Baragan v State of Queensland

Link copied
Case Copied 70 min read

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Baragan v State of Queensland & Ors [2022] QCAT 202

PARTIES:

DORIN BARAGAN

(applicant)

v

STATE OF QUEENSLAND

(respondent)

PAUL STEWART

(respondent)

LAWRIE STURGESS

(respondent)

DAVID WINTER

(respondent)

DAVID CUSKELLY

(respondent)

DARRYL DUNLOP

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

ADL043-16

MATTER TYPE:

Anti-Discrimination matters

DELIVERED ON:

27 May 2022

HEARING DATE:

10 February 2020
11 February 2020
12 February 2020
13 February 2020
14 February 2020
3 June 2020
4 June 2020
5 June 2020

4 February 2021

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Fitzpatrick

ORDERS:

The application is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – INTERPRETATION – GENERAL APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION – contention public interest disclosures made under Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) – whether conduct official misconduct – whether conduct maladministration – whether disclosure made as alleged and within the requirements of the Act

TORT – REPRISAL - whether detriment caused because of a public interest disclosure

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), Chapters 6 and 7

Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) (Reprint No. 7), s5A, s5B(c), s28, s97(5)
Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld), s13, s14, s15
Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Qld), s13, s15
Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), s200
Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld), s7.2, s 10.1
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld), s6, s7 s12, s13, s17, s36, s39, s 40, s44, s45, Schedule 4

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 362

Burns v Australian National University (1982) 61 FLR 76
Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352
R v Purdon [2016] QSC 128

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

Applicant:

C Murdoch QC with him C Martin, Counsel for the respondents instructed by Crown Law

Respondent:

Self-represented

REASONS FOR DECISION

The claim

  1. By s 44 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) (PID Act), the Applicant Mr Baragan has made a complaint under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) about a reprisal. His complaint is dealt with under chapters 6 and 7 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) as if the complaint were about an alleged contravention of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld).

  2. A complaint was lodged with the then Anti-Discrimination Commission on 3 July 2015. The matter was referred to the Tribunal and received on 13 June 2016.

  3. A decision of the Tribunal made on 1 May 2019 ordered that the complaint proceed by reference to certain items set out in a Schedule filed on 29 March 2018. Subsequently an amended statement of facts and contentions was filed dated 6 September 2019 and the respondents’ filed a statement of facts and contentions in response. This matter has been determined by reference to the issues raised in those documents following a nine day hearing.

  4. A non-publication order has been made to ensure non-disclosure of documents or evidence which may identify children, accused persons or witnesses in relation to offences against children being investigated by Child Protection Investigation Unit officers.

  5. Mr Baragan alleges that he made six public interest disclosures and that the Respondents took fourteen reprisals against him in contravention…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Baragan v State of Queensland and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2022] QCAT 202
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Baragan v State of Queensland involves a dispute regarding the conduct of a child safety officer, Ms Fairhurst. The primary issue was whether her actions constituted official misconduct, maladministration, or both, under the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Qld) and the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2002 (Qld). The court was tasked with determining whether Ms Fairhurst's decision not to have a child undergo an internal medical examination, despite a reasonable suspicion of sexual assault, was within the scope of her professional duties and whether it could be classified as maladministration. The case also examined the statutory powers and responsibilities of child safety officers under the Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld).

The court delved into the statutory framework governing the actions of child safety officers, considering whether Ms Fairhurst's decision to not proceed with an internal medical examination was within her discretionary powers. It assessed whether her decision was reasonable and in line with the statutory requirements, particularly the necessity of forming a reasonable suspicion before mandating such an examination. The court further evaluated whether the decision could be considered maladministration, focusing on the definitions provided in the PID Act, including whether the decision was unreasonable or taken for an improper purpose. The court examined the evidence and legal principles to ascertain whether Ms Fairhurst's actions met the criteria for maladministration.

The court found that Ms Fairhurst's decision not to conduct an internal medical examination was within the scope of her professional judgment and statutory duties. It concluded that the decision was reasonable and did not constitute official misconduct as there was no evidence of dishonesty, lack of impartiality, or misuse of information. The court also determined that the decision did not meet the criteria for maladministration under the PID Act, as it was not unreasonable or taken for an improper purpose. The court held that the decision was an administrative action taken under the Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) and did not fall within the definition of maladministration.

The court ruled in favour of the State of Queensland, finding that Ms Fairhurst's conduct did not constitute official misconduct or maladministration. No disciplinary action or termination of employment was warranted based on the evidence presented. The decision clarified the scope of administrative decisions in child protection cases and the legal standards for maladministration.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Mr Boyle was familiar with the case and gave evidence as to the nature of a TAO. His evidence is that the discretion to act under a TAO’s authorisation is always left to the DOCS worker to determine in consultation with the relevant expert health care professionals.Evidence of Kathryn Masters Ms Masters provided an affidavit in the proceeding.[24]At the relevant time Ms Masters was Acting Regional Director, Brisbane Region, Child Safety, Youth and Families.[24]Exhibit 26. Ms Masters sets out in her affidavit the purpose of a TAO and discusses arrangements for a medical examination of a child. She said that a TAO allows for a medical examination. It does not mean a medical examination must be conducted. She said that Department staff must have formed a reasonable suspicion that a child has been the subject of sexual assault to justify an examination to determine whether a child has been sexually assaulted. I find that Ms Fairhurst had a reasonable basis for her decision not to have the child undergo an internal medical examination. I find that Ms Fairhurst’s conduct was the result of the exercise of a professional judgment in performance of her role as a child safety officer with responsibility for the child, including whilst the child was in the custody of the chief executive. I do not consider that Ms Fairhurst’s conduct, as defined in the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Qld), involves any dishonesty, lack of impartiality or misuse of information acquired in connection with the performance of her functions. Accordingly, I do not consider that there is any conduct which could be official misconduct, that is the basis for a criminal offence or a disciplinary breach providing reasonable grounds for terminating her employment. As to whether Ms Fairhurst’s conduct could if proved be maladministration, I consider that the decision made by Ms Fairhurst falls within the definition of administrative action insofar as it involved a decision and act, the making of a recommendation and an action taken because of a recommendation. The definition of administrative action in the PID Act pre-supposes an understanding of what administrative, as opposed to other forms of action, might be. The question has been considered in other contexts. A useful explanation is:…decisions made in the exercise of statutory power conferred by statute.[25][25]Burns v Australian National University (1982) 61 FLR 76, 83, 84. I find that the decision not to have the child internally examined was an administrative decision taken pursuant to the Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld).[26][26]Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) (Reprint No. 7), ss5A, 5B(c), 97(5). I do not consider that the decision could be said to fall within the definition of maladministration in the PID Act. In particular, I do not think the evidence supports a finding that the decision, from the lowest bar, was unreasonable or wrong, nor from the highest bar that it was taken contrary to law or was taken for an improper purpose.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.