Barbaro v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld)

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Barbaro v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) [2022] QCA 145

PARTIES:

HARLEY JOE BARBARO
(appellant)
v
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 5431 of 2022
SC No 2814 of 2022

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal from Bail Application

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2022] QSC 58 (Burns J)

DELIVERED ON:

12 August 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

22 July 2022

JUDGES:

McMurdo and Dalton JJA and Kelly J

ORDER:

The appeal is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – PROCEDURE – BAIL – REVOCATION, VARIATION, REVIEW AND APPEAL – where the appellant applied for bail pursuant to the Bail Act 1980 (Qld) on conditions including that they wear a monitoring device – where the appellant was required to ‘show cause’ why their detention in custody was not justified under s 16(3) – where the primary judge held that when assessing risk under s 16(1), s 16(2A) precludes the Court from considering the effect on the risk of imposing a monitoring device condition – whether the primary judge erred in construing 16(2A) of the Act

Bail Act 1980 (Qld), s 11(2), s 11(5), s 11(9B), s 16(1), s 16(2A), s 16(3)

Taylor v The Owners – Strata Plan No 11564 (2014) 253 CLR 531; [2014] HCA 9, cited
Williamson v Director of Public Prosecutions
[2001] 1 Qd R 99; [1999] QCA 356, cited

COUNSEL: 

M L Longhurst and R M Kurz for the appellant
C W Wallis for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Moloney MacCallum Lawyers for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

  1. McMURDO JA:  I agree that for the reasons given by Kelly J, the appeal must be dismissed.  I agree also with the additional comments of Dalton JA.

  2. DALTON JA:  I agree with the orders proposed by Kelly J and his reasons.  I wish to add some brief comments of my own.

  3. First, although the appellant here was in a show cause position, the difficulty created by s 16(2A) of the Bail Act 1980 (Qld) arises not just where an applicant for bail is in a show cause position, but in every application for bail – s 11(2) and s 16(1)(a) of the Bail Act.

  4. Secondly, the appellant submitted that s 16(2A) of the Bail Act should be read, in effect, to prohibit the Court having regard to the effect of an applicant for bail wearing a monitoring device, in isolation from other conditions. The appellant relies upon the fact that s 16(2A), “was inserted through the enactment of the Bail (Domestic Violence) and Another Act Amendment Act 2017, as a part of the Government response to the Not Now Not Ever report into domestic violence”.  In that context he relies upon a report by Australia’s National Research Organisation for Women’s Safety.[1]  The appellant submitted that, “The ANROWS report concluded that electronic monitoring can contribute to reducing reoffending and enhancing safety for victims/survivors, however asserted that electronic monitoring would not be effective…

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Details
Case
[2022] QCA 145
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Barbaro v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) concerns the interpretation of section 16(2A) of the Bail Act 1980 (Qld) in the context of bail conditions, particularly the imposition of a monitoring device. The appellant applied for bail with conditions, including the use of a monitoring device, and subsequently sought to challenge the decision to revoke or vary those bail conditions. The primary judge determined that when assessing the risk under section 16(1), section 16(2A) precludes the court from considering the effect on the risk of imposing a monitoring device condition. The appellant argued that the primary judge had misconstrued section 16(2A) of the Act.

The legal issue before the court was whether the primary judge erred in their interpretation of section 16(2A) of the Bail Act 1980 (Qld). Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the primary judge correctly held that section 16(2A) precludes the consideration of the effect on the risk of imposing a monitoring device condition when assessing risk under section 16(1). The appellant contended that the primary judge should have taken into account the mitigating effect of the proposed monitoring device on the overall risk when assessing the bail conditions.

The court considered the statutory language and the purpose of the Bail Act 1980 (Qld). The court held that section 16(2A) is intended to ensure that the court's assessment of risk is not influenced by the imposition of bail conditions, including the use of a monitoring device. The court concluded that the primary judge did not err in their interpretation of section 16(2A), as it is consistent with the statutory purpose. The appeal was dismissed, and the primary judge's decision was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established