FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| B PTY LIMITED AND ANOR & SYKES AND ANOR | [2014] FamCA 451 |
| FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Where the application to set aside property orders is made by the Trustee of the bankrupt estate of the second respondent and the first applicant who has taken an assignment of the Trustee’s rights against the respondents under s 79A and s 79 of the Act and also an assignment of any fruits of such actions that the Trustee in Bankruptcy might receive – Where the first and second respondents filed an Application for Consent Orders transferring the second respondent’s interest in the matrimonial home to the first respondent – Where those consent orders were then made on July 2008 – Where the second respondent did not disclose to the court of at least two creditors with significant debts – Where the second respondent subsequently became a bankrupt – Where the court determined that there were a number of non-disclosures by the second respondent to the court – Where the court determined that the non-disclosures made by him were made deliberately and dishonestly – Where the court determined there was clearly a miscarriage of justice by reason of the fraud, suppression of evidence and false evidence of the second respondent – Where the court determined that it is appropriate to set aside the orders made 30 July 2008. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75, 75(2), 75(2)(ha), 79, 79A, 90C Family Law Rules 2004 r 10.15 |
| Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 31 Fam LR 667 Charltons CJC Pty Limited v Fitzgerald [2013] NSWSC 350 In the Marriage of Biltoft (1995) 19 Fam LR 92 In the Marriage of DV v PM Morrison (1994) 18 Fam LR 519 Livesey v Jenkins All ER 119 MJ Bailey v the Estate of HR Bailey (1989) 13 Fam LR 652 |
| FIRST APPLICANT: | B Pty Limited |
| SECOND APPLICANT: | Mr Lane as Trustee of the bankupt estate of Mr Sykes |
| FIRST RESPONDENT: | Ms Sykes |
| SECOND RESPONDENT: | Mr Sykes |
| FILE NUMBER: | SYC | 1555 | of | 2012 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 27 June 2014 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Aldridge J |
| HEARING DATE: | 22 & 23 April 2014 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST APPLICANT: | Mr Fernon |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE FIRST APPLICANT: | Dixon Holmes Du Pont Pty Ltd |
| COUNSEL FOR THE SECOND APPLICANT: | Mr Fernon |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE SECOND APPLICANT: | Dixon Holmes Du Pont Pty Ltd |
| COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: | Mr Steward |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE FIRST… |
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- Case
- [2014] FamCA 451
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the consent orders made in 2008 should be set aside. This question arose in circumstances where the second respondent had subsequently been declared bankrupt and had failed to disclose the existence of at least two significant creditors to the court at the time the consent orders were made.
Aldridge J found that the second respondent had made deliberate and dishonest non-disclosures to the court. His Honour determined that these non-disclosures, along with the suppression of evidence and the presentation of false evidence by the second respondent, constituted a clear miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the court concluded that it was appropriate to set aside the consent orders made on 30 July 2008.
The court ordered that the consent orders of 30 July 2008 be set aside in their entirety pursuant to section 79A of the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth). Furthermore, the court directed that the proceeds of sale of the property at C Street, Suburb D, held by the respective solicitors, be paid forthwith to the Second Applicant.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
That, pursuant to section 79A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the Consent Orders made on 30 July 2008 in proceedings SYC4180/2008 between the First Respondent and the Second Respondent are hereby set aside in their entirety.
2.
That the funds being the proceeds of sale of C Street, Suburb D presently held by the solicitors for the First Respondent and the solicitor for the First Applicant be paid forthwith to the Second Applicant.
Background
Background to the litigation
In July 2008, the first and second respondents filed an Application for Consent Orders, which sought to transfer the second respondent's interest in the matrimonial home to the first respondent. These consent orders were subsequently made by the court on 30 July 2008. However, it was later revealed that the second respondent had failed to disclose the existence of at least two creditors with significant debts to the court at the time of the orders. Following this, the second respondent became a bankrupt.
Further proceedings revealed that the second respondent had deliberately and dishonestly withheld information from the court. The court found that there had been multiple instances of non-disclosure, which constituted a miscarriage of justice due to the fraud, suppression of evidence, and false evidence presented by the second respondent. Consequently, the court determined that it was appropriate to set aside the orders made on 30 July 2008. Pursuant to section 79A of the Family Law Act, the Consent Orders were set aside in their entirety, and the proceeds from the sale of the property, held by the solicitors for the first respondent and the solicitor for the first applicant, were ordered to be paid forthwith to the second applicant.
The matter before the court pertains to an application to set aside property orders that were originally made in consent proceedings between the first and second respondents in July 2008. This application was brought by the first applicant, who is the Trustee of the bankrupt estate of the second respondent, and by the second applicant who has received an assignment of the Trustee’s rights under sections 79A and 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The application was grounded on the second respondent’s failure to disclose to the court the existence of at least two significant creditors, which was subsequently determined to be a deliberate and dishonest omission. Following this revelation, the second respondent was declared bankrupt. The court found that the second respondent’s non-disclosures and fraudulent behaviour constituted a clear miscarriage of justice and that the original orders should be set aside. This application was heard as an interlocutory matter, with the court issuing orders pursuant to section 79A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to set aside the consent orders made on 30 July 2008 and to direct the payment of certain funds to the second applicant.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the court has the jurisdiction to set aside the Consent Orders made on 30 July 2008 under section 79A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
2. Whether the non-disclosures made by the second respondent were deliberate and dishonest, constituting fraud, suppression of evidence, and false evidence.
3. Whether the non-disclosures by the second respondent led to a miscarriage of justice.
4. Whether it is appropriate to set aside the Consent Orders made on 30 July 2008 in light of the findings of fraud, suppression of evidence, and false evidence.
5. Whether the proceeds of sale of C Street, Suburb D should be paid to the Second Applicant instead of being held by the solicitors for the First Respondent and the solicitor for the First Applicant.
Held
1. Whether the court has the jurisdiction to set aside the Consent Orders made on 30 July 2008 under section 79A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The court concluded that it had jurisdiction to set aside the orders, resulting in the setting aside of the consent orders.
2. Whether the non-disclosures made by the second respondent were deliberate and dishonest, constituting fraud, suppression of evidence, and false evidence. The court concluded that the non-disclosures were deliberate and dishonest, resulting in findings of fraud, suppression of evidence, and false evidence.
3. Whether the non-disclosures by the second respondent led to a miscarriage of justice. The court concluded that there was a miscarriage of justice due to the fraud, suppression of evidence, and false evidence, leading to the orders being set aside.
4. Whether it is appropriate to set aside the Consent Orders made on 30 July 2008 in light of the findings of fraud, suppression of evidence, and false evidence. The court concluded that it was appropriate to set aside the orders, leading to the orders being set aside.
5. Whether the proceeds of sale of C Street, Suburb D should be paid to the Second Applicant instead of being held by the solicitors for the First Respondent and the solicitor for the First Applicant. The court concluded that the proceeds should be paid to the Second Applicant, resulting in the payment of the proceeds to the Second Applicant.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined whether it had the jurisdiction to set aside the Consent Orders made on 30 July 2008 under section 79A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The application to set aside the orders was made by the Trustee of the bankrupt estate of the second respondent and the first applicant, who had taken an assignment of the Trustee’s rights against the respondents under sections 79A and 79 of the Act, and also an assignment of any fruits of such actions that the Trustee in Bankruptcy might receive. The court found that it had the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the application, given the statutory provisions allowing for the assignment of rights and the specific authority conferred by section 79A of the Act. This section allows the court to set aside or vary orders where there has been a significant change in circumstances or where an order was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation.
The court delved into whether the non-disclosures made by the second respondent were deliberate and dishonest, amounting to fraud, suppression of evidence, and false evidence. The court examined the second respondent's failure to disclose to the court the existence of at least two creditors with significant debts, which were pertinent to the financial picture presented during the proceedings. The court concluded that the non-disclosures were deliberate and dishonest, indicating a clear intent to withhold critical information. This conclusion was drawn from the respondent's subsequent admission and corroborating evidence presented during the hearings. The authorities relied on included the established principles of equity, which mandate full disclosure in proceedings and the case law emphasizing the importance of honesty and transparency in family law matters.
The next issue was whether the non-disclosures by the second respondent led to a miscarriage of justice. The court determined that the non-disclosures were significant enough to influence the outcome of the proceedings, given the critical nature of the undisclosed financial obligations. The court reasoned that had the first respondent been aware of the full financial picture, the consent orders might not have been agreed upon in the same manner or might not have been agreed upon at all. This finding was pivotal in establishing the basis for setting aside the orders, as the court must ensure that justice is not only done but also seen to be done.
Considering the findings of fraud, suppression of evidence, and false evidence, the court deliberated on whether it was appropriate to set aside the Consent Orders made on 30 July 2008. The court concluded that it was indeed appropriate to set aside the orders in their entirety due to the second respondent's deliberate and dishonest conduct. The court emphasized that allowing the orders to stand would condone the fraudulent behavior and would undermine the integrity of the judicial process. The decision to set aside the orders was grounded in the principles of fairness and equity, which require the courts to rectify injustices caused by dishonest conduct.
Finally, the court addressed whether the proceeds of the sale of C Street, Suburb D should be paid to the Second Applicant instead of being held by the solicitors for the First Respondent and the solicitor for the First Applicant. The court found that, given the circumstances of fraud and the miscarriage of justice, it was equitable to direct that the proceeds be paid to the Second Applicant. The court reasoned that the first respondent should not benefit from the second respondent's fraudulent conduct, and thus, the funds should be distributed to the party that had been wronged by the deceit. This decision was consistent with the equitable principle of preventing unjust enrichment and ensuring that the rightful party receives the benefit of the property.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that where a party to family law proceedings deliberately and dishonestly withholds significant information, leading to a miscarriage of justice, the court has the jurisdiction under section 79A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to set aside the orders and direct the distribution of proceeds in a manner that rectifies the injustice caused. The court followed and applied the established legal principles concerning fraud, suppression of evidence, and false evidence, and it did not depart from prior authority in reaching its decision.