Bajek & Bajek (No 2)
[2024] FedCFamC1F 526
•5 August 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Bajek & Bajek (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 526
File number(s): NCC 2589 of 2023 Judgment of: AUSTIN J Date of judgment: 5 August 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – Interim Orders – Where the anterior question about the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction was previously determined – Commonwealth Personal Protection Measures – Where the father resides in Australia – Where the mother and children have resided in Country B since July 2023 – Where the children have not spent time or communicated with the father for 12 months – Where the father sought orders comprising alternate regimes, depending on whether the children live in Country B or Australia – Where the father’s preference is for the children to live in Australia – Where the mother sought orders requiring the children to live with her in Country B and provision for the children to communicate with the father and spend supervised time with him should he travel to Country B – Where family violence was allegedly committed by both parties – Where no factual findings concerning allegations of family violence are presently feasible – Where the mother has unstable psychological health – Where the mother has limited financial resources – Where the children’s best interests are promoted by them remaining in the mother’s residential care – Where forcing the mother to return to Australia could deleteriously affect her parenting capacity – Where the children have an emotional need to restore and maintain healthy relationships with the father – Ordered the parties retain parental responsibility for the children, however mother vested with sole decision-making authority in relation to the children’s education and place of residence – Ordered children live with mother, subject to certain geographical restraints – Ordered children spend time and communicate with the father, the terms of which vary depending on whether the children reside in Country B or Australia Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pts VII, XIIIAA, ss 4, 4AB, 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61B, 61C, 61D, 61DAA, 61DAB, 64B, 65AA, 65D
Family Law Amendment Act2023 (Cth)
Cases cited: AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160
Bajek & Bajek [2024] FedCFamC1F 466
Sampson v Hartnett (No.10) (2007) FLC 93-350
U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 46 Date of hearing: 5 August 2024 Place: Newcastle Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Evelyn Solicitor for the Applicant: Koulouris & Associates Pty Ltd Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Ticehurst Solicitor for the Respondent: Legal Aid NSW ORDERS
NCC 2589 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR BAJEK
Applicant
AND: MS BAJEK
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
AUSTIN J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 AUGUST 2024
PENDING FURTHER ORDER, THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.These orders relate to the parties’ children:
(a)X, born 2015; and
(b)Y, born 2017.
2.The parties shall each retain parental responsibility for the children, but the mother shall have sole decision-making authority for decisions related to the children’s education and place of residence.
3.The children shall live with the mother, upon condition that:
(a)the mother must live with the children in either Country B or Australia; and
(b)if the mother chooses to live with the children in Country B, she is restrained from relocating their residence beyond a radius of 10 kilometres from the central post office at City C, Country B; and
(c)if the mother chooses to live with the children in Australia, she must establish their residence within, and is restrained from relocating their residence beyond, a radius of 100 kilometres from the central police station at City D, NSW.
4.The parties shall forthwith notify and keep the other informed in writing of:
(a)their current residential address;
(b)their current email address;
(c)their current mobile telephone number; and
(d)the address of the closest police station to the mother’s residence.
5.If the mother and children live in Country B then, whilst ever the father is physically present in Country B, the parties shall take all reasonable steps to ensure the children spend time with the father:
(a)for seven contiguous days not more frequently than once every three months on dates nominated by the father not less than one month in advance; and
(b)each Saturday from 9.00 am until 5.00 pm.
6.If the mother and children live in Country B then, whilst ever the father is not physically present in Country B, the parties shall take all reasonable steps to ensure the children communicate with the father by audio/visual means at 5.00 pm each Wednesday and each Saturday for no less than 15 minutes.
7.If the mother and children live in Australia then, whilst ever the father is physically present in Australia, the parties shall take all reasonable steps to ensure the children spend time with the father:
(a)for seven contiguous days in each of the Spring, Summer, Autumn and Winter public school holidays, commencing on the first Saturday of each holiday; and
(b)each Saturday from 9.00 am until 5.00 pm.
8.To implement Orders 5 and 7 hereof, the parties shall ensure the children are exchanged at the closest police station to the mother’s residence.
9.To implement Order 6 hereof, the mother shall establish the audio/visual connection with the father for the children.
10.Otherwise:
(a)the application for interim orders set out within the Amended Initiating Application filed on 21 May 2024 is dismissed;
(b)the application for interim orders set out within the Further Amended Response filed on 27 May 2024 is dismissed;
(c)the application for interim orders set out within Exhibit F1 is dismissed;
(d)the application for interim orders set out within Exhibit M1 is dismissed; and
(e)any and all outstanding applications for interim orders are dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Balek & Balek (No 2) has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
EX TEMPORE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENTAUSTIN J:
These reasons explain parenting orders, made on an interim basis as “Commonwealth personal protection measures”, between the applicant father and the respondent mother in respect of their two children following on from an anterior decision to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Pt XIIIAA, Div 4 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
Background
The following background facts are lifted from the anterior judgment (Bajek & Bajek [2024] FedCFamC1F 466):
3. The parties are of [Country B] heritage. They married in [Country B] in February 2014 and began cohabitation in Australia in [late] 2014. Their two children were born in Australia in […] 2015 and […] 2017.
4. The parties and the children are all Australian citizens. None is a [Country B] citizen, though there is no immediate legal impediment to the mother and children continuing to live in [Country B] for the foreseeable future. It is unnecessary to explain why.
5.The parties and the children travelled to [Country B] in [mid-]2023 for a holiday. They intended returning to Australia some weeks later [...] and had return flights booked for that purpose. While in [Country B], following an argument between the parties, the mother and children went to stay with maternal relatives.
6.[In mid-]2023, the mother commenced proceedings in [Country B] seeking a domestic violence injunction against the father, an order granting her “temporary custody” of the children, and an order granting her legal guardianship of the children pursuant to s 21 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 (India) (“the Protection Act”).
7.The [Country B] proceedings were commenced by the mother several days before the father returned alone to Australia, [in mid-]2023, though there is a factual dispute about precisely when he was served with process in the [Country B] proceedings. So far as can be discerned, the father has not engaged with the [Country B] proceedings, which are still pending.
8.Soon after the father’s return to Australia, [in mid-]2023, he commenced these proceedings under the Act seeking parenting orders in respect of the children. The mother engaged with the proceedings in January 2024, initially submitting to the Australian jurisdiction and seeking competing parenting orders but, by May 2024, she raised an objection to the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court under the Act.
9.Unlike Australia, [Country B] is not a signatory polity to the 1980 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the 1980 Convention”) and so its provisions cannot be invoked by a central authority in [Country B], securing orders to enforce the children’s return to Australia. Nor is [Country B] a signatory polity to the 1996 Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (“the 1996 Convention”), so there is no easy process for enforcing Australian parenting orders in [Country B].
Consideration of the parties’ applications for interim parenting orders was consensually put to one side while the anterior question about the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction was determined. It having since been determined that jurisdiction under the Act should be exercised, it now falls to consider what orders should be made on an interim basis to govern parenting arrangements for the children.
Proposals and evidence
At least until just before the hearing, the parties’ respective proposals were about as polarised as could be imagined.
The father initially sought the interim orders set out within his Amended Initiating Application filed on 21 May 2024. In effect, he wanted the children returned to Australia within seven days and for them to then live with him. If the mother refuses to comply, he wanted a recovery order issued. He proposed an embargo of three months duration on any contact between the children and the mother, but restoration of their interaction thereafter on a graduating basis.
At the commencement of the hearing, the father instead sought the orders set out within the Minute of Orders he tendered (Exhibit F1), which comprised alternate regimes. Preferentially, he wants the children to live in Australia with the mother, if she is willing to do so, but otherwise with him in Australia if the mother chooses to live in Country B. If the Court concludes the mother should not be compelled to return the children to Australia then, given he apparently intends to stay in Australia, he wants regular electronic communication with them and regular personal interaction with them when he visits Country B.
In support of his application, the father relied upon:
(a)his affidavit filed on 25 June 2024;
(b)paragraphs 79–82 of the mother’s affidavit filed on 25 January 2024 (Exhibit F2); and
(c)some physiotherapy notes dated 22 May 2023 (Exhibit F3).
The mother initially sought the alternate interim orders set out within her Further Amended Response filed on 27 May 2024. She wanted orders to confirm the children must live with her and that she has sole parental responsibility for them, together with a declaration that the children neither spend time nor communicate with the father.
At the commencement of the hearing, the mother instead sought the orders set out within the Minute of Orders she tendered (Exhibit M1). She still wants orders requiring the children to live with her in Country B and for her to have sole parental responsibility for them, but she now countenances the children having regular electronic communication with the father and them also spending supervised time with him if he chooses to visit Country B.
In support of her application, the mother relied upon:
(a)her affidavit filed on 24 June 2024;
(b)some records of the State child welfare agency (Exhibit M2); and
(c)paragraphs 6 and 30 of the father’s affidavit filed on 21 August 2023 (Exhibit M3).
Legal principles
This interim dispute was heard after 6 May 2024, being the date upon which the Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth) commenced operation to amend provisions of the Act, so the new provisions apply.
Orders in respect of children are ordinarily made under Part VII of the Act, where the meaning of a “parenting order” is defined (s 64B). The Court may make such parenting orders as it thinks proper (s 65D), within the context of the objects of the legislation (s 60B). When making parenting orders, the Court is mandated to regard the children’s best interests as the paramount consideration (ss 60CA, 65AA) and the Act specifies the criteria which must be considered when determining the form of orders which meets and promotes the children’s best interests (s 60CC).
Parental responsibility for children is vested in their parents (s 61C(1)), regardless of whether they live together or are separated (s 61C(2)), but that situation only applies whilst ever no order is made to change it (ss 61C(3) and 61D). Parental responsibility is defined to encompass all duties, powers, responsibilities and authority conferred by law upon parents (s 61B).
When an order is made allocating parental responsibility for a child or children in relation to “major long-term issues” to more than one person, the order may prescribe whether those persons have joint or sole decision-making authority in relation to all or only specified issues (s 61D(3)). The Act defines “major long-term issues” to include those such as the child’s education, religion, culture, health, name, and changed living arrangements (s 4(1)) and defines what “joint decision-making” requires in respect of such issues (s 61DAA). A person allocated with parental responsibility for a child need not be consulted by another person in respect of minor decisions made for the child which fall outside “major long-term issues” (s 61DAB).
Parental responsibility orders no longer have any bearing upon determinations about with whom a child should live or spend time.
For all practical purposes, those principles which apply to orthodox parenting orders presently apply as necessarily adapted for “Commonwealth personal protection measures”.
Children’s best interests
These following provisional findings were made in respect of the children’s best interests in the anterior judgment:
59.… However, since none of the parties’ conflictual evidence was tested in cross-examination, their competing parenting applications were put to one side, and their submissions on the issue were brief, the consideration of s 60CC of the Act need not be unduly intricate at this juncture.
60. The mother contends both she and the children require sanctuary from the father to promote their safety (s 60CC(2)(a)). She alleges they are at risk of family violence committed by him, which he denies. No finding to resolve the stark conflict is possible, but the Court must be alive to at least the risk (M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69). The allegations cannot be ignored just because they are denied and unresolved (Cimorelli & Wenlack [2020] FamCAFC 58 at [80]–[81]).
61.The mother contends the children have made statements which either expressly or implicitly reveal they would prefer no interaction with the father (s 60CC(2)(b)). That may be so, but it would be unsurprising for such young children to react to their primary carer in the manner they perceive is expected of them. Children are renowned to be vulnerable to the influence of their carers, even if the influence is only inadvertent (Bondelmonte v Bondelmonte (2017) 259 CLR 662 at [36]–[41]; RCB v Forrest & Ors (2012) 247 CLR 304 at [52]).
62.Assuming the father does not pose any threat to the children’s safety, their emotional needs are best met by their enjoyment of healthy relationships with him (s 60CC(2)(c) and s 60CC(2)(e)). Ordinarily, children benefit from the development of good relationships with both their parents (U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238 at 285–286).
63.Subject to the unresolved allegations about the father’s commission of family violence, both parties seemingly have the capacity to provide adequately for the children’s developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs (s 60CC(2)(d)).
Such findings were necessarily made at a high level of abstraction in the former hearing, but they elicited no real dispute in this hearing. Nonetheless, more intricate analysis of the evidence is now required.
The factual issues chiefly ventilated by the parties concerned: family violence allegedly committed by both parties (s 60CC(2)(a)); the father’s alleged physical abuse of the children (s 60CC(2)(a)); the mother’s state of mental health (s 60CC(2)(d)); and the mother’s financial capacity to return to Australia with the children (s 60CC(2)(d)).
Section 60CC(2)(a)
The mother alleges she was the victim of coercive and controlling violence by the father during their relationship, which was the catalyst for her wishing to escape him whilst they visited relatives in Country B in 2023. The mother alleged the husband prevented her from making independent decisions,[1] prevented her from having a separate bank account,[2] controlled her departures from the family home,[3] isolated her from her family when in Country B,[4] denigrated her in the presence of the children,[5] criticised her appearance,[6] made threats about taking the children to subjugate her,[7] physically abused her on occasions,[8] and sexually abused her on occasions.[9] All of that conduct by the father, if true, amounts to “family violence” (s 4AB).
[1] Mother’s affidavit at [13], [15]
[2] Mother’s affidavit at [17]
[3] Mother’s affidavit at [23]-[24]
[4] Mother’s affidavit at [11]
[5] Mother’s affidavit at [38], [72]
[6] Mother’s affidavit at [46]
[7] Mother’s affidavit at [41]
[8] Mother’s affidavit at [26], [27]
[9] Mother’s affidavit at [26], [31], [36]
The mother conceded she has no corroborative evidence of the father’s family violence,[10] but does assert she made her allegations against the father to members of the paternal family, which elicited admissions by him.[11] As the parties filed their affidavits contemporaneously, neither the father nor any paternal family member has yet responded to the mother’s evidence of the father’s alleged admissions.
[10] Mother’s affidavit at [48], [51]
[11] Mother’s affidavit at [69], [70], [74]
Conversely, the father alleged he was the victim of family violence perpetrated by the mother. He alleged she physically assaulted him on multiple occasions, sometimes with implements.[12] Similarly, the mother has not yet responded to those allegations.
[12] Father’s affidavit at [22], [23], [25], [37], [45]
No factual findings are presently feasible, though the allegations must still be heeded in the context of current risk assessment.
The mother impliedly submitted her safety would be compromised if she was required to return to Australia, but the submission is unpersuasive. The family violence she alleges was committed by the father occurred whilst their relationship was intact. They have now been separated for a year. Whether the mother lives in Country B or Australia, the prospect of her interaction with the father will be limited to them meeting when the children are exchanged. Taking a cautious approach to preserve the parties’ safety, any orders which entail an exchange of the children between them should occur at a venue which will deter one from assaulting the other. Neither party could rationally explain how the reciprocal allegations of historical family violence otherwise influenced the outcome of the current interim dispute.
The mother’s proposal for the children to only spend time with the father under supervision was expressly clarified by her to address the risk of the children being physically abused by the father. She alleged in passing in her affidavit that the father had sometimes hit the children with shoes, leaving marks on their bodies,[13] but such scant untested evidence does not establish the asserted risk of harm is so high as to demand that any personal interaction between the children and the father be supervised. In early 2023, several months before the parties separated, the mother travelled to Country B alone to visit relatives, willingly leaving the children in the care of the father in Australia. The mother could offer no logical explanation for why she was content to leave the children in the father’s care while she was overseas, but they can now only spend time with the father if they are supervised.
[13] Mother’s affidavit at [42]
Section 60CC(2)(b)
The mother gave evidence of the children expressing views to her which indicate their disinclination to return to Australia and how they are ill-disposed to spend time with the father. As was observed in the former hearing, children’s views are liable to be malleable when they live predominantly within one household (Bajek & Bajek at [61]). The mother conceded there is “no independent evidence” about the children’s views.
The children are still only nine and seven years. Their views are given no weight. It is rather extraordinary the children have never asked the mother for any contact with the father, as she alleged.[14] The most likely reason is because the children well know the mother has no interest in promoting their relationships with him. Her current proposal to restore their electronic communication, which is far too little far too late, implies she knows she should have taken those steps voluntarily long ago. The same may be said of her current proposal for the children to spend time with the father, albeit under supervision.
[14] Mother’s affidavit at [125]
Section 60CC(2)(c)
The mother has always been the children’s primary carer. The father chose to leave the children in the mother’s care when he departed Country B in mid-2023 to return home to Australia to resume work. He would not have done so unless he was satisfied the mother had the capacity to meet the children’s developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs, just as the mother was inferentially satisfied the father could meet all of the children’s needs when she left them in his care in early 2023 when she went to Country B alone. The father’s initial idea that the children should be wrenched from the mother’s primary care to instead live with him is just as objectionable as her initial idea to eliminate him entirely from the children’s lives.
The children’s best interests are promoted by them remaining in the mother’s residential care. However, the children have an emotional need to restore and maintain healthy relationships with the father, which benefit the mother has deliberately denied them over the past year. She admitted the children had not had any form of contact with the father or anyone else in Australia for over a year.[15]
[15] Mother’s affidavit at [117]
Section 60CC(2)(d)
The father alleges, and the mother admits, that she has unstable psychological health, which has been managed at times by psychological and pharmacological intervention.[16] The father alleged her psychological health has been unstable since the beginning of their marriage and has manifested itself in destructive behaviour.[17] That may be so, but it has not caused the father to believe the mother is incapable of primarily caring for the children. He would not have left them in her care in Country B and returned alone to Australia had he believed otherwise.
[16] Father’s affidavit at [44], [56], [57]; Mother’s affidavit at [52], [54]
[17] Father’s affidavit at [9], [26], [54], [56]
The mother’s capacity to provide for the children’s physical and emotional needs would be severely compromised if she is required to establish their residence in Australia. The father sold the former family home,[18] so she has no home in Australia in which to settle. She would have to rent a home, but there is no evidence she has the financial capacity to do so.[19]
[18] Mother’s affidavit at [128]
[19] Mother’s affidavit at [131], [134]
The father sought to remedy that problem by proposing orders be made compelling him to pay $10,000 to the mother, to help her obtain “short term accommodation”, and to give her a car. However, there are numerous impediments to such orders being made.
First, orders of that ilk are not “Commonwealth personal protection measures” within the meaning of Pt XIIIAA, Div 4 of the Act so there is no source of power to make them. The father submitted that orders imposing such financial obligations, being linked conditionally to traditional parenting orders, then enables their characterisation as parenting orders also, but the submission is rejected. That would be stretching the definition of “Commonwealth personal protection measure” way too far. Nor could the orders proposed by the father be made in the guise of property adjustment or spousal maintenance orders because there is no financial cause on foot between the parties in this Australian litigation.
Secondly, even if there is some source of power to make those orders, they would be no more than a stop-gap measure because the father clearly envisages any financial assistance he gives the mother is only short-term, after which time she would have to rely upon her own financial resources. But she has none, which the father concedes.
If forced to come to Australia, the mother would be unemployed and without income. Nor would she have any emotional or practical support from family or friends in Australia.[20] Given the father asserts the fragility of her mental health, he must accept that forcing her to return to Australia against her wishes would surely cause her emotional degradation and it would be disadvantageous for the children if the mother’s parenting capacity thereby deteriorates.
[20] Mother’s affidavit at [132]
Section 60CC(2)(e)
It would be safe for the children to communicate electronically with the father. The mother admits that is so because she now proposes an order requiring it. That she did not realise sooner is astounding.
It would also be safe enough for the children to spend time with the father for confined periods of time, provided they live in close enough proximity for that regime to be implemented. There is no need for the children to be supervised with the father, as the mother proposed. Her isolated allegation that he has hit them with shoes on past occasions is not such as to warrant the imposition of supervision. The mother conceded there was no other form of harm from which the children would supposedly be protected by the imposition of supervision.
In any event, the mother adduced no evidence to support the proposed supervision order. There is no evidence as to the availability of professional supervision services in Country B close to where she lives, the waiting list time for such services, the availability of such services to Australian citizens, or the availability and willingness of a maternal relative to fulfil the role of supervisor.
Section 60CC(2)(f)
The mother resists being forced to re-establish the children’s residence in Australia. Her desire to remain with the children in Country B must only yield if the children’s best interests demand that they live with her in Australia instead. Parents enjoy the entitlement to as much residential freedom as is compatible with their obligations pertaining to their children (U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238 at 262; AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160 at 223–224 and 231–232; Sampson v Hartnett (No.10) (2007) FLC 93-350).
But the children’s best interests do not demand their return to live in Australia. They can recover their relationships with the father if they communicate with him regularly and, subject to him travelling to Country B, they are able to see him regularly. The paternal family apparently live in Country B in relative proximity to the maternal family, so the father is able to stay with his own family if he wishes to travel to Country B periodically for visits with the children. The cost of airfares is the only real expense for the father, but he sold the former family home in Australia and kept the net proceeds of sale so he has the capital to cover that expenditure.
Conclusions
The mother sought an order for her to have sole parental responsibility for the children, but the issue was not addressed in submissions by either party. The mother’s proposal for her to have exclusive parental responsibility for the children in all respects and for all parental responsibility to be confiscated from the father is rejected. The parties should retain their parental responsibility for the children, but since the mother will likely remain living with the children in Country B and the father will continue living in Australia for the foreseeable future, the mother should have sole decision-making authority in relation to decisions about the children’s education and place of residence.
The children should continue to live with the mother. She may choose whether they remain living in Country B or move back to Australia, but it must be a choice between those two alternatives to avoid the father having to chase her around those countries or other countries on the globe. If she chooses to live in Country B, her place of residence is confined to a geographical area near to where she currently lives to make it easier for the children to spend time with the father when he travels to Country B to see them. If she chooses to move back to Australia, she must live within a confined geographical area near to where the family formerly lived. The area in Australia is large enough for her choose to reside in Sydney, or other designated areas of New South Wales. Again, that will make it easier for the children to spend time with the father on a weekly basis. The mother agreed she could not argue against such restraints.
The mother must immediately restore the children’s electronic communication with the father, but it should be twice each week – not just once per week as the mother proposed. There is no need for it to be three times per week as the father proposed. It is the mother’s responsibility to ensure the children’s electronic communication with the father is established on each occasion. Such communication should occur when the children and the father are in different countries. It is not necessary if they are in the same country and the children spend regular time with him.
If the mother and children live in Country B then, whenever the father visits Country B, the children shall spend time with him on one day each week and for one full week not more frequently than once every three months. One day each week should be sufficient for the children to restore and retain their loving relationships with the father and they should additionally have the benefit of occasional longer stays with him. If the mother and children move back to Australia, then the same regime will apply.
The children should be exchanged at the closest police station to the mother’s home in either Country B or Australia, which should ensure neither party acts in a violent, threatening or intimidatory way towards the other at the changeovers.
The parties agree they should keep one another informed of their contact details.
I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Austin. Associate:
Dated: 9 August 2024
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