Bally Gaming, Inc and Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v IGT (Corrected Version)
[2009] APO 4
•13 February 2009
ABSTRACTS OF DECISIONS
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS
Application : No. 761822 in the name of IGT
Title: Method of Operating Gaming Devices
Action: Opposition under S59 by Bally Gaming, Inc and Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd
Decision: Issued 13 February 2009
Abstract
Opposition unsuccessful.
Referring to the rest of the specification to explain the background to the claims (as in Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1988) 13 IPR 385), the claims are clear. In addition, as the specification describes at least one embodiment that falls within the claims, the claims are fairly based (see Lockwood Security v Doric Products [2004] HCA 58; 217 CLR 274; 212 ALR 1; 79 ALJR 260).
The particular sequence of steps that occurs around the redemption of the player’s winnings from the gaming device was admitted by the opponent to be novel.
The claims involve an inventive step as it is not a “matter of routine” to implement a system having the particular sequence of steps as claimed. The prior art leads the person skilled in the art in the opposite direction. A claim cannot lack an inventive step in light of a citation and/or common general knowledge that teaches away from what is claimed.
The invention does not fail the “threshold of inventiveness” test. The claims are directed to a Manner of Manufacture.
Costs awarded against the opponent.
PATENTS ACT 1990
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS
Re:Patent Application No. 761822 by IGT and opposition thereto by Bally Gaming, Inc and Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd under S59 of the Patents Act 1990
BACKGROUND
Patent application 761822 was filed under in the name of Acres Gaming, Inc on 28 April 1999, and claimed priority from US 60/083302 filed on 28 April 1998 and US 09/134285 filed on 14 August 1998. On 21 July 2006, the application was assigned to IGT.
Following examination, acceptance was advertised on 12 June 2003, and on 11 September 2003 notices of opposition were filed by Bally Gaming, Inc (Bally) and Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (Aristocrat). After various extensions of time (one of which was unsuccessfully objected to), both opponents served their evidence in support on 11 May 2005. IGT was granted several extensions of time to file evidence in answer and served part of their evidence on 11 November 2006. IGT requested a further extension to file evidence in answer on 13 November 2006 and this was successfully opposed by Bally. IGT were given until 16 February 2007 to file whatever evidence was immediately available which they did. Evidence in reply was served on 23 August 2007.
IGT filed amendments to the specification on 18 December 2007 and these were allowed on 4 August 2008.
The substantive opposition was set down for a hearing in Canberra on 28 November 2008. Mr Glenn McGowan of counsel and Ms Tracey Hendy, patent attorney, of Freehills Patent & Trade Mark Attorneys, Melbourne, represented Bally. Mr Richard McCormack of counsel and Mr Stephen Krouzecky, patent attorney, of Hodgkinson McInnes Patents, Sydney represented the IGT. Aristocrat did not appear. Both parties made oral submissions at the hearing and filed written submissions. They were also permitted to file further submissions after the hearing. I have found these to be extremely helpful. I shall refer to these and the evidence as appropriate in my decision.
GROUNDS OF OPPOSITION
The grounds for opposition alleged by both opponents were that the claimed invention was not a manner of manufacture, lacked novelty and inventiveness, and did not satisfy section 40(2) or (3) of the Act
THE SPECIFICATION
The present invention primarily relates to playing a cashless gaming device (such as a slot machine or an electronic gaming machine) which is interconnected by a network to a host computer.
In the prior art, cashless gaming systems require a player to open an account prior to playing. The player pays an initial deposit which is credited to the account. Typically, once the account is opened, the player is given a card carrying machine-readable information which is insertable into a card reader. Each single gaming device has a card reader. When the player inserts their card into the card reader of a machine, the amount in the player’s account is displayed and the player can transfer money from their account to the credit meter of the gaming device via a network and then play. When the player wins (or loses), the award is added to (or deducted from) the credit meter of the gaming machine. Once the player concludes playing, the player transfers the balance on the credit meter to their account and withdraws their card. The card can be used later in other machines, with credit in the player’s account being transferred to the credit meter of the other machine.
The present application proposes an alternative system. In this system, a player opens an account prior to playing and pays an initial deposit which is credited to the account. The player transfers credit from the account over the network to the credit meter of the gaming machine they wish to play. In the preferred embodiment, the transfer is performed once the player has inserted a card associated with their account into a card reader associated with the gaming machine. It is also possible to add further credit to the credit meter of the particular machine by the player inserting money into the machine. Any wins (and losses) are credited (and deducted) from the credit meter of the gaming machine until the player decides to finish playing. At that point the player can collect the amount stored in the credit meter of the machine. Depending on whether the player’s card is in the card reader or has been withdrawn when the player decides to “cash out” their winnings, the balance on the credit meter is either credited to the player’s account, or is paid out at the machine (by dispensing coins to the value of the credit meter).
The specification ends with 18 claims, with one independent claim. This claim is as follows:
“A method for operating gaming devices interconnected by a computer network to a host computer comprising:
creating a player account accessible by the host computer;
providing access to the player account responsive to a first command initiated by a player at one of the gaming devices;
transmitting data representing the player account over the network to a local memory associated with the one gaming device;
transferring credit from the player account to said one gaming device;
permitting gaming device play;
storing the credit and any awards resulting from gaming device play on a credit meter associated with said one gaming device;
terminating access to the player account responsive to a second command initiated by the player at said one gaming device;
detecting a player–initiated request to redeem the balance stored on the credit meter;
transferring the balance on the credit meter to the player account if the request to redeem occurs before the second command; and
paying the balance on the credit meter to the player via the gaming device if the request to redeem occurs after the second command.”
EVIDENCE
Evidence-in-support
The evidence in support was common for both opponents and consists of the following statutory declarations and accompanying exhibits:
* A declaration by Philip Charles Bennett, Managing Director of Phil Bennett Consulting, with exhibits PCB-1 to PCB-16, dated 30 January 2005
* A declaration by Doron Ben-Meir, consulting principal of Jagen Pty Ltd, with exhibits DBM 1 to DBM 4, dated 30 January 2005 (Ben-Meir #1)
* A declaration by Michael Kenneth Payne, public availability dates enquiry officer at the British Library, with exhibits A, B and C, dated 24 January 2005
* A declaration by Morris William Roffey, director of Operational Services and System (Aust) Pty Ltd, with exhibits MWR 1 to MWR 5, dated 3 February 2005.
* A declaration by Tracey Joan Hendy, patent attorney of Freehills Patent and Trade mark attorneys, with exhibits TJH-1 to TJH-22
* A declaration by Edward William Culley, Managing Director of Bally Gaming Inc, with exhibits EWC-1 to EWC-6, dated 6 May 2005 (Culley #1)
* A second declaration by Doron Ben-Meir, dated 6 May 2005 (Ben-Meir #2)
* Certified copies of US 60/083302, US 09/134285, AU 33822/99 and US 09/055665.
Evidence-in-answer
The evidence in answer consists of the following statutory declarations and accompanying exhibits:
* A declaration by Neil Phillip Spencer, Managing Director of Aerosystems Developments Pty Ltd, with exhibits NPS-1 to NPS-4, dated 10 November 2006 (Spencer #1)
* A declaration by Phillip Charles Dimond, a self–employed contractor providing consultancy services to the casino and gaming industry, with exhibits PCD-1 to PCD-3, dated 16 February 2007
* A second declaration by Neil Phillip Spencer, with exhibit NPS1, dated 23 February 2007 (Spencer #2)
Evidence-in-reply
The evidence in reply consists of the following statutory declarations:
* A second declaration by Edward William Culley, dated 16 August 2007 (Culley #2)
DECISION
Despite the non-appearance of Aristocrat at the hearing, throughout this decision I have used “the opponent” to refer collectively to Bally and Aristocrat.
SECTION 40
Notwithstanding the particulars listed in the Statement of Grounds and Particulars, the opponent concentrated their submissions under this ground to a lack of clarity of claim 1, a lack of clarity and fair basis of claim 9 and a lack of fair basis of claim 13.
In regard to claim 1, the opponent submitted that the feature of “terminating access to the player account responsive to a second command initiated by the player at said one gaming device” was not clear because it did not indicate to what or whom the access is provided.
The opponent provided several alternatives as to what they thought this phrase might mean. They submitted that this phrase might mean the host computer has access. However, by their own interpretation of the description the opponent decided that this would mean claim 1 would lack fair basis. Another alternative that the opponent advanced was that it was the gaming machine that had access. They then supplied reasons why, according to their reading of the specification, this construction must be rejected. Finally the opponent advanced two other constructions of the access that was being terminated was either between the gaming machine and the credit meter or the credit meter of the gaming device and the local memory of the device. The opponent submitted that all these constructions could not stand together leading to their conclusion that claim 1 was not clear.
I do not see a problem. It would appear to me that the opponent has tried hard to find an issue when none exists. In my opinion, the words of the claim are quite clear – access to a player’s account (which had been provided by the player initiating a first command at the gaming device) is terminated when the player initiates a second command at the gaming device. While it is true that there is little detail in the claim about how that actually occurs, that does not mean the claim is unclear. In my opinion claim 1 meets the requirements of Section 40.
Claims 9 and 13 have the following form:
“9.The method of any one of claims 1 to 8, wherein said method further comprises:
measuring the time between each transaction on the player account; and
locking the player account when the time measured exceeds at least one established criterion.”
and
“13.The method of claim 12, wherein the method further comprises:
initiating a timed count responsive to the said second command; and
preventing transfer of the balance in the player account to the second credit meter if the timed count exceeds a predetermined maximum when the said first command is initiated at said second gaming device.”
The opponent submitted that there was an antecedent problem in claim 9 in that there had been no earlier mention in the previous claims of transactions on the player account. The opponent also submitted that it was not clear what was meant by “locking the player account”.
In light of their problems with this claim, the opponent then proceeded to analyse the specification to determine what these terms could mean. The opponent came to the conclusion that claim 9 included within its scope that if a playing session on a gaming device (i.e. the time between the player initiating the first command and initiating the second command) exceeded a certain time or if the time between playing sessions (i.e. the time between the player initiating the second command on one gaming device and the player initiating the first command the next gaming device they wanted to play) exceeded a certain time, the credits available on the player’s account would not be available for another gaming device.
It is recognised tenet of Australian patent law that each claim must be read as part of the entire specification (Electrical and Musical Industries Ltd v Lissen Ltd 56 RPC 23 at 39), and thus the meaning of the words used in a claim may be affected by what is said in the body of the specification (Rosedale Associated Manufacturers Ltd v Carlton Tyre Saving Co Ltd [1960] RPC 59 at 69). While noting that it is not legitimate to narrow or expand the boundaries of monopoly as fixed by the words of a claim, by adding to those words glosses drawn from other parts of the specification (Welch Perrin & Co Pty Ltd v Worrel (1961) 106 CLR 588 and Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1988) 13 IPR 385), it is legitimate to refer to the rest of the specification to explain the background to the claims, to ascertain the meaning of technical terms and resolve ambiguities in the construction of the claims. In the present case this is clearly what the opponent did. They solved their own problem. In light of this, it cannot be said that claim 9 lacks clarity.
The opponent also submitted that claim 9 lacked fair basis. Their submissions on this point were that the description discussed two timed counts. In regard to the first timed count, the opponent quoted the particular passage in description they submitted described a first timed count as follows:
“… the present invention limits the time between storing credits to a player’s account … and accessing the account to resume play with credits in the account. In this aspect, the host computer initiates a timed count when the player withdraws his or her card from the card reader.”
The second timed count was discussed in another passage in the description which the opponent cited as follows:
“The casino may [also] select … a maximum time … that the player may access the account using the card reader. If this time is exceeded, the credits will not transfer from the account to the credit meter of the slot machine when the card is [next] inserted.”
The opponent submitted that the discussion of the first timed count did not mention locking the player’s account. According to the opponent the first timed count was to limit time “between storing credits to a player’s account” and not locking the account. They submitted that the description of the second timed count appeared to describe locking the account. Their conclusion was that since claim 9 covered two possibilities and only one was supported by the description, this claim lacked fair basis.
As an initial point I note that both of the “passages” identified by the opponent occur in the same paragraph. That paragraph has the following form:
“In another aspect, the present invention limits the time between storing credits to a player’s account, whether anonymous or not, and accessing the account to resume play with credits in the account. In this aspect, the host computer initiates a timed count when the player withdraws his or her card from the card reader. The casino may select – at configuration workstation 40 – a maximum time, for example, 2 hours, that the player may access the account using the card reader. If this time is exceeded, the credits will not transfer from the account to the credit meter of the slot machine when the card is inserted.”
The opponent’s use of “[also]” in their citation of the passages has given the impression of two timed counts being described. This would not appear to be the case.
In any event, I do not see any problem. If I accept that claim 9 defines initiating a timed count either when the player’s card is first inserted into the gaming device or after the player removes their card from the gaming device and locking the player account when the timed count exceeds a certain time, and assuming that there are two timed counts described, it is quite clear that the description (when describing the “second” timed count) includes an embodiment that falls within the scope of claim 9. In Lockwood Security v Doric Products [2004] HCA 58; 217 CLR 274; 212 ALR 1; 79 ALJR 260 it was said (at [60]):
“For the purposes of s 40(2)(a), it is not necessary for the inventor to disclose all the alternative means; it is enough that there is disclosure in the sense of enabling the addressee of the specification to produce something within each claim without new inventions or additions or prolonged study of matters presenting additional difficulty.”
This is clearly the situation here. It follows that claim 9 does not lack fair basis.
The opponent submitted that claim 13 lacked fair basis for the same reasons as claim 9. It follows that this argument must fail. Claim 13 does not lack fair basis.
NOVELTY
The basic test for anticipation and lack of novelty is the "reverse infringement" test - see General Tire & Rubber Co. v Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. Limited [1972] RPC 457 and Meyers Taylor Pty. Ltd. v Vicarr Industries Ltd. (1977) 137 CLR 228 at 235. In applying this test I must ascertain whether each and every one of the essential features of the claimed invention is provided by the prior disclosure (Rodi and Wienenberger AG v Henry Showell Ltd. [1969] RPC 367, Flour Oxidising Co. Ltd. v Carr & Co. Ltd. (1908) 25 RPC 428).
I do not think there is any doubt that every feature of claim 1 is essential. A feature is essential if the applicant for the patent has made it an essential feature by the terms of the claim, properly construed (Catnic Components v Hill and Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183), and this seems to me to be the case here. Neither party put a contrary view.
Under this ground the opponent stated during the hearing that the particular sequence of steps that occurred around the redemption of the player’s winnings was the only thing that they could find that was “strictly novel”. As I understand this submission, the opponent is saying that the claimed steps of:
terminating access to the player account responsive to a second command initiated by the player at said one gaming device;
detecting a player–initiated request to redeem the balance stored on the credit meter;
transferring the balance on the credit meter to the player account if the request to redeem occurs before the second command; and
paying the balance on the credit meter to the player via the gaming device if the request to redeem occurs after the second command,
were essential features that were not disclosed by any prior art documents.
I agree. This sequence of steps is not disclosed in the documents the opponent particularised. The claims are novel.
INVENTIVE STEP
The Law
According to subsections 7(2) and 7(3) of the Patents Act a claimed invention will lack an inventive step if it is obvious in the light of:
(a) common general knowledge; or
(b)common general knowledge considered together with information in a single document or through doing a single act, provided that the document or act could reasonably be expected to have been ascertained, understood and regarded as relevant to work in the relevant art in the patent area by the person skilled in the art.
A widely accepted definition of common general knowledge is that provided by Aickin J in Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company and Another v Beiersdorf (Australia) Limited 144 CLR 253 at 292:
“The notion of common general knowledge itself involves the use of that which is known or used by those in the relevant trade. It forms the background knowledge and experience which is available to all in the trade in considering the making of new products, or the making of improvements in old, and it must be treated as being used by an individual as a general body of knowledge.”
The state of the common general knowledge is a question of fact which must, in general, be determined on the basis of evidence from persons whose background enables them to testify authoritatively as to the common general knowledge in the particular art. Indirect evidence such as widespread publication or admissions made in patent specifications may also serve to indicate that something is common general knowledge.
The opponent submitted that this ground was its “best case”. Notwithstanding the particulars to this ground, the opponent’s argument was confined to establishing that the claims lacked an inventive step when compared to US 5429361 (“Raven”) in light of the common general knowledge in Australia.
The evidence put forward by the opponent to establish the common general knowledge in the art was primarily contained in the statutory declarations by Culley and Ben-Meir.
The opponent submitted that their declarants had clearly identified the features that were common general knowledge and had discussed Raven and the way it could operate.
The applicant criticised the opponent’s evidence of common general knowledge, submitting that there was no detailed evidence to “make good” their assertions that the features they identified as common general knowledge were, in fact, common general knowledge.
In response, the opponent indicated that what their declarants had done was to show what a person skilled in the art would understand when reading Raven. The opponent submitted that an expert can express an opinion and/or a conclusion based on their own expertise. They emphasised strongly that their declarant’s evidence was not contradicted.
In the present case I do not have to decide who has the better argument because nothing turns on it. Whether the opponent or the applicant is “right”, the outcome remains the same.
The opponent identified 11 integers of claim 1 as follows:
1.A method for operating gaming devices interconnected by a computer network to a host computer
2.creating a player account accessible by the host computer;
3.providing access to the player account responsive to a first command initiated by a player at one of the gaming devices;
4.transmitting data representing the player account over the network to a local memory associated with the one gaming device;
5.transferring credit from the player account to said one gaming device;
6.permitting gaming device play;
7.storing the credit and any awards resulting from gaming device play on a credit meter associated with said one gaming device;
8.terminating access to the player account responsive to a second command initiated by the player at said one gaming device;
9.detecting a player–initiated request to redeem the balance stored on the credit meter;
10.transferring the balance on the credit meter to the player account if the request to redeem occurs before the second command; and
11.paying the balance on the credit meter to the player via the gaming device if the request to redeem occurs after the second command.”
It was the opponent’s submission that each one of integers 1-7 and 9 were disclosed in Raven, as well as being part of the common general knowledge, and that integer 8 was disclosed in Raven. The opponent also submitted that Raven disclosed both options of transferring the balance of the credit meter to a player account or paying the balance of the credit meter at the gaming device in cash/tokens.
Assuming all of this to be correct, as was admitted by the opponent, what was not disclosed by Raven, and what the opponent did not assert to be common general knowledge, was the particular sequence of termination of account access/request for redemption and the payment outcome selected dependent on the sequence as defined in integers 8–11. Nevertheless, the opponent submitted that this particular sequence added no inventive step.
The opponent’s case for this point was based on statements made by Edward William Culley in the Culley #1 declaration. In that declaration Mr Culley was asked what ways the gaming machine of Raven allowed a player to redeem their winnings. He was also asked what other ways a player could redeem their winnings, other than those disclosed by Raven. In response Mr Culley stated that Raven disclosed both cashless and coin-operated gaming machines. He stated that there was nothing in Raven that precluded a “cashless” gaming machine also being able operate with “physical money” and that to preclude it would be contrary to “some very basic concepts involved in marketing gaming machines that included ensuring maximum throughput for the operator while at the same time ensuring player satisfaction.” He stated that, while Raven did not supply specific details, from his experience it would be “quite straightforward” to implement a system that accepted physical money while a cashless player card was in use. Taking note that Raven stated that:
“On removal of the card the Mastercom 14 will transmit the balance amount to the main computer …”,
Mr Culley concluded that:
“This would imply to me it would be necessary to initiate physical money out payment before the card was removed. For example, pressing the ‘cash out’ button while the card was still inserted in the card reader could initiate physical money payment.”
The opponent noted that dispensing physical money while the card was still inserted was the opposite to what the present application claims. They submitted that there was no inventive merit in pushing a button and withdrawing a card in a particular sequence. It was merely “different” to what was claimed and “not inventive”.
Taking the words of Lockhart J in RD Werner & Co Inc v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (1989) 13 IPR 513 that, for invention to be present, “there must be some difficulty overcome, some barrier crossed”, the opponent stated that there was nothing in the specification that indicated any problem to solve or difficulty overcome in implementing the sequence claimed. They submitted that a lack of an identified problem suggested there was none which led to the conclusion that there was no invention.
I disagree.
It is true that there is little in the specification in the way of discussions of problems with the prior art. While an identified problem is certainly helpful in inventive step analysis, it is not a requirement of a patent specification. If a problem has to be searched out, at its broadest it could be said that the problem to be overcome by the present invention was to provide an alternative. Taking what Aickin J said in Wellcome Foundation Limited v VR Laboratories (Aust) Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 12; (1981) 148 CLR 262 at page 286 the question is whether the person skilled in the art, when looking to supply an alternative:
“would have taken as a matter of routine whatever steps might have led from the prior art to the invention, whether they be the steps of the inventor or not.”
It is quite clear from the Culley #1 declaration that, when considering the Raven specification in light of common general knowledge, it is not a “matter of routine” to implement a system having the particular sequence of steps as claimed. It is clear that Raven leads the person skilled in the art (Mr Culley in this case) in the opposite direction. It is an established principle that a claim cannot lack an inventive step in light of a citation and/or common general knowledge that teaches away from what is claimed. That is the case here.
I cannot find that the claims lack an inventive step.
The opponent submitted that, if I found that the claims did not lack an inventive step, my decision should make it clear that the invention is limited to the particular sequence of steps that have been included in the claims. They submitted that this would require an amendment so that only content to claim 1 is the particular sequence. I do not understand the opponent’s concern. As far as I am able to determine, the claim is limited to that particular sequence of steps. As the applicant pointed out, use of the word “if” in the last two steps of the claim would seem to limit the claim to the particular sequence I have found to be inventive. No amendment seems to be required.
MANNER OF MANUFACTURE
While the opponent supplied particulars in relation to the ground of Manner of Manufacture. They made no submissions at the hearing. The particulars mention that since the invention clamed in at least some of the claims did not constitute an invention on the face of the specification, the claims are not for a Manner of Manufacture. That is, it fails the "threshold of inventiveness" test as set out in NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v Mirabella International Pty Ltd 32 IPR 449, and confirmed by Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd and Anor v Ramset Fasteners ( Aust) Pty Ltd (1998) 152 ALR 604, (1998) AIPC 91-401.
As already admitted by the opponent, the particular sequence of steps claimed was not disclosed in Raven and not clearly part of the common general knowledge. There is also no inkling in the specification that it is common general knowledge. I cannot say that the difference between what is claimed and what is acknowledged as prior art is common general knowledge. Therefore, I cannot find that the threshold of inventiveness has not been passed. This ground is not made out.
CONCLUSION
The opponent has been unsuccessful in making out any of the grounds of opposition.
Unless the Commissioner is served with a notice of appeal within 28 days of the date of this decision, I direct that the application proceed to sealing.
COSTS
The power of the Commissioner to award costs is discretionary, so I must take all relevant considerations into account.
The applicant submitted that, if I dismissed the opposition, costs should be awarded against the opponent.
The opponent submitted that they had been successful in the opposition in having the applicant amend the claims. The submitted that, therefore, costs should be awarded against the applicant.
The opponent also noted that while a desire to amend the claims was expressed by the applicant as far back as 13 November 2006, the amendments did not arise until 18 December 2007, some two months after the parties were informed (by a letter dated 19 October 2007) that a hearing date had been set for 27 February 2008. The opponent submitted that the amendments meant that they wasted their resources between 19 October 2007 and 18 December 2007 working on substantive arguments for a case that changed once the amendments were filed. The opponent submitted that the award of costs given to them should be a double award of the scale cost for preparing for a hearing, since they had prepared for the hearing twice.
While it is true that the applicant amended their claims, I note that the opponent continued with their opposition even in light of the amendments. Clearly they believed that the amended claims were still bad and were prepared to take the risk that they might not be successful in the opposition. In regard to a double award of costs, I note that the letter from IP Australia informing the parties of a hearing date of 27 February 2008 gave each party two months to propose an alternative date. While the opponent’s actions may have led to the problem of them preparing for two hearings, it was a problem of their own making. The letter from IP Australia was clearly indicating that the hearing date could change.
Taking this into account, I see no reason to vary the usual approach to costs. I therefore award costs against the opponent.
GREG POWELL
Delegate of the Commissioner of Patents
Issued 13 February 2009Patent attorneys for the applicant : Hodgkinson McInnes Patents, Sydney
Patent attorneys for Bally : Freehills Patent & Trade Mark Attorneys, Melbourne
Patent attorneys for Aristocrat : Freehills Patent & Trade Mark Attorneys, Sydney
0
9
0