Barbaro v Italiano
[1993] HCATrans 382
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S74 of 1993 B e t w e e n -
GUISEPPE BARBARO
Applicant
and
FRANK ITALIANO
Respondent
Application for special leave
to appeal
BRENNAN J
DEANE J
McHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 10 DECEMBER 1993, AT 11.41 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| Barbaro | 1 | 10/12/93 |
MR D.F. JACKSON, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my
learned friend, MS A.J. KATZMANN, for the
applicant. (instructed by Andrews)
| MR H.D. SPERLING, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear |
with my learned friend, MR R.R. BARTLETT, for the
respondent. (instructed by Abbott Tout Russell
Kennedy)
BRENNAN J: Yes, Mr Jackson.
| MR JACKSON: | Your Honours should have a copy of our outline |
of submissions.
BRENNAN J: Yes, Mr Jackson.
| MR JACKSON: | Your Honours. | As Your Honours will see there |
are two bases upon which we seek special leave, and
may I move immediately to the first of those, thequestion whether there was a miscarriage of
justice. Now, Your Honours will see in paragraph 2 of our written submissions we set out the three
matters which, we submit, give rise to a
miscarriage of justice. Now, Your Honours, may I turn immediately to deal with those, and the first
of them is that the master had made a finding,
which was crucial to the case, that the applicant
was not party to a conspiracy, the nature of which
was to stage an accident in which one of the
conspirators, or some other person, would beinjured thus giving rise to an entitlement to claim
damages for personal injuries.
Your Honours could I go immediately to
paragraph 3 of our submissions where Your Honours
will see that at page 12 of the application book,
that the master said, at the top of the page:the crucial question in this case is not just the existence of a conspiracy. It is whether
the plaintiff was a party to it.
Now, Your Honours will see further, at the next
page of the master's reasons, lines 14 to 15, at
page 13, he referred to the fact that:
In cross-examination the plaintiff not
only denied any complicity in any conspiracy,
he also denied -
et cetera.
Your Honours I will come back to that passage in a
moment, but I just wanted to refer to the first two
lines of it that in cross-examination the plaintiff
had denied complicity in the conspiracy. In fact,
| Barbaro | 2 | 10/12/93 |
Your Honour, and Your Honours will see the page is
attached to the outline of submissions, on four
separate occasions in the cross-examination, the
plaintiff in fact had denied those matters and it
was evidence that the master had before him.
Now, Your Honours, if I could turn then to
paragraph 4 of our written submissions. The master
had the opportunity of seeing the plaintiff, seeing
the applicant, give oral evidence over four days
and in evidence which went on for many pages of the
transcript, nearly 160. He could see him when he was giving evidence, he was entitled to accept his
evidence, of course, in whole or in part and,
Your Honours, if I could return to page 13 of the
master's decision, you will see that part of his
evidence there he did not accept, and that is thepart in the first sentence commencing on the second
line of that paragraph, commencing at line 15, he
also denied two other matters, and you will see
following on from that that those two matters are
ones that he did not accept, and that that is so
appears from the whole of the remainder of that page. He did not accept his denials of who the Reichs were or that the defence in the case was
going to be based on allegation of conspiracy, but
then he went on to say, at about line 22:
It does not follow, of course, that his
denial of complicity in the conspiracy must
also be rejected.
Now, Your Honours, if one goes to page 17 at
lines 16 to 20, he then said:
When all the evidence is taken into
account, I find that I am not persuaded that
the plaintiff had consented to be a party to
any staged accident, or that he had
conspired -
et cetera. In arriving at that conclusion he made it clear that he took into account the view which
he had formed of the applicant at the hearing, and
Your Honours, that that is so appears a little
further up page 17, in the first two new
paragraphs on the page, where he said:
to succeed the defence must demonstrate that
the accident that happened was staged -
and then the next paragraph:
A number of common indicators of such a
false claim are absent.
| Barbaro | 10/12/93 |
And he refers then to a view which he must have
formed of the applicant during his oral evidence.
He was saying:
He did not exaggerate his injuries. He made no attempt to suggest -
et cetera:
genuine efforts to get back to work.
He also made it clear that he had taken into account the matters - I am referring Your Honours
to paragraph 5 of our written submissions - that
might lead to the opposite conclusion, such as
those referred to at page 16, line 23, his:
presence at the scene, his relationship with -
people who were undoubtedly conspirators:
and some unsatisfactory answers -
he had given in cross-examination.
He concluded, Your Honours, by saying, at
page 17, line 16, that his finding of no
participation by the applicant in any conspiracywas based on a consideration of all the evidence. Now, Your Honours, could I pause at that point to
say this, if one looks at paragraph 6 of our
written submissions you will see the paucity of
evidence, objective evidence, that might lead to
the conclusion that he was a party to the
conspiracy.
Could I say this, Your Honours: there was much
reference made to a 1981 accident, which was the
year before. There was no evidence at all that the
applicant was in any way involved in that. The
any discussion with anyone about the accident, the second thing was there was no evidence that he had subject of present proceedings, or any conspiracy about them, and in particular he was not a party to the discussion that took place outside the cars at the worker's club, you will see that at page 15, line 16: The plaintiff was not present.
Now, Your Honours, what could be said about
him is what we refer to in paragraph 6(c) that he
was in a car with persons who were conspirators,
and he should have been aware of what they were
doing.
| Barbaro | 10/12/93 |
If I could just pause at that point to jump to the view that every person who happens to be in a
car with persons who are engaged in forming, or
carrying out, a conspiracy, is himself aconspirator, leads to the very considerable view of
guilt by association. But, having said that
Your Honours, what ultimately was the fact was that
the case was one in which there was oral evidence.
He gave oral evidence, he denied being in the
conspiracy and, Your Honours, the extract from
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Mitchell in theFull Court of the Federal Court, to which we refer
in paragraph 7 - and I wonder if I could perhaps
give Your Honours some authorities to which we may
refer, in case Your Honours need to look at them.
It is obvious, of course, if one is looking to the question of the state of mind of a person,
whether a person is becoming part of a conspiracy,
fraudulent, acting in good faith, that in very many cases, except where the person is dead or does not, for some other reason, give evidence, that the view taken by the judge of that person, the measure of
the man as it is sometime said, is a very important
matter. Your Honours will see the reference to Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Mitchell in
paragraph 7 and, Your Honours, also to the well
known passage of Lord Sumner in in Hontestroom v
Sagaporack. Also in paragraph 7:
If -
the judge's -
estimate of the man forms any substantial part
of his reasons ..... conclusions ..... should .... be let alone.
In this case the master's estimation of him
must, as we say, have played a part in his finding
that he was not a participant to the conspiracy.
To use the normal tests, he had not failed to use
or palpably misused the advantage of seeing the witness. He may have just made a decision on one of the two ways that he could have gone and,
Your Honours, what we would submit is that if one
looks at what the Full Court of the Federal Court
did, at pages 70 through to 83, what in fact they
did was the very thing that the Court has said on anumber of occasions appellant courts should not do,
or should resist the temptation to do, and that is
to go on the basis of their own comparisons,
conclusions, their own view of the probabilities of
the case and, Your Honours, as the Court very
recently said in Devries v Australian National
Railways Commission, that should not be done, even
if the probabilities are against, or strongly
| Barbaro | 10/12/93 |
against, that finding of fact. Your Honours that is the first point. The second point relates to a conversation to
which the applicant was not a party. A conversation which took place between two of the
conspirators, Reich and Pangallo. Your Honours will see that conversation referred to at page 14,
lines 1 to 7. May I invite Your Honours to read that. It was something that took place, the
conversation that Reich - who was the conspirator
who had, in effect, taken to religion and told,
what he said, was the truth - and he said that at
some stage between the first accident, which was
the one at Queanbeyan, and the second accident,which he said was the one in question here, or
happened here, he had had the discussion with
Pangallo, no suggestion the applicant present, in
which Pangallo told him that two of his partners
would be involved, and I should say the applicant
was engaged in a painting business, and in a loose
sense he was a partner in that sense as well as any
other darker sense of the term.
The Full Court of the Federal Court, as
Your Honours will see at page 84, at lines 20 to
24, treated the evidence of that conversation as
being:
an independent ground for the -
conclusion that the applicant was a party to the
conspiracy, and then, Your Honours, the problem in
that view, in our submission, is that the master
did not find that that conversation had taken place
or that any conversation had taken place in terms
which would implicate the applicant in a
conspiracy.
Could I take Your Honours to where the
conversation is dealt with by the master, it is at
page 14, lines 1 to 21.
| DEANE J: | Mr Jackson, could I take you to page 17, the first |
paragraph on that page. Does not that indicate that the master completely misapprehended the
issue? And you see, when you go back to what you
are referring us to, the master keeps honing in on
was there a conspiracy to stage an accident in
which your client would be injured so he could put
in a fraudulent claim. The defence was there was a conspiracy to stage an accident in which Mr Reich
would be injured.
| MR JACKSON: | Your Honour, if I could just say something in |
response to that. Assuming for the moment that
that is right, the result -
| Barbaro | 6 | 10/12/93 |
DEANE J: It is right, is it not?
MR JACKSON: Well, with respect, Your Honour, I submit not
if I may, may I just say that the result should
have been a new trial, rather than anything else
because what the Full Court did was to arrive at
its conclusions against us on the basis of views of
the evidence that just were not correct.
DEANE J: But when you see that the master has completely
misapprehended what the thing was all about, then
that question arises whether you endeavour to deal
with it on the evidence, or whether you send it
back for new trial.
MR JACKSON: Well, Your Honour, if one endeavours to deal
with it on the evidence one should, with respect,
get the evidence right. Could I just say, the
first thing, Your Honour, is this, going back to
the question Your Honour asked me. It may be that the master framed the ultimate question that he
asked himself in terms of the result of the case
incorrectly, but in arriving at that result the
question as to the acceptability of the evidence of
the witnesses - if I could use that expression -
was one that he framed correctly. Could I take
Your Honour to page 12, at the top of the page,
where he said:
the crucial question in this case is not just the existence of a conspiracy. It is whether the plaintiff was a party to it.
Now, Your Honour, that is the question to which he
was directing himself.
DEANE J: But, the wrong approach colours his whole
judgment. If you look at page 14, the last
sentence there, indicates that he simply got what
the question for him was quite wrong.
| MR JACKSON: Well, Your Honour, accepting that for the |
moment, if I may put it that way with respect, one
still has a situation where the view taken by the
Full Court in setting aside his approach to it was
one that should not have resulted at best for the
respondent in there being a judgment the other way.
What should have happened was that there be a new
trial on the basis that the right tests had not
been applied. What the Full Court did, in our submission, was first of all set aside the first
finding to which I referred earlier, and I will not
go over that again, Your Honours, but it was one,
we would submit, that was plainly based on a view
of the plaintiff. It must have been based on a view of the plaintiff's evidence, and even if the
Court were to set aside the judgment the result
| Barbaro | 10/12/93 |
that followed should not have been that they found
against the applicant. Your Honours that is the first thing. The second thing is in respect of the matter I am about to go to, the conversation with
Reich. The Full Court, with respect, just simply
seemed to be incorrect on the issue.
I was about to take Your Honours to page 14
where what Your Honours will see, if one goes from
lines 1 through to 21, you will see that he refers,
in the first paragraph, to the evidence of Reichabout the conversation. If I could ask
Your Honours to hold that page, as it were, for a
moment. He had said at page 11, at line 6: that iri broad outline Mr Reich's evidence
should be accepted.
But, when one came to page 14, it is quite apparent
that in respect of the particular matter, namely
the occurrence of the conversation and its terms,
that he was saying that he did not accept Reich's
evidence. Your Honours, that that is so appears from the whole of the paragraph commencing on page
14 about line 8, and then the way in which he
expresses the alternative view, at page 16, even if
it were safe and, Your Honours, for the Full Court
to take the view that there was a finding that that
conversation had occurred, we would submit is one
that the evidence and the master's findings could
not justify.
Your Honours could I, in that regard, say what
appears in paragraph 12 of our written submissions,
and that is that the Full Court appears to have
treated the master as accepting Reich's credibility
on this point. That appears at page 90, at line 25
through to the top of the next page, where he said:
it is an inference from primary facts found by
the Master and from evidence of a witness
whose credibility the Master accepted.
Your Honours, whilst the master said that in broad
outline - that was the expression he used - he
accepted Reich's evidence, this was a specific
matter where he did not make a finding accepting
his evidence and we would submit, with respect,
there is really no basis on which the Full Court
could take the view that it did in this regard.
That was treated as a separate ground.
The third feature, Your Honours, is this, that
the Full Court, or three members of the Full Court
proceeded to make a finding that the actual
accident which occurred was an implementation of
the conspiracy. Your Honours, that finding appears
| Barbaro | 10/12/93 |
at page 91, line 4, in a passage which goes through
to page 95 with the conclusion being in the last
four lines of page 95.
Now, the findings of fact made by the master,
in that regard, are at two places. Page 13, line 7
through to line 13, where you will see a reference
to:
His version -
that meaning the applicant
of the actual impact, under cross-examination,
was in essential details consistent with his
evidence in chief, and, indeed, with the
evidence of Mr Italiano and Mr Reich. Thereis no reason in the evidence to doubt that
there was a car which came out of the car park
as if to cross in front of the Reichs' car,
causing the driver of that car to apply the
brakes suddenly.
Your Honours, could I also say the second passage
is at page 17, line 25, referring to this accident,
it said:
It happened unexpectedly while they were
returning to the Club to discuss the details
of the proposed staged accident.
As is apparent from the first of those two passages
at page 13, the master appears on this question to
have accepted the evidence of the applicant, where
he says:
His version of the actual impact -
as well, perhaps, as the evidence of Italiano and
Reich. It is clear, in our submission, that there
was evidence from those persons which entitled him
to make those findings.
the passages in paragraph 16, at the top of page 6, Your Honours, we set out and you will see each of the references is to a
page, a copy of which is attached to the written
submissions, and there each of those three
witnesses gives evidence of the actual accident in
terms which tie up with the fact that it was
something that happened accidentally, if I coulduse the expression. A car happened to come out of a car park, Reich's car stopped, the other one ran
into it from behind.
That version depended, or the acceptance of
that version, on the view of the witnesses taken by
the master hearing the case and, Your Honours, we
would submit again, for the reasons to which we
| Barbaro | 9 | 10/12/93 |
have referred, it simply was not open for the Full
Court itself to precede to make its own findings about what had happened in relation to that.
The master's finding involved accepting the
evidence of the applicant and, indeed, Your Honours
will see, as we say in paragraph 18 that a factor
which may have contributed to the Full Court's
error in this regard may appear at page 91.
Your Honours will see at lines 19 to 21 that what
was said there was:
The only version of the accident given by a
witness whose credit was accepted was the
account of Mr Reich.
Well, Your Honours, that just does not tie up with
what appears at page 13, line 7, where the master
speaks of the evidence of the applicant. It is
clear, in our submission, that the master was
accepting, relevantly, the evidence of the
applicant. Your Honours, what we submit then is that, with respect, the Full Court has purported to apply the test laid down by the Court. In fact the
Full Court, with great respect to Their Honours,
has not, and we would submit that the manner in
which they have gone about it, it is a case whichdoes merit the intervention of the Court and,
Your Honours, the errors in this regard, we would
submit, are serious and they are ones which
co-operated to the very significant disadvantage of
the applicant. Now, Your Honours, that is the first basis upon which we seek special leave.
The second thing, of course, concerns the Court's decision in Gala v Preston, and the issue
which arises in that regard is one that would
arise if, in effect, it is found where a party to a
conspiracy, but also found that the occurrence of
the accident was not itself part of the conspiracy.
Your Honours, the view taken by the Full Court is
set out at page 102, lines 24 to 28, in the concluding few lines on that page. There is a more
lengthy discussion, of course, before getting to
that. But, what we would submit, in relation to
that, is that it does give rise, assuming that you
have persons who are conspirators, in a sense, but
are engaged in activities that are in furtherance
of the conspiracy, but no more than that, does the
duty of just driving along, really, does the duty
of care go away and, Your Honours, that is a matter
which we would submit, itself, is of some
importance and merits the grant of special leave.
Your Honours, those are our submissions.
| BRENNAN J: | Mr Sperling. |
| Barbaro | 10 | 10/12/93 |
| MR SPERLING: | The Court will have an outline of submissions |
which we took the liberty of filing last month, a
short document dated 23 November 1993. My learned friend was good enough to supply us with an outline
of his submissions yesterday evening, and we have
prepared a supplementary outline which I would hand
to the Court. Could I say that in view of the
detail of my learned friend's outline we have
provided a good deal of detail in that document
and, if the Court would be good enough to read it,I do not believe that it requires a great deal of elaboration.
BRENNAN J: Yes, Mr Sperling.
| MR SPERLING: | I think my learned friend wishes to add |
something.
| MR JACKSON: | May I just add one thing? Your Honour |
Justice Deane raised the formulation adopted by the
master, the way in which he put the issues. I was reminded while Your Honours reading that that it is
referred to at page 3, and you will see in the
paragraph commencing about a quarter of the way
down the page, he refers to "a ruling" and then
sets out the issues in that paragraph, and the next
paragraph concluding at lines 19, 20 and 21:
I did not understand either counsel to
disagree with that formulation of the issues.
I do not want to take it beyond that, I just wanted
to refer to that.
MR SPERLING: If the Court please. Could I say something
about the context in which these issues arise, and
in this regard I say nothing that is beyond what is
revealed by the judgments in the Full Court. It is
apparent that prior to the statement being made by
Mr Reich on the first day of the hearing that the
case which the defendant proposed to adduce was one
involving a large number of prior episodes, with a
view to endeavouring to establish by circumstantial evidence that this was a case in a series, and that it could be inferred that it was a case of a staged accident with the intent of providing the basis for a claim for damages. That case was not going well, the master rejected a body of material relating to
earlier episodes, and his rejection of that
material was not pursued in the subsequent appealproceedings. The significant change in events was the statement by Mr Reich, who had undergone a
religious conversion, and notwithstanding that he himself had made a claim for damages arising out of the collision, he was prepared to say that a staged
| Barbaro | 11 | 10/12/93 |
collision had, ~ndeed, been arranged. So, there
was no need to rely on circumstantial evidence for
proof of the fact that there was truly a conspiracy
to stage a collision. The essential features of his evidence were, and these were accepted by the master, that there was an arrangement between him
and Pangallo that a collision would be staged,
certainly for Reich's benefit; that there was a
gathering near the club where Italiano presented as
the driver of the vehicle which was to be at fault,
and where Pangallo and Barbaro were passengers in
that vehicle of which Mr Italiano was the driver.
| BRENNAN J: | I am not quite following that. | What do you say |
was the evidence involving the plaintiff in the
action?
| MR SPERLING: | The evidence by Mr Reich was that when he |
arrived near the club where the people were
gathered, Mr Italiano had presented himself in
another vehicle, which was obviously to be the
vehicle at fault, and Mr Pangallo and the plaintiffwere occupants of that other vehicle.
BRENNAN J: Yes.
| MR SPERLING: | The vehicles then drove around looking for a |
suitable place at which to stage a collision, and
it was in the course of that activity that the
subject collision actually occurred. Now, the
master had no difficulty in finding, by inference,
that Italiano was a party to the conspiracy,
notwithstanding that there was no direct evidence
of any arrangements made between Pangallo and
Italiano for Italiano to be a participant, and that
was obviously to be inferred from the
circumstances. It arose from the fact that
Pangallo and Reich had made an arrangement for
there to be a staged accident. They had gone to
the place where they were to meet for the purpose,and Italiano presented himself as the driver of the
vehicle which was obviously to be at fault. So, the inference was drawn that he was a party to the
conspiracy.
There really was no different course of
reasoning available in relation to the applicant's
involvement. He can only have been there in a limited number of roles. His own evidence was that
he was there because he was going with Italiano -
well he was in the vehicle - because he was going with Italiano for a drink at the club. But, once the findings were made in reliance upon Mr Reich's
evidence that a great deal more was, in fact, going
on, it really was impossible to accept that
explanation for his presence.
| Barbaro | 12 | 10/12/93 |
| BRENNAN J: | Why? |
MR SPERLING: Well, for this reason that what then occurred
was that the two vehicles moved away and, rather
than going to the club, drove around the streets in
the way that one can readily and necessarilyappreciate, where what was being done was to look
for a suitable place for an accident to be held.
BRENNAN J: Well, Italiano was not free for a drink at that
time, he had other things on his mind.
| MR SPERLING: | Yes. | By the same token, one could perhaps |
think that Italiano was simply following the other vehicle around for no particular purpose. But, we
would say that it is inconsistent that a person
could be in a vehicle under those circumstanceswithout being privy to what was going on. Pangallo
was in the vehicle; Pangallo was the director of
the operation; Pangallo was in charge of an
exercise to look out for and find a suitable placefor an accident to happen.
DEANE J: But once you get Pangallo in the vehicle
everything you say makes complete sense to me, but
have you not got to get him in the vehicle?
| MR SPERLING: | He was there at the club. |
| DEANE J: | The master made no finding on that. |
| MR SPERLING: | He did not. | He was there at the club. | He was |
there at the scene of the accident because Reich
said that he slipped away when the police arrived.
Now, there is no logical explanation as to how he
can have arrived at the very place where the
accident occurred, the vehicle having moved through
a number of streets, other than that he came with
them. There is also the fact that the police
report recorded three persons in the Italiano
vehicle and the only way that that can have stacked up was if Pangallo was the third person. So, there is evidence to support that approach.
DEANE J: If you get him in the vehicle, the master's
findings become very difficult to understand. It
is also rather difficult to understand how the
master could have dealt with the case without
finding whether he was in the vehicle or not,
because if he were in the vehicle the plaintiff's account just became impossible, that nobody could
get in the front seat because of the door and so
on.
| MR STERLING: | Yes. | We would respectfully agree with the |
view of the Full Court, that that question and the
| Barbaro | 13 | 10/12/93 |
resolution of it was integral to the fact-finding
process.
Now, the reason I embarked on that exercise
was in order to make this submission, that it was
something more than open to the Full Court to make
the finding that it did about the applicant's
participation in the accident. Indeed, they
expressed themselves in terms of being compelled to
make that finding, and we would say that was not to
put it too high.
The only thing which really stands in the way of that being not only a legitimate result but the only reasonable result is the argument that is
advanced here, namely, that they were precluded
from embarking upon that fact-finding approach by
reason of a finding by the master based, it is
said, on the acceptance by him of the applicant in
the applicant's denial that he was a conspirator.
That leads us into what we say in our written outline under point 2(a), to the effect that the
master made no finding of that kind. We set out
our reasons there and there is perhaps no need to
elaborate them, the point being that the master's
finding was a matter of not being persuaded ratherthan a matter of being affirmatively satisfied that
what the applicant said on this issue was true.
Could we add just two observations in support of
that approach? My learned friend has referred the Court to page 13 point 5 of the application book
where, at line 14, the master referred to the
plaintiff's evidence concerning denial of
complicity and also denial of certain other
matters. His Honour found that the applicant was
simply not credible in his denial of:
knowledge of who Mr or Mrs Reich were, or even
that he was aware -
of the nature of the - defence - et cetera. It is simply not feasible that
His Honour may have rejected the applicant as a
witness of truth on those matters which he
mentioned and affirmatively have accepted him as a
witness of truth in his denial that he was party to
the conspiracy. It must be clear that the master simply had no confidence in him and that he did
resolve the matter on the basis of not being persuaded of an onus that went the other way.
If we are wrong in our fundamental submission
that there was no finding of the relevant Abalos
| Barbaro | 14 | 10/12/93 |
kind then we would wish to add this, that even if
the master was affirmatively satisfied that the
applicant was telling the truth in his denial ofcomplicity, and even if the master based himself on
what he thought to be the demeanour of the witness,
the Full Court was entitled to treat that finding
as vitiated by the following considerations: first,
that as has been pointed out, the mastermisconceived the question in that he posed it as
being whether the applicant was privy to a
conspiracy to claim damages for himself; secondly,
he incorrectly used his finding that the applicant
had made a genuine claim for damages which was, in
logic, simply not a matter bearing at all upon
whether the applicant was telling the truth about
privity to the conspiracy, it being entirely
consistent that a dishonest intent at the time may
have resulted in a genuine injury. But, more
particularly, we would say that the case would fall
within the exception to the Abalos rule,
conveniently stated in Devries v Australian
National Railways Commission, (1993) 67 ALJR 528
where, at page 531 the exceptions to the Abalos
rule are stated by quotation from earlier decisions
at the bottom of the second column, where:
it can be shown that the trial judge "has
failed to use or has palpably misused his (or
her] advantage" or has acted on evidence which
was "inconsistent with facts incontrovertibly
established by the evidence" or which was
"glaringly improbable".
In view of the findings in relation to the basic circumstances of the occasion, in so far as
the master did accept the evidence of Mr Reich, any
finding that the applicant was not privy to the
conspiracy was, we would say, "glaringlyimprobable" within the meaning of that statement of
principle.
| BRENNAN J: Can I just ask you again: what are the facts |
with which the innocence of the applicant is
glaringly improbable?
MR SPERLING: That it is inconceivable that a person could
be a passenger in a vehicle engaged in this
enterprise without being aware of what was going
on, and if aware of what was going on - - -
| BRENNAN J: | When you say "a vehicle engaged in this |
enterprise", the vehicle was not engaged in
anything; somebody was engaged in the enterprise.
Who was doing what that makes this glaringly
improbable?
| Barbaro | 15 | 10/12/93 |
MR SPERLING: Italiano was following another vehicle through
various streets in the vicinity of the club;
Pangallo was keeping a look-out for a suitable
place in which to have an accident, all in
circumstances where the applicant's own account of
events was that he was merely going to the club
with Italiano for a drink. So that one has a combination of factors; one has circumstances which would be inconsistent with a person not being aware
of what was going on.
| BRENNAN J: | How do you approve, as against the applicant, |
what Pangallo was doing?
| MR SPERLING: | The conduct was, we would suggest, patently |
unusual.
BRENNAN J: What, two cars driving around in Canberra
streets?
MR SPERLING: Yes.
DEANE J: In circles.
MR SPERLING: There is that: the patently unusual feature
of what was going on; the inexplicability of it
unless knew what was going on; the fact that
Pangallo - one cannot imagine that Pangallo would
have had anyone in the vehicle unless he knew what
was going on.
BRENNAN J: But how do you prove, as against the applicant,
what Pangallo's state of mind was?
| MR SPERLING: | We would say that the nature of the conduct |
was such that it is not conceivable that a person
would have been in that vehicle without beingaware, at least, that something unusual was
happening. He then tells a number of lies about how he came to be there from which an inference is
to be drawn about guilty intent. The objective fact is that the parties were driving around for the purpose of looking for a place to have the
accident because that is what Reich says. So, we
know what Pangallo was in fact doing. It is not a
matter of it having to be proved in any particular
way against the applicant. Pangallo's state of
mind is proved by the circumstance that he had made
an arrangement with the applicant and was now
putting it into effect. So, once that state of
mind is established, the question is with what
confidence could one draw the inference that
Pangallo would have told the applicant what was
going on? We would say, from surrounding circumstances, the inference is irresistible; that
he would not have had him in the car if he did not know and that he would not have had him in the car
| Barbaro | 16 | 10/12/93 |
if he did not have some reason to do with the
enterprise for being in the car. That is my answer
to Your Honour's query.
So, that is the response to my learned
friend's point 2(a).
| BRENNAN J: What do you say to this: | that the applicant |
might just as well have been a mate of a couple of
crooks whom he knew to be a couple of crooks, and that they were setting up this arrangement and he went with them because he was only going to have a
drink with one of them?
| MR SPERLING: | Your Honour, if he had not told a whole lot of |
lies about it that may perhaps be an acceptable
interpretation of events. But when he does say
that Pangallo was not in the vehicle; when he does
say that he was in the back seat, in order to try
and explain away the police record of three
occupants of the vehicle, whereas the hospital
records have him recorded as a front-seat
passenger, so he has been quite elaborate in his
untruthful account of what occurred, that that adds
a dimension to the matter which takes it out of anarea where one could comfortably ascribe an
innocent explanation to his presence.
There is nothing we can add to what we say
about 2(b). As far as the deliberate collision is concerned, point 2(c), the distinction which needs
to be made is a distinction between the third
vehicle coming out on to the roadway unexpectedly,
which all the witnesses deposed to, and the
question of whether Italiano either accidentally
collided with that vehicle or intentionally sees
the opportunity of colliding with it. It is
nothing to the point to establish that the third
vehicle came on to the roadway unexpectedly. That
is not where the area of debate arises. The area of debate arises once that vehicle does emerge from
the car park and the question is whether, at that point, Italiano accidentally or intentionally
collided with it.
So, really, the basis of the submission made
by the applicant in that regard is not made out
because it proceeds on what we would say, with
respect, is the false assumption that an unexpected
intrusion by the third vehicle resolves the
question. It does not.
We have nothing to add to what we say about
Gala v Preston. If the Court pleases, those are
out submissions.
BRENNAN J: Thank you. Mr Jackson.
| Barbaro | 17 | 10/12/93 |
| MR JACKSON: | Your Honours, may I say one matter by way of |
introduction, as it were? There is no evidence
whatsoever of any prior episode or accident
involving the applicant, any member of his family,
in any capacity whatsoever. Related to that is the fact, of course, that Mr Italiano had been involved
in previous accidents. We had not. The second thing I would like to say is this:
that whether Pangallo was or was not in the car -
there was no finding as to his presence there - the
question was not whether we were in the car, thequestion was whether we were a party to the
conspiracy. I should also say there was not evidence of anything that went on in the car or any
detailed mode of moving around but, in any event,
the mere fact that we were - - -
McHUGH J: But did the Full Court not rely on the fact your
client would have heard instructions being given in
the car?
MR JACKSON: But, Your Honour, there was nothing to suggest
that instructions were given.
McHUGH J: That was the inference that the Full Court drew.
| MR JACKSON: | Your Honour, that was the inference the |
Full Court drew but what the Full Court seemed to
leave out of account was that there was no evidence
to show even that the cars stopped on the way, and
they were coming back to have a talk about it
afterwards in the club. So that all one had was asituation where, on the evidence, a man sitting in
the car; he has not been party to any transaction
involving it and he is then involved in an accident
while others, who are found to be conspirators for
something else, are involved in their activities.
What had to be proved was not that he was in the
car or that he knew about it but that he was a
party to the conspiracy.
| DEANE J: But if Pangallo was in the car, you have then got |
the position that he has given an account where he
says Pangallo was not in the car and has elaborated
a concocted reason why he was sitting in the back
seat, because the door to the front seat was in a
mess and so on.
| MR JACKSON: | Your Honour, could I just say that that is one |
of the things that one might have thought would be
a matter that the master, having heard all the
evidence, would take into account. Your Honours, I did not actually take Your Honours to the pages in
which the evidence was given by him denying the
conspiracy but the fact of the matter is, if one
looks at the four pages immediately following our
| Barbaro | 18 | 10/12/93 |
outline of submissions, what you will see is that
he gave oral evidence, as I said before, denying
it. I am using the page numbers at the top of the
page. At page 99, about point 4, Mr Costigan puts
to him:
Let me not beat about the bush, Mr Barbaro.
This accident ..... was a put-up job?
He denies it. On the next page, page 103, about
point 7 on the page, he denied he knew all about
it. The next page, page 104, the last two questions and answers; over to the top of the next
page; he denied that he knew anything about them
driving around for a suitable spot, and then the top of the next page, Your Honours, in the first
three questions again he denies it.
Now, Your Honours, no doubt all the matters
that my learned friend seeks to refer to are
matters that one could rely on but, in the end, the
person who has the opportunity to get the measure
of the man, as it were, is the person who was
conducting the trial and he had the opportunity to
see him giving evidence, as I said, over a long
time.
Your Honours, our learned friends say that the
principle in Abalos and Devries and so on does not
really apply in a case such as this. This is
simply a case where the onus of proof was on my
learned friend's side. There is nothing, we would
submit, to suggest that those cases are not germane
in such a situation.
Could I refer Your Honours to page 531 of
Devries and in the passage referred to before in
the right column, two-thirds of the way down the
page:
If the trial judge's finding depends to any substantial degree on the credibility of the
witness -
et cetera. Now, Your Honours, if one goes to the way in which the finding was expressed in the
present case it is apparent, we would submit, that
it was based upon credibility in that sense. Could
I refer Your Honours to, at the bottom of page 13,
where he says:
It does not follow, of course, that his denial of complicity in the conspiracy must
also be rejected. In weighing up that
question -
| Barbaro | 19 | 10/12/93 |
various matters seem to be significant. Then,
Your Honours, at page 17, he speaks of the onus of
proof in the first new paragraph, and then in the
third new paragraph on that page, says:
When all the evidence is taken into
account, I find that I am not persuaded -
and, Your Honours, in that passage he is, of
course, referring back to the agreed formulation of
the issues at page 13. I am sorry, Your Honours, perhaps I did not put that very clearly. What I am seeking to say is that at page 17, commencing at
line 16, and referring back to the two paragraphs
above on page 17, he is referring back to the
formulation of the issues which appears at an
earlier part of the case - I gave Your Honours a
reference to it a little earlier, I think - at
page 3. Your Honours, those are our submissions.
| BRENNAN J: | Thank you, Mr Jackson. | The Court will consider |
its decision in this application and will give its
judgment at 2 o'clock.
AT 12.45 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED
UNTIL LATER THE SAME DAY
UPON RESUMING AT 2.16:
| BRENNAN J: | The principles on which a Court of Appeal can |
interfere with the findings of fact of a trial
judge which depend in part on the credibility of a
witness are set out in Devries v. Australian
National Railways Commission, (1993)
177 C.L.R. 472. In this case, consistently with those principles, it was open to the Full Federal Court
to reach the conclusion that the Master had failed
to make a finding concerning a fact most material
to credibility, namely, whether the architect of
the conspiracy, Mr Pangallo, was present in the car
in which the applicant was travelling. Once the majority of the Full Federal Court reached that
conclusion and went on to find that the evidence
clearly established that Mr Pangallo was in the
car, their Honours were entitled to reassess the
evidence for themselves.
In these circumstances, it would not be
appropriate to grant special leave to appeal so
Barbaro 20 10/12/93 that this Court could embark on a re-examination of
those findings. The application for special leave to appeal is accordingly refused.
| MS KRATZMAN: | May it please the Court. |
MR BARTLETT: Costs, Your Honour?
| MS KRATZMAN: | I have nothing to say, Your Honour. |
BRENNAN J: It is refused with costs.
AT 2.17 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE
| Barbaro | 21 | 10/12/93 |
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Civil Procedure
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Negligence & Tort
Legal Concepts
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Appeal
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Consent
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Damages
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Procedural Fairness
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Reliance
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