Ball & Ball (No 7)
[2024] FedCFamC1F 903
•23 December 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Ball & Ball (No 7) [2024] FedCFamC1F 903
File number(s): NCC 34 of 2022 Judgment of: SMITH J Date of judgment: 23 December 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Parenting – Interim application – Oral reasons for decision – where prior interim orders were made for mother to spend limited supervised time with the two older children – in circumstances where the mother has now been acquitted of the charges in a Judge alone trial in the District Court of New South Wales – where District Court reasons are not yet available – where father argues there has not been a sufficient change in circumstance to warrant re-examination of the interim orders – where prior supervisors are no longer willing to facilitate the interim orders – finding that it is appropriate to vary the orders to allow the mother unsupervised time with the youngest child Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), Pt VII, ss 60CC, 69ZL Cases cited: Ball & Ball [2022] FedCFamC1F 1068
Ball & Ball (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC1F 752
Ball & Ball (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC1F 215
Ball & Ball (No 4) [2024] FedCFamC1F 232
Ball & Ball (No 5) [2024] FedCFamC1F 261
Ball & Ball (No 6) [2023] FedCFamC1F 308
Bondelmonte & Bondelmonte (2017) 259 CLR 662; [2017] HCA 8
Deiter & Deiter [2011] FamCAFC 82
Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97
SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 52 Date of hearing: 17, 23 December 2024 Place: Newcastle Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Priestley Solicitor for the Applicant: Litigant in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Willoughby Solicitor for the Respondent: Hannaway Lawyers Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Ms McGregor Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: McGregor Family Law ORDERS
NCC 34 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS BALL
Applicant
AND: MR BALL
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
SMITH J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 DECEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Future Listings
1.The mention in the proceedings NCC3275/2024 listed on 11 February 2025 in front of Judicial Registrar Jackson is confirmed.
2.The Independent Children’s Lawyer is excused for attending the mention on 11 February 2025 at Order 1 herein.
3.The matter be listed for mention on Friday, 28 February 2025 at 10.00 am by Webex video link in relation to parenting and property.
4.Liberty is granted to the parties to approach the Court in chambers if any issue arises.
Z - unsupervised time with the mother
5.Z born in 2012 (“the child”) shall spend unsupervised time with Ms Ball born in 1974 (“the mother”) as follows:
(a)Each Sunday from 10am until 4pm; and
(b)Boxing Day 26 December 2024 from 10am until 4pm.
Z - change overs
6.Change overs between the mother and Mr Ball born in 1972 (“the father”) shall take place at the front of K-Mart at R Shopping Centre, Town G.
7.The mother and father are not to approach, nor to speak with, each other unless necessary, and if so are to speak in a civil fashion and only concerning necessary current parenting matters relating to Z.
Z - communication with mother
8.The mother may send Z one unsolicited text message per day.
9.The mother is not required to copy the father in on any text message.
10.Additionally, the mother may respond to any text message sent by Z, and engage in a running text communication so long as Z continues the text message communication.
Restraints
11.Both parents are restrained and prohibited from;
(a)Discussing the family or criminal court proceedings with the children.
(b)Denigrating the other parent or a member of the parent’s family in the presence or hearing of the children and shall ensure that no other person does so in the presence or hearing of the children.
(c)Exposing the children to Family Violence as defined in Section 4AB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
(d)Using physical discipline on the child on a without admissions basis.
Single Expert
12.Pursuant to section 62G(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the Court directs that Mr S, Clinical Psychologist, be appointed as a single expert (the Expert) to prepare a report, and for the purposes of this order:
(a)The parents shall each pay half of all costs associated with the of the report and any subsequent court appearances required for the Expert
(b)The parents are to do all things and attend upon all appointments as may be directed by the Expert including making the children available for appointment(s) with the Expert;
(c)The parents are to produce all documents so requested by the Expert; and
(d)In preparing their report, the Expert is requested to consider:
(i)arrangements that would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of the children and of any other person who has care of the children;
(ii)any views expressed by the children;
(iii)the developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the children;
(iv)the capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the children to provide for the children’s developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs;
(v)the benefit to the children of being able to have a relationship with each parent and other people who are significant to the children, where it is safe to do so; and
(vi)anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the children.
13.The appointments may be arranged now, but are not to take place until the settled Reasons for Decision on the acquittal of late 2024 of His Honour Judge Ellis of the District Court of New South Wales are available and provided to Mr S.
Settled Reasons for Decision of District Court of New South Wales
14.The parties to provide to the Court settled Reasons for Decision on the acquittal of late 2024 of His Honour Judge Ellis of the District Court of New South Wales as soon as they are received.
Property - subpoena
15.By consent, Order 11 of the orders dated 11 December 2024 be varied so that subpoena packet 14 (BB Company) may be released to the parties and to their accountants.
Property – company tax returns
16.By consent, the mother is to nominate three accountants for the purpose of completing any necessary tax returns for T Pty Ltd by 17 January 2025.
17.The father may select one of the three nominated accountants and notify the mother by 31 January 2025, and then that accountant will be the accountant for that purpose.
18.If the father fails to notify the mother by 31 January 2025, then the mother may select the accountant, and notify the father within 7 days.
19.The parties are to do all things reasonably required to complete any outstanding tax returns as soon as possible.
Costs
20.Reserve costs to the final hearing.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A.To the extent this order requiring Z to spend time with the mother is inconsistent with a Family Violence Order protecting Z, this order takes precedence. See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt VII Division 11 “Family Violence” and in particular sections 68P and 68Q.
B.Section 114Q of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) provides that it is an offence punishable by imprisonment for up to one year to publish or disseminate to the public or a section of the public any account of family law proceedings which identifies the parties, witnesses or other people concerned with the proceedings, unless specifically authorised by the Court.
C.If in any proceedings there are allegations of family violence and the provisions of section 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) apply (see attached Family Violence Information Sheet), any unrepresented party will not be permitted to personally cross-examine the other party/parties.
D.Affected unrepresented parties may apply to the Commonwealth Family Violence and Cross-Examination of Parties Scheme (“the Scheme”) for representation but any such application must be made at least 12 weeks prior to the final hearing.
E.Further information about the legislation and the Scheme can be found at Part 4 of the attached Family Violence Information Sheet.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym, Ball & Ball has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
EX-TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SMITH J:
These are short-form oral reasons for decision pursuant to s 69ZL of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) in relation to an interim application to vary parenting orders in relation to the child, Z (born in 2012), now aged 12, brought by the mother, opposed by the father, and supported in part by the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”).
I note that orders are already in place to deal with the other two children the subject these proceedings, Y (born in 2009) and X (in 2008). I am dealing only with Z today.
The matter was heard before me on 17 December 2024 and stood over part-heard until today, 23 December 2024.
I refer to my prior decision in Ball & Ball [2022] FedCFamC1F 1068, and my further interim decisions in this matter, being; Ball & Ball (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC1F 752, Ball & Ball (No 3) [2023] FedCFamC1F 215, Ball & Ball (No 4) [2023] FedCFamC1F 232, Ball & Ball (No 5) [2023] FedCFamC1F 261, and Ball & Ball (No 6) [2023] FedCFamC1F 308. This decision should be read together with those six decisions. I will not restate the material contained in those decisions. I will not restate the law and legislative framework set out in those decisions.
The father’s case is of risk of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse in the mother’s household.
The mother’s case is that the father has engaged in a campaign of fabricated complaints, and criminal complaints, involving the children in the context of family law proceedings.
I can make no findings on issues of disputed fact. The court has taken a conservative approach where criminal allegations have been made and prosecuted against the mother, and prosecutions have been on foot. That is appropriate and has been appropriate, consistent with authority.
The matter came before me by way of Application in a Proceeding filed by the mother on 10 December 2024, supported by the mother’s affidavits of 9 December 2024 and 13 December 2024. The mother also relied upon the single expert report of Ms D, dated 23 June 2022, and a case outline, filed 16 December 2024. The mother sought orders as set out in her case outline, which involve equal shared parental responsibility and decision-making responsibility for Z, and a substantial change from the current limited supervised time, including overnight and block time with the mother.
The father relied on his response filed 16 December 2024, his affidavit filed 16 December 2024, and the Magellan Report filed 12 July 2022, the latter referred to extensively in the earlier judgments, as well as his case outline filed 16 December 2024. The father effectively seeks a dismissal of the application on the basis of no sufficient change of circumstances to vary the current risk-based supervised time and limited supervised communication orders. He seeks that supervision remain in place and is willing to have either Ms U or Ms V, or an agreed person or paid supervisor, undertake the supervision.
The ICL supports some change of orders and relies on the case outline filed 16 December 2024. The ICL seeks orders that Z live with his father and spend unsupervised daytime with the mother. The ICL seeks the assistance of a further single expert report by an agreed expert, Mr S, to determine how Z should spend time with his parents moving forward, noting Z’s express wish and stated view, to the ICL, at the time is that there should be no change.
Nevertheless, taking into account but despite Z’s view, the ICL seeks to move to one session of unsupervised time a week, on Saturdays from 10.00 am to 6.00 pm, with the addition of further time during school holidays, on Wednesdays from 10.00 am to 6.00 pm, alongside special occasion time on Boxing Day 2024 from 10.00 until 6.00 pm
The mother’s position in the alternative was the ICL’s position, plus the lifting of the communications restriction on communications with Z, to allow Z to communicate with the mother at text by will; the Saturday being changed to Sunday to avoid interfering in Z’s sport, which the father did not oppose Ito the extent to which there is a change of day), and that orders be made for the Wednesday to continue after school holidays. Further that the mother be allowed to attend sporting and extracurricular events; and that the changeover be moved to the business premises, which last I think is very unwise.
The appointment of Mr S as an expert is supported by the ICL and the father, and I understand not opposed by the mother, on the basis that the appointments must not be conducted until the final criminal position is determined. I consider that appropriate, noting the parties accept there may be financial consequences to cancelling appointments. As I said, it is common that the child, Z, has told the ICL he wants the current situation, which would include supervision, to continue and so expresses a view contrary to both the mother’s and ICL’s positions.
DISMISSAL OF SOME CHARGES AND POTENTIAL CHANGE OF SUPERVISOR’S AVAILABILITY
It is common ground that after a contested trial before a District Court judge sitting alone, the counts of an offence relating to a child have been dismissed. The acquittal was by way oral reasons for decision in late 2024. It is common ground that the father, mother, and X gave evidence. This Court was offered an unsettled version of the transcript for reasons by the District Court, on the basis that the parties not have access. I have declined that offer, as procedural fairness could not allow me to consider material not available to the parties. There might also be issues as to the reliability to an unsettled transcript of the judgment. That judgment and those findings will be admissible pursuant to division 12A of the Act when a settled final version is available. That may, unfortunately, require yet a further interim application.
I note that I have never allowed anywhere near this many interim applications in any case in the almost seven years I have been sitting, but the question of re-determination of interim orders must be considered on a case-by-case basis, and in this unfortunate and very unusual case, I have considered it necessary and appropriate, despite the significant burden it has placed on my docket and on the court’s very, very limited resources, to allow multiple interim applications, because I have determined that is in the best interests of the children, and that must always be the guiding light.
The mother’s affidavit filed 9 December 2024, in particular, at paragraphs 9 to 16, but also other points, including, in particular, at paragraph 35, for example, purport to recount certain aspects of the Judge’s findings in the District Court, and certain things that occurred in the District Court, based on her recollection. As I indicated during oral submissions, I am not willing to place weight on the mother’s hearsay summary. We must await the settled reasons of the judge. However, if the District Court judge were to make specific credit findings linked to motives associated with these family law proceedings, that would not only be relevant but could also be extremely probative as to the question of whether it would be appropriate to have a further assessment of interim orders in the near future. The court and parties will need to await a copy of the settled reasons. It was thought on 17 December when the matter was heard that those would be available by last Friday, 20 December, and it was on that basis, given the potential probative value of those reasons, that I had stood the matter over to today, Monday, 23 December 2024. Unfortunately, the settled reasons did not eventuate, and so I have only the fact of the acquittal by a judge to rely upon.
The father submitted that the acquittal is not relevant to the assessment of the change of circumstances. Whilst it is not determinative, I think the acquittal on 22 charges is clearly a relevant factor for me to weigh, noting that these charges was one of the significant factors relied upon to put the supervision in place. I note that in my first interim decision (Ball & Ball [2022] FedCFamC1F 1068), paragraph 9, the father argued that the police decision to charge was a significant change of circumstances which justified a re-determination or rehearing of the then interim consent orders, despite the fact that the underlying facts and allegations were known at the time the father agreed to those consent orders that were made. I do not criticise the father for the submission made at that time, which I considered reasonable. It was made on the basis that where an independent authority such as police and DPP considered there was sufficient evidence to charge a person, the court would give that weight.
In my view, on a similar basis, the fact that a District Court judge has dismissed the charges after a lengthy judge-alone trial is also a relevant factor to weigh as to whether there has been a change in circumstance. Of course, the evidentiary standard is quite different, and the standard beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal trial bears little relationship to the standard of unacceptable risk under the Act. Nevertheless, it is in my view a sufficient change of circumstances in the context of this case.
The appeal period has expired without appeal, although, as I understand it, since settled reasons are not yet available, an extension could quite reasonably be sought. However, the acquittal stands unless and until overturned. As I have said, of course, until the reasons for the acquittal are obtained, only limited weight can be placed on that, given the very different standard that applies in criminal proceedings.
I also note the charges against Y have been terminated, as I understand it, but the assault charge related to X remains outstanding and is due for mention in early 2025. Apparently, when the settled reasons are finalised, given that it may be that credit findings were made concerning X, and findings may be made about the interaction between the criminal and these family law proceedings, the police and/or DPP may be asked to “no-bill” these extant charges.
However, at present, I can only proceed on the basis that those proceedings remain on foot. There is also, as I understand it, still an ADVO in place for Z, protecting him from the mother, as well as for X.
As I indicated to counsel for the mother in oral submissions, absent evidence of specific findings from the District Court, and given the fact that the assault charges in respect of X remain on foot, a proper application of principles means it is not open to the court, in my view, to consider the extensive changes to the current arrangement, including overnight block time sought by the mother, nor would it be appropriate at this stage to consider parental responsibility. There has been a change of circumstance, but not so great to allow anything near what the mother seeks.
The other change in circumstance relied upon by the mother and the ICL is that Ms U, who has acted as a supervisor, has provided an email dated 12 December 2024 to the ICL, annexed to the mother’s second affidavit, setting out her position regarding ongoing supervision, which is that, given the outcome of the criminal trial, she would prefer not to supervise. As the father points out, she has not said that she absolutely will not, but she says that it has been a burden. The maternal grandmother has also written an email to the ICL dated 12 December 2024, also annexed to the mother’s second affidavit, and that was directed primarily to Y’s care, which is not now an issue, given consent orders agreed on the last occasion. However, she is 77, she is tired, and, in effect, she does not support the need for supervision, and the fact she does not now believe supervision is required itself raises issues about her supervising.
The father submitted that the mother’s supervisors are, in effect, working with the mother to play chicken with the court, to force the court to have no options of unsupervised time or no time. That is not uncommon, and people who play chicken with this court often find out what happens when you lose such a game. Nevertheless, I am not in a position to make any such finding, and note that the ICL considers the court should take the volunteer supervisors at their word. They have taken on an onerous task for no reward and at great impost to themselves. They may continue, if I make no other order, but they may not, and I consider that a relevant change of circumstances.
I understand it is not in contest that, of the two supervision agencies available, one will not deal with the parties, the father says because of the mother’s conduct, the mother says because of the father’s conduct, about which I cannot make a finding, and Interrelate has, because of the volume of work, presently closed its books. So, if the unpaid supervisors are not available and there is no paid supervision available and there is no change of orders, there will be, in effect, a no-time order.
I also note the father raised the issue there was no formal leave of the court given for filing of an Application in a Proceeding. However, it was filed pursuant to my oral directions, which implicitly included leave, and to the extent necessary leave was, or is, granted.
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES
The father argues that there is not a sufficient change in circumstances to permit the court to reconsider interim parenting orders, and points to numerous decisions in this matter. The relevant principles were not in contest between the parties. The question of whether or not there is a sufficient change of circumstances to justify permitting an interim application to be filed and heard, noting the prima facie limitation on the number of applications that may be filed without leave, and then on whether there is sufficient change and it is appropriate to reconsider and change the orders, is always to be determined by reference to specific facts of the case before the court, with a focus on the interests of the child, while also noting that the parties’, and indeed the court’s, resources are limited, and each interim hearing in one case necessarily uses the court’s resources in a way which means that those resources cannot be used in another proceeding. Given the heavy docket in City W, I am well aware of the very limited resources available. It is always a question of balance, taking into account all of the facts.
As I said, this is, I think, the only case that I have permitted anywhere near this number of interim applications in a single matter, but I have done so because, in my view, the particular facts of these proceedings – and it seems to me that very grave harm is being done to the children because of the conflict, without knowing who is right or who is wrong between the parents – has warranted it.
I also note that the ICL supports the change, and I give some weight to that view, but ultimately it is my assessment, and my assessment is that, whilst it is unfortunate that there have been this many interim hearings, and it may still be that the content of the District Court judgment mean that it would be appropriate to consider it further again, nevertheless, I am satisfied taking into account my duty to promote the best interests of Z these two factors mean it is appropriate to reconsider the issue today, and so I do so.
As I have said, the dismissal of the child exploitation charges, which were a very significant reason supervision was put in place, and the fact that the supervisors have expressed reluctance to continue supervising, in my view, mean that the appropriate standard is met to allow a reconsideration now. I also note that one of the issues with previous orders for the children concerning communication was potential availability of witnesses in the extant criminal proceedings, which was a factor in the communications order. It is common ground that Z is not to be a witness in the extant criminal matter regarding X, noting that Y’s matters appear to have been terminated, and that was relevant to the communications order.
Another very significant issue in this matter is Z’s views. They are a mandatory factor for consideration. I note that the objects require a consideration of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Article 12 puts the views of the child as a central factor for consideration, as picked up in the relevant provisions of s 60CC of the Act. Z’s views, as expressed to the ICL, which I must indeed consider, is that there should be no change. However, Z’s age is a factor. Whilst his views at 12 should be given weight, unlike the views of a 17-year-old, they are not close to or effectively determinative. I also note that the mother is running a specific case of alienation. I can make no findings about that.
However, the court has long recognised that the views of a child may be influenced, either intentionally or unintentionally, by the parent they live with. Bondelmonte & Bondelmonte (2017) 259 CLR 662 and various other authorities make that clear. In this context, the ICL noted that post-separation, Z was initially apparently refusing or reluctant to spend time with the father and spent limited time with the father.
Later, when Z was spoken to by the single expert, Ms D, in her report of 24 June 2022, she set out her summary of her interview with Z from paragraph 154, and at that time when asked his views:
164.…[Z] said he wants to stay with mum and see dad every weekend.
Z’s direct experience with the mother still had that view.
In the meantime, having had very limited direct exposure to the mother and no unsupervised exposure to the mother or unsupervised communication with the mother, the view seems to have turned and hardened against her.
In those circumstances, as I understand it, and in the context of a case of alleged intentional alienation and fabrication of criminal proceedings, the ICL says the court must give weight to Z’s views, but not consider them determinative.
I note the ICL’s submissions included in their case outline that:
13.[Z] is now 12y old. It is submitted that his views should be given appropriate weight, however, it is my view that [Z] is squarely in the middle of the conflict between his parents. He has a sibling in each household that do not wish to have contact with the parent with whom they do not live with. I do not know what the conversation between [Mr AA] and [Z] consisted of and I do not know how any questions were framed by [Mr AA]. I therefore submit that [Z]’s views at this stage may need to be treated cautiously.
That is a sensible approach, consistent with the evidence and consistent with the authorities. The ICL also submitted that:
17.It is submitted that given [Z]’s age he does have the ability to self protect and at this stage the ICL is proposing daytime only for 2 days a week with his Mother. The ICL does not support continued supervised time.
I have referred previously to key authorities, including SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13, Deiter & Deiter [2011] FamCAFC 82 and Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97 in the other written decisions and do not think it necessary to restate what I have said.
Clearly, until I see what the District Court said and until we know what happens with the extant criminal proceedings, and depending on what the findings were, and noting that even they will not be definitive or determinative of what might happen before this court on a final basis, nevertheless, the uncertainty means there must still be considered to be risk issues.
As I said to the mother’s counsel, this means I consider her proposal for block time and overnight time to be inappropriate, given the obligations I have to be cautious about Z’s safety and to take into account Z’s views.
It is in that context that I think, perhaps, even the ICL’s proposal might go too far.
I do give weight to the possibility, and I understand the argument that the supervisors might supervise, but they might not, and the court cannot force them to, and there is also an issue about the benefit of supervision by people who have said, “well, if she has been found not guilty, why is this still required,” and how much supervision really would be provided. I have looked at the expert report again, but much of that related to the 2022 charges that have been dismissed.
Taking into account Z’s views, the risk of alienation by the father, the risk of harm by the mother, the risk of further damage to Z’s relationship with the mother if the unpaid supervisors are not available, and noting his views must be given some weight, and noting he has some self-protective capacity, on balance, and noting that it is always a problem that an the result at an interim hearing may turn out at the final hearing to be in hindsight not correct, but there is no way around having to make decisions at interim hearings, then on balance today, given the evidence before me and having reviewed my prior judgments and the material I have, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make varied interim orders, but not quite so substantial as the ICL proposes, at least until the District Court judgment is available and depending on what it actually says.
I will not make orders concerning parental responsibility, and Z will, of course, continue to live with the father.
ORDERS
At this stage, I do not think that the additional time on Wednesday proposed by the ICL is appropriate; not so much for risk issues, but given Z’s views, I am concerned that requiring a move from some supervised time up to twice by either six or eight hours a week contrary to his views runs the risk of moving too quickly and creating a counterproductive situation, which may, in fact, undermine the relationship and may create difficulties.
I note that this may be inconsistent with an ADVO for Z’s protection, which I am required to consider, but given the information I have, I am satisfied it is in Z’s best interests to make this order, taking into account the evidence before me.
In respect of the text message communication, that was largely around the question of the children being witnesses, and that was one of the main reasons. It should be limited, noting Z’s age. I think that Z should be entitled to communicate with the mother by text message as per his wishes, and the mother should not be required to copy messages to the father. I will, however, structure that so the mother may respond to any text message sent by Z and engage in text message communication, so long as Z continues the communication. The object is that the mother may communicate with Z, but she is not to bombard him with material.
I think the back of the mother’s premises is not a good idea at all as a changeover location. The father suggests Kmart at the R Shopping Centre, Town C. That seems like a reasonable place, given it is a public place.
I will not make orders for the mother to attend sporting events. I think the ICL’s argument that making two major changes, and, in particular, a change that could cause stress or embarrassment for Z if there was a real or perceived conflict at school or around his friends would be counterproductive and not in Z’s best interests at the moment.
The orders shall be as follows.
These orders will be entered later today.
I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the ex-tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Smith. Associate:
Dated: 13 January 2025
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