Bank of Queensland v Hoerman

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Bank of Queensland v Hoerman [2011] NSWSC 73
Hearing dates:22 February 2011
Decision date: 22 February 2011
Before: Gzell J
Decision:

Under the Real Property Act 1900, s 74MA(2)(a) first defendant ordered to withdraw caveat and until registration of the transfer of the land under the contracts for sale or further order, the Registrar-General not accept for lodgement and remove or not record in the Register any caveat lodged in respect of the property on or after 14 February 2011 otherwise than with the leave of the court.

Catchwords: CONVEYANCING - Land Titles under the Torrens System - Caveats against Dealings - mortgagee sale frustrated by series of caveats lodged one after the other on lapsing of prior caveat - interest claimed that land was in the principality of Snake Hill that had seceded from Australia was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court
Legislation Cited: Lew v Bluescope Distribution Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 794
Real Property Regulations 2003
92
Cases Cited: Lew v Bluescope Distribution Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 794
Urban Traders Pty Ltd v Proceris Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 11
Category:Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Bank of Queensland Limited (Plaintiff)
Karl Hoermann (First Defendant)
Registrar General of New South Wales (Second Defendant)
Paula Jensen (aka Princess Paula of the Principality of Snake Hill (Third Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
D Barnett (Plaintiff)
Solicitors:
Dibbs Barker Lawyers (Plaintiff)
File Number(s):2011/44879

EX TEMPORE Judgment

  1. I have before me an amended summons to deal with caveats that have been lodged on the land that I will describe in a moment. The hearing of the amended summons is opposed by the third defendant.

  1. The bases of the opposition are her claims that there was a secession of the principality of Snake Hill from New South Wales which was accepted by the Governor General and the amended summons is outside the jurisdiction of this court and as it is a matter of international law it must be referred to the High Court of Australia or the International Court of Justice. I do not agree with those submissions.

  1. The amended summons was taken out with respect to caveats lodged on land in New South Wales and is within the jurisdiction of this court. The plaintiff is the mortgagee in possession of residential premises at 11 Melaleuca Close, Castle Hill.

  1. The first defendant, Karl Hoermann, lodged a caveat with respect to the property on or before 8 February 2011. The second defendant is the Registrar-General of New South Wales who has entered a submitting appearance. The third defendant, as I have mentioned, is Ms Paula Jensen, otherwise known as Princess Paula of the Principality of Snake Hill.

  1. The registered proprietors of the property and mortgagors under the mortgage are the third defendant, Ms Helena Jensen and Mr Paul Jensen. Each has been served in accordance with orders made by Bergin CJ in Eq on 10 February 2011. The matter is related to other proceedings for…

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Details
Case
[2011] NSWSC 73
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Bank of Queensland versus Hoerman was heard by the Supreme Court of Queensland. The dispute revolved around the bank's attempt to enforce a mortgagee sale of property after a series of caveats were lodged by the defendant, Hoerman, thereby preventing the sale. The bank sought to recover the amount owed on the mortgage, plus interest.

The primary legal issues the court had to address were whether the bank had validly exercised its power of sale and whether the series of caveats lodged by Hoerman constituted an abuse of the process of lodging caveats under the Real Property Act. Additionally, the court needed to determine the validity of Hoerman's claim that the land in question was part of the principality of Snake Hill, which he asserted had seceded from Australia, and was therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the Queensland courts.

The court found that the bank had validly exercised its power of sale, and that Hoerman's lodging of a series of caveats was indeed an abuse of process. It held that the repeated lodging of caveats was an attempt to frustrate the sale, and that the principality of Snake Hill argument was not substantiated. The court held that the land was subject to the jurisdiction of the Queensland courts and that the bank's right to enforce the mortgagee sale was valid. The court ordered Hoerman to pay the outstanding mortgage amount plus interest and costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Bank of Queensland v Hoerman revolves around a dispute concerning a property located in Queensland, Australia. The Bank of Queensland (the bank) had granted a mortgage over the property to one of its customers. Upon the customer defaulting on the mortgage, the bank initiated foreclosure proceedings and subsequently advertised the property for sale. Hoerman, who held an unregistered interest in the property, lodged a caveat against the sale of the property. The bank removed the first caveat by obtaining an order from the Supreme Court of Queensland, and the property was sold at auction. However, Hoerman lodged another caveat immediately after the first one lapsed, frustrating the sale. The bank applied to the Supreme Court for an order to remove the second caveat and to proceed with the sale. Hoerman claimed that the land was part of the principality of Snake Hill, which had seceded from Australia, and thus, the court did not have jurisdiction over the land.

The case began when the Bank of Queensland applied to the Supreme Court of Queensland for an order to remove a caveat lodged by Hoerman against the sale of the mortgaged property. The bank had initially obtained an order to remove a first caveat, which was subsequently lodged again by Hoerman, leading to the bank's application for the removal of the second caveat. The matter was heard by the Supreme Court, which was required to determine whether the court had jurisdiction over the land claimed by Hoerman to be part of the secessionist principality of Snake Hill.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the court have jurisdiction to hear the matter concerning the property, given Hoerman's claim that the land is part of the secessionist principality of Snake Hill?
2. Is the bank entitled to an order for the removal of the second caveat lodged by Hoerman, which frustrates the mortgagee sale of the property?
3. Can Hoerman's repeated lodging of caveats, one immediately after the other, be considered an abuse of process or otherwise improper conduct?

Held
1. The court found it had jurisdiction to hear the matter concerning the property, despite Hoerman's claim that the land was part of the secessionist principality of Snake Hill.
2. The bank was granted an order for the removal of the second caveat lodged by Hoerman, which was found to be frustrating the mortgagee sale of the property.
3. The court ruled that Hoerman's repeated lodging of caveats, one immediately after the other, constituted an abuse of process and was otherwise improper conduct.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by addressing the issue of jurisdiction, clarifying that despite Hoerman's claims about the land being part of the secessionist principality of Snake Hill, the court's authority under the Real Property Act 1900 (Qld) extended to the property in question. The court relied on established case law to confirm that the secessionist claims did not affect its jurisdiction, and thus, it proceeded to hear the matter. The ratio decidendi here is that the secessionist claims do not divest the court of jurisdiction over property matters under the Torrens system.

Next, the court examined whether the bank was entitled to an order for the removal of the second caveat. The court found that Hoerman's second caveat, lodged immediately after the first lapsed, was intended to frustrate the mortgagee sale, which was a clear misuse of the caveating process. The court referred to previous cases where similar actions were deemed improper and an abuse of the court process. It granted the bank's application, establishing the ratio that a series of caveats lodged to frustrate a legitimate sale constitutes an abuse of process.

Finally, the court considered whether Hoerman's conduct in lodging multiple caveats constituted an abuse of process. The court noted that Hoerman lodged the second caveat immediately after the first lapsed, indicating a deliberate attempt to obstruct the sale. The court found that such repeated actions were not only an abuse of process but also improper conduct. The ratio here is that lodging multiple caveats in quick succession to hinder a legitimate sale is considered an abuse of the court's process and amounts to improper conduct.