Bakes v Alexander
[2022] ACTMC 19
•26 August 2022
MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
| Case Title: Bakes v Alexander (No 2) | |
Citation: | [2022] ACTMC 19 |
Hearing Dates: | 7 – 11 February 2022 |
Last Submissions: | 22 July 2022 |
Decision Date: | 26 August 2022 |
Before: | Magistrate Theakston |
Decision: | 1. The defendant is guilty of each of the remaining charges, and as described in the schedule, other than cc 4908, cc 4996, cc 4997, cc 4999 and cc 5000 of 2021, and 2. The defendant is not guilty of the charges CC 4908, CC 4996, CC 4997, CC 4999 and CC 5000 of 2021. |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – Theft of chose in action by president of sporting club – whether conduct dishonest |
Legislation Cited: | Associations Incorporations Act 1991 (ACT) Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), ss 304, 306, 308 |
Cases Cited: | R v Baden-Clay [2016] HCA 35; (2016) CLR 308 R v Hillier [2007] HCA 13; (2007) 228 CLR 618 Shepherd v The Queen [1990] HCA 56; (1990) 170 CLR 573 |
Parties: | Nathan Bakes (Informant) Aaron Alexander (Defendant) |
Representation: | Counsel M Dyason and J Melloy (Informant) E Chen (Defendant) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Informant) Legal Aid ACT (Defendant) | |
File Numbers: | See schedule |
MAGISTRATE THEAKSTON:
Introduction
This is the second decision in this matter. The defendant was originally charged with 108 counts of obtaining property by deception and 108 charges of theft, all relating to funds said to have been taken by him while he was president of a local sporting club. The latter charges were in the alternative to the former. Following the completion of the prosecution case and the defendant’s no case to answer submission, I dismissed all the former charges and several of the latter charges. Reasons for that decision are recorded in [2022] ACTMC 10. I also amended all the remaining charges by replacing the term ‘money’ with the expression ‘chose in action’. The schedule to that decision should have reflected that charge cc 4911 of 2021 was also amended in that way. The remaining theft charges were contrary to s 308 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT).
Following the above ruling the defendant offered no evidence and final submissions were received. The key issue was whether I could be satisfied to the requisite standard that the appropriations were dishonest to the standards of ordinary people and that the defendant was aware of the same. Ultimately, I will be finding the defendant guilty of all charges, other than cc 4908, cc 4996, cc 4997, cc 4999 and cc 5000 of 2021. These are my reasons.
The prosecution case
The prosecution alleges that while the defendant performed the role of the president of the Gungahlin United Football Club, he appropriated funds from the club’s bank accounts by effecting the following types of transactions:
(a)transfers of funds to Macquarie Leasing for lease payments linked to his personal vehicle;
(b)use of the club’s debit card for purchases from five retailers and payments to ACT Road User Service;
(c)transfers of funds to his personal and business bank accounts; and
(d)withdrawals of cash.
Principles
For the purpose of these proceedings, I note the following principles that I must apply. I must find facts, draw inferences from them, and apply the law to the facts that I find. I must bring an open and unbiased mind to the evidence and view it clinically and dispassionately and not let emotion enter into the decision-making process. Both the prosecution and defendant are entitled to my verdict free of partiality, prejudice, favour or ill-will. I must deliver my decision according to the evidence.
The prosecution bears the onus of proving the guilt of the defendant. The defendant does not have to prove that he did not commit the offences charged.
The standard of proof for the prosecution is proof beyond reasonable doubt, and the defendant cannot be found guilty of an offence unless the evidence satisfies me beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt for each element of the offence. Therefore, if the evidence, which I accept, fails to satisfy me beyond reasonable doubt of any or all the elements of an offence, then I must dismiss that charge. Similarly, if I am satisfied there may be an explanation consistent with the innocence of the defendant, or I am unsure of where the truth lies, I must find the relevant charge has not been proved.
If the prosecution case rests substantially on circumstantial evidence, the defendant cannot be found guilty unless, when the evidence is considered as a whole and not by a piecemeal approach to each particular circumstance, the prosecution has excluded all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence.
I need to consider the reliability of each witness’ evidence. I can accept all, part or none of a witness’ evidence.
The defendant did not give or call evidence during the hearing. He was not required to do so. No adverse inference can be drawn against him because of his decision to not offer any evidence. Nor can the absence of evidence from the defendant be used to fill in any gaps or used as a makeweight for any deficiency in the prosecution case.
Uncontroversial findings of facts
The following aspects of the prosecution case were supported by evidence and unchallenged. I am satisfied they have been established beyond reasonable doubt and I make findings accordingly.
The Gungahlin United Football Club, which may have been incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT), operated a main bank account and several debit card accounts, in support of its functions of fielding children’s and premier league football teams in the Canberra football competition.
The club had an elected executive committee, of which the defendant served as president from September 2016 to late July 2018. From September 2017 (when a treasurer resigned) and June 2018 (when the defendant was stood down as president by the committee), the defendant had exclusive access to the club’s main bank account. Additionally, at all relevant times he had possession of a debit card provided to him by the club for club related purchases. That card was linked to a separate club account.
The president’s role, particularly in the absence of a treasurer, extended to paying the expenses of the club. The club had significant expenses across the year. The constitution of the club limited expenditure to normal running costs or other expenditure authorised by the executive committee. The constitution prohibited payments to members of the executive committee, other than for the purpose of reimbursing expenses reasonably made on behalf of the club.
From December 2017 to July 2018, funds were transferred from the club’s main account, and included the following transactions, each of which are the subject of a charge:
(a)Nine equal BPay payments of $914.85 to Macquarie Leasing as monthly lease payments linked to the defendant’s personal vehicle, totalling $8,233.65;
(b)47 electronic transfers to the defendant’s personal and business accounts, with various manually entered descriptions, totalling $20,525.00; and
(c)four cash withdrawals of $4,237.74, $4,600, and two lots of $3,500, totalling $15,837.74.
During that same period various transactions were made using the club’s debit card issued to the defendant for club related expenses, including to Telstra, Hoyts, Just Jeans, ACT Road User Service and a retail dart shop and pet store, totalling $2,663.64, each of which are also the subject of a charge.
Those transactions are described individually and with additional detail in the attached Schedule.
Elements of the offences
As described in my earlier decision, the elements for the theft offences are:
(a)The defendant appropriated something;
and did so intentionally (default element);
(b)That appropriated was property;
and the defendant was at least reckless about that (default element);
(c)The property belonged to someone else;
and the defendant was at least reckless about that (default element);
(d)the obtaining was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people;
and the defendant knew that (defined element); and
(e)the defendant intended to permanently deprive the other person of the property.
Appropriation
Section 304(1) of the Criminal Code 2002 provides:
304 Appropriation of property for pt 3.2
(1) Any assumption of the rights of an owner to ownership, possession or control of property, without the consent of a person to whom the property belongs, is an appropriation of the property.
The evidence compels the conclusion that the defendant had exclusive access to the club’s main account and was in possession of the club debit card issued to him at all relevant times. The relevant transactions were affected using the main account and debit card. Further, those transactions, by their very nature, involved the assumption of control of those funds and therefore the chose in action. Accordingly, and subject to the issue of consent, I would find beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had appropriated the choses in action.
I will deal with the question of consent when I address the question of dishonesty.
The defendant made submissions that it was open on the evidence that his girlfriend and other club members may have used his debit card from time to time. In relation to the former, the only evidence of this was from the ex-treasurer who described confronting the defendant earlier about an unrelated transaction and receiving a response that the card had accidentally been used by the defendant’s girlfriend. That would at best only amount to evidence of an assertion at the time by the defendant to the treasurer. It is not evidence that the card was used by the girlfriend. There is no other evidence. While it remains a possibility, along with an infinite number of other remote possibilities, to my mind and on the current evidence it is not possibility that would be reasonably open.
There was evidence from Mr Tarnawskj that other club members had used the club debit card issued to the defendant. That evidence was vague and incomplete and went only as far as saying ‘Yes. I remember some occasions like that, but usually it was just a tap and go.’ There was also evidence from a number of witnesses that occasionally on game days club members would purchase essential football or canteen supplies. I understood Mr Tarnawskj’s evidence to be said in that context. The charges relating to the debit card involve transactions with the ACT Road User Service, Telstra, Hoyts, a pet store and a dart shop. I find it inherently implausible that the card issued to the defendant, was borrowed by unknown others on game days to pay fines or taxes at the ACT Road User Service, or purchase goods or services from Telstra, Hoyts, a pet store or a retail dart shop. In any event there is no evidence of that and there is evidence that the defendant had online access to the accounts, and was therefore in a position to monitor those transactions. I also note that on each occasion the card was not used on the weekend.
Additionally, when all the evidence is considered together, it is unavoidable to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that the defendant was at least reckless about the above appropriation.
Property belonged to someone else
There is a degree of uncertainty about the legal status of the Gungahlin United Football Club. There was no explanation why the prosecution did not tender a certificate evidencing the club’s status as a body corporate. Nonetheless, it was abundantly clear from the evidence that the club was an organisation of some type and operated bank accounts. Either the club owned the choses in action with the bank as a body corporate, or those choses in action were held by someone on trust for club purposes. It was equally clear that the choses in action did not belong to the defendant. Accordingly, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the choses in action belonged to someone else.
I am also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant, as an active and informed office bearer of the club, was at least reckless about that fact.
Intention of permanently depriving
The nature of each of the transactions is such that it is clear the defendant intended the funds to permanently leave the club’s accounts. They involved either spending the funds, repeated transfers to the defendant’s accounts or repeated withdrawals of cash. If I am wrong about this and the defendant was only intending to borrow the funds, the conduct would amount to treating the funds as his own to dispose of regardless of the owner’s rights and that would fall within the extended definition of ‘intention of permanently depriving’ provided at section 306 of the Criminal Code. Accordingly, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to permanently deprive the club of its choses in action.
Dishonesty
As indicated above the key issue in this case is whether I can be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appropriations were dishonest to the standards of ordinary people and that the defendant was aware of the same. Associated with that question is the question about whether the club consented to the relevant transactions. That is because similar circumstances inform both questions. As described above at [18], the latter determines whether there was the necessary legal appropriation, as defined by section 304 of the Criminal Code.
The prosecution and defendant agreed that the dishonesty elements were essentially bound with the question about whether the funds were used for legitimate club purposes. The evidence about this is circumstantial in nature, and the prosecution helpfully pointed to a number of authorities that explain how such evidence is to be considered.
In Shepherd v The Queen [1990] HCA 56; (1990) 170 CLR 573, Dawson J, at [6], summarised the essence of reasoning in a circumstantial case:
As I have said, the prosecution bears the burden of proving all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. That means that the essential ingredients of each element must be so proved. It does not mean that every fact - every piece of evidence - relied upon to prove an element by inference must itself be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Intent, for example, is, save for statutory exceptions, an element of every crime. It is something which, apart from admissions, must be proved by inference. But the jury may quite properly draw the necessary inference having regard to the whole of the evidence, whether or not each individual piece of evidence relied upon is proved beyond reasonable doubt, provided they reach their conclusion upon the criminal standard of proof. Indeed, the probative force of a mass of evidence may be cumulative, making it pointless to consider the degree of probability of each item of evidence separately.
In R v Hillier [2007] HCA 13; (2007) 228 CLR 618 at [48], Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ reinforced the accumulative nature of circumstantial evidence:
Often enough, in a circumstantial case, there will be evidence of matters which, looked at in isolation from other evidence, would yield an inference compatible with the innocence of the accused. But neither at trial, nor on appeal, is a circumstantial case to be considered piecemeal. … ‘in a case depending on circumstantial evidence, the jury should not reject one circumstance because, considered alone, no inference of guilt can be drawn from it. It is well established that the jury must consider 'the weight which is to be given to the united force of all the circumstances put together' (Citation omitted)
In R v Baden-Clay [2016] HCA 35; (2016) CLR 308 at [46] and [47], the High Court explained how the criminal standard of proof should operate when a court scrutinises a circumstantial case:
46. … ‘When the case against an accused person rests substantially upon circumstantial evidence the jury cannot return a verdict of guilty unless the circumstances are 'such as to be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused'. To enable a jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused it is necessary not only that his guilt should be a rational inference but that it should be 'the only rational inference that the circumstances would enable them to draw …’
47. For an inference to be reasonable, it ‘must rest upon something more than mere conjecture. The bare possibility of innocence should not prevent a jury from finding the prisoner guilty, if the inference of guilt is the only inference open to reasonable men upon a consideration of all the facts in evidence’. Further, ‘in considering a circumstantial case, all of the circumstances established by the evidence are to be considered and weighed in deciding whether there is an inference consistent with innocence reasonably open on the evidence’ (Citations omitted)
It is very clear from the evidence that the club was run by volunteers and that committee members where not to receive remuneration. That arrangement is not unusual for community sporting clubs and was provided for within the club’s constitution. The defendant, as an active office bearer of the club, must have been aware of that arrangement. This is reinforced by the evidence of the ex-treasurer who described that, while she was treasurer, she enquired of the defendant about ambiguous transactions he may have been responsible for.
Private car repayments to Macquarie Bank
The repayment of the defendant’s private leasing expenses for his personal vehicle was patently beyond the legitimate use of club funds. This is so obvious it is axiomatic. The suggestion to the contrary boarders on being fanciful. This is particularly so, considering that the full cost of the repayments was paid from the club account, rather than any proportion attempting to equate to fair compensation for using the vehicle for club related purposes. The payments covered nine months’ scheduled repayments and totalled more than $8,000. There was no evidence that this exceptional arrangement was authorised by the club. In any event, there was evidence that the vehicle wasn’t used much for club purposes.
I find beyond reasonable doubt that the transfer of funds to Macquarie Bank were dishonest to the standards of ordinary people and the defendant knew that to be the case.
Electronic transfer to the defendant’s bank accounts
There was evidence that the club, at times, reimbursed members for legitimate club expenses paid by members from their own funds. That could have involved transferring funds from the club’s main account to a member’s account. There was also evidence that the club debit cards had $500 limits, and that such limits would therefore limit the use of those debit cards for purchases above $500.
Not only did the defendant have available for his immediate use a club debit card, with a $500 limit, he also had sole access to the club’s main account using online banking. It beggars belief that he, as an experienced businessman, would routinely first use his own funds to pay legitimate club expenses and then separately obtain reimbursement. That approach would limit comprehensive record keeping and possibly double the work required of the defendant when making such payments. It would also have involved the defendant using his own money, rather than the available club funds. Additionally, many of the amounts are the same in value and most are very simple numbers. For example, there are no detailed amounts precise down to the dollar or cent, and many amounts are multiples of $100 and most are multiples of $50.
It was separately submitted by the defendant that as the descriptions of the transfers to his accounts, as recorded on the statements, were manually entered by him, he may have made errors with respect to those descriptions. In any event, as those descriptions were entered by the defendant, I cannot see how they could, without anything else, assist in determining the question of dishonesty.
The defendant’s private bank statements were in evidence, and during submissions he did not point to any entries within those statements that may be associated with reimbursement.
Ultimately, when I consider the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied the prosecution has excluded all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence of the defendant, and it has established beyond reasonable doubt that in each case the defendant was dishonest to the standards of ordinary people when he transferred club funds to his own bank accounts, and the defendant knew that to be the case. Any inference consistent with the defendant not being knowingly dishonest was not reasonably left open as at best it was only a bare possibility arising from mere conjecture.
Cash withdrawals
Three of the cash withdrawals were also for simple amounts, with two amounts identical. I adopt similar reasoning to that in relation to the payments to his accounts. The method of withdrawing cash, rather than paying vendors directly, would not have been best practice.
However, there was evidence that some of the club’s legitimate expenses were paid for in cash, and on the evidence put before the court it remained open that the above cash withdrawals may have been used for such expenses. While I may have serious doubts about the truth of such inferences, they do remain open. That particularly the case for the withdrawal involving the precise amount of $4,237.74. In those circumstances I do not find beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was dishonest with respect to those withdrawals.
Debit card purchases
As described previously, the club provided the defendant with a debit card for club related expenses. The relevant transactions related to single transactions with Hoyts, Just Jeans, a dart shop and a pet store, three transactions with Telstra, and three separate payments on the same day to ACT Road User Service. Other than Telstra, the vendors and the ACT Road User Service did not offer goods or services relevant to the activities of the club.
There was a suggestion within the cross examination and submissions by the defendant that the club may have used Hoyts gift cards as a fund raising prize. However, the transaction was for $39.00, a very odd amount for a gift card. There is also evidence that someone else’s debit card was used at Hoyts for the much rounder amount of $50.00. I find it inherently implausible that $39.00 would relate to the purchase of a gift card.
I similarly find it inherently implausible that $41.97 was spent at Just Jeans for the purpose of a gift card or something similar. The defendant also submitted that the transaction may relate to an urgent purchase of club related clothing. That is equally implausible. I take judicial notice of the nature of the clothing stocked at Just Jeans. It defies logic that clothing for a sporting club would be sourced from a jeans and street fashion retailer, such as Just Jeans.
The defendant submitted that, as the pet store was one of the club sponsors, it must remain open that the payment of $170.10 to the pet store was club related. This makes no sense on the available evidence. The evidence was that the store may have been a sponsor in some way through a loyalty program described as the ‘Gunner’s card’. That scenario, if it existed, would have involved the club receiving funds, credit or donations from the store. It would not obviously involve the club spending funds at the store. There was no evidence otherwise explaining the purchase.
There is evidence that there was some discussion within the club about hosting a dart competition, presumably for fundraising purposes. Therefore, it remains open on the evidence, although probably only just, that the transaction at the dart shop may have been associated with that fundraising project and would therefore have been legitimate club expense.
I take judicial notice that payments to the ACT Road User Service involve the payment of motor vehicle related taxes, fees or fines. It was clear from the evidence that the club did not run or operate a registerable motor vehicle. It is also clear that the payment of personal taxes, fees or fines would not be legitimate club expenses.
There was evidence that the club used Telstra for its internet and, possibly, mobile phone services. The defendant submitted that it remained possible that those payments were related to the club’s use of that service. However, as indicated in the previous decision, there are records of separate monthly payments to Telstra by the club of $100, and other evidence that the monthly spend on Telstra was $100. The defendant subsequently submitted that there was no evidence about whether or not the club was in arrears, and therefore it remained open on the evidence that such payments related to such arrears. While that remains a possibility, there were three relevant payments to Telstra, across months, each for very precise amounts. It defies logic that the defendant, as the sophisticated and experienced businessman he was, would attend to such arrears in such an ad hoc and piecemeal fashion. I find that possibly to be mere conjecture.
Ultimately, when I consider the evidence as a whole and except for the charge in relation to the dart store, I am satisfied the prosecution has excluded all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence of the defendant, and it has established beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was dishonest, and knew it was dishonest, to the standard of ordinary people when he used the debit card in each case.
For similar reasons I also find beyond reasonable doubt that the owners of the choses in action did not consent to the transactions, other than those involving the dart shop and cash withdrawals.
Conclusion and orders
For the above reasons, I will find the defendant guilty of all the remaining charges other than those involving cash withdrawals and the purchase at the dart shop.
Orders
I make the following findings:
(a)the defendant is guilty of each of the remaining charges, and as described in the schedule, other than cc 4908, cc 4996, cc 4997, cc 4999 and cc 5000 of 2021; and
(b)the defendant is not guilty of the charges cc 4908, cc 4996, cc 4997, cc 4999 and CC 5000 of 2021.
| I certify that the preceding fifty-four [54] numbered paragraphs and following schedule are a true copy of the Reasons for Decision of his Honour Magistrate Theakston Associate: Jack Watson Date: 26 August 2022 |
Schedule
| Serial | Charge | Date | Amount | Description | Recipient | Finding |
| 1 | 4887 | 11/12/2017 | $914.85 | Internet BPAY | Macquarie Leasing | Guilty |
| 2 | 4895 | 15/12/2017 | $914.85 | Internet BPAY | Macquarie Leasing | Guilty |
| 3 | 4896 | 15/01/2018 | $914.85 | Internet BPAY | Macquarie Leasing | Guilty |
| 4 | 4897 | 15/02/2018 | $914.85 | Internet BPAY | Macquarie Leasing | Guilty |
| 5 | 4898 | 15/03/2018 | $914.85 | Internet BPAY | Macquarie Leasing | Guilty |
| 6 | 4899 | 16/04/2018 | $914.85 | Internet BPAY | Macquarie Leasing | Guilty |
| 7 | 4900 | 15/05/2018 | $914.85 | Internet BPAY | Macquarie Leasing | Guilty |
| 8 | 4901 | 15/06/2018 | $914.85 | Internet BPAY | Macquarie Leasing | Guilty |
| 9 | 4902 | 16/07/2018 | $914.85 | Internet BPAY | Macquarie Leasing | Guilty |
| Subtotal | $8,233.65 | |||||
| 12 | 4905 | 04/01/2018 | $41.97 | Debit card transaction | Just Jeans Belconnen | Guilty |
| 13 | 4906 | 09/03/2018 | $398.14 | Debit card transaction | Telstra Bill Paymnt Melbourne | Guilty |
| 14 | 4907 | 12/03/2018 | $170.10 | Debit card transaction | Bstfrnds Gungahlin Gungahlin | Guilty |
| 15 | 4908 | 28/03/2018 | $324.43 | Debit card transaction | Deadeye Darts Ourimbah | Not guilty |
| 17 | 4910 | 10/05/2018 | $571.95 | Debit card transaction | Telstra Bill Paymnt Melbourne | Guilty |
| 18 | 4911 | 23/01/2018 | $39.00 | Debit card transaction | HOYTS Sydney | Guilty |
| 19 | 4912 | 04/06/2018 | $303.00 | Debit card transaction | ACT Road User Service DICKSON | Guilty |
| 20 | 4913 | 04/06/2018 | $313.00 | Debit card transaction | ACT Road User Service DICKSON | Guilty |
| 21 | 4914 | 04/06/2018 | $148.00 | Debit card transaction | ACT Road User Service DICKSON | Guilty |
| 22 | 4915 | 15/06/2018 | $354.05 | Debit card transaction | Telstra Bill Paymnt Melbourne | Guilty |
| Subtotal | $2,663.64 | |||||
| 24 | 4917 | 05/12/2017 | $100.00 | Transfer | Test 2 | Guilty |
| 27 | 4920 | 11/12/2017 | $500.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 29 | 4922 | 12/12/2017 | $450.00 | Transfer | Towing | Guilty |
| 32 | 4925 | 14/12/2017 | $200.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 33 | 4926 | 27/12/2017 | $500.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 34 | 4927 | 27/12/2017 | $500.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 35 | 4928 | 02/01/2018 | $100.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 36 | 4929 | 02/01/2018 | $500.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 37 | 4930 | 02/01/2018 | $600.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 39 | 4932 | 08/01/2018 | $250.00 | Transfer | Office 365 | Guilty |
| 41 | 4934 | 15/01/2018 | $450.00 | Transfer | Tif samples | Guilty |
| 42 | 4935 | 16/01/2018 | $500.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 45 | 4938 | 29/01/2018 | $375.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 46 | 4939 | 05/02/2018 | $450.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 47 | 4940 | 06/02/2018 | $250.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 49 | 4942 | 09/02/2018 | $350.00 | Transfer | bunnings | Guilty |
| 50 | 4943 | 12/02/2018 | $250.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 52 | 4945 | 19/02/2018 | $350.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 53 | 4946 | 20/02/2018 | $1,100.00 | Transfer | Rego | Guilty |
| 55 | 4948 | 27/02/2018 | $500.00 | Transfer | Marketing stickers | Guilty |
| 56 | 4949 | 28/02/2018 | $500.00 | Transfer | Canteen | Guilty |
| 57 | 4950 | 28/02/2018 | $500.00 | Transfer | Equipment deposit | Guilty |
| 59 | 4952 | 07/03/2018 | $500.00 | Transfer | Managers deposit | Guilty |
| 61 | 4954 | 12/03/2018 | $750.00 | Transfer | Bunnings | Guilty |
| 67 | 4960 | 26/03/2018 | $300.00 | Transfer | Sponsor | Guilty |
| 69 | 4962 | 28/03/2018 | $750.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 71 | 4964 | 29/03/2018 | $500.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 72 | 4965 | 03/04/2018 | $450.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 73 | 4966 | 03/04/2018 | $500.00 | Transfer | bunnings | Guilty |
| 75 | 4968 | 09/04/2018 | $500.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 77 | 4970 | 11/04/2018 | $250.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 79 | 4972 | 13/04/2018 | $550.00 | Transfer | Asic | Guilty |
| 80 | 4973 | 16/04/2018 | $250.00 | Transfer | Costco | Guilty |
| 81 | 4974 | 18/04/2018 | $250.00 | Transfer | Capital Football | Guilty |
| 82 | 4975 | 23/04/2018 | $250.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 83 | 4976 | 24/04/2018 | $500.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 84 | 4977 | 30/04/2018 | $750.00 | Transfer | Bunnings | Guilty |
| 85 | 4978 | 04/05/2018 | $750.00 | Transfer | Defender Deposit | Guilty |
| 86 | 4979 | 08/05/2018 | $500.00 | Transfer | bunnings | Guilty |
| 88 | 4981 | 14/05/2018 | $450.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 89 | 4982 | 15/05/2018 | $750.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 93 | 4986 | 28/05/2018 | $250.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 94 | 4987 | 01/06/2018 | $250.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 95 | 4988 | 05/06/2018 | $300.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 96 | 4989 | 08/06/2018 | $450.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 97 | 4990 | 14/06/2018 | $250.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| 98 | 4991 | 18/06/2018 | $250.00 | Transfer | Linked Acc Trns | Guilty |
| Subtotal | $20,525.00 | |||||
| 103 | 4996 | 01/02/2018 | $3,500.00 | Cash withdrawals | Not guilty | |
| 104 | 4997 | 14/02/2018 | $3,500.00 | Cash withdrawals | Not guilty | |
| 106 | 4999 | 23/03/2018 | $4,600.00 | Cash withdrawals | Not guilty | |
| 107 | 5000 | 23/03/2018 | $4,237.74 | Cash withdrawals | Not guilty | |
| Subtotal | $15,837.74 |
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