FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Baker v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 300
Citation: Baker v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2012] FCA 300Appeal from: Baker v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2011] AATA 622Parties: SOLOMON BAKER v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 1712 of 2011 Judge: COWDROY J Date of judgment: 27 March 2012 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Minister’s decision to cancel visa under s 501(2) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – applicant convicted of criminal offences – decision-maker required to exercise discretion to cancel visa in accordance with a direction of the Minister – Tribunal member’s reasons expressed sequentially – whether Tribunal member misapplied the direction Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 499, 501 Cases cited: Board of Trustees v Edington (2011) 119 ALD 472
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 73 ALD 1Date of hearing: 23 February 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 47 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R. Turner Counsel for the Respondents: Mr T. Reilly Solicitor for the Applicant: Turner Coulson Immigration Lawyers Solicitor for the Respondents: DLA Piper
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1712 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: SOLOMON BAKER
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
COWDROY J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 MARCH 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The Applicant pay the costs of the First Respondent.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1712 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: SOLOMON BAKER
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
COWDROY J
DATE:
27 MARCH 2012
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant was the holder of a visa which permitted him to remain in Australia permanently, subject to the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’). The applicant’s visa was cancelled because of his failure to satisfy the first respondent (‘the Minister’) that he passed the character test. The failure to satisfy the character test stemmed from the applicant’s criminal record. The applicant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) for a review of such cancellation. Such application was unsuccessful, and in its decision dated 5 September 2011 (‘the decision’) the Tribunal affirmed the Minister’s decision to cancel the applicant’s visa because of his failure to pass the character test.
The applicant now applies to…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 300
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal member misapplied the Direction when exercising her discretion not to cancel Mr Baker's visa. The court had to consider whether the Tribunal member's reasons were expressed sequentially and whether this was an error of law. The court also needed to determine if the Tribunal member failed to consider the 'Other considerations' required by the Direction, specifically the extent of disruption to the person's family.
The court found that the Tribunal member's reasons should be read as a whole and not scrutinised minutely. The court noted that it is not an error of law if the decision-makers express their reasons sequentially. The court held that the Tribunal member did not misapply the Direction as she considered all the evidence and the relevant considerations before reaching her conclusion. The court also found that the Tribunal member appropriately gave weight to the 'Other considerations', including the extent of disruption to the person's family, and concluded that the unacceptable risk posed by Mr Baker to the Australian community outweighed these considerations.
The court dismissed Mr Baker's application for a writ of certiorari to quash the decision and a writ of mandamus requiring the Tribunal to determine the application again according to law. The court ordered that Mr Baker pay the costs of the First Respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The Applicant pay the costs of the First Respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Clause 11 is entitled ‘Other considerations’ which, as the note to the clause records, are not primary considerations. Clause 11.1 relevantly provides:(1)In reaching a decision on whether to refuse or cancel a visa, other considerations, although not primary, may be relevant and, if so, must be considered.(2)It is appropriate that these considerations, where relevant, must be taken into account but, generally, they should be given less weight than that given to primary considerations.(3)These other considerations include:(a)family ties, the nature and extent of any relationships:(i)the extent of disruption to the person’s family,…CONSIDERATION Certain principles applicable to the approach to be taken by an appellate court on judicial review need to be stated. The first relevant principle was considered by the High Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272. That judgment cites Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280 where the Full Federal Court stated at 287:The reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error. The majority in Wu Shan Liang also stated at 272:These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. [Footnote omitted] Secondly, it is not an error of law if the decision-makers express their reasons sequentially. Gleeson CJ in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 73 ALD 1 said at 5:Decision-makers commonly express their reasons sequentially; but that does not mean that they decide each factual issue in isolation from the others. Ordinarily, they review the whole of the evidence, and consider all issues of fact, before they write anything. Expression of conclusions in a certain sequence does not indicate a failure to consider the evidence as a whole. I do not think that the tribunal member intended to convey that she made up her mind about the evidence of the applicant/appellant before taking account of the evidence of the witness who was said to corroborate him. In Madafferi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 118 FCR 326 the Full Court at [90] made reference to the artificiality of relying upon only one paragraph of the Minister’s decision to found a challenge to its validity. Thirdly, the decision ‘should be read as a whole’: see Board of Trustees v Edington (2011) 119 ALD 472 at 491. Fourthly, as a matter of general principle it is for the decision-maker to give such weight to the relevant considerations as he or she deems appropriate, unless directed otherwise. The observations of Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24 at [41] are relevant. His Honour said:It follows that, in the absence of any statutory indication of the weight to be given to various considerations, it is generally for the decision-maker and not the court to determine the appropriate weight to be given to the matters which are required to be taken into account in exercising the statutory power: Sean Investments Pty Ltd v. MacKellar; Reg. v. Anderson; Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd; Elliott v. Southwark London Borough Council; Pickwell v. Camden London Borough Council. [Footnotes omitted]