed by a Quistclose type trust and was paid to the respondents on behalf of the applicants.
The respondents submit that, properly analysed, both payments were made by the St George Bank on behalf of Jungle Gym and that neither payment was made by the applicants.
The respondents submit that, even after the receipt by the respondents of the payments of $117,568 and $21,772.45 (which the respondents contend were payments by Jungle Gym), Jungle Gym remained indebted to the respondents in the amount of $194,634.55 (as at 21 October 2013)[18]. The level of Jungle Gym’s indebtedness has allegedly continued to increase and allegedly stood at an amount exceeding $214,159.55 in December 2013[19]. They assert that the indebtedness continues to increase.
[18] Gokani at [19] and [29]
[19] Gokani (2/12/13)
Calling on the bank guarantee and the payment of $117,568
The following facts and matters are relevant for the purposes of considering the bank guarantee payment:
a)the contractual obligation to provide the bank guarantee under the Lease was an obligation imposed on Jungle Gym rather than on the applicants[20];
b)Clause 18.1(b) of the Lease provided that the respondents could call on the bank guarantee if Jungle Gym failed to pay rent or other monies payable or failed to perform its obligations under the Lease;
c)to the extent that the applicants took steps to procure the bank guarantee, they did so on behalf of Jungle Gym;
d)the bank guarantee ($117,568) was called upon on 8 July 2013, which was after Jungle Gym had failed to pay rent for February, May, June and July 2013 (a total of about $247,500[21] but on the same day as the respondents compromised their claim against the applicants in respect of their personal liability as guarantors for a lesser amount); and
e)the Lease had been terminated on 21 May 2013 by the respondents because of the defaults on rental payments and the Property had since been occupied by a prospective new tenant, who, by deed dated 13 June 2013, accepted an assignment of the right to occupy the Property.
[20] clause 18.1(a)
[21] Jungle Gym made some small excess payments in March and April 2013 which were in part payment of the February rent and also paid $1,000 on 10 May 2013 – with the result that $235,250 was then claimed to be owing: Gokani (21/10/13) at [19]
The respondents rely upon two authorities in support of their case. In O’Sullivan v National Australia Bank Ltd[22], the Court was concerned with a bank guarantee that had been procured in circumstances that the respondents assert that are like this case. The facts and decision may be summarised as follows:
a)the tenant was a company called Frogs for Fitness Pty Ltd (like Jungle Gym);
b)O’Sullivan controlled Frogs for Fitness (like the applicants control Jungle Gym);
c)the landlord required a bank guarantee and O’Sullivan arranged with the National Australia Bank to provide that guarantee (like the applicants arranged a bank guarantee);
d)Frogs for Fitness fell into arrears and the landlord called on the bank guarantee and received the proceeds (like the respondents called on the bank guarantee). The amount paid on the bank guarantee was in fact more than the landlord was owed in rental arrears; (emphasis added)
e)there was a question in the case of whether the bank guarantee had been provided by O’Sullivan or Frogs for Fitness and Young J found that the appropriate course was to treat Frogs for Fitness as the provider of the guarantee and the maker of the payment when the guarantee was called upon, his Honour said[23]:
What Morrison J [in Comdel Commodities Ltd v Siporex Trade SA [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 424, 431] is primarily saying is that it is a matter of contract between the person who provides the security and the person who gets paid under the security, and that one does not muddy the waters by looking to see how the promised bond was furnished because it can be assumed that there will be collateral contracts between other parties which will deal with that situation commercially.
It seems to me on this reasoning it is enough that contractually Frogs for Fitness agreed to furnish the bond. That and the fact there is overpayment provides a cause of action. It may be O’Sullivan or someone else can make a claim against Frogs for Fitness in contract, trust or otherwise, so that any moneys recovered by Frogs for Fitness will in fact flow through it like a conduit to the “real owner”. That, however, does not prevent Frogs for Fitness maintaining an action.
[22] (unreported, SCNSW, Young J, 11 June 1998, BC9802906)
[23] BC9802906 at pg 4
I accept that the effect of Young J’s decision is that one must look to the contractual obligation to provide the bank guarantee which is invariably (as it was in this case) the tenant (ie. Jungle Gym). If the calling of the bank guarantee resulted in the landlords receiving too much money, then the tenant (not some other third party, such as the directors controlling the tenant) could sue to recover the overpayment[24].
[24] see also Ideas Plus Investments Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2006] WASCA 215 at [45]-[49] per Steytler (with whom the other members of the Court of Appeal agreed); see also McLure JA at [98]-[101]
Wong v Huisman[25] is another decision concerning facts like this case. In that case, the lease required the tenant to provide a bank guarantee and the wife of the director of the tenant requested the Bank of Queensland to provide that guarantee. The bank guarantee identified the wife as the “customer”. The bank guarantee was called, the bank paid it and then required the wife (customer) to reimburse it. The wife then brought proceedings against the landlord claiming that the guarantee should not have been called upon and seeking to recover the money paid to the landlord by the bank. Margaret Wilson J found that the wife did not have any real prospect of succeeding in her claim[26]. The following passages are apposite:
[15]Assuming (for the purposes of this application) that the defendants called on the bank guarantee when they were not entitled to do so, then the second plaintiff [ie. the tenant] may recover the amount paid under it from the defendants. Its entitlement to do so is based on the contract between it and the defendants. See O’Sullivan v National Australia Bank Ltd and Cargill International SA Antiga Geneva Branch v Bangladesh Sugar & Food Industries Corporation.
and
[21]It is apparent on the face of the bank guarantee and from the bank’s letters to the defendants that it was issued at the request of the first plaintiff [ie. the wife]. However, the obligation to provide a bank guarantee rested with the second plaintiff [ie. the tenant], and there is nothing to suggest that it was of any moment to the defendants that it was issued at the bequest of the first plaintiff. The mere fact that the defendants had knowledge that the bank had given the guarantee at the request of the first plaintiff did not give rise to any contract between the defendants and the first plaintiff.
[25] [2010] QSC 192
[26] see at [15]-[24]
I accept that Jungle Gym was obliged to provide the bank guarantee under the Lease and the payment pursuant to the bank guarantee was a payment made by or on behalf of Jungle Gym. The authorities referred to above establish that if there had been an overpayment, then Jungle Gym (and not the applicants) would be able to sue to recover it.
For these reasons, the $117,568 payment was not a payment by the applicants. It was, in my view, a form of self help resorted to by the respondents to recoup part of their loss to that point in the knowledge of the then pending judgment debt. It does not follow, however, that the bank guarantee sum is irrelevant in determining whether the debt in the bankruptcy notice was overstated.
Payment of $21,772.45 made by direct deposit on 20 August 2013
There is no issue that the payment of $21,772.45 on 20 August 2013 was made by electronic funds transfer from the bank account of Jungle Gym to the bank account of the respondents. The bank statements of the respondents show that the payment was made in the same way that previous rental payments had been made. The payment was on its face a payment made by Jungle Gym. As will be shown, however, one needs to look deeper to discover the true nature of that payment.
Did the judgment fix the quantum of loss?
The applicants submit that the settlement of the District Court proceedings fixed the quantum of loss in respect of the termination of the lease. The submission is based upon a contention that the District Court proceedings sought damages arising from the termination of the lease including lost rent on an on-going basis and that given this, there has been an adjudication of all claims concerning and relating to the respondents’ losses.
The respondents place significance on the fact that Jungle Gym was not a party to the proceedings, and no release was given to Jungle Gym as part of the compromise. They contend that, had the applicants (and Jungle Gym) wished for a resolution of all matters relating to the respondents’ losses arising under the lease, an appropriate release of Jungle Gym should have been sought.
The applicants rely on the principle referred to in Baxter v Obacelo[27]. There is a question, however, whether the respondents are pursuing a further claim in respect of the same damages. The respondents contend that they elected to compromise their claim against the applicants to the extent of the consent judgment, but continue to hold Jungle Gym liable in respect of other losses. They contend that, as was the case in Baxter v Obacelo, there is no evidence that both the applicants and the respondents intended an accord on some other basis[28].
[27] (2001) 205 CLR 635 at 656, in particular at [46] and [48]
[28] see 657 [49]
I agree in part. Three things are clear. First, the applicants were settling a claim against them personally, as guarantors, and not a claim against Jungle Gym. Secondly, the applicants’ liability as guarantors could be no greater than that of Jungle Gym. That was the nature of the guarantee. Thirdly, the claim against the applicants arose because Jungle Gym defaulted on rental payments and the claim was for rental losses up until June 2013. That claim was settled and the settlement fixed the quantum of loss up to June 2013. It also fixed the liability of the applicants as guarantors.
It follows, in my view, that the judgment, while it fixed the quantum of loss up to June 2013, did not prevent the respondents from claiming damages from Jungle Gym for later losses that could be quantified.
Did the proceeds of the bank guarantee satisfy the same liability as gave rise to the judgment?
The applicants contend that the respondents’ entitlement to call upon the bank guarantee did not extend to unliquidated damages following termination, and payment under it could only be recognised as a payment towards the discharge of the judgment debt. This requires analysis of the terms of the Lease.
As referred to above, clause 18.1(b) of the Lease[29] relevantly provides:
[29] Ex RB1, tab 3, p 33
The Landlord may enforce the Banker’s Guarantee.…if the Tenant does not:
(i)Pay the Rent or the Tenant’s Proportion of Operating Costs or any other money payable under this Lease; or
(ii)Perform all the Tenant’s obligations under this Lease.
There is nothing contained in the Lease which prohibits the respondents from calling upon the bank guarantee subsequent to the Lease’s termination, and nothing contained in the Lease which would have the effect of confining the proceeds received from the bank guarantee security to unpaid rental up to the time of termination.
However, after termination, the respondents’ claim against Jungle Gym is for damages which are in total unquantified. The only unquestionable quantification of loss is that contained in the judgment debt. There may well be other losses but they must be quantified, in order to determine whether calling on the bank guarantee in addition to the judgment debt would result in an overpayment. It may[30]. In my view, it is significant that the respondents delayed calling on the bank guarantee until the loss was at least partly quantified by the settlement in a higher amount. It is also significant that the respondents refused to disclose to the applicants how the bank guarantee funds had been applied[31].
[30] Issues addressed at the trial of this case included the calculation of sums said to be due from Jungle Gym, offsetting amounts paid by a replacement tenant and the value of the client data base of Jungle Gym which was made available to the replacement tenant by the respondents
[31] Ex RB1, tab 10, correspondence dated 6 August 2013
The respondents had a duty to mitigate their loss following termination of the Lease. The Property has been occupied by a new gym operator (Elite Fitness) but the operators of that business have yet to sign a lease and the terms of a lease are still being negotiated. They have been paying rent but at a lower rate than was paid by Jungle Gym. The applicants made submissions concerning the absence of evidence relating to amounts that the respondents are entitled to receive from Elite Fitness (the replacement tenant), but the respondents have given evidence of the amounts received (up until December 2013) as well as the status of the lease negotiations with Elite Fitness[32]. It is not necessary in these proceedings to adjudicate on the accuracy of those calculations or on any legal issues as between the respondents and Jungle Gym about them.
[32] see Gokani 21/10/13 at [19], [22]; Gokani 19/11/13 at [13(c)-(d)]; Gokani 2/12/13 at [5]
The letter of demand dated 6 June 2013 issued by the respondents to the applicants which preceded the District Court proceedings claimed $173,375 for unpaid rent up to June 2013 (including damages for lost rent following the termination of the Lease). The compromise reached was plainly a compromise of that claim. At the time of the settlement on 8 July 2013 another month’s lost rent might have been claimed from Jungle Gym, but the respondents could not claim from Jungle Gym the prior lost rent if paid by the applicants.
In his first affidavit, Mr Gokani details alleged losses up to October 2013 which exceed the amount received from the bank guarantee and the payment on 20 August 2013 by $194,634.55. That could only found a claim against Jungle Gym as the claim against the applicants was compromised. This Court is not the appropriate place to adjudicate on that claim (if indeed such a claim is made). I observe, however, that the claim is overstated because the claim for the period up to June 2013 was compromised for a lesser amount.
What is important is that, at the time the bank guarantee was called upon, the respondents’ losses, even on their own case, did not exceed $200,115.45 (ie. the settlement sum plus rent for July 2013 less rent received from another party (Momentum Fitness – apparently on behalf of Elite Fitness) in July 2013). The respondents could not call on the bank guarantee for possible future losses that had not then been suffered. It follows, in my view, that the bank guarantee covered the same loss as was the subject of the settlement, plus lost rent for July 2013. Thus, having called on the bank guarantee in respect of that loss, the applicants were relieved of further liability under the judgment debt by the amount of the bank guarantee, less the net July 2013 rental loss ($60,775). Accordingly, the liability of the applicants under the judgment was reduced by not less than $56,793.
Was the payment on 20 August 2013 of $21,772.45 in law a payment by or on behalf of the applicants?
As referred to above, the payment of $21,772.45 was made by electronic funds transfer from the bank account of Jungle Gym to the bank account of the respondents. The applicants contend that the payment was held by Jungle Gym on a Quistclose trust for Mrs Barnes (ie. that the monies were entrusted to Jungle Gym to meet the liabilities of the applicants).
It is said that any fair reading of the correspondence from the applicants issued on 20 August 2013 to the respondents[33] demonstrates that the moneys were paid on behalf of the applicants and that something akin to a Quistclose trust was formed arising from a particular intention of Mrs Barnes. I accept from her evidence that she intended that the money she advanced would reduce the liability of the applicants.
[33] Ex RB1, tab 11
The correspondence of 20 August 2013 does not demonstrate the establishment of a trust in favour of Mrs Barnes. What that correspondence does establish is that the sum of $21,772.45 was being tendered in full and final settlement of the judgment debt owed by the applicants, after taking into account the bank guarantee payment received by the respondents. The respondents, did not, and did not have to, accept the payment on those terms. The consequences of the respondents calling on the bank guarantee were clearly disputed in correspondence between the parties. However, what should have been blindingly obvious to the respondents was that they were not entitled to retain the money as a payment by someone else entirely, even if the money had passed through the other person’s bank account. The payment was obviously a payment made in reduction of the applicants’ liability under the judgment. The focus of the respondents on the letterhead and signature block of the applicants’ letter rather than on the plain words in the letter is not only misplaced: it is disingenuous[34].
[34] it also paid no regard to the covering letter from the applicants’ solicitors which made clear that the correspondence concerned the judgment debt
I am satisfied that there was a loan agreement between the applicants and their mother. That does not of itself change the characterisation of the payment from Jungle Gym to the respondents. What is, in my view, more important was the basis upon which the money was tendered and accepted. The money was tendered in payment of the judgment debt. It was purportedly accepted as a payment by Jungle Gym in respect of an unquantified liability that had not been pressed. It should have been credited by the respondents against the judgment debt. Otherwise the money paid would have been recoverable by the applicants[35].
[35] David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353
For all of these reasons, I am satisfied that the payment of $21,772.45 was a payment by the applicants (personally) to the respondents in reduction of their liability under the judgment.
Conclusion
I am not persuaded by the applicants’ principal argument that the judgment debt has been paid in full. The respondents were entitled to call upon the bank guarantee and did so. The bank guarantee related to the liability of the applicants’ company rather than their personal liability arising from the judgment. However, the timing of the calling on the bank guarantee created in the minds of the applicants the impression that the bank guarantee had been called on in partial satisfaction of the judgment debt. In reality, as I have found, the bank guarantee satisfied in part the established and asserted losses of the respondents up to the time it was called upon. Those losses included the losses that had been compromised by the settlement resulting in the judgment. Thus, not less than the amount of $56,793 of the judgment debt was satisfied by the bank guarantee.
I accept the evidence of Shelly Barnes that she advanced the sum of $21,772.45 to her children to help them discharge their personal liability. It was clumsy and unfortunate that the funds were paid through the bank account of Jungle Gym but I accept the explanation advanced for the circumstances of that transfer. The respondents were under no obligation to accept that payment as full and final satisfaction of the judgment debt (which was the basis on which it was tendered). Neither, however, were they entitled to accept the payment as a further discharge of asserted liabilities of Jungle Gym (which had not been fully quantified). In truth, the payment was at least part satisfaction of the applicants’ personal liability. They were given no credit for that payment in the bankruptcy notice. Notice has been given of an asserted over statement of the debt[36].
[36] See Exhibit A1
I am persuaded that the asserted debt in the bankruptcy notice is overstated at least by the sum of $78,565.45 ($56,793 plus $21,772.45) and accordingly, the bankruptcy notice should be set aside. I will so order.
I will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding fifty-five (55) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Driver
Associate:
Date: 4 April 2014
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