Bannon v The Queen - [1995] HCATrans 144

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M97 of 1994

B e t w e e n -
ANTHONY CHARLES RAYMOND BANNON
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent

BRENNAN CJ

DEANE J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
McHUGH J
GUMMOW J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 31 MAY 1995, AT 3.09 PM

MR O.P. HOLDENSON: May it please the Court, I appear on behalf of the appellant. (instructed by James C. Galatas, Acting Director of Legal Aid Commission (Victoria))

MR M.S. WEINBERG, QC: May it please the Court, in this matter I appear together with my learned friend, MR P.A. COGHLAN, on behalf of the respondent. (instructed by P. Wood, Solicitor to the Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria))

BRENNAN CJ: Mr Holdenson?

MR HOLDENSON: A little earlier this day, an outline of submissions was filed with the Court Crier on behalf of the appellant.

BRENNAN CJ: Mr Holdenson, your summary of argument, of course, covers a lot of factual material and a lot of argument as well as the essential point, but the basic point is that which is raised in your notice of appeal, is it not, and that is what you got special leave to argue?

MR HOLDENSON: Yes. Special leave was granted in December in respect of what might be called the third party confession, that is, the confessions by Calder to people within an hour or so of the murders, to the effect that she alone ‑ or at least it was open to interpret what she has said to be ‑ that she alone had killed each of the two deceased and the refusal of the learned trial judge to permit the jury to take that evidentiary material into account in its consideration of the case against the appellant, as he now is, Bannon.

BRENNAN CJ: The question is whether or not confessional statements of that kind are admissible in favour of an accused.

MR HOLDENSON: Correct. The facts giving rise to this appeal can be very shortly stated. It was common ground at the trial that two people late one night were murdered. An hour or so later the two people who were present at the scene of the murders, namely the appellant and his co‑accused at trial, namely Calder, attended upon the occupants of a farmhouse. It was there that Calder said that “She, not we, had killed” or “could have killed the two victims”. Subsequently, one of the occupants of that house, Duiker, drove Calder to Calder’s home and during that car trip Calder said that “She - again not “we” - “could have killed two people but it didn’t matter, it wasn’t a worry, for prison meant nothing to her”.

At the trial the Crown alleged that the two accused had either acted in concert or, alternatively, one had aided and abetted the other. As a consequence, the learned trial judge very carefully directed the jury…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Bannon v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Bannon v The Queen [1995] HCATrans 144
Case: [1995] HCATrans 144
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Bannon against his conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained during police investigations and the proper application of the law relating to self-defence.

The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence obtained in circumstances where the appellant's rights may have been infringed, and whether the jury directions on self-defence were adequate and correctly reflected the relevant legal principles. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the evidence was obtained unlawfully and, if so, whether its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, justifying its exclusion. Furthermore, the Court examined the elements of self-defence as they applied to the facts presented at trial, including the requirement for an honest and reasonable belief in the necessity of using force.

The Court's reasoning focused on the principles governing the admission of evidence obtained in breach of statutory or common law rights, balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the protection of individual liberties. It was held that while evidence obtained in breach of rights may be admissible, its admission requires careful consideration of the circumstances of the breach and the potential prejudice to the accused. On the issue of self-defence, the Court reiterated that the question of whether a person acted in self-defence is one of fact for the jury, to be determined based on the evidence and the applicable legal tests, which require an honest belief that the force used was necessary to defend oneself from an unlawful attack, and that the belief was reasonably held in the circumstances.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's rulings or directions that would warrant setting aside the conviction.

Orders