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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No Sl13 of 1991 B e t w e e n -
BALTIC SHIPPING COMPANY
Appellant
and
JOAN NORMA DILLON
Respondent
MASON CJ
BRENNAN J
DEANE J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 7 FEBRUARY 1992, AT 9.48 AM
(Continued from 6/2/92)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| Baltic(3) | 85 | 7/2/92 |
MASON CJ: Yes, Mr Downes.
| MR DOWNES: | Your Honours, I was dealing with the claim for |
restitution of the fare. The propositions which we would seek to rely upon are, firstly, the right to
recover depends upon there being a total failure of
consideration and I took Your Honours yesterday tothe Fibrosa case as authority for that proposition.
Greig and Davis, at page 1281, citing the Fibrosa
case, states the same proposition.
The foundation of the concept of restitution lies in unjust enrichment.
Your Honour
Mr Justice Deane said that in Pavey and Matthews v
Paul, 162 CLR 221, and the passages are at 257 and
263. Your Honour the Chief Justice and
Mr Justice Wilson, at page 227, agreed with
Justice Deane. The House of Lords has recently analysed the law of restitution in precisely the
same way and that is in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale
Limited, (1991) 3 WLR 10.
Your Honours, the next proposition that we
rely upon -
| MASON CJ: | Mr Downes, we do not seem to have a copy of that. |
| MR DOWNES: | It is only very recently reported, Your Honour. |
It was not on our list, and we found it in the
library this morning, Your Honour. It is page 10,
Your Honour.
| McHUGH J: | It has been out for a while. | I remember reading |
it at least two or three months ago.
| MR DOWNES: | I regret that it was only this morning that we - |
the proposition there perhaps was not so centrally
relevant to what we were going to put today, that
it did not earlier seem - - -
| McHUGH J: This is the Gambling Chip case? |
| MR DOWNES: | Yes, Your Honour. | Your Honours, the second |
proposition is that a contract of carriage for
travel, and as such a variety of a contract for
services, ordinarily sounds in damages for breach, not in restitution. Greig and Davis use precisely
those words at page 1282.
Heywood v Wellers, (1976) 1 QB 446, is a good
illustration of the proposition. That was a
decision in which the question of whether a
solicitor had in effect performed his retainer at
all when he incurred a lot of costs on behalf of a
lady seeking non-molestation orders without
| Baltic(3) | 86 | 7/2/92 |
achieving any result at all. Lord Denning, at
page 458C says that:
the contract of the solicitors was an entire
contract which they were bound to carry on to
the end; and, not having done so, they were
not entitled to any costs -
and…
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- Case
- [1992] HCATrans 37
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether Ms. Dillon was entitled to restitution of her fare, and if so, on what grounds. Specifically, the court had to consider whether there had been a total failure of consideration, and whether the contract for carriage was an "entire contract" such that partial performance did not entitle the provider to payment.
The court was presented with arguments that the foundation of restitution lies in unjust enrichment, as articulated in cases such as *Pavey and Matthews v Paul*. It was also argued that contracts for services, including contracts of carriage, ordinarily sound in damages for breach rather than restitution. An exception to this general rule arises where there is an entire contract, meaning no benefit is conferred unless the contract is fully performed, or where there is a total failure of consideration. The court was invited to consider whether the present case fell within these exceptions, with submissions made that the contract was not an entire one and that there had not been a total failure of consideration, given that the "very idea of travel" involved continuous movement rather than merely arrival at a destination.
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