Bank of New South Wales v Brown

[1983] HCA 1

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gibbs C.J., Mason, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ.

BANK OF NEW SOUTH WALES v. BROWN

(1983) 151 CLR 514

8 February 1983

Banks and Banking—Bankruptcy

Banks and Banking—Bank and customer—Overdraft—Interest—Debit of account twice yearly—Interest thereafter calculated on total balance—Whether debited interest capital—Insolvency of customer—Statutory postponement of proof for interest in excess of specified rate. Bankruptcy—Proof of debt—Interest—Postponement of claim for interest above stipulated rate—Capitalization of accrued interest between debtor and creditor—Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s. 112.

Decisions

1983, February 8.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
GIBBS C.J. The respondent is the liquidator of a company known as Tom the Cheap (W.A.) Pty. Ltd. ("the company") which, before it went into liquidation on 21 December 1976, was a customer of the appellant bank. From 30 September 1970 the account of the company was in overdraft, and the appellant charged interest on the company's daily balance with six-monthly rests. As at each six-monthly rest interest was charged not only on the previous principal sum but also on accrued interest debited to the account. The appellant, in debiting interest to the company's account at the expiration of each six-monthly period in this way, was acting in accordance with its usual practice, which was accepted by the company. The rate of interest charged exceeded 8 per cent. On or about 21 June 1974, the company gave a mortgage of its real property to the appellant for the purpose of securing to the appellant the payment of (inter alia) all moneys advanced or to be advanced, and interest upon such moneys. The mortgage provided that:
". . . at the end of every half year ending on the last days of March and September in each year or on such other days as the bank may from time to time determine in respect of the whole or any part of such moneys the interest accrued due to such day in respect of such half year (if not paid) shall commence and thereafter so long as the whole or any part thereof shall remain unpaid shall continue to carry interest at the rate aforesaid and such accrued but unpaid interest may at the option of the Bank be debited against the Debtor . . . PROVIDED ALWAYS that such unpaid interest upon which interest shall have become so payable shall not be deemed thereby or by reason of any such debiting as aforesaid or by the inclusion of interest with principal in any balance carried forward or account stated or otherwise than as hereinafter provided to have become capitalised or added to principal by the Bank by express entry to that effect in its books . . . may at any time and from time to time and as from such date as the Bank shall determine capitalise and add to the principal all or any such unpaid interest upon which interest shall have become so payable . . ."
Although the appellant continued to charge interest at six-monthly rests in accordance with its usual practice, it appears that it did not, by express entry in its books, exercise its power to capitalize and add to the principal all or any of the unpaid interest. (at p518)

2. After the company went into liquidation, the appellant lodged with the liquidator a proof of debt in an amount exceeding $4 million. The liquidator decided that the debt proved included interest, and that such portion of the debt as represented interest at a higher rate than 8 per cent (an amount which he held exceeded $500,000) must be postponed to all of the claims of the other creditors, in accordance with s. 112 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) as amended, which is applicable in the winding up of a company in Western Australia by virtue of s. 291(2) of the Companies Act 1961 (W.A.), as amended. At all times material to this appeal s. 112 of the Bankruptcy Act provided as follows:
"(1) Where a creditor has proved a debt that is for, or includes, interest, or is founded on a claim that is for, or includes, interest, the interest or claim shall, for the purposes of dividend, be allowed at a rate not exceeding eight per centum per annum.
(2) The last preceding sub-section does not prevent the creditor from receiving a higher rate of interest than eight per centum per annum after all claims of the other creditors for valuable consideration in money or money's worth (including any claim by the spouse of the bankrupt under the last preceding section) have been satisfied. (3) In this section, 'interest' includes a pecuniary consideration in lieu of interest." (at p518)

3. The sole question for decision is whether the debt proved by the appellant included interest within the meaning of s. 112. No question arises as to the correctness of the calculations made by the liquidator. (at p518)

4. At first sight, the case for the appellant seems scarcely arguable. There is no doubt that the debt for which the appellant lodged its claim included amounts which originally represented interest. However, the appellant's case was that the amounts which, immediately before each was debited to the account, indubitably had the character of interest, underwent a metamorphosis when, in accordance with the practice of the appellant, each was added to the principal sum due on the account. When they were debited in that way they were, it was said, capitalized - i.e., they lost their quality of interest and were converted into capital. It was nevertheless conceded that no interest was capitalized once the mortgage had been given, for the condition under which, in accordance with the terms of the mortgage, capitalization might occur had not been fulfilled. (at p519)

5. The practice of bankers in periodically debiting accrued interest to the overdrawn current account of a customer, and thereby securing for themselves the benefit of compound interest, has been said to be "a usual and perfectly legitimate mode of dealing between banker and customer": Yourell v. Hibernian Bank (1918) AC 372, at p 385 . Interest so debited becomes capital in the sense that it thereupon bears interest. The submission on behalf of the appellant however was that interest thus capitalized becomes a principal indebtedness for all legal purposes. That this is so was said to be recognized by authority. The older authorities on which the appellant relied are fully discussed in the judgment of Lord Atkin in Paton v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1938) AC 341, at pp 348-351 , and it is unnecessary for me to deal with them in detail. Two of those authorities - Lord Clancarty v. Latouche (1810) 1 Ball &B 420 and Reddie v. Williamson (1863) 1 Macph 228 (1863 SC 228) - were cases which concerned questions as to the proper method of accounting between a bank on the one hand, and, respectively, an executor and co-obligant of the customer on the other. They no doubt show that as between a bank and a customer, or someone standing in the shoes of the customer, the accrued interest when debited to the customer's account is treated as principal, but they do not establish that such a result will follow for all purposes and so as to affect the rights of strangers. Two other cases - Ex parte Bevan (1803) 9 Ves Jun 223 (32 ER 588) and Eaton v. Bell (1821) 5 B &Ald 34 (106 ER 1106) - concerned the operation of the usury laws which restricted the rate of interest chargeable. The effect of Ex parte Bevan was stated by Lord Atkin in Paton v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1938) AC, at p 348 as follows:

"An antecedent (a priori) agreement for half-yearly rests, and interest upon the balance, would be void. But if you settle, i.e., agree the balance at the end of six months, there is nothing to prevent your making a fresh start with the total debt which no doubt includes interest: and agreeing to forbear from suing for the whole debt at a rate of interest meantime."

In Eaton v. Bell that case was followed and it was held that a bank which debited a customer's account with interest at half-yearly rests, and charged interest upon the total, did not infringe the usury laws. These old authorities contain statements that suggest that interest when debited periodically in this way is converted into principal. Although there is no doubt that parties may, as between themselves, agree that what is in truth interest shall be regarded as principal, the cases do not decide that such a transformation may be effected so as to affect the rights of other persons, and in Paton v. Inland Revenue Commissioners Lord Atkin (1938) AC, at p 352 said: "It may well be that interest is not as finally extinguished as some of the above decisions seem to suggest . . ." (at p520)

6. Counsel for the appellant relied also on some other authorities. In Parr's Banking Co. Ltd. v. Yates (1898) 2 QB 460 , a case under the Statute of Limitations, it was held that the general rule, that where principal and interest are due sums paid on account must be applied first to interests, had no application to accounts between banker and customer. Vaughan Williams L.J. said (1898) 2 QB, at p 467 :

"According to the ordinary practice of bankers the interest due is from time to time added to the principal, and becomes itself part of the principal due."

The case was one between a bank and a person who had given a guarantee to secure the overdraft of a customer, and the dictum of Vaughan Williams L.J. cannot be regarded as intended to suggest that the interest becomes part of the principal for all purposes and against all persons. Yourell v. Hibernian Bank (1918) AC 372 was an action by a bank for an account of money due upon the security of a mortgage, which contained a proviso that no greater principal sum than 5,700 pounds should be recoverable on the security. In keeping the mortgagor's current account the bank capitalized interest every half year. Subsequently the bank appointed a receiver of the mortgaged premises and paid to the credit of the current account all sums received from the receiver out of rents and profits and also the proceeds of sale of part of the mortgage security sold in exercise of the powers under the mortgage, with the result that more than 5,000 pounds was appropriated to principal. It was contended on behalf of the bank, inter alia, than s. 24 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1881 (U.K.) required the surplus on the receiver's account to be paid in reduction of interest and that the application of any part of the surplus as against principal was illegal. It was held by the House of Lords that s. 24 imposed on the receiver a duty which was owed only to the parties interested, and not to the Crown or to the general public (1918) AC, at p 387 and that the bank could not object to the appropriation which it had itself made. It was held that the principal sum secured by the mortgage was represented by the debit balance of the current account (which included accrued interest) (1918) AC, at pp 381, 384, 393 and that for that reason every credit to the account reduced the principal sum secured. The decision, depending as it does on the words of the mortgage and the conduct of the parties, is of very limited importance, and it certainly affords no support to the proposition that a banker and customer who treat interest as principal may affect third persons by their actions. (at p521)

7. Finally, the appellant referred to Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Holder (1931) 2 KB 81 . The ground on which that case was decided by the Court of Appeal was held by the House of Lords in Paton v. Inland Revenue Commissioners to be insupportable, and the reasons given by the Court of Appeal, so far as they are material for present purposes, are inconsistent with the judgments in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Oswald (1945) AC 360 to which I am about to refer. (at p521)

8. In Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Oswald a mortgage of a reversionary interest in settled funds provided that interest in arrears might at the option of the mortgagee be capitalized and added to the principal. The mortgagee having died, her trustees executed two instruments capitalizing the interest due. Subsequently the respondent, the trustee of the settlement, handed over to the mortgagee's trustees the whole of the funds remaining in his hands and those funds were appropriated in repayment of the principal sum and interest thereon (including capitalized interest). The first question for decision was whether by virtue of the two instruments the unpaid interest thereby capitalized was paid within the meaning of r. 21 of the General Rules under the Income Tax Act 1918 (U.K.). It was held, following Paton v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, that no payment of interest was made at the time when the interest was capitalized. The second question for decision was whether the respondent was accountable for tax under r. 21 in respect of the funds which were actually handed over by him to the mortgagee's trustees, and it was held that whatever was paid to the trustees over and above the amount of the original capital loans was in law a payment of interest, so that the respondent was accountable under r. 21. In the course of their speeches all members of the House found it necessary to consider the effect of the capitalization of interest (1945) AC, at pp 370, 372, 373, 378-379, 381 and all expressed approval of the statement of Lord Sterndale M.R. In re Morris; Mayhew v. Halton (1922) 1 Ch 126, at p 133 . Lord Sterndale M.R. there said:
". . . when these sums of interest come to be paid at the end of the time when payment is made, although interest has been charged upon them, and although, as a matter of bookkeeping, they have from time to time been added to capital, they do not cease to be interest of money - that is to say, they are overdue interest upon which interest has been paid."
Some of their Lordships in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Oswald (1945) AC 360 repeated for themselves the same view. Lord Macmillan said (1945) AC, at p 373 :

"The unpaid interest never ceases to retain its character as interest, although it has from time to time been added to the capital indebtedness and has carried interest in turn."

Lord Porter said (1945) AC, at p 379 :

"Capitalization means no more than that interest, which continues to be interest, shall be treated together with the capital sum due as itself interest-bearing but does not alter its quality as interest."

The remarks made by their Lordships as to the effect of capitalization were not mere dicta. They were essential to the reasoning which led them to conclude that the act of capitalization did not amount to a payment of interest, and that the actual payment, when made, was a payment of interest. The fact that their Lordships were concerned with a mortgage, and not with the case of banker and customer, does not in my opinion provide any ground of distinction, as indeed they themselves recognized by applying, as they did, Paton v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1938) AC 341 , which was a case of banker and customer. Although, as between the parties, the right to treat interest as capital may be affected by the terms of the mortgage, there can be no reason to distinguish the result of a capitalization effected by a banker from that effected by a mortgagee. The decision in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Oswald (1945) AC 360 is a clear and strong persuasive authority against the appellant's contentions. (at p523)

9. When, in accordance with normal banking practice, accrued interest is debited to a customer's current account, and itself bears interest, it may be convenient to say that, as between the banker and the customer, and those who stand in their shoes, the interest is treated as capital. In truth, however, the interest is not converted into capital, and the rights of third parties must be determined on the footing that the interest retains its character as such. (at p522)

10. There is no legal principal that requires a court, in applying s. 112 of the Bankruptcy Act, to treat a payment which in truth included interest as though it did not. Section 112 is obviously enacted for the benefit of the creditors generally. A banker and a customer cannot, by agreement between themselves, affect the statutory priority which s. 112 affords. It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether, in the circumstances of the present case, there was an account stated between banker and customer, because, even if there were, that would not, for the purposes of s. 112, change the character of the interest which was included in the account. In law, as well as in reality, the debt proved by the appellant in the present case included interest, and the appeal should be dismissed. (at p523)

MASON AND WILSON JJ. The important issue for decision here is whether s. 112(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) applies to a proof of debt lodged by a bank so as to restrict interest to a rate not exceeding 8 per cent per annum on unpaid interest which has been capitalized by the bank in its customer's running account. The section was amended by Act No. 12 of 1980 which substituted 12 per cent for 8 per cent, but this amendment does not affect this case. Wallace J. at first instance and on appeal the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia (Burt C.J. and Wickham J., with Brinsden J. dissenting) answered the question in the affirmative. The appellant, the Bank of New South Wales, now appeals from that decision. (at p523)

2. At the outset it is necessary to summarize the facts. Tom the Cheap (W.A.) Pty. Ltd. was a customer of the bank in the period from 24 September 1970 to 21 March 1975. Throughout this period the company maintained a running account with the bank which was continuously in overdraft. According to the agreed statement of facts the bank conducted the account according to its usual practice in that it charged interest on the daily balance with six-monthly rests. As at each six-monthly rest interest was charged not only on the previous principal sum but also on accrued interest debited to the account. The account was therefore conducted according to the practice, accepted by the company, so that the interest, calculated on the company's daily balance, was debited to the company's account at the expiry of the six-monthly periods. The first of these periods commenced on 30 September 1970, being the date when the account first went into overdraft. (at p524)

3. On 19 May 1975 the company entered into a scheme of arrangement with its creditors. On 21 December 1976 it went into liquidation. Although the company still maintained an account with the bank after 21 March 1975, no further credit was given by the bank to the company after that date. At the date of the company's liquidation it was indebted to the bank in an amount of $4,477,292.20. (at p524)

4. On 10 May 1979 the bank lodged a proof of debt for that amount. The proof of debt claimed interest at the rate of 13 per cent per annum on unpaid interest which had been capitalized. The amount claimed was computed as follows:
______________________________________________________________________________ __
Date Consideration Amount Remarks

19.5.75 Balance of Account Tom the Cheap

(W.A.) Pty. Ltd. Fixed Account at date of Scheme of Arrangement 4,506,697.04

20.9.75 Interest at 13% 243,841.20

1.10.75 to Debits (ex interest) 4,278.75
31.3.76 Interest at 13% 253,988.40

______________ 5,008,805.39

Less: Credit 1,556.14 Refund ______________ of Part 5,007,249.25 Interest debited on 20.9.75

1.4.76 to Debits (ex interest) 168.30 30.9.76 Interest at 13% 235,143.43
1.10.76 to Interest at 13% 132,426.89
21.12.76 ______________

5,374,987.87

Less: Balance in security Realization Account 1,002,709.10 ______________

Plus: Contingent leasing liability per Annexure "B" 105,013.43 ______________ $4,477,29.20 ______________

______________________________________________________________________________ __ (at p524)

5. Prior to June 1974 the company's debt to the Bank was unsecured. In that month the company mortgaged its real property in favour of the bank security for all moneys whether then due and payable or thereafter becoming due and payable by the company to the bank. it was a term of the mortgage that the "moneys hereby secured" should include interest -

". . . at the rate or respective rates agreed upon in writing if any and in the absence of any such agreement then without prior or other notice to the Mortgagor or the Debtor at such rate or rates as the Bank from time to time determines: except as otherwise provided by the terms of any agreement in writing relating to the whole or part of such moneys such interest shall accrue from day to day and shall be computed from the day or respective days of such moneys being paid or disbursed or becoming owing and at the end of every half year ending on the last days of March and September in each year or on such other days as the Bank may from time to time determine in respect of the whole or any part of such moneys the interest accrued due to such day in respect of such half year (if not paid) shall commence and thereafter so long as the whole or any part thereof shall remain unpaid shall continue to carry interest at the rate aforesaid and such accrued but unpaid interest may at the option of the Bank be debited against the Debtor or in the case of interest upon moneys lent paid or advanced to for or on account of the Mortgagor or to for or on account of any other person as aforesaid at the request of the Mortgagor or for the payment of which the Mortgagor is liable to the Bank as hereinbefore stated then against the Mortgagor PROVIDED ALWAYS that such unpaid interest upon which interest shall have become so payable shall not be deemed thereby or by reason of any such debiting as aforesaid or by the inclusion of interest with principal in any balance carried forward or account stated or otherwise than as hereinafter provided to have become capitalised or added to principal but the Bank by express entry to that effect in its books and without the necessity of giving notice to the Debtor or the Mortgagor may at any time and from time to time and as from such date as the Bank shall determine capitalise and add to the principal all or any such unpaid interest upon which interest shall have become so payable and whether such unpaid interest shall have been debited as aforesaid or not and such debitings of interest and additions to principal may be continued and made and the provisions herein contained as to the moneys on which interest is payable shall continue to be applicable so long as any of such moneys remain unpaid . . .. "
It is common ground that since the day on which the account became secured by the mortgage it was maintained consistently with and in accordance with its terms. It is not the fact that "the Bank by express entry to that effect in its books" had exercised its power to "capitalise and add to the principal all or any such unpaid interest". (at p525)

6. By notice dated 18 September 1979 the respondent official liquidator informed the bank that an amount of $500 had been rejected and an amount of $4,476,792.20 had been admitted. Of that sum the sum of $3,892,756.22 was found to rank equally for dividend with the other ordinary unsecured creditors and the sum of $584,035.98 was deferred in priority pursuant to s. 112. It was agreed that the sum of $500 was correctly rejected. The dispute between the parties relates to the liquidator's decision with respect to the amount of $584,035.98. (at p526)

7. It is acknowledged that the liquidator in reaching his conclusion took four main steps. First, he deducted from the amount of $5,374,987.87, the overdraft on the company's fixed account at the date of liquidation, the amount in the security realization account, being the sum of $1,002,709.10. He thereby arrived at a net claim of $4,372,278.77. It is agreed that the liquidator was correct in taking this step. Secondly, he reduced the interest to 8 per cent in all cases where the actual interest exceeded that figure, resulting in his calculation of the amount of $696,598.05 as excess interest. Thirdly, he made an adjustment in order to compute what amount the interest would have been had it been calculated on yearly rests instead of half yearly rests. This calculation resulted in the deduction of a further sum of $21,377. Finally, pursuant to s. 89 of the Bankruptcy Act, he apportioned the proceeds of the security realization account partly to principal, partly to interest at 8 per cent and partly to excess interest. The bank contends that the liquidator erred in taking the second and third steps described above. (at p526)

8. By a summons under s. 279 of the Companies Act 1961 (W.A.) the bank sought an order that the liquidator's decision be reversed in so far as it related to the sum of $584,035.98. The summons was dismissed by Wallace J., his decision being affirmed by the Full Court. The question which now arises for our determination is whether the debt of $4,476,792.20, being the debt proved by the bank, was, within the meaning of s. 112(1) of the Bankruptcy Act "a debt that . . . includes . . . interest". (at p526)

9. Section 112 provides:
"(1) Where a creditor has proved a debt that is for, or includes, interest, or is founded on a claim that is for, or includes, interest, the interest or claim shall, for the purposes of dividend, be allowed at a rate not exceeding eight per centum per annum.
(2) The last preceding sub-section does not prevent the creditor from receiving a higher rate of interest than eight per centum per annum after all claims of the other creditors for valuable consideration in money or money's worth (including any claim by the spouse of the bankrupt under the last preceding section) have been satisfied. (3) In this section, 'interest' includes a pecuniary consideration in lieu of interest." (at p526)

10. The bank's case is that when in a running account between a bank and its customer the bank on the rest day debits the customer's account with interest which has accrued during the period since the last rest day, upon which interest is thereafter charged, it is converted from interest into capital and that it thereupon ceases to be "interest" within the meaning of s. 122. (at p527)

11. There is, the bank argues, an impressive stream of authority for its major proposition that, on the capitalization by a bank of unpaid accrued interest on a current overdraft account at regular periods, the unpaid interest loses its character as interest and becomes capital. Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed. (1973), vol. 3, par. 160, regards the cases as establishing this proposition. (at p527)

12. They begin with the decision of Lord Eldon L.C. in Ex parte Bevan (1803) 9 Ves Jun 223 (32 ER 588) where his Lordship decided that, although compound interest could not be taken under an antecedent contract because such a contract would infringe the statute of 12 Ann. (2), c. 16 (1713) which prohibited a contract to pay a higher rate of interest than 5 per cent per annum, it was permissible to settle as at the end of a period, this not being part of the prior contract, and then forbear the six months' interest being payable on the entire amount then owing, that amount including the unpaid interest. The Lord Chancellor appears to have had in mind an express agreement to settle accounts. (at p527)

13. In Lord Clancarty v. Latouche (1810) 1 Ball &B 420 Lord Manners L.C., in applying the principle stated by Lord Eldon L.C. in Bevan, took it further. First, he presumed an agreement at the end of every year between banker and customer that interest then due should become principal. Secondly, by saying that unpaid interest became principal he made explicit what was implicit in Lord Eldon's earlier remarks. (at p527)

14. Later, in Eaton v. Bell (1821) 5 B &Ald 34, at pp 40-41 (106 ER 1106 at p 1108) Abbott C.J. said:
"It is clear from the facts stated, that the defendants assented to that mode of keeping the accounts, and the bankers who advanced the money might have done it on the faith that they should have been permitted to convert the interest from time to time into capital . . .." (at p527)

15. The same approach was adopted by the Court of Session in Reddie v. Williamson (1863) 1 Macph 228 (1863 SC 228) where the issue was whether the amount which the banker sought to recover exceeded the limit of 400 which had been placed on the co-obligor's guarantee. The court rejected the banker's argument that the amount sued for contained a substantial interest component and therefore did not exceed the limit which was applicable to principal only, stating that the accumulation of interest at each annual balance converted the interest so accumulated into an advance by the bank. Lord Inglis, the Lord Justice-Clerk, after saying of the capitalized interest that it "not only becomes principal, but never thereafter ceases to be dealt with as principal" (1863) 1 Macph p 236 (1863 SC, at p 236) , went on to state (1863) 1 Macph at p 237 (1863 SC, at p 237) :

"The privilege of a banker to balance the account at the end of the year, and accumulate the interest with the principal, is founded on this plain ground of equity, that the interest ought then to be paid, and, because it is not paid, the debtor becomes thenceforth debtor in the amount, as a principal sum itself bearing interest . . . "

and observed that interest was thus converted into principal. (at p528)

16. We put to one side the different view expressed by Lord Cowan (1863) 1 Macph at p 238 (1863 SC at p 238) :
" . . . that the periodical interest at the end of each year is a debt to be then paid, and which must be held to have been paid when placed to the debit of the account as an additional advance by the bank for the convenience of the obligants."
This view is plainly incorrect. It is unsupported by authority except for a comment made by Younger L.J. in In re Morris; Mayhew v. Halton (1922) 1 Ch 126, at p 138 , a comment which was later disapproved by Russell J. in In re Jauncey; Bird v. Arnold (1926) 1 Ch 471 . In that case Russell J. observed that "the interest is not capitalized because it is in fact paid, but because it has in fact not been paid" (1926) 1 Ch, at p 476 , an observation which was later approved by the House of Lords in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Oswald (1945) AC 360, at pp 370, 373, 378, 381 . (at p528)

17. Again in Parr's Banking Co. Ltd v. Yates (1898) 2 QB 460 , Rigby L.J. and Vaughan Williams L.J. (1898) 2 QB, at p 467 spoke of capitalized interest becoming principal, and in Yourell v. Hibernian Bank (1918) AC 372 , a case to be discussed shortly in greater detail, the House of Lords took the same view, Lord Finlay L.C. (1918) AC, at p 381 , Lord Atkinson (1918) AC, at p 384 and Lord Parker of Waddington (1918) AC, at p 393 stating that unpaid interest debited by the bank at half yearly rests was principal owing to the customer by the bank. This view also prevailed in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Holder (1931) 2 KB 81 , where the Court of Appeal held that once interest had been capitalized, according to the regular practice of bankers, it could not ground a deduction for payment of interest due under s. 36 of the Income Tax Act 1918 (U.K.). Lord Hanworth M.R. (1931) 2 KB, at p 94 referred to "the system of bankers in turning interest into capital as usual and binding on the parties who have acquiesced in it". (at p529)

18. The appellant relies strongly on Yourell. There the customer mortgaged land to the banker to secure moneys owing including those on his overdraft account. The mortgage deed contained a proviso that no greater principal sum than 5,700 pounds should be recoverable on the security. In the mortgagor's current account, interest as stipulated was charged from day to day with half-yearly rests, so that the interest was capitalized every half year. The mortgagor eventually owed more than 5,700 pounds. The bank appointed a receiver. The bank paid to the credit of the mortgagor's account moneys received by it from the receiver, appropriating more than 5,000 pounds to the payment of principal. In an action to enforce the security the bank claimed that an account should be taken as between mortgagor and mortgagee and that any surplus on the receiver's account ought to be applied in reduction of interest. The House of Lords, in rejecting this claim, stated that there was no case for re-opening the account, it having been regularly communicated to the mortgagor and assented to by him. Lord Atkinson described it as a "settled account" (1918) AC, at p 392 . (at p529)

19. There are, however, a series of revenue cases which, it has been suggested, are inconsistent with the approach which we have outlined thus far. Of these decisions, three - In re Craven's Mortgage; Davies v. Craven (1907) 2 Ch 448 , In re Morris (1922) 1 Ch 126 and In re Jauncey (1926) 1 Ch 471 might be distinguished on the ground that the agreement in each instance was merely to pay compound interest, there being no agreement express or implied to capitalize unpaid interest. But the reasoning in two of the judgments and the effect of later decisions of the House of Lords throws the validity of the distinction into serious question. As we have seen, the comment of Russell J. in In re Jauncey (1926) 1 Ch, at p 476 was approved in Oswald. Of equal, if not greater significance, were the remarks of Lord Sterndale M.R. in Morris which were also subsequently approved in Oswald. The Master of the Rolls, speaking in a context in which capitalization was not expressly provided for, said (1922) 1 Ch, at p 133 :
"I think that the word 'capitalisation' used in many of the books quoted is a convenient word, but for the purposes for which it has been used in the argument before us it is a fallacious word, because it is taken as referring to capitalisation for all purposes, income tax and otherwise. I do not think that is the meaning of the word. In may opinion . . . when these sums of interest come to be paid at the end of the time when payment is made, although interest has been charged upon them, and although, as a matter of bookkeeping, they have from time to time been added to capital, they do not cease to be interest of money - that is to say, they are overdue interest upon which interest has been paid." (at p530)

20. In Paton v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1938) AC 341 it was decided that the action of a bank in debiting a customer's account with unpaid interest on half yearly rests did not constitute as between the bank and the customer a payment of interest by the customer within the meaning of s. 36(1) of the Income Tax Act 1918 which would have entitled the trustee of the customer's estate to recover the amount of income tax thereon. It is important to note the treatment of the decided cases in the speeches of Lord Atkin and Lord Macmillan and the reservations which they expressed. Paton does not affirm the Bevan principal on the footing that capitalization works a conversion of interest into principal so that it ceases thereafter to have the character of interest for all purposes. In discussing Bevan Lord Atkin and Lord Macmillan made no reference to the conversion of interest into principal, pointing to the difference between an antecedent agreement and one which is subsequent involving, as Lord Atkin put it, "making a fresh start with the total debt which no doubt includes interest" (1938) AC, at p 348 . His Lordship went on to say (1938) AC, at pp 351-352 :

"I would only add that the question does not arise in this case whether, if the debit balance including interest is paid in the next or succeeding accounts either in whole, or by a specific appropriation of a sum to the past interest, that is or is not a payment of interest for the purposes of the Income Tsx Act, It may well be that interest is not as finally extinguished as some of the above decisions seem to suggest . . . . "

And Lord Macmillan remarked (1938) AC, at p 357 : "Now it may well be that as between a bank and its customer this method of dealing may have the result that the accrued interest which the bank has with the customer's assent added to the principal loan thereby ceases to be due or recoverable as interest, but becomes merged in the principal loan." (at p530)

21. These comments may be seen as a bridge to the last of the revenue cases, Oswald (1945) AC 360 , which presents some difficulty for the appellant's case. Oswald related, not to a customer's running account with his banker, but to the question whether capitalization by a mortgagee of unpaid interest under a mortgage of a reversionary interest involved "payment of any interest of money" so as to impost a liability under r. 21 of the General Rules applicable to schedules of the Income Tax Act 1918 on the person paying the interest to deduct the amount of tax ayable on the amount of that interest. It was held unanimously that capitalization did not involve payment of interest. Their Lordships approved the statement of Lord Sterndale M.R. in Morris and rejected the argument that any distinction should in this respect be drawn between capitalization of interest in a customer's running account with a bank and capitalization of interest under a mortgage, regarding the principal applied in Paton as decisive. (at p531)

22. Lord Macmillan and Lord Porter gave expression ot a proposition concerning capitalization of interest which is implicit in the other speeches. Lord Macmillan said (1945) AC, at p 373 :
"Capitalization means no more than that interest, which continues to be interest, shall be treated together with the capital sum due as itself interest-bearing but does not alter its quality as interest." (at p531)

23. Mr. Meagher, for the appellant, submits that neither the decision in Oswald nor the principle according to which it was decided touches the present case. It was a case involving an account between mortgagor and mortgagee in which there was no suggestion of an account stated or settled account. According to his argument, the principle that capitalization converts interest into principal rests at bottom on settled account which takes place consensually as between customer and banker in relation to the customer's running account at each rest period. In this respect he claims that Yourell has a special significance because it acknowledges that the Bevan principle applies between banker and customer on this very footing and it was not overruled or even discussed in Oswald and Paton. This, it is suggested, confirms that, despite the generality of the comments made in the speeches in Oswald, no reflection on the Bevan principle as applied in Yourell was intended. (at p531)

24. The thrust of this argument is blunted by the reservations expressed by Lord Atkin and Lord Macmillan in Paton and by the refusal of Lord Porter and Lord Simonds in Oswald to draw any distinction between capitalization of interest under a mortgage and capitalization of interest between banker and customer according to the custom of bankers (1945) AC, at pp 379, 380 . For our part we are much inclined to agree with this view. (at p532)

25. However, in the ultimate analysis the decision in the present case hinges, as did the decision in Bevan itself, upon the construction of the relevant statute. True it is that in Bevan reliance seems to have been placed on the proposition that unpaid interest on a running overdraft account, once capitalized according to the practice of bankers, ceases to be interest and becomes capital. But the Lord Chancellor's reliance on this proposition was an inessential element in his conclusion that the statute on its true construction did not prohibit the taking of interest on unpaid interest which had been capitalized, notwithstanding that the result of doing so was in effect to secure the payment of interest at a rate exceeding the prescribed maximum. It goes without saying that the reasons which induced his Lordship to take that view of the statute of 12 Ann. (2) c. 16 have little to do with the interpretation of s. 112. (at p532)

26. When we look to s. 112 it is apparent that the section was enacted to protect the general creditors of an insolvent estate against the proof of debts which included claims for interest based on excessive interest rates. This it does by imposing a general limitation on the inclusion in proofs of debt of claims for interest based on a rate exceeding 8 per cent per annum. So long as this limitation is read as applying to amounts included in a proof of debt which originated as interest, whether they have been capitalized or not, the section serves the object which we have ascribed to it. If, however, the limitation is so interpreted that it has no application to capitalized interest included in a proof of debt the object of the section is more obscure. It might still be described as a provision which is designed to protect creditors generally. But the protection which it conferred on them would then be made subject to an exception which would be at variance with the interests of creditors generally. It is an exception which would preserve to any creditor the freedom to agree in a particular case with the bankrupt or the company, as the case may be, that unpaid interest should be capitalized and bear interest, thereby enabling that creditor to prove for an amount that would exceed a return of 8 per cent per annum on the unpaid principal sum. (at p532)

27. In our view the section should be read in conformity with its evident object of protecting creditors generally so that it prohibits the inclusion in a proof of debt of a claim for interest based on a rate of interest exceeding 8 per cent per annum, treating the word "interest" as referring to an amount whose original character was interest, even if it subsequently became capitalized by arrangement between the parties. (at p533)

28. The fact that in the present case there was a settled account between the appellant and the respondent is then of no significance. The importance of the settled account for Yourell was that it precluded the bank from reopening the account with the mortgagor. Here, however, we are concerned to construe and apply a statutory provision. (at p533)

29. In the result we would dismiss the appeal. (at p533)

BRENNAN J. Section 112 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) prescribes a rule for adjusting the rights of creditors inter se. A debt for interest, or a debt that includes interest, or a debt that is founded on a claim that is for, or includes, interest is subject to the adjustment specified in sub-s. (1) until all creditors for valuable consideration in money or money's worth have been satisfied. For the purposes of dividend, the interest or claim is to be allowed at a rate not exceeding 8 per cent per annum. That rule is applied by s. 291(2) of the Companies Act 1961 (W.A.) to the adjustment of the rights of creditors in the winding up of an insolvent company. Tom the Cheap (W.A.) Pty. Ltd. is such a company; the respondent is its liquidator; the appellant bank is a creditor in the sum of $4,476,792.20, an amount representing the balance owing by the company on its overdrawn current account when it went into liquidation on 21 December 1976. The bank had charged interest on the overdrawn current account of the company at a rate in excess of 8 per cent per annum. The bank contends that, prior to June 1974, the interest charged had been capitalized and had lost the character of interest so that the rule has no application; the liquidator contends that the interest charged has retained the character of interest and is to be allowed at only 8 per cent per annum for the purposes of dividend. There is no dispute as to the interest charged after June 1974. In June 1974, the company gave the bank a mortgage to secure its indebtedness and the terms of the mortgage provided that any interest accruing thereafter should not be capitalized or added to principal unless the bank should otherwise determine by express entry to that effect in its books. As the bank did not so determine, interest accruing subsequent to the mortgage is conceded to be subject to adjustment in accordance with the rule expressed in s. 112 of the Bankruptcy Act. (at p533)

2. From 30 September 1970 until June 1974 the company's account was in overdraft. During this time, according to the agreed statement of facts, the bank "conducted the account according to its usual practice in that it charged interest on the (company's) daily balance with six monthly rests. As at each six monthly rest interest was charged not only on the previous principal sum but also on accrued interest debited to the account. The account was accordingly conducted according to the practice, accepted by the (company), such that the interest, calculated on the (company's) daily balance, was debited to the (company's) account at the expiry of the six monthly periods." The question is whether the amounts thus debited on the rest days between 30 September 1970 and June 1974 retained their character as interest after they were so debited. (at p534)

3. How does a debt for interest, or the interest component of a larger debt (i.e., "a debt that includes interest") lose its character as interest? Not merely by allowing the debt to stand as a debit item in a running account. A debt takes its character from the circumstances of its creation and thus the interest which was charged on the daily balance was a debt for interest. The question for determination is whether it remained a debt for interest until discharge of the debt or whether, by some legal alchemy, its character was transformed before discharge. A related question - to which s. 112(3) is relevant - is whether, upon discharge of a debt for interest, another debt or liability which takes its place is a debt or liability of the same character. But since, in my view, that question does not arise upon the facts of this case, I put that question and s. 112(3) aside, and turn to the primary question whether the debt for interest has lost its character so that it is not subject to adjustment in accordance with s. 112. (at p534)

4. The bank submits that it had and exercised the right to capitalize interest on the rest days and that interest loses its character on capitalization. But what is meant by capitalization? There is a sense in which interest may be said to be capitalized though it retains its character as interest. That sense was explained by Lord Sterndale M.R. in In re Morris; Mayhew v. Halton (1922) 1 Ch 126, at p 132 in a passage which has commanded assent in later cases:
"The process would be more complicated but would, as it seems to me, effect the same result, if the interest were not added to the capital, but two accounts were kept, one charging interest upon capital year by year, and the other charging interest upon the sums of overdue interest which are not paid from year to year. That however is not the way in which it is done in practice. It would be a cumbrous and unbusinesslike way of doing it. The way in which it is done as a matter of business is by adding the interest year by year - namely, the interest for the first year to the capital sum, the interest for the second year to the capital sum, plus the first year's interest. This is commonly and conveniently spoken of as capitalising the interest. It is capitalising the interest in a sense, and in the sense in which Mr. Beaumont put the matter to us. He said that the interest should be treated as capital for the purpose of bearing interest; and in the sense that it becomes a thing which bears interest itself which interest, as a rule, does not, it may be said to be capitalised - that is to say, it may be said to be put in the same position as capital in the sense that it is regarded as a thing which bears interest. But it seems to me that it is going a very long way beyond that to say that it is made capital for all purposes, and that when it is paid, at the expiration of three, four, five or ten years, it is all paid, with the exception of the last year, as capital." (at p535)

5. Capitalization which consists merely in subjecting a debt for interest to a liability itself to bear interest is not the capitalization upon which the bank relies in this case. The bank contends that the interest capitalized by the bank in accordance with its practice loses its character as interest for all legal purposes. The authorities on which the bank places reliance and which have influenced banking practice begin with a line of cases where it was held that, on an account stated, a debt for interest was extinguished. To ascertain from these cases whether and in what manner a debt for interest is extinguished when it is capitalized by an account stated, an ambiguity in the meaning of "account stated" should be resolved. (at p535)

6. An account stated may take either of two forms (per Jordan C.J. in Commonwealth Dairy Produce Equalisation Committee Ltd. v. McCabe (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 397, at p 401 ). The two forms are explained by Viscount Cave in Camillo Tank Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Alexandria Engineering Works (1921) 38 TLR 134, at p 143 :
"The expression 'account stated', as Mr. Jowitt pointed out in his able argument, has more than one meaning. It sometimes means a claim to payment made by one party and admitted by the other to be correct. An account stated in this sense is no more than an admission of a debt out of court; and while it is no doubt cogent evidence against the admitting party, and throws upon him the burden of proving that the debt is not due, it may, like any other admission, be shown to have been made in error. This is the plain result of the authorities, such as Perry v. Attwood (1856) 6 El &Bl 691 (119 ER 1021) and Laycock v. Pickles (1863) 4 B &S 497 (122 ER 546) . Where the transaction is of this character, it makes no difference whether the account is said to be stated or to be 'stated and agreed'; the so-called agreement is without consideration and amounts to no more than an admission. There is a second kind of account stated where the account contains items both of credit and debit, and the figures on both sides are adjusted between the parties and a balance struck. This is called by Mr. Justice Blackburn, in Laycock v. Pickles (1863) 4 B &S 497, at p 506 (122 ER 546, at p 549) , a 'real account stated', and he describes it as follows: -

'There is a real account stated, called in old law an insimul computassent, that is to say, when several items of claim are brought into account on either side, and, being set against one another, a balance is struck, and the consideration for the payment of the balance is the discharge of the items on each side. It is then the same as if each item was paid and a discharge given for each, and in consideration of that discharge the balance was agreed to be due.'"

Mr. R. M. Jackson, in "The History of Quasi-Contract in English Law" (Cambridge (1936)) at p. 110 describes the former kind of account stated as admissions, the latter as contracts. "The latter," he observes, "should be discussed within the body of contract law, perhaps the most convenient place being in proximity to Accord and Satisfaction." (at p536)

7. Although the former kind of account stated, being an acknowledgment of a debt, infers a promise to pay (per Viscount Haldane in the Camillo Case (1921) 38 TLR, at p 137 ), the existence of the debt can be rebutted (Siqueira v. Noronha (1934) AC 332, at p 337 ). The acknowledgement does not discharge or require the discharge of the items on either side of the account. By contrast, the latter kind of account stated requires the discharge of the items on either side of the account, whatever their character, as consideration for a new liability created in their place. Hereafter, I use "account stated" to mean the contractual kind of account stated. (at p536)

8. It is not necessary that there should be debts or claims on both sides: all that is required is that there be cross items of account the liability for which and the credit for which are discharged by the account stated. In Firm Bishun Chand v. Seth Girdhari Lal (1934) 50 TLR 465 , the Privy Council held that, where a debtor paid various sums towards the discharge of his loan account, an account might be stated which discharged the antecedent debt and created a new liability. Lord Wright, in delivering the judgment of the board, said (1934) 50 TLR, at p 468 :
"Indeed, the essence of an account stated is not the character of the items on one side or the other, but the fact that there are cross items of account and that the parties mutally agree the several amounts of each and, by treating the items so agreed on the one side as discharging the items on the other side pro tanto, go on to agree that the balance only is payable. Such a transaction is in truth bilateral, and creates a new debt and a new cause of action. There are mutual promises, the one side agreeing to accept the amount of the balance of the debt as true (because there must in such cases be, at least in the end, a creditor to whom the balance is due) and to pay it, the other side agreeing the entire debt as at a certain figure and then agreeing that it has been discharged to such and such an extent, so that there will be complete satisfaction on payment of the agreed balance. Hence, there is mutual consideration to support the promises on either side and to constitute the new cause of action. The account stated is accordingly binding, save that it may be reopened on any ground - for instance, fraud or mistake - which would justify setting aside any other agreement. . . .
This rule does not depend on the character or the origin of the debts or credits on either side. . . ." (at p537)

9. When there are debit and credit items in an account and a balance is struck by one party who sends a written statement of the balance to the other and the other raises no objection, is an account stated between the parties to be inferred? Or is a mere acknowledgment of debt by the party apparently liable for the balance to be inferred? These are pure questions of fact but, generally, the bare delivery of a written statement of account by one party to another is insufficient to raise an inference that the balance is due on an account stated: see Irvine v. Young (1823) 1 Sim &St 333 (57 ER 134) . On the other hand, the passing to and fro of a bank pass-book has been regarded as evidence of a stated and settled account (see Blackburn Building Society v. Cunliffe, Brooks, &Co. (1882) 22 ChD 61, at pp 71-72 ). (at p537)

10. A banker and customer, like any other creditor and debtor, may make a contract by which the balance of an account is agreed to be the liability owing by one to the other, liability for the items in the account being discharged. Whether such a contract should be inferred from the conduct of the banker and customer (in the absence of an express contract) is a question of fact. In Firm Bishun Chand (1934) 50 TLR, at pp 468-469 Lord Wright referred to some of the familiar features of the relationship between banker and customer as relevant circumstances for consideration in determining whether an account has been stated:
". . . that relationship is one of debtor and creditor, the banker being debtor when the account is in credit, and the customer being debtor when the account is overdrawn. It has not been doubted that in law there can be a settled or stated account between banker and customer: what has been questioned is whether the acceptance by the customer without protest of a balance struck in the pass-book constitutes a settled account, but the question has had reference merely to the issue whether such a settlement can be inferred as a matter of fact from the passing backward and forward of the pass-book. The legal competence of such a settlement, if made, is not questioned." (at p538)

11. If the balance owing after debiting interest on a rest day becomes a new liability arising upon an account stated, the debt for the interest so debited is discharged. If the interest charged by the bank is capitalized in this sense, there is no debt for interest, or no debt including interest, to which the rule in s. 112 of the Bankruptcy Act may apply. But if the debt for interest is not discharged, there appears to be no reason why the rule in s. 112 should not apply to that debt, although it has been "capitalized" in the sense that it is subjected to a liability itself to bear interest thereafter. (at p538)

12. The cases in which "capitalization" has discharged a debt for interest and those in which the debt for interest has retained its character when it is "capitalized" may now be examined. The first, Ex parte Bevan (1803) 9 Ves Jun 223 (32 ER 588) concerned the operation of the Usury Law of 1713, 12 Ann. (2) c. 16, upon interest charged by a lender at the maximum lawful rate, the accrued interest being added to the principal sum after six months and interest being thereafter charged upon the whole. Lord Eldon L.C., finding an account stated, upheld the creditor's claim to the whole of the interest charged. It was essential to the result that the debt for accrued interest should have been extinguished. His Lordship said (1803) 9 Ves Jun at p 224 (32 ER, at p 588) :
"As to the question of compound interest, it is clear, you cannot a priori agree to let a man have money for twelve months, settling the balance at the end of six months: and that the interest shall carry interest for the subsequent six months; that is, you cannot contract for more than 5 per cent.; agreeing to forbear for six months. But, if you agree to settle accounts at the end of six months, that not being part of the prior contract, and then stipulate, that you will forbear for six months upon those terms, that is legal. . . . It is not enough to say in this case, that these accounts have been settled from half-year to half-year; and therefore it is legal to take interest in this way; for the transactions may be evidence of previous agreement." (at p538)

13. If the lending agreement had provided that accrued interest be added to the principal sum after six months in order that it also might bear interest, there would have been no discharge of the debt for interest. The interest charged during the second six months would have included both interest and interest upon the interest upon the principal sum so that the total interest during that period would have exceeded the statutory maximum chargeable upon the principal sum. The usury statute would have been contravened. But as Lord Eldon found that, by an account stated, the parties had extinguished the debt for principal and the debt for interest and had created a new liability which was to remain outstanding for a further six months at interest, the usury statute was not contravened. Similarly, in Lord Clancarty v. Latouche (1810) 1 Ball &B 420 , Lord Manners L.C. presumed an account stated at the end of each year from the acquiescence of the debtor in the annual settlement of the account. The accounts were drawn up according to the contemporary custom of bankers which was thus described in the report (1810) 1 Ball &B, at p 421 :

". . . at particular Periods, Balances of Principal and Interest were struck, and the consolidated Sum was introduced as the first Item in the subsequent Account, and Interest calculated on it."

Lord Manners L.C. said (1810) 1 Ball &B, at pp 429-430 :
"From the Acquiescence of Mr. Conolly I ought to presume an Agreement at the End of every Year, that the Interest then due, should become Principal and carry Interest, which according to Ex parte Bevan (1803) 9 Ves Jun 223 (32 ER 588) , this Court will admit of, and that was a Case of Half yearly Rests. In the Case of a Mortgage Security, it would be fair for a Mortgagee to call for Interest due at the End of the Year, and if not paid, to insist on its becoming Principal; but I admit, if this constituted Part of the original Contract, it would, according to Bosanquet v. Dashwood (1734) Cases T Talbot 38 (25 ER 648) , be usurious and oppressive." (at p539)

14. The same principle explains Eaton v. Bell (1821) 5 B &Ald 34 (106 ER 1106) , although Abbott C.J. spoke as though an account stated, extinguishing the debt for interest and creating a new liability, was not an inference to be drawn from the facts but a legal entitlement. His Lordship said (1821) 5 B &Ald, at p 40 (106 ER, at p 1108) :

"As to the question of compound interest, it is now settled, that a party advancing money to another is entitled to charge interest, and at the end of every year, then to add the principal to the interest."

Taken in isolation that proposition may be too widely stated. An entitlement to add principal and interest so as to create a new liability must arise upon the consensual stating of the account; it could not have arisen out of an antecedent contract without contravention of the usury laws, as Abbott C.J. recognized in the next sentence in his judgment:

"In Ex parte Bevan, it was expressly held, that although an antecedent contract for a loan for twelve months, to settle the balance at the end of six months, and that the interest should carry interest for the subsequent six months, would be bad; yet, that an agreement at the end of six months to settle accounts, (that not being part of the prior contract), and then a stipulation to forbear the balance then struck for those six months, is legal."

The entitlement to charge interest upon capitalized interest could be maintained in the face of the usury laws only upon the hypothesis that the debt for interest had been discharged by an account stated. The inference of an account stated was readily drawn - no doubt to ameliorate the operation of the usury laws - but the principle is clear. Capitalization destroyed the character of a debt for interest by discharging the debt. (at p540)

22. From the foregoing it is clear, I think, that the interest which was added to the principal debt owing by the company for the purpose of calculating further or compound interest was not paid and did not cease to be owing. It is also clear, in my view, that the compounding of interest in this manner involved no novation either by a statement or settlement of accounts or otherwise. In so far as capitalization of the interest took place, it involved no more than a rearrangement of the accounts to enable interest to be charged upon interest. This was achieved, as must always be the case with compound interest, by periodically adding the interest owing to the principal sum for the purpose of calculating the further interest. The sum added by way of interest remained discernible in its original character as interest. Even if the total sum formed by the addition of interest might be said to have been capital, that does not mean that it did not include amounts which were identifiable in their origin as interest and remained identifiable as such. Indeed, compound interest is properly described as interest upon interest and so to describe it is to assume the continued identity of the component parts of the capital upon which interest is calculated from time to time. (at p556)

23. That is sufficient to dispose of the question whether s. 112 of the Bankruptcy Act applies to the interest which was debited to the company's account half-yearly during the relevant period. For the foregoing reasons, it is my view that the debt of $4,476,792.20 proved by the company includes interest within the meaning of the section so that the section does apply. It is unnecessary to consider what the position would have been had the parties agreed that the interest should have been capitalized for purposes other than the calculation of interest, for there was no such agreement between them. (at p556)

24. I would dismiss the appeal. (at p556)

Orders

Appeal dismissed with costs.