Baldini v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Baldini v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 173

DEPORTATION - appeal against the Administrative Appeal Tribunal’s decision to deport the applicant to Italy - reviewable error - error of law and error of fact - when error of law does not invalidate Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision - Australia’s Criminal Deportation Policy (No 9) - whether existence of a parental relationship between the applicant and child necessary before primary consideration in par 6(b) need be considered

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 200 and 499
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Rokobatini v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 30 AAR 74 at 77; [1999] FCA 1238 referred to
Sharp Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs (1995) 59 FCR 6 referred to
Hui v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 985 followed
Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 discussed
Tien v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 53 ALD 32 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teo (1995) 57 FCR 194 cited
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 cited
Collins v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 58 FLR 407 referred to
Bisley Investment Corporation Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1982) 59 FLR 132 referred to
Casarotto v Australian Postal Commission (1989) 86 ALR 399 referred to

General Direction No 9, described as “Australia’s Criminal Deportation Policy”

EDUARDO BALDINI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Q 201 OF 1999

DRUMMOND J
25 FEBRUARY 2000
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 201 OF 1999

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

BETWEEN:

EDUARDO BALDINI
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DRUMMOND J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 FEBRUARY 2000

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 201 OF 1999

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

BETWEEN:

EDUARDO BALDINI
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DRUMMOND J

DATE:

25 FEBRUARY 2000

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming the decision of a delegate of the Minister to deport the applicant pursuant to s 200 the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Such an appeal lies to this Court only on questions of law: s 44 the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).

  2. The applicant is now 36 years of age, being born in 1964.  He is a citizen of Italy who arrived in Australia with his parents and older brother in July 1975.  He was granted permanent resident status in 1976.  In January 1982 he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for five years for the offence of robbery in company while…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 173
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Baldini v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant contested the decision of the Tribunal to deport him to Italy. The applicant argued that the Tribunal made errors in assessing his fluency in Italian and in interpreting psychiatric evidence regarding his risk of recidivism. Additionally, the applicant claimed that the Tribunal misinterpreted the obligation under section 499 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) regarding compliance with a General Direction concerning deportation decisions.

The central legal issues revolved around whether the Tribunal's errors in assessing the applicant's language skills and risk of recidivism amounted to an error of fact or law, and if so, whether these errors vitiated the Tribunal's decision. Furthermore, the court examined whether the Tribunal's interpretation of its statutory duty under section 499 was accurate.

The court concluded that the Tribunal's finding regarding the applicant's fluency in Italian constituted an error of fact, not law. It was held that the Tribunal's assessment of the applicant's risk of recidivism, despite the noted error, was still valid as it appropriately considered the applicant's conduct and rehabilitation efforts. Moreover, the court found that the Tribunal's understanding of its duty under section 499 was not erroneous, as it correctly interpreted the requirement to have "due regard" to the General Direction, rather than strictly adhering to it as a mandatory rule. Therefore, the Tribunal's decision to deport the applicant was not vitiated by any errors.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the Tribunal's decision to deport the applicant to Italy.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Its actual finding that he speaks fluent Italian with a Neapolitan accent was wrong. The Tribunal, in considering the question of the applicant’s fluency in Italian in the context of assessing the degree of hardship which he might suffer by return to Italy, concluded that his fluency with the language extended to “Italian” which he spoke with “a Neapolitan accent”, when the evidence justified a conclusion that his fluency extended only to the Neapolitan dialect of Italian. It did not err in holding that he had Italian language skills; its error was as to the extent of those skills. But that, in my opinion, is properly characterised as an error of fact, not law. It cannot be characterised as a finding made without any evidence to support it and is thus not an error of law.The psychiatric evidence Next, the applicant contended that the Tribunal erred in its conclusion that “as both Dr Curtis and Dr Kingswell noted, the issue of recidivism is an inexact science, and the only helpful indicator to future behaviour is a person’s past behaviour”. It was said that the expert medical evidence did not provide any support for the finding in the last part of this passage. Dr Curtis, the applicant’s psychiatrist, in response to a question about the risk of the applicant re-offending said:“… people like me, those psychiatrists, and I think other disciplines, as well, are not good at predicting future behaviour so I acknowledge that. In my own experience, I think that past behaviour is the only really good indication we have of future human behaviour. Now, on that basis, Mr - there’s a weighing up to be done.…Now, to answer - the short answer of your question is that, I mean, one has to say, I say, that there’s a risk to be taken. I mean, there has to be an acknowledged re-offending risk given the history of the man and the type of personality that I’m describing, but in fairness, if I could just say it again, I would weigh in that - the recent incarceration and what I took to be genuine reports from this man that he’d worked hard to make it a positive rehabilitation experience rather than the type of struggle that he reported that he’d indulged in earlier.” Dr Kingswell, the psychiatrist called by the respondent, said in answer to a question about the applicant’s risk of recidivism:“… I don’t think I could make any comment about his likelihood of reoffence that would be based on anything other than a lay person’s guess or actuarial data.…Right, and you weren’t attempting [in your report] to put forward a view as to this question of recidivism at all?---I have no view about the question of recidivism at all.” When pressed further by the Tribunal member about the risk of recidivism by the applicant, Dr Kingswell said:“… I think it would only be to add my prejudices to the things. It looks like ---I don’t want your prejudices, I want your clinical observation?---Well, there are no clinical observations to be made here. The role of the psychiatrist here would be no different to anybody else looking at this sort of history. I mean, I can give you an answer based on actuarial data, but I’m sure you know that yourself.I can’t---?---That the more offences you commit, the more you are likely to commit in the future …”

Decision

Reasons for decision

DRUMMOND J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DRUMMOND J

Despite the error in question, the Tribunal correctly took into account all of the applicant’s own conduct now relied on in so far as it assessed whether the applicant had undergone rehabilitation to an extent that told against his being a likely recidivist. In [9] and [12] of its reasons, the Tribunal noted the training courses that the applicant had undertaken in prison and the job offers available to him if he were not deported; at [37] it noted that applicant’s counsel identified the risk of recidivism as the critical issue in the case. The Tribunal then proceeded to discuss this issue, noting again in [38] and [39] the applicant’s “impeccable” conduct during his last period of incarceration. In [39] of its reasons, the Tribunal recorded that it was not prepared to find that the applicant’s conduct during his last period in gaol “evidences genuine rehabilitation”, ie, it was not prepared to accept that that conduct, which included the undertaking by him of the various courses referred to by the Tribunal, provided reason to think there might be a change in his behaviour in the future. Then, in [40], it made the comment now the focus of complaint in this same context of dealing with the issue of risk of recidivism. That job offers are open to the applicant matters little once it can be seen that the Tribunal was not prepared to accept that his future conduct was likely to be different from his past behaviour. For the reasons given, it can be said with confidence the Tribunal would have come to the same decision in favour of deportation if it had not misunderstood par 13(c). Its error of law does not vitiate its decision under appeal.The Tribunal’s duty under s 499 the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Finally, the applicant submitted that the Tribunal erred in law in concluding that it merely “must have regard to” the General Direction when the Direction was, in fact, mandatory. Reference was made to Rokobatini v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs at 77; [12], where it was held that the Tribunal’s failure in that case, due to its ignorance of the existence of the Direction, to ascertain “as a threshold question, whether [it was] under a statutory duty to regard itself as bound by government policy” as contained in the Direction led it into error of law. The result of this error was that the Tribunal determined the case by reference to an old policy “entirely superseded by the Direction”, hence the need to set aside the decision. But, while s 499 the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) obliges the Tribunal to comply with the General Direction in making a deportation decision, the Direction itself states that the way the Tribunal complies with the Direction is by having “due regard” to the importance placed by the Government on the two primary considerations (par (6)) and by having “due regard” to the Government’s views on the various other considerations spelled out in the Direction, eg, those in pars (8), (9), (10), (11), (12) etc. The Tribunal commits no error by failing to acknowledge in express terms that s 499 obliges it to comply with the Direction if it has performed that obligation by having due regard to the various considerations which the Direction in terms requires it to take into account in making a deportation decision.