Baker v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Baker v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 300

Citation: Baker v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2012] FCA 300
Appeal from: Baker v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2011] AATA 622
Parties: SOLOMON BAKER v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1712 of 2011
Judge: COWDROY J
Date of judgment: 27 March 2012
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Minister’s decision to cancel visa under s 501(2) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – applicant convicted of criminal offences – decision-maker required to exercise discretion to cancel visa in accordance with a direction of the Minister – Tribunal member’s reasons expressed sequentially – whether Tribunal member misapplied the direction
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 499, 501
Cases cited: Board of Trustees v Edington (2011) 119 ALD 472
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 73 ALD 1
Date of hearing: 23 February 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 47
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R. Turner
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr T. Reilly
Solicitor for the Applicant: Turner Coulson Immigration Lawyers
Solicitor for the Respondents: DLA Piper

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1712 of 2011

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

SOLOMON BAKER
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

COWDROY J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 MARCH 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The Applicant pay the costs of the First Respondent.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1712 of 2011

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

SOLOMON BAKER
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

COWDROY J

DATE:

27 MARCH 2012

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant was the holder of a visa which permitted him to remain in Australia permanently, subject to the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’). The applicant’s visa was cancelled because of his failure to satisfy the first respondent (‘the Minister’) that he passed the character test. The failure to satisfy the character test stemmed from the applicant’s criminal record. The applicant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) for a review of such cancellation. Such application was unsuccessful, and in its decision dated 5 September 2011 (‘the decision’) the Tribunal affirmed the Minister’s decision to cancel the applicant’s visa because of his failure to pass the character test.

  2. The applicant now applies to…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 300
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the applicant, Mr Baker, appeals against the decision of the Tribunal to cancel his visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Tribunal's decision was based on the applicant's substantial criminal record and the unacceptable risk he posed to the Australian community. Mr Baker argues that the Tribunal member misapplied the Direction issued by the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship when exercising her discretion not to cancel his visa. The applicant contends that the Tribunal member did not adequately consider the 'Other considerations' outlined in the Direction, particularly the extent of disruption to the person's family.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal member misapplied the Direction when exercising her discretion not to cancel Mr Baker's visa. The court had to consider whether the Tribunal member's reasons were expressed sequentially and whether this was an error of law. The court also needed to determine if the Tribunal member failed to consider the 'Other considerations' required by the Direction, specifically the extent of disruption to the person's family.

The court found that the Tribunal member's reasons should be read as a whole and not scrutinised minutely. The court noted that it is not an error of law if the decision-makers express their reasons sequentially. The court held that the Tribunal member did not misapply the Direction as she considered all the evidence and the relevant considerations before reaching her conclusion. The court also found that the Tribunal member appropriately gave weight to the 'Other considerations', including the extent of disruption to the person's family, and concluded that the unacceptable risk posed by Mr Baker to the Australian community outweighed these considerations.

The court dismissed Mr Baker's application for a writ of certiorari to quash the decision and a writ of mandamus requiring the Tribunal to determine the application again according to law. The court ordered that Mr Baker pay the costs of the First Respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The Applicant pay the costs of the First Respondent.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant now applies to this Court for a writ of certiorari to quash the decision and a writ of mandamus requiring the Tribunal to determine the application again according to law. FACTS The applicant was born on 20 December 1979 in Papua New Guinea. He left Papua New Guinea at approximately age seven and has spent most of his formative years in Australia with his family. The applicant’s parents and brother live in Australia. The applicant is not married but he has three children who were referred to in the decision as T1, T2 and R. T1 resides with her maternal grandmother. T2 and R reside with their mother, who is not the mother of T1. The applicant has an extensive criminal history. The applicant committed his first offence in 1998. Thereafter the applicant has been convicted of numerous offences, some of which have resulted in periods of imprisonment. The applicant has only been employed for two periods for a total period of 10 months for the whole of his residency in Australia. His criminal record comprises drug offences, public order offences, larceny and other dishonesty offences and some offences involving violence or the apprehension of violence, including convictions for common assault, assaulting police and stalking or intimidating with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm. The most serious of these offences and the offence for which the applicant is currently serving a gaol sentence involved an assault perpetrated by him on the mother of T2 and R. According to the sentencing remarks, which the Senior Member recorded in her decision, the applicant entered the victim’s home and assaulted the victim with a blunt instrument which caused a wound to the victim’s back. The child T2, at the time three years old, was present during the assault. The applicant removed T2 from the room and then continued the assault on the victim. The applicant received a sentence of 3 years and 5 months with a non-parole period of 2 years and 6 months. The applicant has drug dependency issues and is undergoing methadone treatment in prison for his heroin dependency.VISA CANCELLATION By letter date 7 June 2011 the Department of Immigration and Citizenship gave notice that the Minister had decided to cancel the visa. Such letter relevantly stated:After careful consideration of your response and the matters listed in the Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation, the delegate of the Minister has decided to cancel your visa pursuant to subsection 501(2) of the Act.Under subsection 501(2) of the Act, the delegate of the Minister may cancel a person’s visa if the delegate of the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test, and the person does not satisfy the delegate of the Minister that the person passes the character test.The particular ground upon which the delegate of the Minister suspected that you do not pass the character test and the ground under which you have failed to satisfy the delegate of the Minister that you pass the character test is:Subsection 501(6)(a): the person has a substantial criminal record (as defined by subsection 501(7)). Under subsection 501(7)(c), a person will have a substantial criminal record if they have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Minister has a discretion with regard to decisions under s 501(2). This discretion must be exercised in accordance with ‘Direction [No. 41] – Visa Refusal and Cancellation’ (‘the Direction’) which was made by the Minister on 3 June 2009. The Direction was made pursuant to s 499 of the Act and binds the Tribunal: see s 499(2A) of the Act. The Direction requires due consideration to be given to the objective of the Act to regulate, in the national interest, the coming to and presence in Australia of non-citizens and the protection of the Australian community from unacceptable risks of harm as a result of criminal activity or other serious misconduct by non-citizens. The Direction lists ‘the primary considerations’ and the ‘Other considerations’ that the decision-maker must take into account in exercising the discretion. TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal considered the relevant issue before it, namely whether it should exercise its discretion not to cancel Mr Baker’s visa. The Tribunal considered the nature and seriousness of Mr Baker’s conduct including his extensive criminal record and then directed its mind to the matters required of it by the Direction. Having done so, it then addressed its conclusions in [85] and [86] of the decision. Those paragraphs provided:85. Despite evidence that suggests Mr Baker may have been making efforts to change his behaviour, I am not satisfied that he will not revert to committing serious and violent offences. His history suggests a high probability that he will again revert to abusing drugs and commit serious, violent offences. There is, in my view, an unacceptable risk of harm to the Australian community from his conduct in the future. I am not satisfied that the other primary considerations outweigh that unacceptable risk of harm. In particular, I am not satisfied, on the available evidence, the best interests of two of Mr Baker’s three children favour that he remain in Australia. As to the third child (T1) it is only marginally in her best interests that Mr Baker remain in Australia. His relationship with all his children has been non-existent for over two years, and there is no evidence that their best interests would be served by him remaining in the country or even that he will be able to see them in future if he does. 86. I accept that Mr Baker’s family, especially his mother, wish to support him and that they may be distressed at his removal from Australia. I acknowledge that he has few, if any, meaningful ties in PNG and that it will be very hard for him to establish himself there. It is quite possible that, if he is deported, his rehabilitation will be set back. However, I am satisfied that the degree of unacceptable risk that he poses to the Australian community outweighs all other considerations. The discretion in s 501 of the Act should not be exercised in Mr Baker’s favour.GROUNDS OF APPEAL AND APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS The applicant does not challenge the conclusion that the applicant does not satisfy the character test. Rather, the challenge is confined to the manner in which the Senior Member exercised her discretion as guided by the Direction.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Clause 11 is entitled ‘Other considerations’ which, as the note to the clause records, are not primary considerations. Clause 11.1 relevantly provides:(1)In reaching a decision on whether to refuse or cancel a visa, other considerations, although not primary, may be relevant and, if so, must be considered.(2)It is appropriate that these considerations, where relevant, must be taken into account but, generally, they should be given less weight than that given to primary considerations.(3)These other considerations include:(a)family ties, the nature and extent of any relationships:(i)the extent of disruption to the person’s family,…CONSIDERATION Certain principles applicable to the approach to be taken by an appellate court on judicial review need to be stated. The first relevant principle was considered by the High Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272. That judgment cites Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280 where the Full Federal Court stated at 287:The reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error. The majority in Wu Shan Liang also stated at 272:These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. [Footnote omitted] Secondly, it is not an error of law if the decision-makers express their reasons sequentially. Gleeson CJ in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 73 ALD 1 said at 5:Decision-makers commonly express their reasons sequentially; but that does not mean that they decide each factual issue in isolation from the others. Ordinarily, they review the whole of the evidence, and consider all issues of fact, before they write anything. Expression of conclusions in a certain sequence does not indicate a failure to consider the evidence as a whole. I do not think that the tribunal member intended to convey that she made up her mind about the evidence of the applicant/appellant before taking account of the evidence of the witness who was said to corroborate him. In Madafferi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 118 FCR 326 the Full Court at [90] made reference to the artificiality of relying upon only one paragraph of the Minister’s decision to found a challenge to its validity. Thirdly, the decision ‘should be read as a whole’: see Board of Trustees v Edington (2011) 119 ALD 472 at 491. Fourthly, as a matter of general principle it is for the decision-maker to give such weight to the relevant considerations as he or she deems appropriate, unless directed otherwise. The observations of Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24 at [41] are relevant. His Honour said:It follows that, in the absence of any statutory indication of the weight to be given to various considerations, it is generally for the decision-maker and not the court to determine the appropriate weight to be given to the matters which are required to be taken into account in exercising the statutory power: Sean Investments Pty Ltd v. MacKellar; Reg. v. Anderson; Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd; Elliott v. Southwark London Borough Council; Pickwell v. Camden London Borough Council. [Footnotes omitted]