B and B
[2005] FCWA 7
•24 JANUARY 2005
JURISDICTION:
FAMILY COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
| ACT: | FAMILY LAW ACT 1975 |
| LOCATION: | PERTH |
| CITATION: | B and B [2005] FCWA 7 |
| CORAM: | THACKRAY J |
| HEARD: | 29 JUNE, 14 SEPTEMBER, 21 SEPTEMBER |
2004 (WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS)
| DELIVERED: | 24 JANUARY 2005 |
| FILE NO/S: | PT 3530 of 2002 |
| BETWEEN: | B |
Applicant/Husband
AND
B
Respondent/Wife
Catchwords:
COSTS - failure to comply with orders of the Court - costs increased by husband's failure to take part in much of the proceedings - husband's failure to respond to early reasonable offer - wife's failure to acccept late filed reasonable offer - wife's failure to negotiate property issues on basis she may not be successful in children's issues - costs fixed to avoid expense and delay of taxation - broad brush approach in dealing with numerous costs issues
Legislation:
Family Law Act 1975, s 117 Category: Not Reportable
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant: | Mr T O'Sullivan |
| Respondent: | Ms S Vincent |
Solicitors:
| Applicant: | O'Sullivan Davies |
| Respondent: | Summers Legal |
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Collins & Collins (1985) FLC 91-603
1 I am required to determine applications for costs arising out of financial and child welfare proceedings.
2 The wife seeks an order that the husband pay the entire costs of the proceedings on an indemnity basis. The husband opposes the application. He counters by seeking an order that the wife pay him $4,000 costs. He asserts the trial took at least a day longer than necessary, because of the manner in which the wife’s counsel conducted the case.
3 Notwithstanding the property was of fairly modest value, and the issues relating to the children were straightforward, this was a messy piece of litigation. Both parties have filed detailed submissions in relation to costs. The submissions raise a multitude of matters said to be relevant. In order to deal adequately with all of them, it would be necessary to write a judgment longer than that given in the substantive proceedings. This would be inappropriate and would make no difference to the ultimate outcome. I intend to take a broad-brush approach and deal only with what I saw as being the principal issues.
Background
4 The husband commenced the proceedings on 30 May 2002. At the time he was living in the town, where the parties had spent the latter part of their marriage. He proposed a week and week- about arrangement for the care of the children. He proposed the sale of the parties’ real estate, including the shed, which was the major asset. He proposed he receive $61,000 more from the proceeds of sale than the wife.
5 On 8 July 2002 the wife filed a response, seeking residence of the children and proposing the husband have fairly standard contact. She too sought the sale of the real estate, but proposed she receive such amount as would result in an overall division of property 60:40 in her favour.
6 There was a directions hearing on 11 July 2002. Orders were made for the parties to provide appraisals or valuations, and copies of a variety of financial documents before 5 September 2002. The husband did not comply with those orders.
7 The parties attended a conciliation conference on 24 September 2002, but were unable to reach agreement. The matter was included in the defended list. The parties were ordered to file the documents upon which they intended to rely at trial not later than 21 days before the pre-trial conference. They were advised it was likely the pre-trial conference would be listed in about June 2003.
8 The husband provided the wife with an informal list of documents at the conciliation conference. On 29 October 2002 the wife’s solicitors wrote to the husband’s solicitors, seeking copies of some of the documents. They also drew attention to the husband’s failure to do anything about the sale of the shed, notwithstanding the parties were in agreement it should be sold. Notice was given of the intention to make an application for interim orders, inter alia, relating to discovery.
9 The husband’s solicitors did not provide copies of the documents requested, nor did they respond to the letter from the wife’s solicitors. They had also not responded to their letter of 8 October 2002.
10 There was no further action from the husband’s solicitors until 10 January 2003, when they filed a Notice of Ceasing to Act. The Notice advised the Court that the husband’s future address for service was Post Office Box no in the town. The husband should thereafter have filed a Notice of Address for Service, but did not do so.
11 In April 2003 the husband left town. He and his de facto wife went to live on a farm nearby. He continued to use his original Post Office Box as his postal address. He cleared the box on his regular trips to the town.
12 At the conciliation conference in September 2002, both parties had been ordered to give discovery within 42 days. The wife did not file her formal affidavit of documents until 27 February 2003. On 9 April 2003 she made an application seeking leave to proceed undefended as a result of the husband’s failure to comply with the direction for discovery. The wife’s solicitors had written to the husband on 27 February 2003 giving notice of their intention to make such an application.
13 The matter came before Barlow J on 5 May 2003. His Honour made orders for the husband to give discovery and for the husband to obtain a valuation of certain items of chattel property and his motor vehicle. His Form 3 Application, insofar as it related to financial matters, was to be dismissed if he failed to comply with these orders after they were served on him. The wife was then to have liberty to apply to proceed on an undefended basis. The husband was ordered to pay the wife’s costs fixed at $500. The husband did not attend the hearing before Barlow J.
14 Court staff posted a copy of the orders to the husband at the Post Office Box address on 4 June 2003. He was later to claim he did not receive a copy. However, later still, he acknowledged he was mistaken - he had received a copy of the orders. The wife’s solicitors had also posted a copy to the husband on 10 June 2003, giving him until the middle of July 2003 to comply with the orders. Their letter also requested the husband to attend an informal conference to try to resolve issues, with a view to reducing the legal costs.
15 The husband did nothing to comply with the orders of Barlow J, nor did he make any contact with the wife’s solicitors. He says he thought the wife’s solicitors already had the information, or the information did not exist. This is somewhat disingenuous, given the court had made a specific order about the matters in question.
16 On 7 August 2003, the wife’s solicitors applied for orders dismissing the husband’s Form 3 Application insofar as it related to financial matters (notwithstanding the order of Barlow J provided for automatic dismissal in the event of non-compliance). The wife also sought leave to proceed on an undefended basis.
17 The matter came before me on 8 September 2003, at which time leave was given to the wife to proceed on an undefended basis. The matter was set down for an undefended hearing on 27 October 2003. The wife was given leave to file evidence in support of the orders she proposed seeking. The husband was ordered to pay $350 costs. A copy of the order was posted to the husband by Court staff on 12 September 2003, albeit the postcode shown on the correspondence was wrong.
18 On 25 September 2003 the wife made application for leave to amend her response to the husband’s application, with a view to seeking a 70:30 division of the property. The application was listed for hearing on 30 September 2003. The husband was entitled to notice of this application, and it was adjourned for hearing at the same time as the substantive matter on 27 October 2003.
19 At the hearing on 30 September 2003, an order was also made for the husband to file affidavit evidence in relation to child welfare issues before 20 October 2003. If he failed to do so, the wife was also to have liberty to proceed on an undefended basis in relation to the child welfare issues. At that stage, it appeared the husband had lost all interest in the proceedings, having done nothing since his solicitors filed a Notice of Ceasing to Act in January 2003.
20 The order of 30 September 2003 was posted by Court staff to the husband at his Post Office Box on 6 October 2003.
21 On 3 October 2003 the husband had been personally served with the wife’s application for leave to amend her Form 3A Response. He was also served with the wife’s Offer of Settlement filed on 23 September 2003. (Indeed, perusal of the annexures to the wife’s cost submissions suggests the offer was sent to the husband three times in the space of 5 days!)
22 On 14 October 2003 the wife filed an 18-page affidavit in support of the relief sought, together with 70 annexed documents. The husband did not file any documents in relation to the child welfare issues.
23 On 27 October 2003 the matter came before me for hearing on an undefended basis. The husband attended, but in light of the fact that leave had been given to proceed on an undefended basis, he was not invited to take any substantive part in the hearing.
24 Having heard detailed submissions from counsel for the wife, I reserved my judgment. Although the Record of Proceedings suggests I dismissed the wife’s application filed on 7 August 2003, the application I intended to dismiss was that filed on 25 September 2003, by which the wife sought to amend to seek a larger share of the property.
25 On 29 October 2003 the husband’s present solicitors filed a Notice of Address for Service and obtained permission to inspect the Court file. On 28 November 2003, shortly prior to the time I intended to give my judgment, the husband filed an application, effectively seeking the discharge of the earlier orders giving leave to the wife to proceed on an undefended basis, and permitting him to resume involvement in the proceedings.
26 The husband provided sufficient evidence to persuade me it was in the interests of justice for him to be given permission to defend the wife’s application. I indicated I would not deliver my reserved judgment, and listed the matter for trial on 9 March 2004. In order to redress the prejudice to the wife, the husband was ordered to make an immediate payment of $50,000, which he had been able to borrow for this purpose. The wife’s costs were reserved.
27 The parties were invited to agree the terms of appropriate directions to ensure the matter was properly ready for hearing. On 13 January 2004 the Court received an agreed Minute of Consent Directions, requiring each party to file their affidavit evidence by 10 February 2004.
28 On 16 January 2004 the husband filed an application seeking the preparation of a family report in relation to the wishes of the children and seeking leave to amend his application to seek orders for sole residence. He claimed the children (then aged 10, 9 and 6) had indicated a desire to live with him.
29 On 27 January 2004 I gave leave to the husband to amend his application to seek orders for sole residence. However, I adjourned his application for preparation of a welfare report until the trial. I did so because a report could not be prepared in time for trial. Furthermore, I was not at that stage satisfied the husband could establish he had a sufficiently strong claim for residence to make it appropriate to put off the trial pending the preparation of a report.
30 The husband’s trial affidavits were filed on 11 February 2004 and the wife filed hers two days later. On 25 February 2004 the wife sought leave to file affidavits by her boyfriend, another friend and a doctor. She was successful in her application to rely upon these late filed documents.
31 The husband’s application for preparation of a family report was relisted before me on 8 March 2004, the day before the trial was due to commence. Having read the husband’s trial affidavit, I was satisfied he had made out an arguable case for residence and it was therefore appropriate to order a family report. I therefore rescheduled the trial for 8 June 2004.
32 The welfare report was prepared and distributed late in May 2004. H expressed a definite desire to live with his father. N expressed a desire to increase the amount of time he spends with his father. J was clear he wanted to live with his mother.
33 The trial commenced on 8 June 2004 and ran for four days. At the last minute, the husband’s solicitor found it necessary to brief another solicitor in her office to appear as counsel. The reason for this being necessary was not made clear at the time. However, I subsequently became aware (albeit by means other than admissible evidence) of the tragic circumstances that led to this being entirely understandable. This last minute change of representation placed counsel for the wife under considerable pressure in coming to grips with a case that had a long and shambolic history.
The law
34 S 117(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 provides that, subject to subsection (2), each party to proceedings shall bear his or her own costs. Subsection (2) provides that if the Court is of the opinion there are circumstances that justify doing so, the Court may, subject to subsection (2A), make such orders as to costs as it considers just.
| 35 | Subsection 117(2A) provides as follows: “In considering what order (if any) should be made under sub- section (2), the court shall have regard to-- (a) the financial circumstances of each of the parties to the proceedings; | |||||||
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(g) such other matters as the court considers relevant.”
36 The Full Court in Collins & Collins (1985) FLC 91-603 confirmed that the discretion conferred by s 117 is a broad one and that the factors contained in s 117(2A) are not to be read in a restrictive way.
37 I will now refer briefly to each of the factors.
Section 117(2A)(a)
38 The financial circumstances of the parties are set out in my judgment. The total assets (including more than $60,000 in legal fees added back), were worth only about $258,000.
39 It is a tragedy that people of such modest means have incurred such large legal costs in resolving the division of their meagre property and issues relating to their young children. I accept that any order for costs against either of them would be a severe blow to their already difficult financial circumstances.
Section 117(2A)(b)
40 Neither party was in receipt of legal aid.
Section 117(2A)(c)
41 Each party makes a large number of complaints about the alleged inappropriate conduct of the other. I do not intend to deal with any of these in detail. I have already found in my judgment that the husband’s conduct of the proceedings in relation to the obtaining of valuations was unsatisfactory. His failure to comply with orders relating to obtaining valuations led to additional correspondence and complicated the resolution of the dispute. His refusal to sell the shed property, even though his original application sought its sale, also increased the amount of correspondence and issues to be resolved by the Court.
42 However, the husband’s inappropriate conduct goes much further. Although in the very early stages of the proceedings, the husband conducted the litigation with diligence, he then buried his head in the sand. After his first solicitors ceased to act for him, he did not file a Notice of Address for Service and took no part in the proceedings. He ignored all correspondence from the wife’s solicitors. See generally the affidavit of Margaret Sandford sworn 15 December 2003.
43 At the eleventh hour, the husband was (just) able to persuade me it was appropriate for him to be permitted to resume involvement in the proceedings. There were a number of reasons:
•
At the time, I had some doubts as to whether the husband had received all of the mail sent to the address, as it was a post office box shared with the wife. However, after having had the opportunity to assess the parties at trial, I was satisfied the wife would not have removed mail intended for the husband.
•
I also had concerns about the husband’s level of literacy and his ability to comprehend the order of 5 May 2003. However, having had the opportunity to hear from his de facto wife at the hearing, it was readily apparent he had the wherewithal to find out what was happening to the litigation, if he could have been bothered.
•
I was unhappy with a number of aspects of my draft reserved judgment, as so many matters had been left open to speculation, even after the wife had filed a fairly comprehensive affidavit. A judgment delivered in such circumstances was not in the interests of justice, which was the overriding consideration.
•
Had I not granted the husband leave to resume involvement in the proceedings, I considered some of the earlier orders giving the wife leave to proceed on an undefended basis were open to attack (and would be attacked) on appeal. This would have further delayed the resolution of the matter and increased the costs. In particular I was concerned the order I had made giving leave to proceed undefended on the child welfare issues was flawed because of a denial of natural justice.
•
The prejudice to the wife could be remedied in part by the allocation of an early trial date and an order for costs.
44 Having been granted permission to take part, the husband then made a substantial amendment to the parenting orders sought and proposed the preparation of a family report. These actions ultimately resulted in the last minute postponement of the trial listed for early in 2004. As a result, the wife effectively had to prepare for trial on three occasions. The first time for the undefended hearing; the second for the aborted trial; and the third for the final hearing.
45 I accept the wife’s submission that the last minute amendment of the residence application completely changed the complexion of the case for which she had to prepare. Until that stage, the residence dispute was a formality, since the husband could not have succeeded in a shared residence arrangement whilst living so far from town. The wife was justified in taking short cuts with the preparation of that part of her case, and not filing affidavits by witnesses such as her boyfriend since she was in no danger of losing residence. The husband ought not to have opposed her application for leave to file further affidavits out of time in these circumstances, especially in light of the enormous latitude shown to him in allowing him back into the proceedings.
46 The last minute change in the complexion of the case, the need to prepare for trial three times, and the husband’s failure to agree to witness affidavits being filed late, undoubtedly increased the wife’s costs.
47 However, it should also be noted that after he instructed his current solicitors, the husband conducted the proceedings in a much more appropriate and timely fashion. Amongst other things, he did make efforts to limit issues and reduce the number of witnesses required.
Section 117(2A)(d)
48 The granting of leave to the wife to proceed with her application for property settlement on an undefended basis arose from the failure of the husband to comply with orders of the Court. He did not give discovery of documents. He did not obtain valuations he was ordered to obtain. However, in coming to my decision, I must take into account the fact that the husband has already been ordered to meet some costs associated with applications necessitated by his failure to comply with these orders.
Section 117(2A)(e)
49 The husband was wholly unsuccessful in his application for
residence.
50 Although the very strident costs submissions made on behalf of the wife criticised the husband for seeking sole residence, I consider such criticism to be misplaced. The husband had justification for amending his application to seek residence. Two of the children were expressing a desire either to live with him or to spend more time with him. The wife was estranged from members of her own family, with whom the children previously had very close attachments. I do not consider the outcome of the proceedings concerning parenting orders was anywhere near as clear-cut as asserted in the wife’s submissions. In pursuing his application for residence, I consider the husband was motivated by what he regarded as being the best interests of the children.
51 The wife was far from successful with her application for property settlement, since she sought 70% and received only 59% of the assets.
Section 117(2A)(f)
52 The wife made four different offers of settlement. The most generous offer was the first, which she made on 7 October 2002. At that very early stage in proceedings she was prepared to settle the property dispute on the basis she received 55% of the property. That offer was only open for 14 days (see the letter of 8 October 2003 from wife’s solicitors to husband’s solicitors). This did not give the husband much time in which to consider the offer and receive advice from his solicitors. However, it did alert the husband to the fact the wife was prepared to compromise. At the very least it should have set off a round of negotiations to settle a dispute in which the legal costs were always likely to far outweigh any possible benefit of continuing the litigation.
53 The wife made a further offer on 23 September 2003, by which time she wanted 65% of the assets. On 27 February 2004 she made a further offer of settlement, again seeking 65%.
54 On 22 April 2004 the husband filed his only offer of settlement. This was after he had instructed his present solicitors and the matter was all but ready for trial. The husband’s submissions suggest the offer was made on two alternative bases, depending upon the outcome of the parenting issues. Perusal of the offer itself does not make this clear. However, the offer marked “A” is said to contain the terms of the financial settlement proposed if it were decided the children would reside with the wife (which was what I ultimately ordered). I am satisfied the wife’s solicitors understood the basis on which the husband’s alternative offers were made. It is most regrettable they did not adopt a similar stance, since the wife’s stubborn refusal to negotiate on any assumption other than that she would succeed on the residence issue meant a trial on financial issues could not be avoided.
55 The husband’s offer marked “A” proposed that the wife receive 65% of the assets. In money terms this involved the wife receiving $140,000 (inclusive of the $50,000 already received). The assumption in the offer was that the shed property was worth $180,000. The wife was to get 65% of any excess if the property sold for more than $180,000 (and accept a reduction of 65% of the difference if the property sold for less than $180,000).
56 On 2 June 2004 the wife filed her final offer. This offer is easier to compare with the final outcome than her earlier offers, since it indicates a money amount the wife was prepared to accept. It mirrored the husband’s offer marked “A”. However, instead of the wife receiving $140,000 as the husband proposed, she wanted $160,000 (inclusive of the $50,000 already received). This offer was also predicated on the shed property being worth $180,000 and provided for the wife to receive 65% of any amount received from a sale above $180,000. Significantly the offer was silent on the outcome if the property sold for less than $180,00 – clearly the husband was expected to wear any “loss”.
57 The wife’s final offer was clarified in a letter to the husband’s solicitors dated 2 June 2004. She expressly refused to make any concession in her offer based on an assumption that the children might live with the husband. She asserted that her offer would involve her receiving 59% of the total assets, assuming her legal costs paid were added back into the pool.
58 As it turned out, my assessment of the appropriate percentage division corresponded exactly with the percentage mentioned in the letter from the wife’s solicitors of 2 June 2004. In comparing the final outcome with offers made earlier in the proceedings, it should be noted I reduced the husband’s entitlement from 44% to 41% because of his conduct relating to the shed. Had the matter been resolved at an early stage of the proceedings, prior to the complications associated with the shed, the outcome would have been a settlement dividing the assets 56:44 in favour of the wife – once again remarkably close to the 55:45 initial offer made by the wife in the very early stages.
59 However, references to percentage outcomes can be quite misleading in cases where the asset pool is not clearly defined. The matter of significance from the parties’ point of view is the dollar amount they would receive pursuant to the various offers. The wife’s final offer would have seen her ending up with an extra $110,000 from the sale of the shed property, assuming it sold for $180,000. The husband’s offer would have seen her end up with $90,000. However, under the terms of the judgement, based on the asset pool as found by me, the wife will receive only about $67,000 from the proceeds of sale.
60 I consider the wife’s earliest offer of settlement at 55:45 to have been a sensible one. It is most unfortunate the husband did not accept it, or at the very least indicate it would be acceptable if the wife’s application for residence of the children was successful. However, the later offers made by the wife were less generous to him, and involved the wife receiving a greater share of the property than I considered was appropriate.
61 It would be fair to assume that the wife factored into her final offer an expectation that she would be successful in obtaining an order for the husband to contribute to her costs. However, it may have been better if her offer sought a lesser percentage of the property and contained a separate proposal for payment of costs. Although experience suggests it is not usually helpful in this jurisdiction for an offer to require the other party to pay portion of the offeror’s costs, this case may have been the exception. It was clear the husband was going to have some liability for costs. Treating the costs issue as a discrete issue would have focused attention on the fact there were two issues involved – the substantive division of property and the payment of costs. Splitting the two issues could, for example have allowed the parties to settle the main dispute and leave the Court to adjudicate on the much less expensive issue of costs, if agreement could not be reached. After all, the two offers were only $20,000 apart – albeit the wife’s refusal to contemplate negotiations based on an assumption the husband might succeed on the residence issue would have continued to be a major stumbling block.
62 The failure of the husband to make an offer of settlement until very near the end of the proceedings is a significant matter I intend to take into account. However, I must also take account of the fact that when he finally made an offer, it was a very good one. Balanced against that is the fact it contained no proposal to meet any portion of the wife’s costs, and was therefore less attractive to the wife who reasonably expected to receive a costs order.
Section 117(2A)(g)
63 I consider there is some merit in the proposition made by counsel for the husband concerning the additional time taken because of the manner in which the wife’s counsel conducted the trial. Some of the decisions taken by counsel for the wife were very surprising – for example, her obdurate refusal to concede that undisputed loans obtained by the husband to meet legal costs should not be taken into account as liabilities, even when it was being asserted that the legal costs paid should be added back. There was also the last minute change of position in which counsel for the wife argued against the proposition made in her own client’s Papers for the Judge about the wife’s initial contribution.
64 However, I recognise counsel received the brief late for reasons out of the control of everyone involved. Although the conduct of counsel for the wife did prolong the matter, it did not do so to any significant extent. I do not consider this is a matter I should take into account.
Conclusion
65 The major matters of importance in favour of the wife’s claim
for costs are:
(a) the sensible offer of settlement made by the wife near the commencement of the proceedings, albeit the husband was not given much time in which to consider and accept it; (b) the failure of the husband to make any offer of settlement until near the end of the proceedings; (c) the failure of the husband to obtain valuations; (d) the actions of the husband, which led to the wife having to prepare for trial on three different occasions; (e) the expense to which the wife was put in seeking to proceed on an undefended basis.
66 The major matters of importance in favour of the husband’s position in opposing costs are:
(a)
the husband made a very reasonable offer of settlement prior to trial, which would have given the wife more than she ultimately received, albeit the failure to include a component for the wife’s costs made the offer less attractive than it first appears;
(b)
the refusal of the wife to negotiate on the basis the husband might succeed in his claim for residence made it more difficult to resolve the financial issues;
(c)
in the very early stages and in the last part of the litigation, the husband conducted the proceedings appropriately and in a timely fashion;
(d)
the husband was justified in amending his application to seek residence and he was motivated by what he considered was the best interests of his children. Although he did not succeed, he presented an arguable case that was difficult for the Court to determine.
67 In these circumstances I am not satisfied the husband should pay all of the wife’s costs as she proposes. Nor were there any specific submissions advanced to support an order for costs to be awarded on an indemnity basis, although there were parts of the proceedings necessitated by the husband’s failure to comply with orders that could reasonably attract an award of indemnity costs.
68 However, the manner in which the husband conducted the proceedings overall was entirely unsatisfactory. His conduct caused the wife to incur substantially greater legal costs than she otherwise would. This, combined with his failure to respond sensibly to the wife’s original offer of settlement, must inevitably lead to an order for him to make a significant contribution towards the wife’s costs.
69 I do take into account the fact that the husband has very limited property as a result of the orders I have made. He earns a very modest income. He has significant legal costs of his own. Whilst his poor financial position is an important consideration, so too is the wife’s. It is true she has more of the property, but she also has the main responsibility of caring for three young children.
70 To a large extent, the husband is the author of his own misfortune. Therefore, notwithstanding his very difficult financial circumstances, I have determined it is appropriate for him to make a substantial contribution to the wife’s costs.
Quantum
71 I am very reluctant to order a taxation of costs. The litigation has gone on for far too long and cost far too much. If I were to order a taxation, the parties would not know their respective entitlements and obligations for a very long time. They would incur further legal costs in having the costs assessed. Furthermore, the husband is not being ordered to pay all of the wife’s costs or a fixed proportion of them. My assessment of what he should pay involves a very subjective exercise of discretion to take account of the competing factors I have identified above. In exercising my discretion, I take account of the fact this case was very expensive for both parties, especially the wife in the early stages when she was endeavouring valiantly to gather the evidence to assist the Court to make its determination. Her costs, even by the time of the undefended hearing, exceeded $18,000. Although this seemed excessive, the wife had nevertheless incurred enormous legal costs, even at an early stage of the proceedings.
72 I have had significant involvement in this matter from an early stage. I consider I am well placed in taking a broad-brush approach in determining what would be a reasonable contribution for the husband to make towards the wife’s costs. I consider the husband should contribute towards the wife’s costs in an amount of $15,000. This figure is inclusive of the costs already ordered against the husband (and the interest now outstanding on the unpaid amounts).
Orders
1. The husband contribute to the wife’s costs in the sum of $15,000, payable from the husband’s share of the proceeds of sale of the shed property.
2. All earlier orders for costs be discharged.
I certify that the preceding [72] paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons
for
judgment delivered by this Honourable Court
Associate
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