Baramilis v Lucarelli

Case [2008] QMC 4


MAGISTRATES COURTS OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Baramilis v Lucarelli & Anor [2008] QMC 004

PARTIES:

CAROLYN ANNE BARAMILIS

(plaintiff)

v

MARIA KATHLENA LUCARELLI

(first defendant)

ZACHARIAH LUDWICK

(second defendant)

FILE NO/S:

M667/06

DIVISION:

Magistrates Courts

PROCEEDING:

Claim

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court at Southport

DELIVERED ON:

15 February 2008

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

19 October 2007

MAGISTRATE:

Lee G

ORDER:

Judgement for the plaintiff against the first defendant.

Judgement for the second defendant against the plaintiff.

Judgement for the second defendant against the first defendant in the third party proceedings.

CATCHWORDS:

TORTS - NEGLIGENCE – vicarious liability – property damage claim - whether owner of motor vehicle vicariously liable for negligence of driver – social context - whether use of motor vehicle for owner’s purpose

Soblusky v. Egan (1960) 103 CLR 215

COUNSEL:

SOLICITORS:

  1. On 13th May 2005 at about 8.45 a.m. a motor vehicle accident occurred involving a Chrysler Grand Voyager owned and driven by Ms Carolyn Anne Baramilis (the plaintiff), a Holden Commodore driven by Ms Maria Kathlena Lucarelli (first defendant) and owned by Mr Zachariah Ludwick (the second defendant), and a third motor vehicle.  The accident occurred within the jurisdiction of this court - Napper Road, Parkwood.   

  2. The plaintiff claims damages against the first defendant driver as principal tortfeasor and against the second defendant on the basis that he is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the first defendant according to the principles set out in the High Court case of Soblusky v. Egan (1960) 103 C.L.R. 215. The driver or owner of the third motor vehicle is not a party in this action.

  3. The damages claimed by the plaintiff total $17,991.67 comprising $17,048.43 for damage to the plaintiff’s vehicle and $943.24 for the plaintiff’s cost of hiring a replacement vehicle[1].  The plaintiff’s vehicle was uneconomical to repair[2]. In addition, interest is claimed at the statutory rate pursuant to section 47 of the Supreme Court Act 1995.  At trial the second defendant admitted the quantum of the plaintiff’s claim as against him (page 8 line 10 transcript[3]).           

    [1] Further Amended Statement of Claim filed 27 February 2007 at paragraphs 3(d), 3A & 11(a);

    [2] Ibid; paragraphs 3(c) & 9;

    [3] Future page and line references are to the transcript; 

  4. In addition to filing his original defence on 23 May 2006 the second defendant commenced third party proceedings against the first defendant claiming $27,518.22 damages for the second defendant’s Holden Commodore which was damaged beyond economical repair[4].  In addition, the second defendant claims an indemnity or contribution from the first defendant in the event that the second defendant is found liable to the plaintiff in the principal cause of action.       

    [4] Third Party Notice filed 23 May 2006 at paragraph 6;

  5. The first defendant has failed to file a defence to the plaintiff’s claim against her.  She has also failed to file a defence to the second defendant’s third party proceedings against her.  The first defendant appeared at trial and, apart from intending to give evidence…

Continue reading Baramilis v Lucarelli

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
Baramilis v Lucarelli [2008] QMC 4
Case
[2008] QMC 4
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Baramilis v Lucarelli was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The dispute concerned a claim for damages for property damage caused by a motor vehicle. The plaintiff alleged that the damage to their property was due to the negligence of the first defendant, who was the driver of the vehicle, and sought to hold the second defendant, the owner of the vehicle, vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver. The legal issues the court needed to address were whether the owner of the motor vehicle could be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver under the principles of vicarious liability, and whether the use of the vehicle by the driver was for the owner's purpose.

The court examined the evidence to determine if the second defendant exercised effective control over the vehicle at the time of the incident, and if the use of the vehicle by the driver was for the owner's purpose. The court found that there was insufficient evidence to conclude whether the driver's alcohol consumption affected their ability to control the vehicle. The court held that the second defendant was not vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the first defendant, as the driver's use of the vehicle was not for the owner's purpose. The court also noted that the first defendant had failed to enter an appearance and defence, and was deemed to have admitted the allegations pursuant to rule 166 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999.

The court made a judgement for the plaintiff against the first defendant, and for the second defendant against the plaintiff and the first defendant in the third party proceedings. The court found that the first defendant was liable for the damage caused to the plaintiff's property, but the second defendant was not vicariously liable for the driver's negligence. The court also made a judgement for the second defendant against the first defendant in the third party proceedings, as the first defendant had failed to enter an appearance and defence. The court ordered that the amount of damages to be determined after further submissions were heard.

Orders

Orders of the court

Judgement for the plaintiff against the first defendant.

Judgement for the second defendant against the plaintiff.

Judgement for the second defendant against the first defendant in the third party proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

However, there is a dearth of evidence as to the actual effects of an alcohol reading of at least 0.12% on the second defendant and in particular whether it affected his capacity on that occasion to exercise effective control over the car. Accordingly, I make no conclusions or findings on this point. Conclusion I give judgement for the plaintiff against the first defendant in an amount to be determined after I hear further submissions. This is on the basis that the first defendant has failed to enter an appearance and defence together with formal proof of quantum. The first defendant is deemed to have admitted the plaintiff’s allegations pursuant to rule 166 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999. I give judgement for the second defendant against the plaintiff. Effectively, the plaintiff’s claim against the second defendant is dismissed on the ground that the second defendant is not vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the first defendant. I give judgement for the second defendant against the first defendant in the third party proceedings in an amount to be determined after I hear further submissions. Again, this is on the basis that the first defendant has failed to enter an appearance and defence together with formal proof of quantum. The first defendant is deemed to have admitted the second defendant’s allegations in third party proceedings pursuant to rule 166 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.