Badari v Minister for Territory Families and Urban Housing
[2022] NTSC 83
•10 November 2022
CITATION:Badari & Ors v Minister for Territory Families and Urban Housing & Anor [2022] NTSC 83
PARTIES:ASHER BADARI
and
RICANE GALAMINDA
and
LOFTY NADJAMERREK
and
CARMELENA TILMOUTH
v
MINISTER FOR TERRITORY FAMILIES AND URBAN HOUSING
and
MINISTER FOR HOUSING AND HOMELANDS
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: SUPREME COURT exercising Territory Jurisdiction
FILE NO:2022-01585-SC
DELIVERED: 10 November 2022
HEARING DATES: 5 September 2022 and 8 September 2022
JUDGMENT OF: Burns J
Supreme Court Rules 1987 (NT)
The Housing Act 1982 (NT)
Adjrun v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2022] NTSC 42; Blanket v The Housing Authority [2014] WASC 409; Castle v Director-General, State Emergency Services [2008] NSWCA 23; Comptroller-General of Customs v Kawasaki Motors Pty Ltd (No 1) (1991) 32 FCR 219; Kioh v West (1985) 159 CLR 550; Medway v Minister for Planning (1993) 30 NSWLR 646; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 322; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZFW (2018) 264 CLR 54; MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 95 ALJR 441; Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 243 CLR 319 at [74]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180; SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 , referred to.
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Plaintiffs: M Albert with D Kelly
Defendants:L Peattie with J Clow
Solicitors:
Plaintiffs:Australian Lawyers for Remote Aboriginal Rights
Defendants:Solicitor for the Northern Territory
Judgment category classification: B
Judgment ID Number: Bur2212
Number of pages: 32
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWINBadari & Ors v Minister for Territory Families and Urban Housing & Anor [2022] NTSC 83
2022-01585-SC
BETWEEN:
ASHER BADARI
First Plaintiff
AND
RICANE GALAMINDA
Second Plaintiff
AND
LOFTY NADJAMERREK
Third Plaintiff
AND
CARMELENA TILMOUTH
Fourth Plaintiff
v
MINISTER FOR TERRITORY FAMILIES AND URBAN HOUSING
First Defendant
ANDMINISTER FOR HOUSING AND HOMELANDS
Second Defendant
CORAM: Burns J
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 10 November 2022)
Introduction
The four plaintiffs are tenants in public housing in remote communities in the Northern Territory. On or about 23 December 2021, the defendant, the Minister for Territory Families and Urban Housing, made a Determination (the First Determination) under s 23 of the Housing Act 1982 (NT) (Housing Act) that affects the mechanism by which rent payable by the plaintiffs is assessed, and, ultimately, the amount of base rent payable by the plaintiffs with respect to their various leased premises. Subsequently, the defendant on 27 April 2022 made a further Determination (the Second Determination) in similar terms to that which was made on 23 December 2021, revoking part of the first Determination. On 2 September 2022, the defendant made a further Determination (the Third Determination) in similar terms to that made on 27 April 2022, but revoking part of the second Determination. In essence, the second and third Determinations postpone the commencement date for the new rent from that set in each of the earlier Determinations.
The present proceedings are applications for judicial review under rule 56 of the Supreme Court Rules 1987 (NT) (Supreme Court Rules). The plaintiffs seek the following relief:
i.A declaration of right pursuant to section 18 (1) of the Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT) that
a)the three Determinations do not give rise to an increase in the plaintiffs’ rent having regard to section 41 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1999 (NT) (the RTA)(the first declaration); and
b)any rent increase by way of an increase in the percentage of the plaintiff’s income is unlawful having regard to section 41 of the RTA (the second declaration).
ii.A declaration of right pursuant to section 18 (1) of the Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT) that the plaintiffs as tenants of “public housing premises” as defined in section 5 of the Housing Act 1982 (NT) (the Housing Act) can seek a declaration that the rent payable under their tenancy agreement is excessive under section 42 of the RTA because such agreements are not a “tenency under the Housing Act” as defined in section 4 of the RTA.
iii.An order quashing those parts of the three Determinations which give rise to rent increases because of a failure to afford procedural fairness and for legal unreasonableness.
The defendant opposes the relief sought by the plaintiffs.
Background
It is accepted that each of the plaintiffs occupy residential dwellings in a remote community pursuant to a lease which names the Chief Executive Officer (Housing) (the CEOH) as the landlord. The first and second plaintiffs jointly lease residential premises in Gunbalanya (also known as Oenpelli). The third plaintiff leases different residential premises in Gunbalayna. The fourth plaintiff leases residential premises in Laramba.
The written lease signed by the first and second plaintiffs does not specify within the document the rent that is payable. A clause in the Remote Public Housing Tenancy Rules,[1] which purported to be part of the terms of the lease, gave the CEOH, as landlord, the right “to vary the Rent from time to time in accordance with any determination made pursuant to section 23 of the Housing Act”. As the copy of the lease before the Court has not been executed by or on behalf of the CEOH, the first and second plaintiffs submitted that the terms of the lease are the default terms set out in Schedule 2 of the Residential Tenancies Regulations 2000 (NT) (RTA)[2]. The default terms do not contain a clause equivalent to clause 5.1. Nothing turns upon this point. The only relevance of clause 5.1 is as demonstrating that the first and second plaintiffs were on notice that determinations made by the Minister under s 23 of the Housing Act may result in an increase in base rent for the premises they were occupying.
A similar situation existed with regard to the lease signed by the third plaintiff.
The lease signed by the fourth plaintiff specified the rent payable as $140.00 per week, but included a note to the effect that “the rent is subject to adjustment in accordance with section 23 of the Housing Act 1982 (NT).” The terms of the fourth plaintiff’s lease are, as I understand it, identical to the default terms.
The provisions of the Housing Act govern aspects of the provision of public housing in the Northern Territory. The Housing Act establishes an entity by the name of the CEOH. This entity is a body corporate sole and is capable, in its corporate name, of acquiring, holding and disposing of real, leasehold and personal property.[3] The CEOH has power to do all things that are necessary or convenient to be done for or in connection with or incidental to the performance of its functions in the exercise of its powers.[4] The CEOH is, however, subject to Ministerial direction.[5]
One of the functions of the CEOH is to provide, and to assist in the provision of, residential accommodation.[6]. To that end, and without limiting the generality of s 16(1), in carrying out its functions the CEOH may let premises and may acquire, hold and dispose of real property, or any interest therein.
A dwelling for the purposes of the Housing Act means a house acquired and retained by the CEOH. S 23 of the Housing Act addresses the rent payable for dwellings to which the Housing Act applies. The section provides:
Rent payable for dwellings
(1) The Minister may, from time to time, by Gazette notice determine the rent to be paid for a dwelling or a class of dwelling.
(2) A determination under this section may be subject to conditions that the Minister thinks fit.
(3) A determination under this section is to specify the date on which the rent will become payable for the dwelling or the class of dwelling.
(4) The rent to be paid for a dwelling is the rent determined from time to time under subsection (1) and the rent is to be paid despite anything to the contrary contained in the tenancy agreement entered into in respect of the dwelling or in any arrangement or agreement, or alleged arrangement or agreement, between the tenant of the dwelling and any other person (including the Chief Executive Officer (Housing), the former Commission, the Territory or their employees or agents).
It is apparent from the provisions of s 23 that the base rent payable for occupation of remote dwellings falling within a class of dwellings to which a determination under that section applies is not set by agreement between the parties as recorded in the lease agreement. It is set by statute as the amount determined from time to time by the Minister. This is what I refer to as the base rent. The base rent is not necessarily the rent paid by a tenant, as there exists a rebate system which permits a rebated rent to be charged based on household income. The claim now made by the plaintiffs is that any rent increase, either in base rent or rebated rent, is only permissible if the provisions of the RTA are satisfied, and in particular, that the provisions of s 41 of the RTA are satisfied. I will return to that claim presently. Before doing so, it is appropriate to set out the basis on which the CEOH held an interest in each of the dwellings so as to be able to lease the dwellings to the plaintiff.
In an affidavit made on 22 August 2022, Brent Aaron Warren, the Deputy Chief Executive of Housing Operations in the Department of Territory Families, Housing and Communities stated:
· the townsite of Gunbalanya lies within Northern Territory Portion 1646 (NT 1646), as identified in Survey Plan CP 004181;
· Lots 553 and 699, Town of Gunbalanya, where the first, second, and third plaintiffs reside, are contained within NT 1646;
· NT Portion 1646 is Aboriginal land within the meaning of section 3 (1) of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) (ALRA). The Arnhem Land Aboriginal Trust holds an estate in fee simple over NT Portion 1646;
· on 26 August 2009, the Arnhem Land Aboriginal Trust, Northern Land Council, CEOH and the Commonwealth of Australia entered into an agreement through which the Arnhem Land Aboriginal Trust granted to the CEOH a lease under section 19 of the ALRA (the Gunbalaya lease); and
· the Gunbalaya lease remains in force.
As I understand it, the parties agree that the residential dwelling occupied by the first and second plaintiffs, and that occupied by the third plaintiff, are premises that were part of the land leased to the CEOH by the Gunbalaya lease.
In the same affidavit, Mr Warren stated:
· Laramba is an Aboriginal community living area which was excised from the Napperby pastoral lease in 1992 under Part 8 of the Pastoral Land Act 1992 (NT). It comprises NT Portion 4069 over which the Laramba Community Incorporated (LCI) holds an estate in fee simple, subject to various statutory conditions and restrictions which cover the use and occupation of Aboriginal community living areas;
· Lot 51, Town of Laramba, where the fourth plaintiff resides, is situated within NT Portion 4069;
· on 18 July 2014, LCI, the Central Land Council and the Executive Director of Township Leasing (the EDTL) entered into a head lease concerning certain land in Laramba, including Lot 51, to facilitate the provision of public housing; and
· on 6 July 2018, the EDTL entered into a sublease with the CEOH to facilitate the CEOH providing public housing in Laramba. This sublease included the land comprising Lot 51.
Prior to December 2021, the Determination setting out base rent payable for remote dwellings included a Table which specified the base rent payable depending upon whether the dwelling was 1, 2, 3 or 4 bedroom dwelling and whether the dwelling was classified as “new or rebuilt”, “refurbished” or an “existing house”. Acknowledging that tenants in public housing were often poor, a safety net system existed such that rent for public housing could be set at the lesser of the base rent determined in accordance with the Table or rent calculated based on a percentage of household income (rebated rent). This safety net was implemented as a matter of policy.
Over time, this system was considered to be inefficient, complex and difficult to administer. As household income frequently changed for tenants in remote public housing, due to factors such as changes in Centrelink entitlements and changes to the number of persons occupying a dwelling, the rent payable by the tenant required frequent reassessment and was subject to change. The Northern Territory Government determined to implement a simplified and consistent scheme that was easy to administer, easy to understand, and affordable for all parties. To that end, a new framework for determining rent for remote dwellings was developed throughout 2018. This process included the formation of the Stakeholder Advisory Group (the SAG), comprising representatives from:
a) the North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency;
b) Aboriginal Housing Northern Territory;
c) NT Shelter;
d) the Northern Land Council;
e) the Central Land Council;
f) Yili Rreung Aboriginal Housing Corporation;
g) Kalano Community Association;
h) the Tangentyere Council;
i) the Central Australian Affordable Housing Company;
j) the Julalikari Council Aboriginal Corporation;
k) Aboriginal Peak Organisations Northern Territory;
l) North Australian Aboriginal Family Legal Service; and
m) Aboriginal Medical Services Alliance Northern Territory.
The SAG considered a number of different methodologies for determining base rent for remote dwellings. A record of the meeting of the SAG on 9 November 2018 reveals that all members of the SAG agreed that the operational cost per bedroom model was the best model. This model was approved by Cabinet in December 2021. The model approved by Cabinet provided for base rent for a remote public housing dwelling to be determined based on the number of the bedrooms the dwelling contains and to be set accordingly by the Minister pursuant to s 23 of the Housing Act. The model approved by Cabinet contained a safety net by way of a policy allowing the CEOH to only charge a portion of the full rent payable by a tenant on a temporary basis, if the tenant would encounter rental stress due to being required to pay the full rent payable pursuant to the Determination. The government policy is for the CEOH to require such tenants to pay an amount equivalent to 25% of the total household income of the relevant dwelling, initially for up to 6 months.
It was against this background that the Minister made the three Determinations which are the subject of the present proceedings.
Does s 41 of the RTA apply to any of the plaintiffs’ leases?
It is central to the plaintiffs’ claim for the first and second declarations that s 41(1) of the RTA applies to restrict the defendant’s right to increase either their base rent or their rebated rent by way of the three Determinations under s 23 of the Housing Act. I am satisfied for the reasons that follow that this is clearly not the case.
S 41 of the RTA provides:
RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES ACT 1999 - SECT 41
Increases in rent
(1) A landlord may increase the rent payable under a tenancy agreement only if:
(a)the right to increase the rent; and
(b)the amount of the increase in rent or the method of calculation of the increase in rent, is specified in the agreement.
(2) A proposal to increase the rent payable under a tenancy agreement is of no effect unless at least 30 days written notice is given to the tenant of:
(a)the amount of the increase; and
(b)the date from which the increase is to take effect.
(3) The date fixed for an increase in rent in relation to a tenancy must not be earlier than 6 months after:
(a)the day on which the tenancy agreement commences; or
(b)if there has been a previous increase of rent under this section in relation to one or more of the same tenants and the same premises – the last increase.
(4) If the rent payable under a tenancy agreement is increased under this section, the terms of the agreement are varied accordingly.
(5) Subsections (2), (3) and (4) do not apply in relation to:
(a)a provision of a tenancy agreement in relation to a tenancy under which the rent payable changes automatically at stated intervals on a basis set out in the agreement or by a determination under the Housing Act 1982 by the minister administering that Act; or
(b)an increase in the amount of rent payable by a tenant because of the cancellation or adjustment of a rent rebate.
The plaintiffs submitted that none of their leases contain clauses that satisfy the requirements of s 41(1) of the RTA. For present purposes I will assume that to be correct. The difficulty for the plaintiffs is that the landlord, the CEOH, has not purported to increase the rent. The term “landlord” is defined in s 4 of the RTA, relevantly for present purposes, as “the person who grants the right of occupancy under a tenancy agreement”. That entity is clearly the CEOH. In the case of the first, second and third plaintiffs, the land in question is owned by the Arnhem Land Aboriginal Trust, which has leased the land to the CEOH, which in turn further let the land to the plaintiffs. In the case of the fourth plaintiff, the land is owned by the LCI, which leased the land to the EDTL, who sub-leased the land to the CEOH, which in turn leased it to the plaintiff. Neither the defendant nor the Northern Territory as a legal entity were involved in granting any of the plaintiffs a right of occupancy of the respective parcels of land under a tenancy agreement. Neither entity can be said to be the plaintiff’s landlord either de facto or de jure.
This is not, as counsel for the plaintiffs sought to characterise it, some sort of chicanery. By establishing the CEOH as a corporation sole the legislature has provided that the CEOH is separate to other areas of the Executive and is capable of entering into leases as an entity separate from the Executive. This was clearly a deliberate decision by the legislature.
Much of the plaintiffs’ argument on this issue was directed towards demonstrating reasons why the terms of s 41 of the RTA were to apply to each of the leases despite the obvious conflict between the terms of that provision (which could permit rents lower than the Minister’s determination to be set) and the requirement imposed by s 23 of the Housing Act that the rent payable for each of the premises is the rent as set by the Minister’s determination. It is unnecessary to refer to those submissions in detail. When it is accepted that the legislature in the RTA, a later enactment to the Housing Act, chose to provide that the CEOH could be the entity granting the right of occupancy (effectively the landlord) while retaining the Minister as the person responsible for setting rents, the apparent conflict between the provisions falls away.
Provisions such as s 41 of the RTA are intended to redress inequality of bargaining power in a market-based residential lease system. In considering the likelihood of the legislature intending that s 41(1) would not apply to leases such as those held by the plaintiffs, it is important to remember the differences between a market-based system and a public housing system. Parties entering into a private residential lease are free to agree upon the rent payable under the lease. They are also free to agree on whether the lessor has a right to increase the rent and, if so, the mechanism by which the new rent is to be determined. A private lessor has no obligation to consider the effect that payment of the rent set by the agreement will have on the lessee. A lessee to a private lease may apply to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal for a declaration pursuant to s 42 of the RTA to the effect that the rent payable under such a tenancy agreement is excessive, but the basis upon which the Tribunal may make such a declaration is limited to the features of the leased premises and the cost of services provided by the lessor. The provisions of the RTA are not concerned with consideration of the financial viability of the lessee.
The second way in which the interests of the lessee in public housing are protected is by the adoption by the government of a policy of granting exceptions to the base rent as determined by the Minister in cases where requiring the lessee to pay the determined rent would lead to rent stress. This is referred to as a rental rebate. The content of that policy and how it is administered are also matters upon which the government is answerable to the legislature and to the people of the Northern Territory.
The evidence established that there are in excess of 5,000 remote dwellings affected by the defendant’s Determinations. It is obvious that significant public resources would be required to set an individualised “market rent” for each property. It is also apparent that the legislature avoided the necessity of conducting individual rental evaluations by giving the defendant the power in s 23 to determine rent payable for “a class of dwellings”.
The substantial differences between private leases and public housing leases, the political nature of the decision of the Minister to fix rents payable for occupancy of remote dwellings, and the similar nature of the decision as to the content of the policy governing rental rebates, provide an explanation (if any is required) for the legislature deliberately confining the operation of s 41 of the RTA to a rent increase imposed by a “landlord”. It may be taken that the legislature was aware in enacting the RTA of the process for leasing and setting rents for public housing and deliberately chose to frame s 41 of the RTA in the way it did. While the provisions of s 23 of the Housing Act were amended into their present form after the passing of the RTA, that amendment does not affect the fact that the legislature was aware at the time that the RTA was passed that base rents for classes of remote dwellings were set by Ministerial Determination.
The plaintiffs submitted that s 41 of the RTA performed the function of giving a lessee advance notice of whether the rent for leased premises could increase and, if that be the case, the mechanism for determining the increase. That is undoubtedly correct, but it is hardly to the point. In any event, each of the plaintiffs were on notice by the terms of their written lease document that their base rent could be varied by Ministerial Determination under s 23.
The plaintiffs called in aid of their submission the provisions of s 7 (5) of the RTA which provides that specified provisions of the RTA do not apply to a tenancy or proposed tenancy under the Housing Act. S 41 is not one of the specified provisions. The absence of a reference to s 41 in s 7 (5) is not indicative of a legislative intention that the provisions of s 41 are to apply to a lease under the Housing Act. To the extent that the rent payable by a tenant in public housing under a lease from the CEOH is fixed by a determination under s 21 of the Housing Act, inclusion of a reference to s 41(1) in s 7(5) would be unnecessary.
In addition, s 41 of the RTA is only applicable where rent is “payable under a tenancy agreement”. It is arguable that the word “under” is used in this context as meaning “in accordance with”, indicating that for s 41 to apply the rent must be determined by the provisions of the agreement itself. That is simply not the case where rent is determined by the Minister under s 23 of the Housing Act. It is, however, unnecessary to finally decide that point.
For these reasons the plaintiff’s first claim for relief must fail, both with regard to the challenge to the application of the three Determinations to the plaintiffs’ leases and to the challenge to any increase in the rebated rent.
Application for a declaration that the plaintiffs are entitled to apply to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal for a declaration under s 42 of the RTA
Relief should be refused on discretionary grounds. The plaintiffs have not sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal. Even accepting counsel’s statement that the plaintiffs’ present intentions are to commence such proceedings in the Tribunal, this Court should be reluctant to give, what is essentially an advisory opinion, before any attempt has been made to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. At the present time the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that there exists a question of their rights which would be authoritatively determined by the making of the declaration which they seek. Because the Plaintiffs have not sought to involve the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, this Court does not have the benefit of reasons from the Tribunal for refusing jurisdiction (assuming that was the case).
Application for relief based on failure to provide procedural fairness
The plaintiffs submitted that each of them has an obvious and direct interest in any decision to increase the base rent payable for their dwellings. They submitted that, absent plain language to the contrary, the legislature impliedly intends all grants of statutory power to be conditioned by a requirement to afford procedural fairness to a person, like the plaintiffs, whose interests might be prejudiced by the exercise of that power.[7] This is part of what used to be referred to as the rules of natural justice, but is now more frequently referred to as the obligation to provide procedural fairness. The plaintiffs submitted that this implication of statutory construction can only be ousted by clear and plain words to that effect.[8] The plaintiffs submitted that the provisions of the Housing Act did not contain clear words indicating a legislative intention that lessees of remote dwellings were not to be afforded procedural fairness before any Ministerial Determination was made increasing base rent, or before any policy change occurred which may increase the rebated rents paid by them.
In the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs’ claim is that the Minister was obliged to give each of them an opportunity to be heard before making a new Determination.
The plaintiffs submitted that the presumption that they would be accorded procedural fairness by way of an opportunity to be heard before the making of any new Determination is not rebutted by the fact that the power given to the Minister in s 23 of the Housing Act may be exercised in respect of a “class” of dwellings. This is because, the plaintiffs said, the power granted to the Minister in s 23 may equally be exercised in respect of a single dwelling and, in any case, any Determination affects the rights, interests and expectations of the individual citizen in a direct and immediate way.
The plaintiffs’ submission on this issue also appeared to draw upon the earlier submission that s 41 (1) of the RTA applied to limit the circumstances in which a valid Determination could be made increasing base rent for each of their dwellings. In that regard, the plaintiffs’ written submissions stated: “Read in context with the (RTA), Parliament intended that any attempt to increase rent in spite of s 41(1) of that Act required that all affected persons be afforded procedural fairness”. The plaintiffs referred to the provisions of s 7 of the RTA which set out specific requirements for consultation by the Minister where it is proposed to exempt tenancy agreements of a specified class from all or any of the provisions of the RTA, or where it is proposed to modify specified provisions of the RTA in their application to a specified class of tenancy agreement or a specified class a premises. The plaintiffs went on to submit that if the Minister proposed exempting a specified class of tenancy agreement, which included the agreements under which the plaintiff’s occupy their dwellings, from the requirements of s 41 of the RTA, the Minister could only do so if he or she followed the consultation process set out in s 7 of the RTA.
The plaintiffs submitted that as none of them had been given an opportunity to be heard before any of the three Determinations were made by the Minister, they had been denied procedural fairness with the result that the making of each of the Determinations was infected by jurisdictional error.
The defendant accepted, as a general principle, that where an administrative decision is apt to affect the rights or interests of an individual there is a common law duty to act fairly, in the sense of according procedural fairness, subject to the manifestation of a contrary statutory intention.[9] The defendant submitted, however, that the decision of the Minister to make the Determinations fell into a category where there was no obligation to accord the plaintiffs a hearing.
The defendant submitted that both the existence and content of an obligation to afford procedural fairness depend on the statutory framework within which a decision-maker exercises their power. In SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs,[10] the High Court (Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heyden JJ) said:
It has long been established that the statutory framework within which a decision-maker exercises statutory power is of critical importance when considering what procedural fairness requires. It is also clear that the particular content to be given to the requirement to accord procedural fairness will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. As Kitto J said in Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation:
“[T]he books are full of cases which illustrate both the impossibility of laying down a universally valid test by which to ascertain what may constitute such an opportunity [”to correct or contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to their view”] in the infinite variety of circumstances that may exist, and the necessity of allowing full effect in every case to the particular statutory framework within which the proceeding takes place.”
The cases draw a clear distinction, the defendant submitted, between powers that are necessarily directed towards the rights and expectations of individuals and those which affect the community at large or a section of it. In Kawasaki Motors, Hill and Heerey JJ said:
In determining whether the rules of natural justice apply, his authority warns that the classification of the power as executive or legislative “seems only to introduce a distracting complication into the process of its decision”: see Bread Manufacturers of New South Wales v Evans (1981) 56 ALJR 89 at 94, per Gibbs CJ. In similar vein, Mason and Wilson JJ commented (at 101) that “the question of the application of the rules of natural justice is not to be determined merely by affixing a label to describe the character of the task which is under consideration”.
But there are nevertheless features characteristic of the legislative process which, if present where a statutory power is under consideration, may point towards a conclusion that Parliament did not intend exercise of the power to be conditioned on the exercise of the rules of natural justice. Speaking of the authority whose orders were under consideration in Bread Manufacturers (supra), Gibbs CJ said (at 94):
“Its function, at least in the present case, was to make a general decision of a discretionary character which affected all consumers and sellers of bread. In Salemi v MacKellar (No 2) (1977) 137 CLR 396 at 452 Jacobs J drew a distinction between an act which directly affects a person individually and one which affects him simply as a member of the public or a class of the public, and an executive or administrative decision of the latter kind is truly a “policy” or “political” decision and is not subject to judicial review. Although it is unsafe to generalise, I respectfully agree with the significance of the distinction.”[11]
Similarly, in Kioh v West,[12] Mason J, drew a distinction between the exercise of a power to make a decision which directly affects a person individually and that which simply affects an individual as member of the public or of a class of the public. In the latter case, the decision is of a “policy” or “political” character to which a duty to afford a hearing before exercising the power does not apply.
In Castle v Director-General, State Emergency Services,[13] Basten JA, after referring to the above statements of Mason J in Kioh, said:
6. This statement of principle must be applied with due regard to the underlying concepts. Thus, one limitation on the operation of the duty to accord procedural fairness arises from the need to identify the obligation by reference to an individual or class of persons. The obligation must be capable of identification and fulfilment, in a reasonable and practical sense, prior to the making of the decision. Some guidance may be obtained by asking whether it was reasonable to expect the officer exercising a particular power to identify, in advance, the applicant as a person whose rights or interests may be affected and the way in which the proposed affectation would occur. The larger the class of persons reasonably expected to be affected, the less the likelihood that procedural fairness will be attracted and, if it is, the lower the likely content of the duty. Similarly, even though the class of those affected may be small, the duty is less likely to be attracted if membership of the class is variable and not readily ascertained: see, eg, Comptroller-General of Customs v Kawasaki Motors Pty Ltd (No. 1) [1991] FCA 519; 32 FCR 219 at 240-241 (Hill and Heerey JJ).
7. The concept of a “policy” or “political” decision raises a different kind of issue. It suggests a power which is to be exercised in accordance with broader questions of public interest, and not by reference to individual affectation. The imposition of a tax, the striking of a rate or the setting of preconditions to the provision of a benefit would all be likely to fall within that category. The failure to take account of adverse impacts on individuals would not invalidate the exercise of the power and, in that sense, the exercise would not be subject to judicial review. However, care must be taken in equating the availability of judicial review with engagement of the obligation to accord procedural fairness. Nor will possession of a sufficient interest to confer standing to challenge the validity of the exercise of a power necessarily give rise to a prior right to procedural fairness: cf Kioa v West at 621 (Brennan J).
8. Just as it has been said that the application of rules of natural justice cannot usefully be determined by asking “whether or not the power in question should be classified as legislative” – see Bread Manufacturers of New South Wales v Evans [1981] HCA 69; 180 CLR 404 at 415 (Gibbs CJ) – so it may be unprofitable to place too much weight upon classification as a policy or political decision. There are occasions where an established practice cannot be changed, although to do so would clearly be a policy decision of the executive government, without according procedural fairness: see, eg, Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. In other cases, the obligation to accord procedural fairness may depend upon the basis of a proposed decision. In Kioa v West, a case involving a deportation order made with respect to prohibited immigrants, Mason J stated at 586-587:
“These considerations indicate that, in the case where the reason for the making of the order is that the person concerned is a prohibited immigrant, the dictates of natural justice and fairness do not require the giving of any advance notice of the proposed making of the order ... .
But it may be otherwise where the reasons for the making of the order travel beyond the fact that the person concerned is a prohibited immigrant and those reasons are personal to him, as, e.g., where they relate to his conduct, health, or associations.”
9. Whether or not the decisions made in the present case attracted an obligation to accord the applicant procedural fairness will depend in part upon the correct analysis of the decisions themselves and the grounds on which they were made, including the circumstances in which the power came to be exercised. Nevertheless, it is clear that the deregistration of the unit, even when viewed independently from the revocation of the applicant’s appointment as local controller, was, by reference to the nature of the power alone, far removed from the powers being considered by Mason J in the relevant passage in Kioa v West, such as the levying of a tax or the striking of a rate. Although it may have been reasonable to characterise the decisions as “managerial or operational”, neither of those classifications provides real guidance in determining whether procedural fairness was required.
The defendant submitted that Courts have “placed powers which regulate prices in the public interest” into a category of cases that do not attract the obligation to afford a prior hearing. The defendant referred to:
· Bread Manufacturers of New South Wales v Evans (1981) 180 CLR 404, which determined that the exercise of a power to fix the price of bread, they would affected the sellers of bread, was not conditioned on giving those sellers advance notice of any proposed change and an opportunity to be heard;
· Re Gosling (1943) 43 SR (NSW) 312, which held that a power to fix the price of milk was a delegated legislative power and that the rules of natural justice did not apply to such a power;
· Bates v Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone [1972] 1 WLR 1373, which held that a power to set and regulate the remuneration of solicitors was not conditioned on those solicitors been consulted; and
· Queensland Medical Laboratory v Blewett (1988) 84 ALR 615, where Gummow J stated, at 637, that a decision to amend a schedule of fees payable for services provided by pathologists, though it affected the remuneration of those pathologists, did not affect the rights and interests of those pathologists in a sufficiently individual, direct and immediate way as to attract a duty to accord a theory to those persons.
By reference to these principles, the defendants submitted that the decision to make the Determinations was not one which was conditioned on giving the plaintiffs a hearing in advance. The defendants submitted that the Determinations do not affect the plaintiffs individually but as members of a broad class of persons who represent a section of the public at large. In support of that contention, the defendant submitted that the class of persons potentially affected by the making of the Determinations is vast. The Determinations cover approximately 5,313 remote dwellings and, indirectly, approximately 4,850 tenancy agreements. Some of those tenancy agreements may well concern more than one tenant. Implying an obligation to accord a hearing to all of those persons would impose a massive task on the defendant. In addition, the defendant submitted, the class of persons potentially affected is not restricted to current tenants. As the Determinations have prospective application they will also affect the interests of any future tenants who rent dwellings within the class. As such, the class of persons that are or may be covered by the Determinations is indeterminate.
A further matter indicative of a legislative intention that the defendant not be required to afford a hearing to every person potentially affected by the making of a Determination under s 23 of the Housing Act is that the considerations that the Minister may take into account in making the Determination are textually unconfined and do not specifically require the consideration of the position of an individual tenant. The defendants submitted that decisions of this nature are essentially matters of politics or policy, concerning the appropriate level of government funding for public services.
In my opinion, the defendant is correct. In making the Determinations under s 23, the defendant was required to balance the interests of both tenants, and prospective tenants, against the interests of the general public in the expenditure of public funds. Minds may legitimately differ on where the balance should be set, but the fact that the legislature has made the Minister the repository of the power to make a determination is indicative that the legislature understands that the exercise of the power is in the nature of a policy or political decision. The evidence establishes that in setting a base rent the defendant has adopted a model based on the operational cost of maintaining the dwelling, but with the understanding that it is almost inevitable that some public monies will need to be expended even if base rent is paid. This methodology for ascertaining base rent is overlaid by a policy of rental rebates intended to assist individual tenants avoid rent stress. It may be expected that many tenants of remote dwellings will, from time to time, be entitled to a rebate. This will lead to the need to expend further public funds.
The nature of the power being exercised (being a power of a policy or political nature), the number of people as a class potentially affected by the exercise of the power and the fact that the exercise of the power does not affect the plaintiffs other than as members of an affected class convince me that the legislature did not intend that the exercise by the defendant of the power to make the present Determinations under s 23 of the Housing Act with regard to a class of dwellings was conditioned on the Minister affording the plaintiffs a right to be heard before any Determination was made.
The fact that a Determination under s 23 may be made regarding an individual dwelling, as opposed to a class of dwellings, does not alter this position. The same considerations which influence me to find that the defendant was not required to provide the plaintiffs with a hearing before making the present Determinations will very probably not arise with regard to an exercise of the power granted by s 23 to make a Determination concerning a single dwelling, and procedural fairness may imply different obligations on the defendant in such a case.[14] It is, however, unnecessary to determine that issue in the present proceeding.
In the event that I am wrong in determining that the defendant was not obliged to provide procedural fairness to the plaintiffs as part of a class of tenants to whom the Determinations applied, I will add my satisfaction that the consultation process undertaken by the defendant through the SAG was all that was reasonably required of the defendant in the circumstances.
The plaintiffs’ application based on procedural fairness fails.
Unreasonableness
The plaintiffs submit that the Determinations are legally unreasonable because “the outcome of the exercise of the determination power was blunt: every premises across all remote communities and town camps will be required to pay the same rent per bedroom regardless of the state of that premises or its location”. In practical terms, the plaintiffs submitted, this means that the base rent will be set for premises containing a particular number of bedrooms without reference to the state of the individual premises or their proximity to services.
The plaintiffs presented criticisms of the “operational cost model – cost per bedroom” recommended by the SAG and adopted by the defendant. The plaintiffs submitted that I should look behind the Determination and make my own assessment of the rationality of the decision, including inferring the reasoning behind the defendant’s decision and considering whether the suggested premises of the defendant’s decision were justified. In the absence of undertaking such an exercise, the plaintiffs submitted, the situation remains that there is no intelligible basis for a base rent per bedroom to be imposed absent consideration of the state of the premises and their proximity to services. To put it in another way, the plaintiffs said, the identification of the “class” on which the Determination is based was based on an unwarranted assumption of uniformity across the class.
The defendant accepted that an absence of legal unreasonableness is an essential element in the lawfulness of a determination made under s 23(1) of the Housing Act, because the legislature is taken to have intended that a statutory power will be exercised reasonable.[15] The defendant submitted, however, that this Court’s function is not concerned with the merits of the Determinations made by the defendant. The Court’s role is supervisory as to the legality of the Determinations.
The defendant accepted that as there was no obligation in s 23(1) to provide a statement of reasons for a Determination, this Court’s enquiry is therefore “outcome focused”.[16] In such cases, however, a decision will only be found to be unreasonable where it falls outside the zone of rational choices available to the decision-maker. The defendant submitted that by conferring a discretion on her, s 23(1) left to her a zone of “decisional freedom” in which she could act.
As the onus falls on the plaintiffs to establish legal unreasonableness, the obligation also falls on them to prove the facts necessary to prove that the Determinations, or any of them, are unreasonable.[17]
The defendant also submitted that the test for determining whether a decision is legally unreasonable is necessarily stringent and will be rarely satisfied.[18]
I am satisfied that the plaintiffs claim that the Determinations are tainted with legal unreasonableness has not been made out. It must be accepted that the provisions of s 23(1) expressly permit the defendant to make a Determination in relation to a class of dwelling. The plaintiff’s submissions would either render nugatory the power thus provided to the defendant, or would make its exercise dependent upon identification of classes of dwelling with similar attributes concerning the state of the dwelling and its proximity to services. The latter consideration raises its own difficulties: what services are to be taken into account in identifying such a class of dwelling? For some lessees, proximity to supermarkets may be important. For others, proximity to health facilities may be important. Younger lessees may place more value on proximity to entertainment facilities, sporting facilities or schools. The range of services or facilities which may be relevant to such an analysis would be vast, and the value which individual lessees may place upon proximity to different services or facilities may also differ.
It is important to again emphasise the differences between a market-based system of determining dwelling rental and a system of providing remote public housing. A lessor offering to lease a property privately may choose the location of that property by reference to proximity to services and facilities. The lessor may expect that such proximity will be reflected in the rent obtained for the premises, but whether the lessor achieves that rent depends upon multiple factors, including the existence of a prospective lessee who was willing to pay that rent bearing in mind proximity to the services and facilities. That dynamic is entirely absent in remote dwelling leases. By and large, remote dwellings for lease by the CEOH are constructed in places where there is a demand, that is, where the prospective occupants are already living or wish to live. This necessarily implies that some lessees want, undoubtedly for good reason, to live in communities that do not have the same access to all services and facilities that other communities do. In other words, to some the place in which they live is more important than its proximity to services and facilities. Undoubtedly, in a perfect world they would have access to all services and facilities, but in reality that is simply not the case.
There was no evidence led by the plaintiffs to the effect that it is cheaper to build and maintain a remote dwelling of a particular size compared to a similar dwelling in an urban location or closer to services and facilities. In fact, the opposite would be expected. The approach taken by the plaintiffs involves selectively excising from the principles applying to assessment of market-based rent two circumstances which may affect that assessment, being the condition of individual premises and their proximity to services, and attempting to apply them in isolation to a public housing system which is not market-based. They do so without consideration of a multitude of other factors that would bear upon the assessment of rent in a market-based system, such as the cost of construction of the dwelling and the availability or otherwise of alternative properties.
It is obvious that a different approach to fixing base rents is justifiable with regard to remote public housing. Policy considerations such as maintaining the economic viability of the scheme of provision of remote public housing and ensuring a degree of consistency across communities may be relevant to rent setting for remote public housing but would have no role in a market-based system. There is simply no logical requirement for this Court to settle upon the factors identified by the plaintiffs as being essential elements of a rational approach to setting base rents for remote public housing.
I agree with the submission made by the defendant that an insuperable hurdle to the plaintiffs’ case on unreasonableness is the lack of any evidence that the base rent payable by each plaintiff pursuant to the relevant Determination is unreasonable for each of the three properties. In addition, the reasonableness of the Determinations cannot be assessed without reference to the availability of the safety net, which in many cases will mean that rent actually paid by the tenant (rebated rent) will not be dictated by considerations of cost recovery, but by the tenant’s ability to pay.
The plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the outcomes of the Determinations are so unreasonable or irrational that no reasonable decision maker could have made those Determinations. On the contrary, the Determinations are readily explicable by the policy considerations which are relevant to assessing base rents for public housing in a broad geographical range of communities and in a system where rental rebates will be available.
The plaintiffs’ case on unreasonableness fails.
Orders
The plaintiffs’ application is dismissed. I will hear the parties on the question of costs.
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[1] Clause 5.1.
[2] s 19(4).
[3] The Housing Act s 6.
[4] Ibid s 16(1).
[5] Ibid s 17.
[6] Ibid s 15(a).
[7] Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 243 CLR 319 at [74]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180 at [75].
[8] Blanket v The Housing Authority [2014] WASC 409 at [78]-[79].
[9]Comptroller-General of Customs v Kawasaki Motors Pty Ltd (No 1) (1991) 32 FCR 219 at [238]-[9] (Kawasaki Motors); Kioh v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at [554].
[10](2006) 228 CLR 152 at [26].
[11] Kawasaki Motors at [239].
[12] (1985) 159 CLR 550 (Kioh) at [584].
[13] [2008] NSWCA 231 at [6]-[9].
[14] Medway v Minister for Planning (1993) 30 NSWLR 646.
[15] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 322 at [29] (French CJ), [63] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ), [88]-[92] (Gaegler J)(Li).
[16]Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437.
[17] MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 95 ALJR 441 at [39].
[18] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZFW (2018) 264 CLR 541 at [52] per Gaeger J; Adjrun v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2022] NTSC 42 at [72] per Grant CJ.
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Administrative Law
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Property Law
Legal Concepts
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Natural Justice & Procedural Fairness
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Statutory Construction
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Legitimate Expectation
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