JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: BARNEL INVESTMENTS PTY LTD -v- CONCEPTUAL TECHNOLOGIES PTY LTD [2022] WASC 8
CORAM: TOTTLE J
HEARD: 13 DECEMBER 2021
DELIVERED : 13 JANUARY 2022
FILE NO/S: CIV 1347 of 2019
BETWEEN: BARNEL INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
First Plaintiff
TZANEEN KOELKAMERS CC
Second Plaintiff
SOUTPANSBERG KOELKAMERS PTY LTD
Third Plaintiff
AND
CONCEPTUAL TECHNOLOGIES PTY LTD
First Defendant
STEELE CHRISTIAN WEST
Second Defendant
STEPHEN MARK WEST
Third Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Recusal application - Whether hypothetical lay observer might entertain a reasonable apprehension of bias based on previous proceedings between a defendant and the case managing judicial officer - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Application granted
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| First Plaintiff | : | Mr WCJ Zappia & Mr CC McCavana |
| Second Plaintiff | : | Mr WCJ Zappia & Mr CC McCavana |
| Third Plaintiff | : | Mr WCJ Zappia & Mr CC McCavana |
| First Defendant | : | Mr S Penglis SC & Mr M McKenna |
| Second Defendant | : | Mr S Penglis SC & Mr M McKenna |
| Third Defendant | : | Mr S Penglis SC & Mr M McKenna |
Solicitors:
| First Plaintiff | : | Minter Ellison |
| Second Plaintiff | : | Minter Ellison |
| Third Plaintiff | : | Minter Ellison |
| First Defendant | : | Gilbert + Tobin |
| Second Defendant | : | Gilbert + Tobin |
| Third Defendant | : | Gilbert + Tobin |
Cases referred to in decision:
Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337
Helljay Investments Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1999] HCA 56; (1999) 166 ALR 302
Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488
Livesey v The New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288
R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte The Angliss Group [1969] HCA 10; (1969) 122 CLR 546
R v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450
R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256
Rayney v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2018] WASCA 73
Rayney v Western Australia (No 2) [2020] WASCA 207
Re Polites; Ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 25; (1991) 173 CLR 78
Smits v Roach [2006] HCA 36; (2006) 227 CLR 423
Vakauta v Kelly [1989] HCA 44; (1989) 167 CLR 568
Webb v R [1994] HCA 30; (1994) 181 CLR 41
TOTTLE J:
Introduction
On 13 December 2021 I acceded to the defendants' application that I should recuse myself from further management of this action on the grounds of apprehended bias.
The trial of the action was listed to commence on 17 January 2022 and the estimated duration of the trial was eight days. The imminence of the trial meant it was necessary to deliver a decision promptly. Assisted by the helpful submissions filed by both parties, I reached a firm conclusion on the disposition of the application and delivered short oral reasons explaining why I considered that I should recuse myself. I said that the oral reasons…
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- Case
- [2022] WASC 8
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In addressing the issue, the court considered the principles established in prior cases regarding judicial impartiality and recusal. It was noted that while a reasonable apprehension of bias must be firmly established to justify recusal, in cases of real doubt, it is often prudent for a judge to recuse themselves to avoid the potential inconvenience of an appellate court reaching a different conclusion. The court emphasised that the test for recusal involves an objective assessment of whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the case. The court also highlighted the importance of the logical connection between any matter suggesting bias and the feared deviation from deciding the case on its merits.
After considering the submissions and relevant authorities, the court concluded that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias that warranted the recusal of the judge. The court found that the prior involvement of the judge in a related proceeding did not give rise to an apprehension that the judge would not approach the current matter with an impartial mind. Consequently, the judge was not disqualified from hearing the case.
The court's final orders did not include any directions for the recusal of the judge. Instead, the court confirmed that the judge was entitled to continue to hear and determine the matter.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
While a reasonable apprehension of bias must be firmly established to justify a judge recusing themselves from hearing a matter,[10] in a case of real doubt it will often be prudent for a judge to decide not to sit in order to avoid the inconvenience that could result if an appellate court were to take a different view on the matter of disqualification.[11][10] R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte The Angliss Group [1969] HCA 10; (1969) 122 CLR 546, 553-554. [11] Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [20]. In Rayney v Western Australia (No 2)[12] Murphy JA provided the following review of the statements of principle in the leading authorities:[13][12] Rayney v Western Australia (No 2) [2020] WASCA 207.[13] Rayney v Western Australia (No 2) [80] - [86] (Murphy JA).In Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said:[14][14] Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [19].Judges have a duty to exercise their judicial functions when their jurisdiction is regularly invoked and they are assigned to cases in accordance with the practice which prevails in the court to which they belong. They do not select the cases they will hear, and they are not at liberty to decline to hear cases without good cause. Judges do not choose their cases; and litigants do not choose their judges. If one party to a case objects to a particular judge sitting, or continuing to sit, then that objection should not prevail unless it is based upon a substantial ground for contending that the judge is disqualified from hearing and deciding the case.In Livesey v The New South Wales Bar Association the High Court said:[15][15] Livesey v The New South Wales Bar Association (294).If a judge at first instance considers that there is any real possibility that his participation in a case might lead to a reasonable apprehension of pre-judgment or bias, he should, of course, refrain from sitting. On the other hand, it would be an abdication of judicial function and an encouragement of procedural abuse for a judge to adopt the approach that he should automatically disqualify himself whenever he was requested by one party so to do on the grounds of a possible appearance of pre-judgment or bias, regardless of whether the other party desired that the matter be dealt with by him as the judge to whom the hearing of the case had been entrusted by the ordinary procedures and practice of the particular court.In Ebner, their Honours also said:[16][16] Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [6].Where, in the absence of any suggestion of actual bias, a question arises as to the independence or impartiality of a judge …, the governing principle is that, subject to qualifications relating to waiver … or necessity …, a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide.There must be an articulation of the logical connection between (1) the matter identified as the basis upon which it is said that the judge might decide the case other than on its merits, and (2) the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits.[17][17] Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [8].…In Johnson v Johnson, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said:[18]The hypothetical reasonable observer of the judge’s conduct is postulated in order to emphasise that the test is objective, is founded in the need for public confidence in the judiciary, and is not based purely upon the assessment by some judges of the capacity or performance of their colleagues. At the same time, two things need to be remembered: the observer is taken to be reasonable; and the person being observed is ‘a professional judge whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require [the judge] to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial’.Whilst the fictional observer, by reference to whom the test is formulated, is not to be assumed to have a detailed knowledge of the law, or of the character or ability of a particular judge, the reasonableness of any suggested apprehension of bias is to be considered in the context of ordinary judicial practice. (emphasis added)In Re Polites; Ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd,[19] Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said (albeit with particular reference to the decision in Livesey):In applying this test, it is necessary to bear in mind the caution expressed by Mason J in Re JRL; Ex parte CJL:'It seems that the acceptance by this Court of the test of reasonable apprehension of bias in such cases as Watson and Livesey has led to an increase in the frequency of applications by litigants that judicial officers should disqualify themselves from sitting in particular cases on account of their participation in other proceedings involving one of the litigants or on account of conduct during the litigation. It needs to be said loudly and clearly that the ground of disqualification is a reasonable apprehension that the judicial officer will not decide the case impartially or without prejudice, rather than that he will decide the case adversely to one party. There may be many situations in which previous decisions of a judicial officer on issues of fact and law may generate an expectation that he is likely to decide issues in a particular case adversely to one of the parties. But this does not mean either that he will approach the issues in that case otherwise than with an impartial and unprejudiced mind in the sense in which that expression is used in the authorities or that his previous decisions provide an acceptable basis for inferring that there is a reasonable apprehension that he will approach the issues in this way. (emphasis added)[18] Johnson v Johnson [12] - [13].[19] Re Polites; Ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 25; (1991) 173 CLR 78, 86; see also Helljay Investments Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1999] HCA 56; (1999) 166 ALR 302 [11]; R v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450, 471.