JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: BAN -v- JURIC [2011] WADC 139
CORAM: CURTHOYS DCJ
HEARD: 30 AUGUST 2011
DELIVERED : 1 SEPTEMBER 2011
FILE NO/S: CIV 2480 of 2010
BETWEEN: JOSIP BAN
Plaintiff
AND
ZELJKO JURIC
First DefendantPETAR JURIC
Second DefendantDARIO JURIC
Third Defendant
Catchwords:
Personal injuries - Battery - Right to exemplary damages where substantial punishment in criminal court
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Plaintiff awarded damages of $766,267.46
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr Tom Offer
First Defendant : Not applicable
Second Defendant : Not applicable
Third Defendant : Not applicable
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Leonard Cohen Legal
First Defendant : Not applicable
Second Defendant : Not applicable
Third Defendant : Not applicable
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Carter v Walker [2010] VSCA 340
Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1; [1998] HCA 70
Jongen v CSR Limited (1992) Aust Torts Reports 81-192
Whitbread v Rail Corporation New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 130
CURTHOYS DCJ: Josip Ban was assaulted on 4 April 2009 by the three defendants. The first defendant was sentenced to four years imprisonment and each of the other defendants received a suspended sentence. Mr Ban sues the defendants for damages for battery arising from the assault. The defendants did not appear at the trial.
Mr Ban's history before the assault
Mr Ban was born on 19 March 1970 in Bosnia. He left school at 17. When he finished school he started work in a coffee bar. He then worked in a nightclub for 2 1/2 years. He completed his military service in Bosnia. He did not have any problems with his military service. He did not have any psychological issues as a result of his military service.
Mr Ban migrated to Australia on 23 October 2003. He came to Australia with his wife and son.
When Mr Ban arrived in Australia he did an English course for one month. He gave evidence at the trial through an interpreter. He was able to give some of his evidence without an interpreter but it is clear that his English is weak. It appears to me that he would be unable to undertake any occupation where a command of English was required.
After Mr Ban finished the English course he went up north to work. He worked in Dampier for 2 1/2 years as a labourer and then as a concrete finisher. A concrete finisher is basically a manual labouring job with some skills required. It is basically screeding. Mr Ban was earning $2,250 net per week whilst working up north.
One or two months after Mr Ban's return to Perth he commenced employment with Best Formwork as a form worker. Mr Ban explained what is involved in form work. It was apparent from his evidence that he had problems in expressing himself. He explained that he was required to read a plan and prepare for formwork. He was required to calculate how much timber, how many props and how many…
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- Case
- [2011] WADC 139
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the precedent set in Whitbread v Rail Corporation New South Wales, where the NSW Court of Appeal emphasised the dual purposes of exemplary damages: to punish the defendant and deter similar conduct in the future. The court also referred to the High Court's decision in Lamb v Cotogno, which outlined that exemplary damages are appropriate when the defendant's conduct exhibits a conscious and contumelious disregard for the plaintiff's rights. However, in Gray v Motor Accident Commission, the High Court held that exemplary damages could not be awarded if the defendant had already been substantially punished through criminal proceedings.
In the present case, the court found that the first defendant, who received a four-year imprisonment sentence, was precluded from being awarded exemplary damages. Regarding the second and third defendants, who were given suspended sentences, the court noted that while criminal punishment was in place, it was not sufficient to negate the need for exemplary damages if the criminal proceedings did not adequately address the need for punishment and deterrence. The court ultimately decided that the criminal sentences did not sufficiently account for the need to punish and deter, allowing the plaintiff to seek exemplary damages.
The court ordered that the plaintiff, Mr Ban, was entitled to claim exemplary damages from the defendants, Juric and others, for the injuries sustained during the incident. The decision underscored the importance of ensuring that both criminal and civil justice systems effectively address the objectives of punishment, deterrence, and retribution in cases of personal injury and battery.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Whitbread v Rail Corporation New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 130 Whealy JA, Giles JA agreeing, stated: [214]In Australian law, an award of exemplary damages is intended to punish the defendant and also to deter the defendant, and others, from behaving in the same or similar reprehensible manner. The objects of such an award encompass condemnation and admonition of the defendant and his behaviour. The purpose of damages of this kind is to mark out the court's strong disapproval of the conduct and to visit retribution on the person thus sanctioned. It also embraces the notion that such an award will assuage the victim's potential desire or need for revenge and thus avoid any temptation to engage in self-help likely to endanger the peace. Lamb v Cotogno[1987] HCA 47 ; 164 CLR 1 at 8–13; Uren v John Fairfax and Sons Pty Ltd [1966] HCA 40 ; 117 CLR 118 at 138; Luntz, Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury and Death: General Principles (2006) LexisNexus Butterworths [7.2] at 98–99.[215]The type of conduct that will attract an award of exemplary damages has been described as 'conduct showing a conscious and contumelious disregard for the plaintiff's rights': XL Petroleum NSW Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd[1985] HCA 12 ; 155 CLR 448 at 472 per Brennan J. It has plainly been recognised in cases where trespass to the person has been alleged against police officers who have been shown to have acted in a high-handed and contumelious fashion: Adams v Kennedy [2000] NSWCA 152 ; 49 NSWLR 78; Knight v State of New South Wales [2004] NSWSC 791 per Hoeben J.[216]In Lamb v Cotogno , at 8, the High Court cited with approval the following passage from Mayne and McGregor on Damages, 12th ed (1961) Sweet & Maxwell:[Exemplary damages] can apply only where the conduct of the defendant merits punishment, which is only considered to be so where his conduct is wanton, as where it discloses fraud, malice, violence, cruelty, insolence or the like, or, as it is sometimes put, where he acts in contumelious disregard of the plaintiff's rights. Mr Ban has claimed exemplary damages against each of the defendants. The first defendant was sentenced to a term of four years imprisonment, therefore exemplary damages cannot be awarded against him: Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1; [1998] HCA 70 [40] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). The second and third defendants were sentenced to suspended sentences of imprisonment. In Gray v Motor Accident Commission Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated at [46]:These, too, are not questions that fall for decision in this case. At first sight, however, if criminal charges, alleging the same conduct as is alleged in a civil proceeding, have been brought and proved, it would be a most unusual case in which it was open to a civil court to conclude that the outcome of those criminal proceedings did not take sufficient account of the need to punish the offender and deter others from like conduct. There seems to be much to be said in favour of the views reached by a majority of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Daniels v Thompson that for a civil court to revisit a sentence imposed in a criminal court for the purpose of deciding whether the criminal received his or her just deserts is 'contrary to principle' and must 'undermine the criminal process'.