Baars and Guerin

Case [2018] FCCA 199


FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BAARS & GUERIN [2018] FCCA 199
Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Parenting – one child aged 10 – Rice & Asplund application – where the mother sought to reopen proceeding so as to relocate with the child – no change in circumstances warranting a reopening of the proceedings – not in the best interests of the child to reopen proceedings.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), pt.VII

Cases cited:

Marsden & Winch [2009] FamCAFC 152
Newling & Newling; Mole (Applicant) [1987] FamCA 21
Poisat & Poisat [2014] FamCAFC 128
Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725

Applicant: MS BAARS
Respondent: MR GUERIN
File Number: NCC 229 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Middleton
Hearing date: 22 January 2018
Date of Last Submission: 22 January 2018
Delivered at: Newcastle
Delivered on: 1 February 2018

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Duane
Solicitors for the Applicant: East Coast Law
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Rugendyke
Solicitors for the Respondent: John Adams Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The application filed on 14 June 2017 is dismissed.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Baars & Guerin is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT NEWCASTLE

NCC 229 of 2015

MS BAARS

Applicant

And

MR GUERIN

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The Applicant, Ms Baars, commenced proceedings by filing an initiating application on 14 June 2017.

  2. The mother's application sought to discharge the Orders made by consent on 9 August 2016. The mother seeks orders in lieu thereof permitting her and the child to relocate to South Australia. The mother seeks orders providing for the child to spend holiday time, one weekend every five weeks in Sydney, two weekends during each school term in Adelaide and Father’s Day in Adelaide in the event the father travels to Adelaide.

  3. The Respondent father Mr Guerin filed his response on 6 September 2017. He seeks an order that the mother’s initiating application be dismissed.

  4. The matter was adjourned until 22 January 2018 for a hearing as to whether the rule in Rice and Asplund[1] should be applied so as to prevent the application of the mother proceeding any further.

    [1] (1979) FLC 90-725.

  5. The parties agreed and I allowed to some short cross-examination of the parties at the hearing.

The issue

  1. The issue for me to determine therefore is whether the mother's application should be dismissed after applying the rule in Rice & Asplund.[2]

The evidence relied upon by the parties

[2] Ibid.

The material

  1. The mother relied upon:

    a)initiating application filed 14 June 2017;

    b)notice of risk filed 14 June 2017;

    c)affidavits filed 14 June 2017 and 10 January 2018;

    d)affidavit of Mr M (the mother’s current husband) filed 10 January 2018;

    e)case outline.

  2. The father relied upon:

    a)response filed 6 September 2017;

    b)his affidavit filed 6 September 2017 and10 January 2018.

Background

  1. The parties married on (omitted) 2002.

  2. The mother has suffered ongoing and variable depression and anxiety since 2003.

  3. The…

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Details
AGLC
Baars and Guerin [2018] FCCA 199
Case
[2018] FCCA 199
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of *Baars and Guerin*, heard by Judge Middleton, the applicants sought to set aside a statutory demand. The core of the dispute concerned whether the applicants had a genuine dispute about the existence of the debt claimed in the statutory demand, or whether they had a counterclaim, set-off or cross-demand that would have had the effect of reducing the amount of the debt to less than the statutory minimum.

The court was required to determine whether the applicants had demonstrated a sufficient basis to establish a genuine dispute regarding the debt. Specifically, the court had to assess whether the evidence presented by the applicants raised a real question as to the existence of the debt, or whether their alleged counterclaim, set-off, or cross-demand was substantial enough to reduce the debt below the threshold for a statutory demand.

Judge Middleton dismissed the application, finding that the applicants had failed to establish a genuine dispute about the existence of the debt or a valid counterclaim, set-off, or cross-demand. The court concluded that the evidence did not support the applicants' assertions and that the debt, as claimed in the statutory demand, was not genuinely disputed. Consequently, the application to set aside the statutory demand was unsuccessful.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application filed on 14 June 2017 is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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