AZU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AZU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1336

Appeal from: AZU16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 3016
File number: NSD 2122 of 2017
Judge: DAVIES J
Date of judgment: 20 August 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court (“FCC”) – primary judge dismissed application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“AAT”) affirming decision not to grant appellant protection visa – appellant claimed real risk of significant harm if returned to India due to homosexuality – AAT rejected credibility of protection claims -  FCC concluded credibility findings reasonably open and no denial of procedural fairness – no error in decision below – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(aa), 36(2B)(a), 438
Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 93 ALJR 252; [2019] HCA 3
Date of hearing: 20 August 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 17
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms A Davyskib of MinterEllison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 2122 of 2017
BETWEEN:

AZU16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

DAVIES J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 AUGUST 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)

DAVIES J:

  1. The appellant has appealed the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCC”) which dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“the Minister”) not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa.

  2. This matter has a long procedural history which is set out at [9]-[15] of the decision of the Tribunal (“the 2016 Tribunal decision”).  It is sufficient for present purposes to note that in 2015 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister (“the 2015 Tribunal decision”) with respect to an application for a protection visa that was made by the appellant in 2014 relying upon the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), making claims to fear harm in India due to his homosexuality.  The Tribunal accepted the appellant’s claim that he is a homosexual, but it was not satisfied that the appellant had suffered any significant harm in India for the reasons of his sexuality, nor was it satisfied that there was any real risk of the appellant suffering significant harm for reasons…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1336
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of AZU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves the appellant, who has been the subject of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) not to grant a protection visa. The appellant had claimed that he faced a real risk of significant harm if returned to India due to his homosexuality. The AAT found the appellant's claims lacked credibility and rejected them. The Federal Circuit Court (FCC) dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review, holding that the AAT's findings were open on the evidence and there was no procedural unfairness. The appellant has appealed to the Federal Court against the FCC's decision.

The primary legal issues in the appeal were whether the AAT's findings of fact, particularly those related to the credibility of the appellant's claims, were open on the evidence and whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness. The appellant argued that the AAT's findings were incorrect and that he was denied procedural fairness as the AAT had changed its view on his sexual orientation from one hearing to the next. The Minister contended that the AAT's findings were open and there was no procedural unfairness.

The Federal Court held that the AAT's findings were open on the evidence. The Court noted that the AAT had thoroughly considered the appellant's claims and provided detailed reasons for rejecting them. The Court further held that there was no procedural unfairness as the AAT had not changed its view on the appellant's sexual orientation but had instead considered the appellant's credibility in light of the entire body of evidence. The Court concluded that the AAT's decision was correct and that the appeal should be dismissed.

The orders of the Court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the costs of the Minister. The costs were to be taxed if the parties could not agree on them. This case underscores the importance of the AAT's role in assessing the credibility of protection claims and the deference courts give to such findings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

This matter has a long procedural history which is set out at [9]-[15] of the decision of the Tribunal (“the 2016 Tribunal decision”). It is sufficient for present purposes to note that in 2015 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister (“the 2015 Tribunal decision”) with respect to an application for a protection visa that was made by the appellant in 2014 relying upon the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), making claims to fear harm in India due to his homosexuality. The Tribunal accepted the appellant’s claim that he is a homosexual, but it was not satisfied that the appellant had suffered any significant harm in India for the reasons of his sexuality, nor was it satisfied that there was any real risk of the appellant suffering significant harm for reasons of anything he had done in India, should he now return. However, the Tribunal did accept that he would face a real risk of significant harm if he returned to his home region in India for reasons related to his homosexuality. The Tribunal then considered and found that he could safely relocate to another region in India. By consent, the 2015 Tribunal decision was quashed by order of the FCC on 2 December 2015, and a writ of mandamus issued directed to the Tribunal requiring it to determine the application for review according to law. A note attached to the consent order stated that the Minister had conceded that the 2015 Tribunal decision was affected by jurisdictional error with respect to the application of the statutory test in s 36(2B)(a) of the Act as to whether it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to an area of India other than his home state. The rehearing of the appellant’s application for review was before a differently constituted Tribunal. The 2016 Tribunal decision affirmed the delegate’s decision. In short, the 2016 Tribunal rejected the credibility of the appellant’s protection claims, including his underlying factual assertions. The 2016 Tribunal did not accept that the appellant was homosexual, that he had ever been involved in homosexual relationships, or that he had been attacked in India because he is or was suspected of being homosexual. The 2016 Tribunal therefore concluded that the appellant did not satisfy the complementary protection criterion. The appellant sought judicial review of the 2016 Tribunal decision. The appellant, who represented himself at the FCC hearing, relied on several grounds. It is not easy to ascertain the precise grounds that were relied upon, as the appellant, in his judicial review application, identified the grounds by reference to attachments, which contained within them reference to considerable material. However, it appears from the reasons for decision of the FCC that the grounds, in substance, amounted to the following: (1) a challenge to the correctness of the findings below; (2) a claim that the appellant had been denied procedural fairness, in that in the 2015 Tribunal decision it was accepted that he was homosexual but the 2016 Tribunal decision recorded a different conclusion; and (3) a claim that the Tribunal had failed to consider a claim or misunderstood his evidence at the hearing.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established