Baldwin and Merrick and Ors (No 2)

[2018] FamCA 613

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BALDWIN & MERRICK & ORS (NO. 2) [2018] FamCA 613

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Best interests – where the paternal grandparents propose to spend time with the children, aged 13 and 15 on the first weekend of each month from after school Friday until 5.00 pm Sunday – where the applicant mother proposes that the children spend no time and have no communication with the paternal grandparents – where the father ultimately proposed that the children spend no time with their paternal grandparents – where it is determined that it is not in the children’s best interests for them to communicate or spend time with their paternal grandparents unless their mother agrees otherwise in writing.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Banks & Banks (2015) FLC 93-637
Donnell & Dovey (2010) FLC 93-428

APPLICANT: Ms Baldwin

1st RESPONDENT: Mr J Merrick

2nd RESPONDENT: Ms Merrick

3rd RESPONDENT: Mr P Merrick

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Cherry Family Lawyers

FILE NUMBER: BRC 8035 of 2011

DATE DELIVERED: 13 August 2018

PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Hogan J

HEARING DATE: 9, 10 & 11 July 2018

REPRESENTATION

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Biggs, Biggs Fitzgerald Pike

COUNSEL FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT: Mr Anderson

SOLICITOR FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT: Simonidis Steel Lawyers

2ND RESPONDENT: In person

3RD RESPONDENT: In person

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Ms Oakley

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Cherry Family Lawyers

Orders

IT IS ORDERED WAY OF FINAL ORDER THAT

1. The children, S, born … 2005 and D, born … 2003, spend no time or communicate with the paternal grandparents unless agreed between the mother and the paternal grandparents in writing.

2. The Independent Children’s Lawyer is hereby directed to provide a copy of these Reasons for Judgment to the appropriate officer within the Queensland Police Service by no earlier than 13 September 2018.

3. In the event that the father wishes to be heard in relation to the implementation of Order (2), he has liberty to file an Application in a Case and supporting affidavit outlining any opposition to the terms of that Order, provided that any such Application and supporting affidavit is filed and served by no later than 4.00 pm on 31 August 2018.

4. Following compliance with the terms of Order (2), the Independent Children’s Lawyer is discharged.

5. All outstanding applications are otherwise dismissed and removed from the list of cases requiring finalisation.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT

1. Pursuant to s 65DA(2) and s 62B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the particulars of the obligations these Orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these Orders and details of who can assist parties to adjust to and comply with an Order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached and these particulars are included in these Orders.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Baldwin & Merrick has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 8035 of 2011

Ms Baldwin

Applicant

And

Mr J Merrick

First Respondent

And

Ms Merrick

Second Respondent

And

Mr P Merrick

Third Respondent

And

Independent Children’s Lawyer

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. Whilst Ms Merrick and Mr P Merrick (the children’s paternal grandparents) initially suggested that they sought an order that the children, D (born in 2003) and S (born in 2005), live with them and spend time with each of their parents on weekends, they did not maintain this position at the trial.

2. In fact, all parties ultimately agreed that the children should remain living with their mother (with whom they have lived since 13 June 2014 as a consequence of an order made that day); that she should have sole parental responsibility for the major long term issues[1] relating to the children and that she be restrained from changing their surname from “Merrick” or referring to them by any surname other than “Merrick”. Agreement was also reached between the parents and the Independent Children’s Lawyer that the children spend supervised time with their father once per month at a Contact Centre, if one can be found to accommodate such time in the circumstances of this case, which are as I outlined briefly in the short Reasons I delivered orally in support of the order made on 10 July 2018 to give effect to these agreements.

   [1] As that term is defined in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

3. A consequence of the parties’ agreement is that the only issues which now require determination are whether it is in the children’s best interests to spend time and communicate with their paternal grandparents and, if so, what time and communication and under what circumstances and conditions.

4. Resolution of this issue occurs in circumstances where it is accepted that the children have not spent any time with their paternal grandparents since about August 2015, when the Contact Centre manager decided to terminate the Centre’s services because of her view that they had made denigratory comments about the mother.Prior to that, the children had only spent supervised time with them on five occasions (being 16 May 2015, 12 June 2015, 11 July 2015, 8 August 2015 and another visit in August 2015) after interim parenting orders were made on 22 August 2014. I accept they also attended at the Contact Centre on 25 July 2015 but the mother did not attend with the children on that date.

5. When interviewed by Ms B on 10 April 2018 for the purpose of her most recent Family Report, the paternal grandparents had not seen the children for about two years: they explained their perception of being “attacked” by the Contact Centre supervisor when they asked about make-up time for the two occasions on which the mother did not make the children available; they said that they were then advised, via the father, that their time with the children had been suspended.

The competing proposals

1. The mother proposed that the children spend no time and have no communication with the paternal grandparents. Having originally proposed that the children spend time with their paternal grandparents on one occasion each year under supervision, the father ultimately proposed that the children spend no time and have no communication with the paternal grandparents.

2. The paternal grandparents proposed that the children spend time with them and members of the paternal extended family (other than the father) on the first weekend of each month (from after school Friday until 5.00 pm on Sunday). In the alternative, they proposed that the children spend time with them between 9.00 am and 5.00 pm on the first Sunday of each month. They also sought that the children spend time with them for one week each year, commencing on the first Saturday in January each year. They advanced a number of different options by which the children would transition into, and from, their care on these occasions. They also proposed that the children be able to speak with them by telephone each week between 4.00 pm and 7.00 pm on any night; that the children have an email address by which they could communicate with them and that any correspondence or gift they sent the children (or which is sent to the children by any member of the paternal extended family) be provided unopened to the children. They also sought to be able to attend at school events such as mass, assemblies and/or sporting events.

3. When they spoke with Ms B for the preparation of her April 2018 Family Report, the paternal grandparents were opposed to spending supervised time with the children. Whilst the paternal grandmother was, perhaps, a little less resolved about this during her cross-examination and prevaricated about whether she would attend if an order was made for the children to spend supervised time with their paternal grandparents (initially saying that she wouldn’t and then saying that she would have to discuss it with the paternal grandfather as they were aged pensioners and there were significant costs involved), the paternal grandfather was resolutely clear in his position that he would not attend a Contact Centre for supervised time with the children.

4. In all the circumstances of this case and given their response to the option of supervised time previously, I think it highly unlikely that the paternal grandparents would attend a Contact Centre on an on-going basis to spend supervised time with the children, even if an order to that effect was made.

5. Consideration of the competing proposals must, obviously, occur within the context of the circumstances in each particular case. The most relevant matters in this case seem to me to be the time the children have previously spent with their paternal grandparents; the children’s wishes; the paternal grandparents’ attitude to the mother; the mother’s attitude to a resumption of the children’s time with their paternal grandparents; and, given the reality of the relationships between the mother and the paternal grandparents, the likely impact on the children, in terms of their functioning and relationships with their mother (their agreed primary care provider), of a resumption of time and communication with their paternal grandparents.

6. It seems to me that central to the resolution of the issue of those parenting orders which are now in the children’s best interests vis-à-vis their future time and interaction with the paternal grandparents is the attitude of those adults to the mother – the parent with whom it is agreed they will continue to live.

7. An exceedingly powerful demonstration of the way in which the mother continues to be viewed by the paternal grandparents occurred during the course of the paternal grandfather’s submissions: in responding to submissions that he had previously spoken in a derogatory and dismissive way about the mother to the children, he asserted that he had never spoken about the mother to them, saying “why bother”.

The children’s previous time with their paternal grandparents and since 13 June 2014

1. On 13 June 2014, I made orders which changed the children’s primary living arrangements from living with their father to living with their mother. When living with their father, they spent a lot of time with their paternal grandparents and the paternal grandmother, in particular, was very involved in facilitating matters such as their attendances on various medical specialists.

2. On 13 June 2014, I also ordered that the children spend no time with their father, pending the hearing of any interim application he might file for interim parenting orders. I expressed the reasons for this decision in the Reasons for Judgment I delivered that day.

3. Nothing in the orders made that day dealt with the issue of the children’s time with their paternal grandparents.

4. As is apparent from reference to the Reasons for Judgment delivered on 13 June 2014, the June 2014 orders were made after the mother made the Court aware (after she first learned of this on 23 May 2014, when information was received from the solicitor then acting for the father in his criminal proceedings) that the father had been charged with five counts of indecent treatment of children under the age of 16.  These charges were based on behaviour which it has been accepted occurred between 1993 and about mid-1996, whilst the father was a teacher at a school in G Town.  He and the mother had not met at this time.

5. The father has subsequently been acquitted of two of the charges and convicted of three charges: showing pornography to a child under 16 years of age; having a child under the age of 16 run around naked and taking photographs of the child under the age of 16, whilst that child was running around naked.

6. It is uncontentious that, after their parents separated in mid-October 2010, the children remained living with their father; as noted earlier, their paternal grandparents were very involved in their lives and on an almost daily basis. It is uncontentious that, as a consequence of various orders made in the proceedings, the children had spent increasing time in the care of their mother before 13 June 2014.

7. It is also uncontentious that, until she received information from the father’s then solicitor, the mother had no idea that the father had been charged with any criminal offence or was in any way involved in any criminal proceeding. It is also uncontentious that, despite the paternal grandmother accompanying the father to the police station on 1 November 2013 (so he could decline formally to be interviewed), neither the father nor the paternal grandparents made any mention of the existence of the charges to the Family Consultant who interviewed them in January 2014 as part of the Family Report preparation process.

8. On 22 August 2014, I made interim orders which provided for the children to spend time their father and paternal grandparents for two hours each alternate weekend at a Contact Centre. These orders were made in the context of the maternal grandmother’s application that the children live with her, she have sole parental responsibility for the long term issues in relation to them and they spend time with their mother each alternate weekend from Friday until Monday and have unrestricted telephone communication with her. 

9. On 3 February 2015, I made further orders for the children to spend supervised time with their grandparents.

10. I accept that, having sought an intake Session at the relevant Contact Centre on 17 April 2015, the paternal grandparents attended an Intake Session there on 8 May 2015. I am not persuaded that they did anything particularly proactive, other than make general inquiries of the Centre or ask that it provide them with information, before mid-April 2015 to take advantage of the opportunity, afforded to them by the order made on 22 August 2014, to spend supervised time with the children.  I am not persuaded that it was the “fault” of the Contact Centre that the children did not have the opportunity to spend supervised time with their paternal grandparents until 16 May 2015.

11. I have arrived at this conclusion given that the paternal grandfather confirmed to Ms B during interview for the December 2014 Family Report that he had not then taken up the opportunity to spend supervised time with the children (despite that the August 2014 Order permitted this to occur). He told her that “I won’t do it. I refuse. I don’t think I should pay to see my grandchildren” and also said “I’m not interested in paying. I can’t afford it. I will go and see them publically from a distance. I’m not putting my name down to pay supervision… if I didn’t have to pay I would go… fancy being supervised, bloody insult”.

12. I also accept, as noted earlier, that the children last spent supervised time with their paternal grandparents in August 2015 and that, in total, they spent time with them on no more than five occasions and for no more than 10 hours in the period from 13 June 2014 until about August 2015.

APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES  

1. In these proceedings, subject to s 61DA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (the Act), I may make such parenting order as I think proper.[2] I must have regard to the Objects of Part VII of the Act and the Principles which underpin those Objects.[3] The paramount consideration when making parenting orders is each child’s best interests.[4]

   [2] s 65D of the Act. 

   [3] s 60B of the Act.

   [4] s 60CA and s 65AA of the Act.

2. The matters to which regard must be had in determining those parenting orders which are in each child’s best interests are prescribed by s 60CC of the Act. The requirement to “consider” each of these matters involves taking note of them or giving heed to them or thinking over or reflecting on them; it does not necessarily mean that each must be the subject of any particular discussion, particularly where the evidence leads inexorably to a particular conclusion.[5] Any failure to mention a consideration specifically does not mean it has been overlooked in my deliberations about those orders which are in the children’s best interests. I have given heed to and reflected on all of the relevant considerations in arriving at my conclusion about those orders which are in the children’s best interests.

   [5] Banks & Banks (2015) FLC 93-637: whilst said in the context of a consideration of interim proceedings, there is no reason to think that the underlying principle does not apply to the final disposition of proceedings.

3. In this case, there are parenting proposals by a ‘parent’ (the mother and the father) and ‘non-parents’ (the paternal grandparents). In Donnell & Dovey[6] the Full Court considered the manner in which Part VII of the Act is to be applied in such a situation. I consider that the following relevant binding principles emerge:

   [6] Donnell & Dovey (2010) FLC 93-428.

   a)‘parent’ means a biological or adoptive parent and does not include a person who stands in loco parentis to a child[7] – hence, the grandmother/grandparents are not a ‘parent’ for the purpose of Part VII of the Act; and

   [7] Ibid, [92].

   b)sections 60B(1) and (2) of the Act maintain a distinction between a ‘parent’ and a ‘non-parent’ as the Objects expressed in s 60B(1)(a), (c) and (d) and the Principles expressed in s 60B(2)(a), (c) and (d) specifically refer only to “parents” (or parenting);[8] and

   [8] Ibid, [121] - [122].

   c)there being no distinction between parents and non-parents in s 60CA of the Act, a child’s best interests remain the paramount consideration in deciding whether to make a particular parenting order regardless of ‘the biological (or other) connection of the child to the parties to the proceedings’;[9] and

   [9] Ibid, [79] - [80].

   d)sections 64B(2) and 64C of the Act permit a parenting order, which includes an order for parental responsibility, to be made in favour of a non-parent as well as a ‘parent’ and an order can be made for a non-parent to share parental responsibility with another person;[10] and

   [10] Ibid, [82] - [83].

   e)in the absence of an order of the Court which allocates parental responsibility for a child or a parenting plan, only the ‘parents’ of a child have parental responsibility in relation to that child;[11] and

   f)the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility prescribed by s 61DA of the Act and considerations of equal or significant and substantial time prescribed by s 65DAA of the Act are not ‘prescribed pathways in the reasoning process towards a best interests conclusion’;[12] and

   g)section 65DAA of the Act has no application in circumstances where an order is made for a parent to share parental responsibility with a person who is not a parent;[13] and

   h)section 60CC of the Act on its face maintains clear distinctions between a ‘parent’ and a non-parent such that:

   i)section 60CC(2)(a) has no application to a person who is not a parent and any consideration of the benefit to a child of having a meaningful relationship with a non-parent is not a primary consideration; and

   ii)the additional consideration in s 60CC(3)(e) of the Act does not apply to proceedings between a parent and non-parent.

   i)whilst the benefit to a child of the maintenance of a meaningful relationship with a non-parent can never be a ‘primary consideration’, this does not, of itself, mean that it will be of any less significance than the benefit to the child of the maintenance of a meaningful relationship with a ‘parent’;[14] and

   j)where the subject matter of a consideration which refers only to a ‘parent’ is relevant to a non-parent, consideration of the same can occur pursuant to s 60CC(3)(m) of the Act.[15]

   [11] Ibid, [81] - [83].

   [12] Ibid, [86], [121] - [122].

   [13] Ibid, [84] - [86].

   [14] Ibid, [101] - [102].

   [15] Ibid, [99].

1. I have specifically outlined this in detail so that there can be no doubt that I am fully cognisant of the manner in which the relevant matters must be considered in determining those parenting orders which are in D’s and S’s best interests.  Any intermingling of my discussion of the relevant evidence and the considerations should not be regarded as demonstrative of any confusion as to the appropriate application of these binding principles.

The children

1. It is accepted that D has Tourette’s syndrome, with prominent ticks and a number of comorbid features, which include obsessive compulsive features and some academic difficulties. Whilst S was previously assessed to determine whether he suffers from ADHD, the outcome of his assessment was that he does not and he has been further reviewed by Dr W. Both children have had some learning and communication issues and both have previously had extensive involvement with medical and educational professionals.

2. When 15 year old D spoke with Ms B in April 2018, he told her that he felt “not okay” about not spending time with his paternal grandparents; he said it would be “good” to see them again. When asked how he would feel about not seeing them until he was an adult, he told Ms B that he would see them again then, so would not feel too bad.

3. When S (than 12 years and 8 months of age) spoke with Ms B in April 2018, he told her that he did not know why he did not see his paternal grandparents; he did not know how he felt about this and said that he would feel “a bit excited” if he started to see them again.

4. Ms B reported that, whilst the children hugged their paternal grandparents when they saw them and when they departed and that D seemed interested in their interactions, S appeared less so.

5. Ms B, whose evidence I accept unless I specifically indicate otherwise, concluded that both children want a relationship with their paternal grandparents; she thought it likely that the children would experience much love and affection from their extended paternal family. I accept her evidence in this respect.

The paternal grandparent’s past actions and their attitude to the mother 

1. Whilst Ms B assessed the children as wanting the opportunity to have an ongoing relationship with their paternal grandparents, she also expressed concern about the paternal grandparents’ inability to contain their views about the mother and, potentially, the father’s offending behaviour. From her interactions with them, she concluded that the paternal grandparents still appeared to view the mother negatively; she opined that they had demonstrated no ability to shift their thinking about the mother and had failed to demonstrate the ability to refrain from sharing their views of her.  I accept her evidence in this respect.

2. Ms B has had the opportunity to engage with the paternal grandparents longitudinally. She reported that, during the interviews for her November 2012 Report, the paternal grandparents indicated to her that they believed the mother suffered from a plethora of psychological disorders (such as Obsessional Disorder, Dysfunctional Disorder; panic attacks and Projection Disorder); they advanced that the mother “knew how she was mistreating the children but that she could not help it”;[16] and that she lacked capacity to parent and “couldn’t cope with the children for more than an hour”.[17]

   [16] Family Report dated 29 November 2012, [41].

   [17] Family Report dated 29 November 2012, [40].

3. Ms B concluded then that they “essentially shared” the father’s critical appraisal of the mother and seemed to perpetuate a negative image of the mother; they appeared unable to move beyond any wrong doings they believed she had committed.[18] She thought that they had failed to appreciate the mother’s strengths and seemed to have viewed her bids for help during the marital relationship as signs of her inadequacies, rather than as viewing them within the context of the circumstances which then existed.  I accept her assessment in these respects.

   [18] Family Report dated 29 November 2012, [81].

4. After interviewing the parties and paternal grandparents on 16 January 2014, Ms B prepared an updated Family Report, dated 20 January 2014.  Relevantly, she concluded that the paternal grandparents – and particularly the paternal grandfather – still appeared to hold a level of animosity towards the mother and viewed most of her actions in a negative light. For example, the paternal grandfather told Ms B that the mother did not call the children when they were with their father because “I think she doesn’t call because she doesn’t care. She is not a good mother in not doing that.” He also mentioned that he was unable to forgive the mother for fighting for property which he alleged was his life savings.

5. Ms B’s assessment at that time, which I accept, was (in essence) that, despite the passage of time, there was no apparent change to the paternal grandparents’ attitude toward, or opinion of, the mother.

6. Ms B interviewed the paternal grandparents again on 10 April 2018. Reference to her most recent report establishes that the paternal grandfather in particular was disparaging toward, and dismissive of, Ms B and the manager of the Contact Centre at which their time with the children had previously occurred.  Further, the reports by the father’s current wife to Ms B certainly suggest that the paternal grandparents had been critical of her and her choice of clothing on an occasion.

7. I consider it clear that the paternal grandmother continues to hold a very negative view of the mother and her capacities as a parent; I do not accept what I regard as her disingenuous and self-serving protestations that all she has ever wanted to do was help the mother to be a parent.  That she apparently believes this assertion is, I consider, an unequivocal demonstration of the extent of her absence of insight into her own behaviours.

8. I consider that a true appreciation of the paternal grandmother’s current attitude to the mother is evident from her questioning of her and the matters upon which she chose to focus, even after it was agreed that the children would remain living with their mother: for example, she suggested to the mother that there was an incident which happened about seven months after the parental separation (14 October 2010) where the mother tore up S’s first school photograph in front of him – a contention the mother, whose evidence I generally accept, denied.

9. Further, she also outlined her opposition to the mother moving to live with the children independently of her parents (their maternal grandparents); she advanced that an appropriate order was that the mother be restrained from moving unless she was “cleared” by her treating psychiatrist.

10. That the paternal grandmother advanced this position resulted in the mother giving evidence about her past engagement of a psychiatrist.  The mother said she was not currently under the care of a psychiatrist and had last seen a psychiatrist in about December 2013; correspondence from that psychiatrist (dated 16 December 2013) to the mother’s treating general practitioner contained the assertion that the mother was the most stable the psychiatrist had seen of her and had maintained this stability over the last few reviews. The psychiatrist also reported that the mother had ongoing stressors related to her Family Court proceedings, but was working with these and was less prone to becoming overwhelmed or emotionally reactive; she remained socially connected with play group and church and had been stable in her work attendance. The psychiatrist also noted that the work the mother had done over the last 12 months with her psychologist had made a big difference: the mother had reported that she had reached a point where she felt comfortable in her own skin and had developed a much better capacity to think through issues when they arose and to choose responses, rather than reacting quickly. The psychiatrist noted that the mother remained on Lexepro (20mg daily), which she was tolerating well; it was suggested that she remain on this medication until the proceedings were completed.

Exposing the children to their views about the mother’s parenting

1. It appears highly likely that the children have previously been exposed to the paternal grandmother’s view that D’s tics were caused by the mother’s actions in squeezing him too tightly when he was a baby.  For example, when he spoke with a psychologist organised by the father and paternal grandmother in late July 2013, he told her that, when he was a baby, the mother would squeeze him so he would stop crying – he advanced that he remembered it.

2. D was nearly 10 ½ years of age when he recounted this “memory”. I think it highly unlikely he had an independent memory of anything that occurred when he was a baby. Given that he had been in the primary care of the father and paternal grandparents since the October 2010 parental separation and given that the content of the asserted “memory” is critical of the mother’s approach to his parenting, I think it much more likely than not that D had been exposed to idea, that his mother had squeezed him to make him stop crying, by members of his paternal family.

3. Nothing in the paternal grandparents’ presentation persuades me that they are likely to be able in the future to refrain from making adverse comments about the mother in the children’s presence. I consider that their attitude toward her remains so all-pervasively negative that it is highly likely that they could make negative comments about her to the children without appreciating that is what they are doing (see, for example the paternal grandfather’s comment during submissions referred to above) and without any appreciation of the negative impact on the children of such comments.

4. A further example of this approach can be found in the paternal grandmother’s use of the word ‘abandoned’ to describe the parental separation.

View that the mother abandoned the children

1. It is clear that the paternal grandmother remains of the view that the mother “abandoned” the children when she separated from their father. For example, when the paternal grandmother cross-examined the father, she asked him who the support person was when he was working after the mother “abandoned her children and him.”

2. The paternal grandmother also advanced that the mother had not sought to see the children for about seven months after the parental separation in October 2010. However, during her cross-examination, she accepted that she had been with the father on occasions when he sought legal advice from his then solicitor. I consider it much more likely than not that the paternal grandmother was aware – from either her attendance with the father on these occasions or subsequent discussions with him (given that she and the paternal grandfather were actively involved in the care of the children at that time) – that the mother had, in fact, actively sought to spend time with the children.

3. I think it much more likely than not that she knew about the contents of correspondence from the mother’s then solicitors dated 25 October 2010, 2 November 2010 and 23 December 2010 in which the mother advanced various proposals for the children’s time with each of their parents. I have arrived at this conclusion because the paternal grandmother’s evidence during cross-examination clearly established that she was then aware that the mother had refused to provide details about the other occupant of the premises in which she was staying and that the father’s legal advice was, in essence, that until she provided such information, the father was not required to facilitate the children spending time with their mother.

Previous descriptions of the mother provided to third parties

1. The mother’s legal representative suggested to the paternal grandmother, in essence, that, in the period between the October 2010 separation and the June 2014 order, she had told various medical practitioners upon whom the children had attended whilst in her care various untruths about the mother so as to cast her in the least favourable light and in an attempt to garner support for limitations on the mother’s interactions with the children.

2. The notes of an attendance on a Dr X from Y Medical Practice on 10 November 2010 (at which D, the father and the paternal grandparents were present) include that “Mother more significantly affected with poor impulse control, also developmental issues predated her accident, was attending a special school.”[19] I accept the paternal grandmother’s admission that she provided this information about the mother on this occasion; I also accept that she told the medical practitioner that the mother  “abandoned the family with no notice”; that “since her departure [D], and his brother, have not voiced any distress at all at her absence” and that, “in recent yrs [D] has really been a carer for his mother, prompting her to put lights on in car, directing her with which way to drive as she frequently gets lost, helping her with grocery shopping, wiping little brothers bottom etc”.  I accept the mother’s mostly contradictory evidence about these assertions.

   [19] Exhibit 4 (Tender Bundle, p. 101-102).

3. I also accept that the paternal grandmother likely told the medical practitioner that “[D] has suffered with a tic but interestingly this has resolved since mother has left”.

4. Whilst the paternal grandmother sought to explain this information on the basis that she had simply told the doctor what she had observed and under the belief that anything she said would not be revealed to the mother, I note that none of the mother’s asserted failings were sufficient to cause the father to instigate the separation; it was only after the parental separation that it was thought necessary to provide such information to the treating professionals.

5. A further example of the manner in which the paternal grandmother determined to provide information about the mother to external service providers after the parental separation can be found in the notes of a consultation in which the father and paternal grandmother engaged with Ms Z of AA Centre on 11 November 2010. The paternal grandmother accepted that she provided most of the information during that consultation. According to the notes,[20] the clinician was told that “[Ms Baldwin] apparently has the maturity of an 11 year old, and has very little patience and ability or reason or think beyond herself” and that she (the mother) used to “squeeze” the children rather than hug them. It should not be forgotten that, as at 2010, the mother was working on a part-time basis.

   [20] Exhibit 4 (Tender Bundle, p. 132).

6. The notes of this attendance also include that “At this stage [D][21] is not pursuing anything legal, and they wish to avoid this action in the event that it encourages the boys more access with their mother”. Whilst the paternal grandmother said during her cross-examination that she would never use those terms, she appeared to accept that this could be a summary of what she had said during that attendance. I think that is more likely than not. I also think that this entry clearly establishes that falsity of the paternal grandmother’s assertion that she had always supported the mother in every way in her parenting role; it also clearly establishes that the attitude within the paternal family at that time was not to encourage the children in their relationship or interactions with their mother, but positively to act so as to minimise the prospects of the same occurring after the parental separation.

Deliberate failure to advise the mother about medication/deliberate falsehoods to third parties about the mother’s attitude to medical treatment

[21] Whilst the notes refer to “D”, it is likely that the reference is to the father, Mr J

1. It is very significant to record that I am persuaded that the paternal grandmother, in particular, previously portrayed the mother to some of the children’s treating medical specialists as neglectful on the basis of an assertion that she failed to administer prescribed medication to one of the children – this occurred in circumstances where the mother had not been told about the necessity to administer such medication.

2. During her cross-examination, the paternal grandmother said that, when D was prescribed Lexapro in 2013 to assist in the management of his tics, she knew that he needed to take that medication irrespective of whether he was in his mother’s or father’s care. I consider she knew that it was very important to ensure that the mother was made aware of the prescription and about the need to have D take this medication whenever he was in her care. In fact, her evidence was to the effect that Dr W (upon whom D attended) had advised that it was a form of child abuse not to seek this intervention for D.

3. Despite this, I am completely persuaded that neither the paternal grandmother nor the father took any steps at all to tell the mother about the fact that D had been prescribed Lexapro.  I consider the paternal grandmother’s evidence during cross-examination about this issue to be a further demonstration of her inability, or unwillingness, to accept responsibility for a decision I consider she deliberately made: once again, she attempted to divert responsibility for informing the mother about the medication and the need for D to receive it when in her care to someone other than herself - on this occasion, it was Dr W who was, it seems, to bear the responsibility for the failure within the paternal family to ensure that the mother knew about the medication and the necessity for its provision. The paternal grandmother’s evidence about the doctor’s supposed involvement in this included the assertions that she thought Dr W contacted the mother and also that she thought the doctor had tried to contact the mother, but she wasn’t sure if that was successful.

4. I accept the mother’s evidence to the effect that she first became aware that D had been prescribed Lexapro when she read Dr W’s affidavit, filed on 4 October 2013. I accept that reference to him taking that medication was first made in correspondence written by Dr W on 10 May 2013.

5. The mother’s evidence was that no medication was sent with the children during their weekly visits to her home after 10 May 2013. The paternal grandmother said that medication had been sent to the mother when the children transitioned into her care; she said the mother did not administer it and the medication was returned to them when the children returned to their care. She advanced that the mother knew about the prescription of Lexapro as the medication was sent with D when he went to spend overnight time with his mother.

6. I accept the mother’s evidence to the effect that, once she became aware of the medication having been prescribed for D, she asked him about it and he told her that he did take medicine but only at his father’s house; I accept that, when she asked him whether he needed to bring his medicine to her house, he told her that his father had told him he only needed to take the medicine at his house.

7. My acceptance of the mother’s evidence in this respect is buttressed by the father’s comments to Ms B when interviewed in January 2014: he told her then that, whilst he thought D’s tics increased after his time with his mother, he (the father) had not provided the mother with the Lexapro (for when D spent time with her) due to asserted concerns about her administering the medication properly. That is, the father’s own report to Ms B completely contradicts the paternal grandmother’s assertion that “they” provided the mother with the medication D needed.

8. I am also completely persuaded that, knowing that the mother had not been told about D’s prescription and/or the necessity to administer the Lexapro to him when he was in her care (which he was on a regular basis at this time), the father and the paternal grandmother led Dr W to believe that the mother had expressed a reluctance to administer the medication to D. I have arrived at this conclusion because Dr W’s 10 May 2013 correspondence to Dr X contains the following statement: “I believe his father is in the process of accessing the Family Court again, to challenge the mother’s reluctance to allow [D] to have appropriate treatment for his anxiety, and I would certainly support this”.[22]

   [22] Exhibit 4 (Tender Bundle, p. 129).

1. I also note that, on 7 May 2013, Ms BB (a learning support teacher) sent Ms CC (a school counsellor) an email about D’s tics in which she said: “he really can’t help it and his Grandma has reported they wanted to place him on medication but his mother will not agree.”[23]  Further, the records[24] of a mid-year review for D (undertaken on 28 May 2013 by his then school) includes, under the heading “parents and grandparents” that “[D] is currently taking 20 mg of Lexapro for his anxiety (takes it at the night time) – paediatrician says he may need an increased dose”; “concerns raised regarding the implementation of medication protocol – mother does not agree with the treatment”.

   [23] Exhibit 4 (Tender Bundle, p. 343 – 344).

   [24] Exhibit 4 (Tender Bundle, p. 315 – 316).

2. I am persuaded that it is much more likely than not that the paternal grandmother deliberately led D’s school to believe that the mother was oppositional to D receiving appropriate treatment for his tics. I do not accept that this was the case.

3. I am also persuaded that the paternal grandmother positively acted to attempt to prevent the mother from becoming aware of the children’s attendance on Dr DD (a clinical, educational and developmental psychologist). Reference to the developmental questionnaire[25] completed by the paternal grandmother for D on 17 July 2013 contains that the paternal grandmother did not agree to the psychologist contacting the teacher or school. She wrote “school will inform mother, who cancels all”.

   [25] Exhibit 4 (Tender Bundle, p. 169 – 184).

4. As noted in the Reasons for Judgment I delivered at an earlier time in this matter, it also appears that, historically, the paternal grandmother inveigled the children in a deception of their mother by telling them not to tell her that they had attended upon such counsellor: an action eerily similar to the father’s more recent attempt to have the children correspond to the Independent Children’s Lawyer to seek more time with him – this involved the father telling a child to speak only to his brother about the father’s suggestion that they both write letters outlining a desire for more time and refrain from telling their mother about the contents of the letter he had written to them about this issue (which he showed one child at least during supervised time). This was the incident which resulted in in the Contact Centre ceasing the provision of its services to this family.

Attitude to the father’s convictions

1. I consider the paternal grandparents were emphatic in their evidence that they did not mention anything about the father’s charges to the Family Consultant in January 2014 because they had received legal advice to the effect that they were not required to make any disclosure about this because the father had not then been convicted of any offence.

2. The paternal grandmother, in particular, asserted repeatedly that she had simply acted on legal advice and, in essence, done what she was told. No party called the solicitor from whom the paternal grandparents said they had received this advice; in fact, the paternal grandmother in particular prevaricated significantly about his identity at the start of her evidence, before finally revealing his name for the first time during her cross-examination. This late provision of information meant that neither the mother’s legal representatives nor the Independent Children’s Lawyer had the opportunity of making appropriate inquiries of the named lawyer.

3. Irrespective of this, and even if the paternal grandparents had received the advice about which they gave evidence, I am not persuaded that they simply did nothing more than what they were told to do when they decided not to tell the Court or the mother about the offences with which the father had been charged. I am completely persuaded that they fully appreciated the potential impact on the father’s parenting case of any disclosure that he had been charged with historical sexual offences involving children. I think it much more likely than not that they determined to act protectively of their son and, because they had already formed the view – which they continue to hold stridently – that he had not committed any offence and that all of the matters alleged against him were simply untrue or fabrications by the complainants, they could see no issue with their deliberate subterfuge. I think it much more likely than not that they simply decided not to provide any information about the whole episode.

4. Lest it is thought that the passing of time since the June 2014 orders were made has, in any way, changed their minds, it is important to record that both paternal grandparents remain convinced of their son’s innocence; both are unable to accept the reality of his actions as found by outcome of the contested criminal proceedings.

5. Whilst there are other examples, it is sufficient to gain an appreciation of the extent of their denial by noting that the father in fact disagreed with what his parents said (in their Summary of Argument) about him showing pornography to a child under the age of 16 years; there they asserted, in essence, that in doing so he acted lawfully because he was the complainant’s religious education teacher and, as part of that instruction, teachers were to show students a film in which a man and a woman were engaged in sexual intercourse.

6. Whilst the father agreed with the assertion about the existence of the film and its contents, he said he did not agree that him showing the complainant the film was lawful; rather, he said that he was not teaching the student who made the allegation against him at the relevant time and that what his parents (the paternal grandparents) said about this topic was not true. He also said that he was left with the impression that, whilst he had moved on with his life after the criminal proceedings concluded, his parents had not. I agree with this assessment.

7. That the paternal grandmother previously acted, as I have found her above to have acted, casts a very long shadow – even now – over her repeated assertion during her cross-examination that she had always tried to help the mother and had only ever been supportive of her. Her actions and attitudes and those of the paternal grandfather put in context the mother’s current opposition to the children having any interaction with the paternal grandparents.

The mother’s attitude to the children’s relationship with the paternal grandparents 

1. Having interviewed the mother for the preparation of her November 2012 Family Report, Ms B reported that she appeared to have viewed the paternal grandparents’ support during the cohabitation as generally intrusive; it seems the mother perceived their actions and approach as undermining of her own sense of her own parenting abilities.

2. Having interviewed the mother for the preparation of her January 2014 Family Report, Ms B noted that the mother’s then expressed wish for the children to live primarily with her was largely because of her concerns about the children being exposed to negative views about her when with their father and paternal grandparents.

3. During her evidence at trial, the mother was adamant in her disagreement with the proposition that the children should be able to communicate or spend time with the paternal grandparents.  When asked to explain the basis for her position, she explained (in essence) that she had formed this view because of the actions of the paternal grandparents after separation.  She particularised these actions as being that the children were taken to see multiple doctors and allied health professionals whom were told, in her view in an attempt to prevent her from seeing the children, that she had abused the children both sexually and in other ways; that, when D was spending time with her, the paternal grandmother “made out” that she (the mother) was not giving him the prescribed medication (in circumstances where she was unaware of the need to provide him with that medication) – she said that, by doing so, the paternal grandmother potentially harmed D in her attempt to create a basis for the unfounded assertion that she (the mother) had abused the children. 

4. The mother also outlined that the paternal grandmother had said terrible and horrible (false) things about her to the medical practitioners upon whom the children attended whilst in her (the paternal grandmother’s) care; she explained that these specialists did not know her (the mother); that the paternal grandmother orchestrated everything and said negative and derogatory things about her to them, which they then relied upon in authoring reports about her (the mother’s) parenting, her functioning and her parental capacity and which resulted in her being prevented from seeing the children and in the children being  prevented from obtaining the care from her that they needed.

5. The mother reiterated that it was for these reasons that she had concluded that the children were not safe in the care of the paternal grandparents.

6. When the paternal grandmother asked the mother whether she was “hostile” towards the paternal family, the mother said: “you kept my children away from me for two, maybe more, years and I am not going to be friendly with you.”

7. Given the actions and attitudes of the paternal grandparents as I have found them to be, I consider the mother’s response understandable; it is not a response without foundation and, in the circumstances of this case, it is not unreasonable.

8. The mother said that the children know about the father’s criminal proceedings.  She explained that they knew he could have possibly gone to jail; that he had his own lawyer who worked for him; that he still loved them and that it was an adult thing to worry about; that 20 years ago he did something to children at schools that everyone was angry about. When she was asked whether she intended to tell the children anything more about the father’s convictions, the mother said she intended to make that decision later, and to act with the assistance of the children’s long term psychologist (with whom she had discussed the need for the children to be told about the facts of their father’s offences at some future point in time) -  her view was that she did not think that the children should now know too much about it, the father is their father and they are not yet of an age to know about such things. In her view, the children are children and should be children and should remain as children at present. 

9. As I understood the tenor of the mother’s evidence, she is concerned to ensure that the children are not exposed to interactions that might disrupt their current settled functioning; she considers that, given they know their paternal grandparents, they will be able to engage with them when they are older and once they have completed their formal education. Underpinning her concerns is, in my view, an understandable fear that all of the work she has done with the children to solidify their relationships with her and regain their trust may be undermined if the paternal grandparents are again placed into a position of being able to influence the children’s views of her.

10. The mother accepted that the children might choose to re-engage with members of the paternal family when they are older.  Given this, she was asked whether she identified any benefit to them in spending small amounts of supervised time with their paternal grandparents from the present into the future.  Her answer remained a resolute negative.

The father’s attitude to the children’s relationship with the paternal grandparents 

1. During cross-examination by Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer, the father identified the risk he said his parents posed to the children which warranted any time between the children and their paternal grandparents occurring on a supervised basis. He said this risk was of them saying anything bad about the mother in front of, or to, the children. He accepted that he was aware that his parents had a very dim view of the mother.  He knew that his parents were very critical of the parenting the children had previously obtained from their mother and that they had said terrible things about her in the affidavit material filed in the proceedings. 

2. The father also said that, when he was acting on his own behalf during the proceedings, the paternal grandmother drafted many of his affidavits (which also contained many accusations critical of the mother) and that he did not read the majority of these before he signed them because he trusted her.

Likely effect on the children of a resumption of their interaction with their paternal grandparents

1. Having interviewed the children for the preparation of her November 2012 Family Report, Ms B noted that S (then a little over 7 years of age) reported that he thought that his father and paternal grandparents felt “pretty upset” about the time he was then spending with his mother. I think this provides an insight into his sensitivity to the views of the adults with whom he was then spending a lot of time.

2. During her evidence at trial, Ms B noted that, if the children continued to spend no time with their paternal grandparents, they would experience no change to their current world: that is, they would continue to experience the consistency and stability of their current living arrangements with their mother, something she opined would bode them well. She did not observe any evidence, during her most recent observation of the children, that there is a risk that their sense of self-worth may be adversely affected by a continuation of the paternal grandparent’s absence from their lives.

3. Whilst Ms B considered the option of the children spending only limited day-time time with the paternal grandparents as being a possibility, she was concerned that the children’s vulnerability and lack of sophistication may likely result in them failing to question the actions or behaviours of their grandparents. I accept her evidence in this respect.

4. Whilst Ms B also opined that the Court could consider the option of limiting the frequency of the children’s interactions with their paternal grandparents to a few times a year – so as to allow the children to maintain some connection with their paternal family and, possibly, mitigate the risks she identified – she was concerned that the paternal grandparents may use the time as an opportunity to encourage the children to seek to spend more time with them: something that would likely create tensions within their mother’s home and/or in their relationships with her.

5. It is also relevant, I think, to record the mother’s evidence about the impact on S of the father’s attempts to inveigle him to contact the Independent Children’s Lawyer with a request to spend more time with him; that request was accompanied by a direction to S that he keep the fact of this request a secret from his mother and discuss it only with his brother.  It was the supervisor’s discovery of this correspondence that resulted in the Centre terminating the father’s supervised time with the children.

6. When the mother was asked, during cross-examination by Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer, about whether she observed the children to be distressed after the contact centre withdrew its services, the mother outlined that, one day, S had told a friend that he was going to go home and kill himself that day; the friend told his mother, who contacted the mother, who took S to see his psychologist. The mother said that, after speaking with S, the psychologist told her that, after what his father had told him, he was really scared and worried that he had to make a choice or choices about the time he would spend with each of his parents. She also said that, after the psychologist told S he did not need to make choices and that was something his mother needed to do, a big weight lifted from his shoulders.

7. That the father’s attempts to encourage S to seek to spend more time with him had such a dramatic impact on the child’s functioning is, in my view, particularly pertinent to the consideration of the likely impact upon him and his functioning if exposed in any way to the paternal grandparents’ unyieldingly critical view of the mother as both a person and a parent.

What parenting orders are in the children’s best interests?

1. Ms B outlined that she had no confidence that the paternal grandparents would contain their views in the children’s presence; she opined that, if the children were exposed to their negative views about their mother and, I infer, their steadfast views about the innocence of the father, there is the potential that such exposure may potentially negatively influence the children’s perceptions of their mother and destabilise their living arrangements with her.

2. Consequently, her ultimate recommendation was that the children spend no time with their paternal grandparents.

3. I completely accept that it is more likely than not that the paternal grandmother would behave in the future toward the mother vis-a-vis the children as she has in the past if afforded the opportunity: whilst she regards her past actions as having been emotionally, financially and practically supportive of the mother as a parent, I consider them to have been deliberately undermining and unsupportive in the period from at least the October 2010 parental separation until the June 2014 orders effected a change in the children’s care arrangements.

4. I accept that increased exposure to the paternal grandparents’ animosity about the mother, assessment of her actions in a negative way and dismissive attitude toward her and her capabilities as both a parent and as a person is highly unlikely to be beneficial to the children. I do not accept any contention that interaction with the paternal grandparents is likely to provide the children with a “safe haven”.

5. I accept Ms B’s assessment that the mother and the paternal grandparents do not have a relationship with each other. I accept that the mother does not want a relationship with them as a result of their actions toward her and attitudes about her. She is unwilling (or unable) to forget the vitriolic and significantly demeaning comments about her as a person and a parent that have been made during the course of these proceedings and to others upon whom the children attended for care before June 2014.

6. I accept the tenor of the mother’s evidence during her cross-examination to the effect that she regards the paternal grandmother (in particular, but not exclusively) as being largely responsible for the approximately two year hiatus in her time with the children; for attempting to prevent her from having a meaningful relationship with the children and for positively endangering D’s health by failing to inform her of his prescription for Lexapro, failing to ensure she was provided with the medication so that she could administer the same to him when he was in her care and then positively relying on her failure to administer the medication to enjoin unwitting health practitioners to express negative and critical opinions about her parenting capacity.

7. I accept that the mother is genuine in her beliefs about the paternal grandparents and that such beliefs are unlikely to change in the future. I also accept that she has a reasonable basis for forming her opinions of them; in my view, the actions of the paternal grandmother and the attitude of the paternal grandfather have been completely dismissive of the mother in her capacity as one of the children’s parents.

8. As I assess the current attitudes of the paternal grandparents, they consider that they have done nothing wrong in the manner in which they approached their interactions with the mother. Both clearly regard themselves as victims and as having done nothing other than act on advice provided to them. Neither appeared able to accept any personal responsibility for the decisions each made about the manner in which they chose to interact with, and regard, the mother.

9. That they maintained this view despite having been willing to risk actual harm to D in order to advance the paternal proposition that the mother was  incapable of caring for her children is unfathomable.

1. Given the history of her actions toward the mother, I am not remotely persuaded that the paternal grandmother is likely to be able to refrain from undermining the children’s relationships with their mother if she had the opportunity to interact with them in anything but a supervised environment. I consider it much more likely than not that, as she has done in the past - intentionally or insightlessly - she is likely to communicate with the children in such manner as to subtly undermine their confidence in their mother’s capacity to parent them. Whilst both children are chronologically of an age where it might be thought that they are likely to be able to resist or deflect such criticisms without negative repercussion, the evidence about the impact on S of the father’s attempt to have him express, to the Independent Children’s Lawyer, a wish to spend more time with him persuades me that the children likely remain vulnerable to the likely subtle influences of their paternal grandparents.

2. Further, I think it highly likely that, if the children spent unsupervised time with their paternal grandparents, the paternal grandmother would be unlikely to be able to refrain from checking in with them about aspects of their mother’s parenting of them; I do not discount the possibility that, if the children were in her care for a lengthy enough period of time, she might engage with third parties – as she has done in the past – in an attempt to have them express a negative opinion about the mother’s care of the children. I also consider the paternal grandmother to be quite capable of reprising her past actions of enjoining the children to keep matters such as their attendance on various medical practitioners and/or allied health professionals secret from their mother.

3. As demonstrated by the comment to which I have already made specific reference at paragraph 12, the paternal grandfather is completely dismissive of the mother as both a parent and as a person; to him, it seems, she is worthless. That he spoke as he did in the course of responding to the very criticism that he has previously exposed the children to his negative view of the mother demonstrates such an absence of insight into his own behaviour that I am completely persuaded that it is much more likely than not that the children would be exposed to derogatory comments about their mother if they spent any unsupervised time with him.

4. All of these considerations persuade me to conclude that it is not in the children’s best interests for them to spend time or communicate with their paternal grandparents.

5. Whilst Ms B opined that, if the children spent unsupervised time with their paternal grandparents, there may be a risk that they would permit the father to see them, I not so persuaded of this.

6. Given the paternal grandparents’ attitude to supervised time with the children, it is not in the children’s best interests that an order for supervised time is made; it could not be thought to be beneficial for the children to attend and discover that their paternal grandparents had not attended.

7. In any event, even if I had been persuaded that the paternal grandparents would likely attend supervised time with the children on an on-going basis, I am not persuaded in the circumstances of this case that any benefits to the children associated with the opportunity to spend limited supervised time with their paternal grandparents are sufficient to outweigh the likely significant risk to their current stability and relationships with their mother as to persuade that such an order is now in the children’s best interests.

8. Whilst others may disagree, given the particular history of this case and noting the children’s respective vulnerabilities and the importance of ensuring their stability, I accept the mother’s evidence that it is likely that the children would find it very confusing – and, I conclude, destabilising – to receive cards and/or gifts from their paternal grandparents but not be able to spend face to face time with them. I have concluded that any benefit the children might obtain from the receipt of cards or gifts is unlikely to outweigh the deleterious impact on their stability of the same.

9. Whilst, as I have noted, the mother was very adamant in her view about the children not spending time or communicating with their paternal grandparents, there may come a time in the future when such interaction is thought to be beneficial for them. With this in mind, I intend to make orders which specifically recognise that it is for the mother to determine whether any future time or communication between the children and their paternal grandparents occurs.

A final matter

1. I note that, during his evidence, the father said he has been solely responsible for caring for the grandchildren of his current wife on occasion; these children are apparently six and three years of age respectively; he said their mother was made aware of his offending prior to permitting him to care for her children; he said she had informed police that she accepted responsibility for him looking after her children.  The father also said that he was aware that he was required to report his interactions with associated children to the police; he said he had babysat the children on three occasions this year and had made one online report about this; he said he was only required to report once every three months and he informed the police registry that, during this period, he had babysat those children.

2. Whilst the father was asked to provide a copy of the report he made online to police, the parties subsequently agreed about the parenting orders to be made vis-à-vis the children’s interaction with him. Consequently, no such report formed part of the evidence before me.   

3. Given my concerns about the father’s lack of veracity (arising, for example, out of his deliberate lie to Ms B in relation to the correspondence he authored and took to the Contact Centre), I think it appropriate that the Independent Children’s Lawyer be directed to provide a copy of these Reasons for Judgment to the appropriate officer within the Queensland Police Service. 

4. As this issue was not the subject of discussion with the father’s legal representatives, the father will have liberty to apply to be heard in relation to this order before the time for its implementation expires.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and sixteen (116) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Hogan delivered on 13 August 2018.

Associate: 

Date:              13 August 2018