[2016] QCA 309
COURT OF APPEAL
FRASER JA
Appeal No 9868 of 2016
SC No 1519 of 2013
BANK OF QUEENSLAND LIMITED Applicant
ACN 009 656 740
v
MURRAY CHARLES WILLSON
AND
PRESTIGE POOLS PAVING AND LANDSCAPES PTY LTD Respondents
ACN 063 803 672
BRISBANE
WEDNESDAY, 23 NOVEMBER 2016
JUDGMENT
FRASER JA: This is an application for security for costs of this appeal. The trial judge gave judgment in favour of the respondent bank against the appellant on the appellant’s counterclaim against the bank. The appellant signed a joint facility account agreement, in which he expressly authorised the respondent to use money, in any of the appellant’s accounts, to pay out the money owing under the join facility agreement. To summarise it very briefly, the appellant’s counterclaim challenged the actions of the bank in crediting to the joint facility account a cheque that had been drawn in favour of the respondent bank for the credit of the appellant. On the face of the documents, the action of the respondent bank was authorised by the joint facility agreement, which the appellant had signed.
The appellant made a case that he was a party to the joint facility agreement, together with another person, only because he’d been asked to help out the other person; the bank having assessed that the other person did not have the capacity to make the repayments. His own submissions to this court suggested that he was made a party so that he would be liable as a party to the joint facility. At the trial of his counterclaim, the appellant relied upon claims that the bank had engaged in misleading conduct, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of statutory provisions, breach of the banking code of conduct, and also unconscionable conduct. Essentially, unless he could make out those cases he could not succeed, having regard to the joint facility account contract he had signed. Also, his case ultimately had to depend upon his own oral evidence of communications that he had had with the bank.
The trial judge did not accept any of the oral evidence given by the appellant, finding that he was not, in that respect, a reliable witness. The appeal is based on grounds that the trial judge erred in law in issuing judgment for the respondent, that on the evidence it was not open to the trial judge to conclude that a counterclaim failed, and that the trial judge took irrelevant matters into account, and failed to consider relevant matters in finding for the respondent bank on the counterclaim. These grounds of appeal were addressed in general terms in the appellant’s argument, but no detail was given of any particular way in which it was said that the trail judge made an error.
The appellant argued that he did not have a fair trial, because all of his evidence was stopped. I did my best to attempt to obtain details of what evidence could have been given that was relevant, and who stopped it…
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- Case
- [2016] QCA 309
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the appellant had a viable appeal that demonstrated a reasonable prospect of success. The court had to consider the arguments presented by Willson, which primarily challenged the credibility of the trial judge's findings and the acceptance of evidence. The court also needed to assess the financial position of Willson to determine if he could afford the costs if the appeal were to fail. The court's task was to balance these considerations against the risk that ordering security for costs might prevent Willson from litigating the appeal.
In determining the application, the Court of Appeal considered the arguments and evidence presented by Willson. The court noted that Willson had not provided specific details to support his claims of error by the trial judge. The court found that the appeal did not appear to have a viable prospect of success, as it required Willson to persuade the Court of Appeal that the trial judge had misused the advantage of seeing and hearing the evidence. The court also took into account Willson's impecuniosity and the risk that an order for security might prevent him from pursuing the appeal. Based on the evidence, the court decided that ordering security for costs in the amount of $25,000 was appropriate, as it was less than a full indemnity and aimed to balance the interests of both parties.
The Court of Appeal ordered that Willson provide security in the amount of $25,000 by 30 January 2017, in a form satisfactory to the Registrar. The court also ordered that the further prosecution of the appeal be stayed unless and until the security was provided. This decision ensured that the bank would be protected against potential costs if the appeal were to fail, while also considering the appellant's ability to pursue the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
At the trial, Willson presented oral evidence to support his claims, which the trial judge did not accept, finding Willson to be an unreliable witness. The appeal was based on the grounds that the trial judge erred in law, that the judge incorrectly concluded that the counterclaim failed, and that the judge considered irrelevant matters while failing to consider relevant ones. Willson argued that the bank had earlier pleaded guilty to unconscionable conduct, a claim the bank denied.
This matter is an appeal from a decision made by the trial court in favour of the bank against Willson on his counterclaim. The appeal was heard in the Queensland Court of Appeal. Prior to this appeal, the case was decided in the trial court where the judge dismissed Willson's counterclaim. The appeal was brought before the Court of Appeal on the grounds that the trial judge made errors in law and in the assessment of evidence. The Court of Appeal was required to assess whether the appeal had prospects of success and whether security for costs should be ordered in light of Willson's impecuniosity.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the trial judge erred in law in issuing judgment for the respondent on the counterclaim.
2. Whether, on the evidence, it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the counterclaim failed.
3. Whether the trial judge took irrelevant matters into account and failed to consider relevant matters in finding for the respondent on the counterclaim.
Held
1. The court determined that the trial judge did not err in law in issuing judgment for the respondent on the counterclaim. The court found that the appellant had not demonstrated that the trial judge misused the advantage he had in seeing and hearing the evidence.
2. The court concluded that, on the evidence, it was open to the trial judge to determine that the counterclaim failed. The court found that the trial judge did not accept the appellant's evidence as reliable.
3. The court held that the trial judge did not take irrelevant matters into account and failed to consider relevant matters in finding for the respondent on the counterclaim. The court noted that the trial judge had regarded the appellant's allegations of unconscionable conduct but ultimately found it unsupported by the accepted evidence.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court evaluated the appellant's arguments that the trial judge erred in law and that the evidence did not support the trial judge's conclusion. The court examined the trial judge's reasons for judgment and found that they were extensive and referred to the evidence the appellant relied upon to establish his version of the bank and customer relationship. The court noted that the trial judge did not accept the appellant's case due to the unreliability of his evidence.
The court assessed the appellant's claim that he did not have a fair trial because all of his evidence was stopped. The court attempted to obtain details of what evidence could have been given that was relevant, and who stopped it and how, but in the end, it was not able to obtain such detail. The court found that the appellant did not refer to any particular piece of evidence to justify the contention that the respondent had previously admitted being guilty of unconscionable conduct.
The court considered the financial position of the appellant and found grounds for considering that the appellant is impecunious. The court noted that the fact that an impecunious appellant has already had a day in court and lost, on the merits, is a circumstance which increases, rather than reduces, the likelihood of an order for security for costs.
In determining the amount of security, the court considered the affidavit evidence of a solicitor from the firm acting for the respondent, which estimated the respondent would likely incur legal costs of the order of $63,000 and would likely recover about 60 per cent of those costs, or $37,800 on a standard basis. The court also considered that it is not necessarily the case that an order for security for costs should provide a respondent to an appeal with a full indemnity. In light of these considerations, the court proposed to order security in an amount of $25,000, which it expected to be less than a full indemnity.