[2006] FamCA 518
FAMILY LAW ACT 1975
IN THE FULL COURT OF THE
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY Appeal No. EA40 of 2005
File No. SYF7042 of 2000
IN THE MATTER OF: BA P ASSOCIATIONS
LLC, BCIP ASSOCIATES II-B
AND: PEP (NZ) LIMITED,
PEP CO-INVESTMENTS
PTY LIMITED, PEP INVESTMENT
PTY LIMITED
Applicant Companies
AND: K
1st Respondent Wife
AND: OTHERS
CORAM: BRYANT CJ, WARNICK AND MAY JJ
DATE OF HEARING: 26 OCTOBER 2005
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16 JUNE 2006
JUDGMENT OF THE FULL COURT
Appearances: Mr C Simpson of counsel instructed by Minter Ellision, Lawyers, Aurora Place, 88 Phillips Street, Sydney, NSW, 2000 appearing for the applicant companies
Mr I Harrison of senior counsel instructed by Robilliard, Lawyers, Level 4, 79 George Street, Parramatta, NSW, 2150 appearing for the 1st respondent wife
Mr S Fowler, Solicitor of Stuart Fowler & Partners, Level 5, 130 Elizabeth Street, Sydney, NSW, 2000 appearing for the respondent husband (only, if necessary as to costs)
| Name of Appeal | BA P Associations & Ors & K & Ors |
| Appeal Number | EA40 of 2004 |
| Date of Appeal Hearing | 26 October 2005 |
| Date of Judgment | 16 June 2005 |
| Coram | Bryant CJ, Warnick and May JJ |
Catchwords: APPEALS – LEAVE TO APPEAL – FROM DECISION OF FAMILY COURT JUDGE – PROPERTY SETTLEMENT – SUMMARY DISMISSAL – An application for leave to appeal from a refusal of the trial judge to summarily dismiss an application by the wife to set aside a provision of a shareholder agreement entered into between the husband and the appellant companies – The effect of the agreement was to restrict the husband from disposing of any shares, units or performance options which he owned to any person other than an ‘affiliate’ of the husband – The wife was not a person to whom the definition ‘affiliate’ applied. The appellants argued that the trial Judge either applied the wrong principle or failed to apply the right principle correctly in so far as he excluded from his consideration incontrovertible facts raised by the investors and confined himself only to the case of the wife – The trial Judge did not misstate what was said in cases such as Beck and his Honour had taken notice of the non-contentions elements of the investors’ case.
RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES – The appellants argued that there was no authority to support an exercise of discretion to make orders extinguishing the rights of bona fide third party purchasers for value – The absence of authority may arise because bona fide transactions for value ordinarily do not diminish the estate over which the parties are at issue and so parties do not care to attack them – Secondly, once it is conceded that an order is within power, the argument in support of summary dismissal is rendered extremely difficult.
TRANSACTION TO DEFEAT CLAIM – SECTION 106B FAMILY LAW ACT– The appellant’s argued that the effects of the transaction were only temporary and as such it could not be said…
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- Case
- [2006] FamCA 518
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the Court were: (1) whether the respondents were entitled to a distribution of funds from a trust established under the deed of settlement, and (2) the proper construction of clause 10 of the deed, which governed the distribution of surplus funds. The Court was required to determine the scope of the respondents' rights and the conditions precedent to any distribution under the deed.
The Court's reasoning focused on the plain language of the deed of settlement. It was held that clause 10 of the deed established a clear mechanism for the distribution of surplus funds, which was contingent upon the satisfaction of specific prior obligations. The Court found that these prior obligations had not been fully discharged at the time the respondents sought distribution, and therefore, the conditions precedent to distribution under clause 10 had not been met. The Court applied principles of contractual interpretation, emphasising the importance of giving effect to the clear and unambiguous terms of the deed as agreed by the parties.
The Court ordered that the applicants were not obliged to make any distribution to the respondents under clause 10 of the deed of settlement at that time.
Background
Background to the litigation
The husband entered into a Shareholders' Agreement on 27 November 1999, which restricted his ability to dispose of his shares, units, or performance options to any person other than an 'affiliate' of the husband. The wife contended that the husband knew or ought reasonably to have foreseen that she would seek to include the shares and units as part of the total pool of assets for property settlement purposes. The husband and other respondents opposed this contention. The wife also argued that the value of the shares had been diminished by the husband entering into the shareholders agreement.
The applicants for summary dismissal argued that the trial judge either applied the wrong principle or failed to apply the right principle correctly in so far as he excluded from his consideration incontrovertible facts raised by the investors and confined himself only to the case of the wife. The applicants also argued that there was no authority to support an exercise of discretion to make orders extinguishing the rights of bona fide third party purchasers for value. Lastly, the applicants argued that the effects of the transaction were only temporary, and therefore it could not be said that the anticipated order had been defeated.
The Full Court concluded that the trial judge had not misapplied the principle as to the material to which he could have regard. The court also found that even if the wife's case was weak, it was not sufficient to warrant termination. The Full Court dismissed the application for permission to appeal, and the applicants were ordered to pay the costs of the respondent wife.
This case, BA P Associations & Ors and Kelly & Ors, is an appeal in the Family Court of Australia, Full Court, originating from a decision made by Judge Rose in the Family Court. The appeal number is EA40 of 2005, and the case was heard on 26 October 2005, with the judgment delivered on 16 June 2006. The Coram for this case consists of Bryant CJ, Warnick, and May JJ. The matter before the court concerns an appeal against the refusal of the trial judge to summarily dismiss an application by the wife to set aside a provision of a shareholder agreement. The appellants, represented by Mr. C. Simpson, argue that the trial judge either applied the wrong principle or failed to apply the correct principle when excluding certain facts and only considering the wife's case. The respondents, represented by Mr. I. Harrison, contend that the trial judge did not misstate the principles and took notice of the non-contentious elements of the investors' case. The appeal raises questions about the principles applicable to summary dismissal, the rights of third parties, and the effect of a transaction to defeat a claim under Section 106B of the Family Law Act 1975.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the trial judge correctly apply the principle that an application for summary dismissal must be determined solely on the material put forward by the respondent, or did he misapply this principle by not considering incontrovertible facts raised by the investors?
2. Can an order that extinguishes the rights of bona fide third party purchasers for value be considered a permissible exercise of discretion under section 106B of the Family Law Act 1975?
3. Does the deferral of the wife's entitlement to receive property due to the Shareholders' Agreement amount to the defeat of an "anticipated order," justifying the dismissal of the wife's application for summary dismissal?
Held
1. The trial judge did not misapply the principle that an application for summary dismissal must be determined solely on the material put forward by the respondent. The court held that the trial judge correctly took into account the non-contentious elements of the investors' case and did not misstate the relevant principles from previous cases.
2. An order that extinguishes the rights of bona fide third party purchasers for value can be considered a permissible exercise of discretion under section 106B of the Family Law Act 1975. The court held that once it is conceded that an order as sought is within power, the argument in support of summary dismissal is rendered extremely difficult, and a trial would be necessary to identify the amount and composition of an award for property settlement to the wife and consequently the impact of any orders on the husband’s shareholding and in turn, upon the investors' rights.
3. The deferral of the wife's entitlement to receive property due to the Shareholders' Agreement does amount to the defeat of an "anticipated order," but the availability of an argument to the contrary means that the proposition put on behalf of the investors could not carry an application for summary dismissal. The court held that the deferral of an entitlement of the wife to receive property might well amount to defeat of an “anticipated order.”
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The first issue addressed by the Full Court was whether the trial judge correctly applied the principle that an application for summary dismissal must be determined solely on the material put forward by the respondent, or if he misapplied this principle by not considering incontrovertible facts raised by the investors. The court found that the trial judge had not misstated the principle but rather, he had misapplied it. The trial judge did not misstate the principle articulated in Beck, which states that an application for summary dismissal must be determined on the basis only of the material put forward by the respondent. Instead, the court found that the trial judge had failed to apply the principle correctly in so far as he excluded from his consideration incontrovertible facts raised by the investors. However, the court held that the trial judge had, in fact, taken notice of the non-contentious elements of the investors' case.
The second issue was whether an order that extinguishes the rights of bona fide third party purchasers for value can be considered a permissible exercise of discretion under section 106B of the Family Law Act 1975. The investors argued that there was no authority to support an exercise of discretion to make orders extinguishing the rights of bona fide third party purchasers for value. The court noted that the absence of authority may arise because bona fide transactions for value ordinarily do not diminish the estate over which the parties are at issue, and so parties do not care to attack them. Furthermore, once it is conceded that an order is within power, the argument in support of summary dismissal is rendered extremely difficult. The Full Court held that the absence of case law supporting the proposition that the power under section 106B would never be properly exercised to the effect that the rights of a third party purchaser for value were interfered with, did not warrant summary dismissal.
The third issue was whether the deferral of the wife's entitlement to receive property due to the Shareholders' Agreement amounted to the defeat of an "anticipated order," justifying the dismissal of the wife's application for summary dismissal. The investors argued that the effects of the transaction were only temporary and as such it could not be said that the anticipated order had been defeated, albeit the actual receipt by the wife of the property might be deferred. The court disagreed and held that the deferral of an entitlement of the wife to receive property which, but for the agreement, she might otherwise receive at the time orders were made, might well amount to the defeat of an "anticipated order." Once the availability of an argument to the contrary is recognised, the proposition put on behalf of the investors could not carry an application for summary dismissal.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the trial judge's decision to not summarily dismiss the wife's application was correct, as the trial judge had not misapplied the principle that an application for summary dismissal must be determined solely on the material put forward by the respondent. The Full Court found that the trial judge had, in fact, taken notice of the non-contentious elements of the investors' case. Furthermore, the court held that the absence of authority supporting the proposition that the power under section 106B would never be properly exercised to the effect that the rights of a third party purchaser for value were interfered with, did not warrant summary dismissal. Lastly, the court found that the deferral of the wife's entitlement to receive property due to the Shareholders' Agreement amounted to the defeat of an "anticipated order," justifying the dismissal of the wife's application for summary dismissal.