Barlow & Sellers (No 3)
[2022] FedCFamC1A 105
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Barlow & Sellers (No 3) [2022] FedCFamC1A 105
Appeal from: Barlow & Sellers [2021] FedCFamC1F 327 Appeal number(s): NAA 15 of 2022 File number(s): ADC 3611 of 2012 Judgment of: ALDRIDGE, AUSTIN & TREE JJ Date of judgment: 13 July 2022 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – Where the mother appeals from final parenting orders – Procedural fairness – Bias – Where these allegations are not substantiated – Family violence – Where the primary judge did not accept the mother’s evidence and found the issue was not relevant – Where the Independent Children’s Lawyer was under the obligation to tender only material they reasonably believed to be relevant, not all available material – Children’s views – Challenges to weight – Findings were open on the evidence – No error established – Appeal dismissed – No order as to costs. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 68LA Cases cited: Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55
Conway v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 203; [2002] HCA 2
Giltson & Basfield [2014] FamCA 319
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
Jess & Jess (2021) FLC 94-055; [2021] FamCAFC 159
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17
Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513; [1986] HCA 17
Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128; [2016] NSWCA 88
Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568; [1989] HCA 44
Number of paragraphs: 70 Date of hearing: 1 June 2022 Place: Adelaide (via video link), delivered in Sydney The Appellant: Self-represented litigant Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Roberts Solicitor for the Respondent: Thomson & Associates Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Ms Olsson Solicitor for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Silkwoods Chambers ORDERS
NAA 15 of 2022
ADC 3611 of 2012FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MS BARLOW
Appellant
AND: MR SELLERS
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
ALDRIDGE, AUSTIN & TREE JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
13 JULY 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Barlow & Sellers (No 3) has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ALDRIDGE, AUSTIN & TREE JJ:
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from final parenting orders made by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) on 20 December 2021.
Ms Barlow (“the mother”) and Mr Sellers (“the father”) have two children who were born in 2010 and 2012. The orders provided for both children to live with the father who was to have sole parental responsibility for them. The children were to have limited time via Skype with the mother and no face-to-face time. The mother was restrained from attending at or approaching nearer than 100 metres of the children’s school (unless invited to a parent/teacher interview by the principal or the class teacher) and restrained from attending nearer than 100 metres of the father’s church from 15 minutes before any advertised service until 15 minutes after the conclusion. Orders were also made for the father to keep the mother updated of the children’s schooling and health, and where the mother chose to attend therapy, to provide the relevant reasons for judgment and Family Report to the therapist.
The mother appeals against these orders.
The parties have had a history of almost continuous litigation in relation to their children.
The parties commenced a relationship in late 2009 and separated in September 2012. The mother commenced proceedings on 19 September 2012.
Final orders were made by consent on 9 October 2013, but on 21 November 2013 the mother stopped complying with them. On 18 February 2014, the mother filed an application seeking to suspend the children’s time with the father.
Ultimately, a final hearing took place before Berman J for five days between October 2017 and March 2018. On 5 April 2018, his Honour made orders which provided for the parties to have equal shared parental responsibility and for the children to live with the mother and spend significant and substantial time with the father.
The mother filed a further Initiating Application on 23 October 2018 seeking orders that the children spend no time with the father, but filed a Notice of Discontinuance on 16 January 2019.
The father filed an Initiating Application on 15 February 2019 seeking orders that he have sole parental responsibility for the children and that the children live with him and spend significant and substantial time with the mother.
On 16 March 2019, the Department for Child Protection (“the DCP”) removed the children from the care of the father, with whom they were spending time pursuant to the orders made on 5 April 2018. The children were placed in the care of the mother and were not to see the father.
The DCP appeared in the proceedings on 9 July 2019 and informed the Court that it no longer had any objection to the children spending time with the father.
Interim orders were made by the primary judge on 27 February 2020 and 13 March 2020 which had the consequence that the children were to live with the father from 27 February 2020 until the final orders were made.
The mother’s case at the final hearing was that the father posed a risk of sexual harm to the children and that he was violent. The primary judge did not accept these contentions. Findings were made that the mother “did not promote the children’s relationship with the father [following the orders of 5 April 2018] at any level, and to the contrary determined by her actions that there would be no such relationship” (at [441]) and that “facilitating physical time … between the children and their mother will inevitably result in the children yet again being the subject of ongoing litigation due to the mother’s inability to comply with orders of the Court” (at [445]).
THE APPEAL
The mother filed a Second Further Amended Notice of Appeal on 8 March 2022 pursuant to orders made by Austin J on 18 February 2022 which struck out many of the grounds of appeal. The Second Further Amended Notice of Appeal contained five grounds raising the following issues:
·The findings were not supported by the evidence (Ground 1);
·The primary judge wilfully failed to consider the evidence (Ground 2);
·The mother was denied procedural fairness (Ground 4);
·The primary judge was biased (Ground 5); and
·The primary judge breached the provisions of the “Data Communication Act 2013, Data [Surveillance] Act SA 2015 and the Evidence Act of 1995” (Ground 11).
The mother filed a set of written submissions on 11 February 2022, but also filed a document headed “Appellant Submissions” on 25 May 2022 on which she relied on at the hearing. These reasons address the matters raised in those submissions even though they do not directly reflect the grounds appearing in the Second Further Amended Notice of Appeal.
It has to be understood that this appeal is being heard in a limited context. On 12 May 2022, orders were made discharging the requirement for the mother to obtain a copy of the transcript for use in the appeal, but dismissing her application that the Court obtain the transcript on her behalf. The consequence is that the appeal is being heard without that transcript.
Was there a denial of procedural fairness?
Grounds of appeal which contend a denial of procedural fairness or judicial bias are to be considered at the outset as they strike at the integrity of the trial process (Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577 at [117]; Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128 at [9]).
The mother says that the evidence showing the denial of procedural fairness is to be found in the transcript, in the way the trial was conducted and due to the lengthy delay in between the hearing dates and the orders being made. She submitted that she was required to present her phones and personal correspondence without any “established reasons …and in direct violation of multiple legislation”. She also complained that she was not allowed to show the expert witness documents during cross-examination and was generally denied procedural fairness because she was a woman.
There may have been good reasons for those rulings made by the primary judge, if, indeed, they were made, or they may have been made in error but in the absence of the transcript we are quite unable to take these matters further.
Although the delay is not ideal, the mother did not point to any practical injustice which resulted from it or suggest that the reasons should be subject to greater scrutiny (see Jess & Jess (2021) FLC 94-055 at [58]). She did, however, assert that she was the subject of “systems abuse” because of the delay, which she said led to a biased trial and orders that endangered the children.
No further details or examples were provided in support of how the trial was conducted in an unfair way and without the transcript, this ground cannot stand.
Was the primary judge biased?
The mother submitted that the primary judge was biased because:
·The findings reiterated the previous interim judgment delivered on 27 February 2020 and 12 November 2020;
·The mother was prevented from questioning witnesses;
·The Independent Children’s Lawyer (“the ICL”) refused to tender the DCP file; and
·The primary judge failed to refer to case law.
In order to establish actual bias, the mother must demonstrate that the primary judge’s mind was “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented” (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [72]).
The mere fact that the primary judge made a set of interim parenting orders on 27 February 2020 and 12 November 2020 does not mean that her Honour did not bring an open mind to bear on the question of what orders were appropriate to be made on 20 December 2021. Bias is not established by the mere fact that the sets of orders were similar in content. Further, there is no suggestion that the mother sought the disqualification of the primary judge at any time after 12 November 2020 (Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568).
In the absence of the transcript, we are unable to deal with the submission that the mother was improperly prevented from asking questions.
The conduct of the ICL cannot bear upon impartiality of the primary judge.
We do not understand why a failure to refer to case law suggests bias. In her written submissions on appeal, the mother referred to a particular trial decision, which was also referred to in her affidavit of 14 September 2020 (Giltson & Basfield [2014] FamCA 319). This decision, which was based upon the facts peculiar to it, was not binding on the primary judge and, in any event, concerned a completely different set of circumstances. It is not relevant to these proceedings in any way.
In short, the mother’s complaints about bias are merely no more than a complaint that the proceedings did not go her way. This ground is not established.
Was a single expert witness impermissibly asked leading questions?
The mother submits that an expert witness must not be asked leading questions and that as such questions were asked of the experts, their evidence could not be relied upon.
We do not agree that there is an absolute rule that witnesses should not be asked leading questions, but in any event, in the absence of the transcript, we are unable to see whether any such questions were asked, whether they were objected to and what, if any, the ruling on those objections was. We are unable to take this matter any further.
Did the primary judge fail to consider the evidence of Dr EE?
The mother submitted that the primary judge failed to consider the evidence of Dr EE, which she considered demonstrated that the father had a mental illness which would adversely impact on his ability to meet the physical and emotional needs of the children. Dr EE was the single expert psychiatrist in the case, who conducted an assessment of the parties. His evidence as to the mental state of each of the parties was extensively considered by the primary judge at [265]–[289]. Her Honour said:
289.Dr EE reported that the father suffered from Condition FF, that he considered that it was under control and that it could be adequately treated by his General Practitioner. He considered that the level of Condition FF suffered by the father should not impact significantly on his parenting ability and his opinion was not shaken in cross-examination.
This led to the conclusion that the children were not at risk of any form of harm or abuse on the part of the father (at [339]) and that both parents have the capacity to provide for the physical needs of the children (at [394]). Thus the evidence as to the husband’s condition was expressly considered.
We add that it is clear from the finding that the low level of Condition FF from which the father was found to suffer did not significantly impact on his ability to care for the children. This is in marked contrast to the evidence in relation to the mother which was:
287.He expressed the view that he thought what he had observed in court illustrated a very different behaviour on the part of the mother to that exhibited by her during the consultation in his rooms and that he had observed her in court to be emotionally dysregulated with difficulty in following guidance and being very focussed on the father’s negative traits.
288.He said that he did consider paranoia in his report and that he had probably seen evidence in the courtroom that perhaps raised that possibility. He considered the mother’s aggressive tone and her outbursts from time to time to be either part of her fundamental personality structure or that she suffered from a delusional disorder with a paranoid subtype.
This, and other evidence, led the primary judge to conclude that, unlike the father, there was a need to protect the children from the risk of harm in the care of the mother.
The mother also submitted that the topic of her willingness and need to obtain counselling did not feature in the trial and no evidence was produced in support of such a finding. However, the mother was cross-examined about attending therapy and “sought therapy when she thought she needed it” (at [211]). Dr EE also expressed a view that if the Court found in the father’s favour, then it would be appropriate for the mother to attend therapy (at [269]–[270]). Thus, there was evidence to support her Honour’s conclusion that the mother would benefit from therapy (at [405] and [455]).
No error has been demonstrated.
Did the primary judge fail to have regard to the wishes of the children?
To understand this ground it is necessary to explain that on 12 November 2020 the primary judge made interim orders for reasons that were given at the time. The mother submits that the primary judge erred in those reasons by failing to consider “the expressed articulated vehement wishes of the children” because they were autistic (Mother’s written submissions filed on 25 May 2022, paragraph 11(iii)). There is, of course, no appeal from that decision and the submission is misplaced.
In any event, in the reasons subject of the appeal, the primary judge dealt extensively with the children’s wishes at [355]–[366]. As her Honour said in [356], there was no doubt that the children’s express view was to return to live with their mother. Her Honour then said:
364.At the time of trial B was aged 10 years and C was 8 years of age. They are young but their wishes must be taken into account, although the weight to be given to those wishes is a matter for the Court.
365.Both children are on the Autism Spectrum, although C is able to function at a much higher level than B and does not require anywhere near as much additional assistance at school. This was clear from the evidence of Mr T and the children’s school reports.
366.I am not satisfied that either child has the level of maturity necessary to enable the Court to rely on their expressed wishes as a strong [determinator] of the outcome of these proceedings. I am satisfied that unfortunately they have a knowledge of court proceedings well beyond what would normally be expected of children their age. I find the complexity of the issues before the Court are well beyond the capacity of either child to understand. …
Contrary to the submission of the mother, the primary judge did not simply discount the children’s wishes because they were autistic, but having regard to that, to their age and their maturity and ability to understand the complex issues before the Court, her Honour considered that their expressed wishes could not be seen as a “strong [determinator] of the outcome”. In other words, the weight to be given to the children’s views was not such that it should outweigh all other considerations. Thus, we are satisfied that the primary judge expressly considered the children’s wishes. We see no error in the weight that her Honour was entitled to give to them and questions of weight are very much a matter for the primary judge (Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513).
Did the ICL fail to act in the best interests of the children?
Under this heading, the mother contends that the ICL failed to tender the full set of subpoenaed documents produced to the Court by the DCP (the mother asserted only two files out of four files were tendered), failed to present all evidence from subpoenaed records, including the children’s medical and school records, and was thereby shown to be biased and not acting in the best interests of the children.
Contrary to the mother’s assertion, it is not the function of the ICL to tender all evidence from subpoenaed materials. Under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”), such lawyers must “act in relation to the proceedings in what the independent children’s lawyer believes to be the best interests of the child” (s 68LA(2)). That requires the ICL to put forward evidence that he or she considers would advance the determination of the children’s best interests. The view formed by the ICL on those matters may not accord with that of the other parties but that does not make it erroneous.
As to reports and the like, s 68LA(5)(c) of the Act provides:
(5) The independent children’s lawyer must:
…
(c)if a report or other document that relates to the child is to be used in the proceedings:
(i)analyse the report or other document to identify those matters in the report or other document that the independent children’s lawyer considers to be the most significant ones for determining what is in the best interests of the children; and
(ii)ensure that those matters are properly drawn to the court’s attention.
In addition to this statutory obligation on the part of the ICL to identify matters of significance, all lawyers are under an obligation to tender only material that they reasonably believe to be relevant and therefore admissible. Therefore, the mere fact that not all available material was tendered cannot, of itself establish partiality or misconduct.
The mother did not explain why she did not herself tender the relevant DCP files, the children’s medical record or school reports, if they were so relevant to the proceedings before the Court.
To the extent the mother asserted, at various times, that she was not permitted to do so, that complaint cannot be addressed in the absence of the transcript. This challenge therefore does not succeed.
Was the family assessment improperly conducted and was family violence not considered?
The mother submitted that the family assessment was improperly conducted, did not comply with the relevant standards and that the report writer was biased. Accordingly, she said the report should not have been admitted or given any weight.
Ms R prepared a Family Report on 16 April 2020 which was summarised by her Honour as follows:
262.The nub of her evidence was that if the Court accepted the mother’s evidence regarding the risk to the children by the father, then the children should live with the mother and spend only supervised time with the father.
263.In the event that the Court found no substance in those allegations, Ms R was concerned as to the psychological harm that the children may suffer from exposure to the mother’s views, was confident that the children had a loving and comfortable relationship with the father, and supported them remaining in the care of the father. The concept of what time the children should spend with the mother and under what conditions was less clear to her but she was of the view that the concept should be approached cautiously such that the children were protected.
In the absence of the transcript we are unable to see if these issues were raised at the hearing, if there was any relevant objection which was refused or if there was any relevant cross-examination. This creates a significant difficulty for the mother.
The mother submitted that the family assessment did not meet the requirements of Australian Standards of Practice for Family Assessments and Reporting (February 2015) (“the Standards”), which is a publication developed by the Family Court of Australia, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and the Family Court of Western Australia to ensure good practice in conducting and reporting in family assessments. This was because Ms R had been kept informed of the case by the ICL and had read trial and other documents presented to the Court after her assessment in 2020. She had not read those documents prior to seeing the father, but did read them prior to seeing the mother. The mother also complains that contrary to the Standards, the report writer had regard to previous Family Reports and failed to conduct an assessment of family violence.
At page 6 of the Standards, the following appears:
The principles of practice in these Standards are not intended as a step-by-step guide to practice, nor to limit the discretion of social scientists conducting assessments in individual cases. It is recognised that the processes of each assessment must be tailored to the needs and circumstances of that matter, as well as guided by principles of best and ethical professional practice.
The Standards are therefore a guide as to best practice and not an absolute set of requirements. Thus, contrary to the assertion of the mother, the mere failure to comply with the Standards does not result in the report being invalid or being inadmissible. At the most, depending on the nature of the disconformity between the Standards and the preparation of the Family Report and having regard to the effect, if any, of that discrepancy on the findings and recommendations of that report, it may affect the weight to be given to the report writer’s opinions.
Clause 23(a) of the Standards notes that “[p]reliminary information can be obtained by reading available documents in order to ascertain the composition and characteristics of the family system, the parties’ issues, and to make arrangements for the assessment process”.
Given its significance to the mother’s submissions, it is worth quoting Clause 25 in full:
25.Family assessors should refrain from reading the evaluations of other similar professionals who have assessed the same family in a family assessment prior to formulating their own evaluation.
a.While appropriate to read assessments by different professions, such as psychiatric or medical assessments, reading the evaluations of other family assessors before gathering enough information to formulate their own assessment can lead to the perception of influence by the previous assessment, and may compromise the independence of the assessment.
b. As part of the preparation for an assessment, it is important to be aware of what prior assessments have been undertaken. There are circumstances where it is necessary to read another assessor’s evaluations prior to meeting the parties, and where so, reasons for this should be clearly delineated in the report.
c.Once an assessor has gathered enough information and formulated their own view, it is recommended that they read previous relevant assessments by others so as to be more informed and be able to comment on them, and any similarity or variation between them and the assessor’s views, if needed.
Clause 27 suggests that where family violence is identified as an issue in a matter, “the assessor must conduct an expert family violence assessment as part of their report”.
The report of Ms R indicated that she had read Family Reports prepared on 22 October 2014 and 26 February 2018. Ms R does not say at what stage she read those reports. Neither Family Report is referred to by Ms R and none of its content was noted. In the absence of the transcript we do not know if there were any questions directed to this point.
It follows that there is no evidence to suggest that the report writer read the earlier Family Reports at an inappropriate time. Therefore, the premise of the complaint made by the mother has not been established.
There is no evidence to suggest that the report writer was biased, despite the mother’s vehement rejection of its contents.
It is true that the report conducts no family violence assessment. This is, perhaps, not surprising.
The mother’s evidence as to family violence was limited to the following:
5.Domestic Violence can be defined as any form of abusive behaviours by one partner towards the other. Abuse is always intentional. It cannot happen by accident. Abuse includes; (a) physical aggression; (hitting, kicking, biting, shoving, restraining, throwing objects). (b) threats; (c) sexual abuse, (d) emotional abuse, and (e) financial abuse (withholding or controlling all money). Abuse includes (f) social (isolating and restricting access to friends); (g) controlling, (h) domineering, (i) intimidation, (j) stalking and (k) other forms of passive/covert abuse. During the relationship The Mother suffered every kind of abuse at [the father’s] hand.
6.The Mother endured 2 attempted murders by strangulation. Since the relationship has ended, the Mother has endured more attempts to murder her-(multiple attempts to be run down while the Children were in [the father’s] car. A direct “hit” was placed on the Mother in Sep 2016 by [the father], who sort to have unknown persons kill or seriously injure the Mother. This is believed by SAPOL to be connected to an as-yet unsolved murder that occurred under eerily similar circumstances, just 2 streets away from the Mother’s former residence.
7.The Mother has endured personal property damage including slashed tires, car engine tampering on at least 5 occasions (verified by other persons); severed brake lines, unexplained fuse removals, battery terminal being removal and damaged, along with the wilful destruction- via hammer- to an engine part that never breaks down. The property damage has included: 2 different smashed windows and vandalized and destroyed CCTV cameras. This property damage usually occurs the night before a Family Court Hearing. The Mother and her family has endured ongoing stalking and harassment, continual defamation and deliberate character assassination all across Adelaide at [the father’s] instigation.
8.SAPOL charged [the father] with stalking in 2017. [The father] claims in both oral testimony (previous Trial) and via affidavit to this Court that the charges were dropped as the CCTV pictures were too grainy for clear identification. SAPOL formerly cautioned [the father] and his son [M] on or around the 25 Jan 2018 for trespassing on the Mother’s property between 10 pm and 0500 am. [The father] has also told the Court via affidavits tendered since last trial, that ‘he does stalk the Mother but it does not affect his parenting’. [Note SAPOL information on [the father] was not presented to Family Court when subpoenaed as [the father] is still the subject of investigation]
(Mother’s affidavit filed on 14 September 2020, paragraphs 5–8) (As per the original)
This affidavit was, however, sworn after the preparation of the Family Report.
The interviews of the mother by Ms R do not reveal any significant complaints about family violence. Given that and the generalised nature of the allegations, we do not find it surprising that the report writer did not conduct a family violence assessment.
The primary judge set out the mother’s complaints as to family violence at [113] and [116]. After an extensive discussion of the evidence from [118]–[233], it is plain that the primary judge did not accept the mother’s evidence and found that her “presentation was unbalanced, dysregulated and on occasions hysterical” (at [231]).
Thus, her Honour found that issues of family violence were not relevant in the proceedings at [420] and [421]. Any failure by the report writer to conduct a family violence assessment was therefore immaterial in the scheme of things because the primary judge found that there was no such violence to be assessed. It would not justify the orders being set aside (Conway v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 203).
This also deals with the mother’s point that the injunctions ordered against her were inconsistent with the evidence of family violence. Contrary to the submissions of the mother, we are unable to find anywhere in the reasons where the primary judge incorrectly assumed that there was an Apprehended Violence Order against the mother. Since the primary judge found family violence was not relevant to the proceedings, this challenge cannot stand.
Was the decision clearly wrong?
An appeal from a discretionary decision may be allowed if, upon the facts, “it is unreasonable or plainly unjust” so that “the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion” (House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505).
In support of her complaint the mother submitted:
a.In this Case There is clear evidence of the failure to render the judgment based on Law instead the judgment was rendered on a perception of the fathers’ rights being more of a consideration than the paramount principle of family law. Such failure to uphold and adhere to the law demonstrates clearly that the decision was clearly wrong.
...
[S]ufficient evidence exists of the failure of the judicial officer to consider and uphold the law rendering the judgment erroneous and requiring the appeal be upheld.
(Mother’s written submissions filed on 25 May 2022, p.14) (As per the original)
Again, this is nothing more than a complaint that the findings and orders that were made were contrary to what the mother saw as those that should have been made. That does not establish that the decision was unreasonable or clearly wrong. Indeed, having closely considered her Honour’s reasons, we consider that the outcome was well open on the evidence before her.
Did the primary judge breach the “Data Communication Act 2013, Data Surveillance Act SA 2015 and the Evidence Act of 1995”?
The mother’s challenges to the evidence have been addressed above. She made no other submissions seeking to explain this ground and therefore no error is identified.
CONCLUSION AND COSTS
It follows that the appeal will be dismissed.
The father sought an order for costs on the grounds that the appeal had been wholly unsuccessful, but having regard as to the mother’s financial position, we are satisfied that it is just in all of the circumstances that there be no order as to costs.
I certify that the preceding seventy (70) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justices Aldridge, Austin & Tree. Associate:
Dated: 13 July 2022
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