Aziz v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1242
•6 August 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Aziz v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1242
File number(s): SYG 784 of 2021 Judgment of: JUDGE SKAROS Date of judgment: 6 August 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Judicial review – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Other Family visas – whether the Tribunal erred in relation to reg 1.15AA(1)(e)(i) of the Regulations – where the Court finds that the Tribunal did explore the reasonableness of the assistance being provided by various relatives – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 477(1).
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.15AA, sch 2 cl 836.221.
Cases cited: El-Chahini v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCA 202
Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1460
Valencia v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 397
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 57 Date of hearing: 15 April 2025 Place: Parramatta Counsel for the Applicants: Mr O Jones Solicitor for the Applicants: Infinity Law Group Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G Johnson Solicitor for the Respondents: Mills Oakley ORDERS
SYG 784 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: REFAA H AZIZ
First Applicant
SAFAA AZIZ
Second Applicant
MADELINE AZIZ (and others named in the Schedule)
Third Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE SKAROS
DATE OF ORDER:
6 AUGUST 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application filed on 5 May 2021, and amended on 3 September 2021, is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE SKAROS:
By application filed on 5 May 2021, and amended on 3 September 2021, the applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal[1] (the Tribunal) dated 25 July 2019. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (the delegate) of the first respondent (the Minister) in refusing to grant the applicants’ Other Family (Residence) (Class BU) (Carer) Subclass 836 visas (the visas) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
[1] The Court notes that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal has been superseded by the Administrative Review Tribunal. Item 10, Part 2 of Schedule 16 to the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 provides that for any proceedings that were pending in any court or tribunal immediately before the transition time and to which the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was a party, the Administrative Review Tribunal is, after the transition time, substituted for the Tribunal as a party to the proceedings.
BACKGROUND
The application for the visas was made on the basis that the first applicant (the applicant) satisfied the requirements of the visa. The second, third, fourth and fifth applicants, being the applicant’s husband and three children, were included in the application as members of her family unit.
The applicant was born in Iraq and is a citizen of the United States. The applicants arrived in Australia on 29 April 2016 as holders of visitor visas. On 26 July 2016, the applicants lodged the application for the visas. The applicant applied for the visa on the basis that she was the carer of her mother (the sponsor), who is a permanent resident of Australia.
On 11 July 2018, the delegate refused to grant the applicants the visas on the basis that cl 836.221 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations) had not been met. The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant met the definition of a carer as set out in reg 1.15AA(e) of the Regulations, which provides that the assistance required ‘cannot reasonably be provided by any other relative of the resident who is an Australian citizen, permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen, or reasonably obtained from welfare, hospital, nursing or community services in Australia’.
On 18 July 2018, the applicants applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. The applicant and the sponsor (the applicant’s mother) appeared before the Tribunal at a hearing on 25 March 2021. The representative attended the hearing.
On 29 March 2021, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.
THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION
The Tribunal summarised the circumstances of the sponsor and her relatives who reside in Australia. The sponsor was born in Iraq, was 70 years old (at the time of the Tribunal’s decision) and suffered from osteoarthritis, a lumbar spine fracture and degeneration, depression and a post-traumatic stress disorder. She required assistance with bathing, showering, dressing, grooming, eating, and supervision for her medication, personal safety and transportation.
The Tribunal then summarised the information provided by (and on behalf of) the applicant and the sponsor in support of the review. The Tribunal noted that the applicant did not provide any further statements from any of the sponsor’s relatives or any material about contact she had made with community services. It noted the submission that family members were unwilling or unable to assist with the required care of the sponsor and that community care was either unavailable or unaffordable for the sponsor. The applicant stated the sponsor also had three sisters in Australia but was unable to provide further details.
The applicant said that when she contacted community care, she was informed they could only provide three hours of care a day to the sponsor and they refused this service because the sponsor required 24-hour care. The applicant had not made any further contact with any other community services for more than three years.
When it was put to the applicant that it appeared family members and community care providers could provide the required care to the sponsor, the applicant said none of the family members were willing or able to assist and that the sponsor’s mental health needs were only understood by her.
The Tribunal noted that the sponsor’s grandchild was receiving a carer’s pension for caring for his mother and this indicated he could provide care for the sponsor and other information suggested that other family members had been providing care for the sponsor in the past. The applicant stated the sponsor wanted the applicant to care for her.
The sponsor told the Tribunal that she and her husband were still married but could not live together, that her son was looking after her husband (as his carer) and could not care for her also. She said her family are busy and cannot care for her and she only wanted the applicant to care for her. The sponsor did not provide any details about her sisters or any children they may have and said she had not spoken to them since leaving Iraq. The sponsor stated she never left home, save for visiting the doctors, but later acknowledged she also went to church once or twice a month. She claimed that nobody visited her.
The Tribunal identified that the dispositive issue on the review was whether the applicant was a carer as required by reg 1.15AA of the Regulations.
First, the Tribunal considered whether relatives in Australia could reasonably provide the assistance to the sponsor. The Tribunal identified the sponsor’s children and grandchildren:
•Thaer Hekma Azeez Azessz Azeez, 41 years old – son;
•Maying, 21 years old – granddaughter;
•Thatic, 19 years old – grandson;
•Muntaha Hekma Azeez Azeez, 42 years old – daughter;
•Youseff, 19 years old, grandson;
•Fahad Hikmat Azeez Azeez, 31 years old – son;
•Rawaa Hekma Azeez Azeez, 52 years old, 1/3/1969 – daughter;
•Nour, 22 years old – granddaughter; and
•Nahlah Azeez, 46 years old – daughter;
•Alex, 26 years old – grandson;
•Eevet, 23 years old – granddaughter;
•Rafal, 21 years old – grandson;
•Dani, 19 years old – grandson; and
•Angela, 18 years old – granddaughter.
The Tribunal noted the lack of up-to-date information and statements about the relatives and considered the evidence before it as to each of these relatives and made findings as to whether they could assist the sponsor, and the level of assistance that could be provided. In doing so, it listed and considered the familial, medical, employment, study and other relevant circumstances of each relative.
In summary, the Tribunal found as follows (at [63], [66] and [67])
[63] As set out above, the sponsor has five children and nine grandchildren all over the age of 18 years who reside in Australia. One of her grandchildren, Maying, is planning to immigrate to the United States and the Tribunal accepts that in those circumstances she would not be able to provide any assistance to the sponsor. Of the other relatives, the Tribunal finds that it would be reasonable for each of them to provide at least some assistance to the sponsor. For some, such as Rawaa and Nahlah, this assistance would be limited due to their own medical issues. For others, such as Thaer Azeez, Muntaha Azeez and Eevet, this would be substantial. This would include the sponsor living with those relatives so that they would be able to provide care overnight as well as substantial care during the day. Other relatives would be able to provide the relative with whom the sponsor was living respite by also providing care to the extent that it would be reasonable for them to do so as set out above. This would include for some of the relatives providing care overnight or on weekends or when they were not working or attending their studies.
…
[66] The Tribunal finds that a combination of the relatives of the sponsor resident in Australia would more than meet the assistance requirements of the sponsor. The level of assistance of each relative could provide, as set out above, varies. Some of the relatives are able to provide substantial assistance and this would meet the majority of, if not all, the assistance requirements of the sponsor. The other relatives would be able to provide any relative providing the substantial assistance to the sponsor respite and opportunities to pursue their own affairs. With 13 relatives all able to provide assistance to some extent this would minimise the burden on any one relative in meeting the assistance requirements of the sponsor.
[67] For the above reasons, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the assistance required by the sponsor cannot reasonably be provided by other relatives of the sponsor resident in Australia, either individually or in combination.
The Tribunal noted the sponsor’s claims that she had no contact with her sisters or any children they may have and did not take those relatives into account when considering any assistance that could reasonably be provided to the sponsor. The Tribunal also considered that there was nothing to indicate that the sponsor could not live with one of her relatives if required, either in their accommodation or in some other accommodation.
Relevant to the ground of review in these proceedings is the Tribunal’s findings that relatives could live with the sponsor or vice versa:
(a)At [35], that Maying could ‘live with her child and husband with the sponsor in the home the sponsor currently rents’;
(b)At [38], that Thatic could ‘liv[e] with the sponsor in the home where she currently resides’ and at [39] that he would be ‘able to live with the sponsor in any home she chose to live so that he would be able to provide overnight supervision and assistance’;
(c)At [41]-[42], that the sponsor ‘would … be able to live with Muntaha’ and that Muntaha could reasonably provide assistance to the sponsor ‘including living with the sponsor…’
(d)At [48], that there was ‘nothing to indicate that Nour would not be able to live with the sponsor’;
(e)At [55], that there was ‘nothing to indicate that the sponsor would not be able to live with Eevet and Eevet’s husband and child’; and
(f)At [60], that Angela could provide overnight assistance to the sponsor if she ‘lived with the sponsor.’
The Tribunal made findings as to whether community services could also assist with the requirements of the sponsor. Despite its concerns as to the lack of any attempt to obtain these services and the applicant’s evidence that only three hours of care a day could be provided, the Tribunal accepted the applicant’s evidence. It found that community services could not meet all the needs of the sponsor but it could reduce the burden of relatives assisting her.
Accordingly, the Tribunal found that, with the assistance that could reasonably be provided by relatives of the sponsor and the services that could be reasonably obtained from community services, the sponsor’s needs would be fully met. Therefore, the applicant did not meet the requirements of reg 1.15AA(1)(e) and the Tribunal was not satisfied she was a carer and affirmed the decision under review.
APPLICATION TO THIS COURT
The application which commenced proceedings in this Court was for an extension of time to seek judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. The prescribed period by which the applicants had to file their application for judicial review ended on 3 May 2021. The application was not filed until 5 May 2021. On 31 January 2023, an order (by consent) was made by a Registrar of the Court that the time for making an application provided by s 477(1) of the Act be extended up to and including 5 May 2021. Accordingly, the Court need only consider the ground of judicial review advanced by the amended application.
On 16 April 2025, the applicants filed written submissions and on 2 May 2025 the Minister filed written submissions.
At the hearing on 15 May 2025 the applicants were represented by Mr O Jones of Counsel and the Minister was represented by Mr G Johnson of Counsel. The oral submissions of the parties developed their written submissions.
GROUND OF REVIEW
The application for judicial review raises the following ground (without alteration):
1.The Second Respondent (Tribunal) made a jurisdictional error in relation to reg l.15AA(l)(e)(i) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations).
a. Clause 836.221 in Sch 2 to the Regulations required the Applicant to be a “carer”;
b. Reg l.l5AA(l)(e)(i) of the Regulations required that the assistance needed by the sponsor in need of care "cannot reasonably be ... provided by any other relative of the resident, being a relative who is an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen":
c. Reg 1.15AA(l)(e)(ii) of the Regulations required that the assistance needed by the sponsor in need of care "cannot reasonably be ... obtained from welfare, hospital, nursing or community services in Australia";
d. There is nothing in the language of reg.s l.15AA(l)(e)(i) and l.15AA(l)(e)(ii) of the Regulations to prevent reasonable receipt of assistance from others arising from satisfaction of the provisions combined. Nor is there anything in reg l.15AA(l)(e)(i) of the Regulations to prevent its satisfaction by a number of relatives: see. generally, Nguyen v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCA 688 at [15], [32];
e. As a general proposition, the Tribunal in applying reg 1.15AA(1)(e) need not “specify how the [sponsor’s] needs might precisely be met by the family members already in Australia” or provide “prescriptive detail and particularity”: Nguyen at [40];
f. On the other hand, reliance by the Tribunal on a specific matter may lead to jurisdictional error where the Tribunal fails to engage with reasonableness in respect of that matter. For example, in El-Chahini v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCA 202 at [23], the Tribunal found that it was not impossible for the sponsor to move close to her relatives in another part of Australia. The Tribunal had not engaged with the actual needs of the person in assessing reasonableness and had, therefore, not performed its task under reg l.15AA(l)(e)(i) of the Regulations;
g. A significant part of the Tribunal's reasoning was that one relative or another could live with the sponsor (at [35]. [38], [39], [41]-[42], [48], [55], [60], [62], [63])
h. The Tribunal did not engage with the circumstances of the relatives it considered should live with the sponsor. It merely asserted that the co-habitation could occur or indicated there was no basis for concluding that it could not occur. A finding of reasonableness by reference to such specific conduct on the part of the relatives required, in light of the authorities, more in order to satisfy reg 1.15AA(l)(e)(i) of the Regulations.
The applicants contend that the Tribunal, when considering the requirement in reg 1.15AA(1)(e)(i), failed to consider the reasonableness of family members providing the assistance that was needed by the sponsor, and thereby fell into the same type of error that arose in El-Chahini v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCA 202 (‘El-Chahini’).
In El-Chahini, the sponsor (the mother) in that case indicated that she wished to remain in her home in Sydney and did not wish to relocate to Young, where her daughter and six adult grandchildren lived. The Tribunal concluded that direct assistance could reasonably be provided by the sponsor’s relatives in Young, stating that ‘it was not satisfied that it would be impossible for the mother to find accommodation in Young’, where she could relocate to live closer to her daughter, and that the sponsor could find doctors in Young: El Chahini at [8] and [20]. In respect of these conclusions, Jagot J found at [20] that they exposed a failure on the part of the Tribunal to engage with the case that had been put.
In considering the Tribunal’s reasoning, Her Honour stated at [21]:
…It is not apparent that the Tribunal has engaged with the actual needs of the mother for assistance and the impact of those needs on the capacity of her daughter in Young and adult grandchildren, all of whom are married, working and have their own families, to provide such assistance. While the Tribunal referred to the carer visa assessment in its reasons and, as noted, at [10] identified the wide range of assistance the mother required for daily living, when the Tribunal came to assess whether the mother’s relatives could reasonably provide those kinds of assistance it did not mention, let alone evaluate, the nature of the mother’s needs. The Tribunal’s assessment consisted of nothing more than a stated satisfaction that it would not be impossible for the mother to find accommodation in Young, it would be possible for her to find doctors in Young and her family could jointly provide the required assistance.
The applicants contend that the Tribunal made a similar error because it failed to engage with aspects of the statutory test, which required it to consider the reasonableness of the sponsor living with relatives rather than simply asserting that she could live with her husband, children or grandchildren and finding there was no evidence that a change in living arrangements could not take place. It was contended that the absence of evidence was only part of the regulation and that it was necessary for the Tribunal to consider ‘reasonableness’ to properly complete its statutory task.
In oral submissions, the applicants took issue with the Tribunal’s comments at [32] where the Tribunal, in reflecting on the evidence before it, said it was difficult to understand why the sponsor and her husband could not live together and that it ‘does not appear be unreasonable’ for them to do so and be cared for by their son Thaer Azeez. It was submitted that this was not an unequivocal (stand-alone) finding by the Tribunal that Thaer Azeez could provide all the relevant assistance, such that any error in the balance of reasons would be immaterial. This was not a point of contention between the parties and the Minister agreed that [32], read in context, was not intended to be a separate (and alternative) finding by the Tribunal.
As to the statutory test in reg 1.15AA(1)(e)(i), which is stated in negative, (‘that the assistance cannot reasonably be provided’), the applicants contend that this did not permit the Tribunal to invoke a positive state of affairs without proper foundation, including in circumstances where the applicant has not disproved them, to disqualify the applicant.
The applicants took issue with the (positive) findings made by the Tribunal about the assistance that could be provided by various relatives and, significantly, with the findings made about which relatives could live with the sponsor and/or whom the sponsor could live with. In relying on the reasons of Jagot J in El Chahini at [23] and [24], it was contended that the Tribunal in the present case similarly failed to explore (or evaluate) the premise, on which it relied to disqualify the applicant, that a relative (or combination thereof) could cohabit with the sponsor and provide the assistance needed. The error going to jurisdiction, as contended by the applicants, was the Tribunal’s failure to explore whether those relatives could reasonably provide the assistance needed by the sponsor.
The Minister contended that the Tribunal did not misapply reg 1.15AA(1)(e)(i). It was submitted that the Tribunal’s approach was consistent with the findings of Buchanan J in Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1460 (Nguyen) at [31] – [32] that assistance can be provided by a combination of relatives in Australia or external services, or by ‘a reasonable combination of the two’.
As to the applicants’ reliance on El Chahini, the Minister contended that the Tribunal in the present case did not fall into the same error (as the Tribunal in El Chahini) of failing to engage with the reasonableness of a relative providing the assistance needed without reference to the ‘actual needs’ of the sponsor. It was also contended that the Tribunal in the present case engaged with the evidence before it when considering the reasonableness of the assistance that could be provided to the sponsor, including a change in living arrangements, by each of the sponsor’s relatives in Australia.
Consideration
In conducting the review, the Tribunal was required to determine whether, at the time of its decision, the applicant satisfied cl 836.221 of the Regulations, which in turn required the applicant to satisfy the definition of ‘carer’ in reg 1.15AA. That provision relevantly stated:
1.15AA Carer
(1) An applicant for a visa is a carer of a person who is an Australian citizen usually resident in Australia, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen (the resident) if:
….
(b) according to a certificate that meets the requirements of subregulation (2):
….
(iv) because of the medical condition, the person has, and will continue for at least 2 years to have, a need for direct assistance in attending to the practical aspects of daily life; and
….
(d) if the person to whom the certificate relates is not the resident, the resident has a permanent or long-term need for assistance in providing the direct assistance mentioned in subparagraph (b)(iv); and
(e) the assistance cannot reasonably be:
(i) provided by any other relative of the resident, being a relative who is an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen; or
(ii) obtained from welfare, hospital, nursing or community services in Australia; and
…
Regulation 1.15AA(1)(e) required the Tribunal to be satisfied that the assistance (being the ‘direct assistance’ in attending to practical aspects of daily life, as described in reg 1.15AA(1)(b)(iv), for which the sponsor has a need), ‘cannot reasonably be provided’ by any other relative of the sponsor or obtained from care/community services in Australia. This provision was discussed in Valencia v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 397 (Valencia) where Perram J said at [9]:
[9] … The effect of subcl (1)(e)(i) is that if the relatives of the person requiring care are residents and could reasonably provide this direct assistance then the visa applicant cannot be a carer. The severity with which this requirement operates may be observed: it does not ask whether the relatives will provide the direct assistance but rather only whether they reasonably could. Subclause (1)(e)(i) contemplates in its operation, therefore, that a person will not satisfy the carer requirements if there are Australian resident relatives who refuse to assist when they reasonably could: Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1460 at [45]–[53] per Bromwich J.
[10] … Additionally, since subcl (1)(e) is cast in the negative it must be shown that the direct assistance cannot be reasonably provided or obtained. …
[11] Correspondingly, the Tribunal in coming to the opposite view is not obliged to work out a detailed analysis of a how a patchwork of familial or privately contracted care might combine to provide the required care: Nguyen v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCA 688 at [38]–[40] per Buchanan J. This has the effect — not immediately obvious when one first reads the subclause — of requiring the visa applicant to disprove a large range of potential scenarios involving the hypothetical assistance of the person to whom care is to be given.
I accept the Minister’s submission that the test, being stipulated in the negative, required the applicants to provide evidence to persuade the Tribunal that the assistance cannot reasonably be provided by any other relative.
I also accept the applicants’ submission that the Tribunal, in making its assessment, was required to engage with the evidence before it about the ‘actual needs’ of the sponsor for assistance and consider the ‘reasonableness’ (by reference to those needs) of the sponsor’s relatives providing her with the required assistance: El-Chahini [21], [23] – [24].
The material provided in support of the claim that the assistance cannot reasonably be provided by any other relative was, as acknowledged by the applicants, quite limited. I will return to discuss the nature of that material and the efforts made by the Tribunal to obtain current and relevant information about the capacity of other relatives to provide the assistance needed by the sponsor.
The Tribunal’s reasons plainly disclose that it had regard to the sponsor’s medical condition, noting at [6] that she suffered from osteoarthritis in her upper and lower limbs, a lumbar spine fracture and degeneration, and depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.
As to the needs of the sponsor, the Tribunal noted that this included assistance with bathing, showering, dressing, grooming, eating and supervision for her medication, personal safety and transportation: [6].
At [7] of its reasons, the Tribunal observed that the evidence before the delegate regarding the support that could be provided to the sponsor by relatives in Australia consisted of brief statements from the sponsor’s family members claiming they could not provide any support to their mother. Given the limited evidence before it, the Tribunal sought current information about all the relatives of the sponsor, including grandchildren, and requested statements as to why the relatives were not able to provide assistance to the sponsor. The Tribunal also requested information about any contact that had been made for community support services for the sponsor: CB 271, 309: [13]. The Tribunal records at [14] that the requested information was not provided and that it had received a submission from the applicants’ representative stating that the family members, due to their circumstances, were ‘unwilling or unable to provide the required care’ and that the family had looked into community care for the sponsor, but it was either not available or unaffordable.
Given the limited evidence about the sponsor’s relatives and their capacity to provide the assistance needed by the sponsor, the Tribunal went to great lengths at the hearing to obtain as much information as it could about the sponsor’s relatives in Australia and their circumstances.
The oral evidence obtained at the hearing indicated that the sponsor had the following relatives in Australia: three sisters, three daughters, two sons and nine grandchildren who were over 18 years of age. The Tribunal’s reasons disclose that it had sought information about the circumstances of each of those relatives to ascertain whether the assistance needed by the sponsor ‘cannot reasonably be provided’ by any other relative.
Paragraph [30] plainly demonstrates that the Tribunal understood the task it was required to undertake when making its assessment about the reasonableness (or otherwise) of the assistance that could be provided by each relative to meet the sponsor’s needs. As it stated:
The Tribunal has considered all the circumstances of the relatives of the sponsor and whether the assistance required by the sponsor cannot reasonably be provided by those relatives. This includes assessing the level of assistance that those relatives can reasonably provide and whether a combination of the sponsor’s relatives resident in Australia can meet the sponsor’s assistance requirements.
(emphasis added)
In relation to the sponsor’s three sisters who resided in Sydney, including any children they may have, the Tribunal considered the evidence before it that the sponsor did not have contact with them or their families and decided not to take these relatives into account when considering whether the assistance required by the sponsor cannot reasonably be provided by those relatives: [61].
Nevertheless, the Tribunal considered there were 14 other relatives of the sponsor, including five children and nine grandchildren, who lived nearby, 13 of whom could reasonably provide some assistance to the sponsor which, in combination, would ‘more than meet’ the assistance needed: [62], [63] and [66].
Relying on the evidence it had before it (limited as it was) about the personal circumstances of each relative, including their work and family commitments, travel plans, study commitments, health/medical conditions and carer obligations for other family members, the Tribunal considered what assistance could reasonably be provided by each family member to meet the needs of the sponsor: see [33]–[60].
In considering the circumstances of each relative, the Tribunal formed the view that some family members could, or would be able to, (there being no evidence to the contrary), live with the sponsor, have the sponsor live with them or provide overnight supervision and assistance: for example, Maying at [35], Thatic at [38] and [39], Muntaha at [41]–[42], Fahad at [44], Nour at [48] Eevet at [55] and Angela at [60].
As emphasised by the Minister in oral submissions, the stipulation in reg 1.15AA(1)(e) is a negative one, which is of importance when examining the findings made by the Tribunal. I am persuaded by the Minister’s submission that, with respect to the findings about certain relatives being able to reside (or stay overnight) with the sponsor, the Tribunal was not making unfounded positive findings of fact, but it was making findings about the absence of any evidence that those relatives could not provide that assistance. To draw out this point, the Minister referred to several paragraphs in the Tribunal’s reasons, including the following example regarding the applicant’s daughter Muntaha at [40]–[42]:
40. Muntaha Azeez is the daughter of the sponsor. She is a single mother who claims to look after her children, Youseff who is 19, Helen who is 16 and Christina who is 10 years old. She previously claimed to be working at a childcare centre, however, it is now claimed that she works part-time at Woolworth’s Supermarket, working about 20 or 25 hours per week.
41. There is nothing to indicate that Muntaha Azeez does not have the capacity to care for the sponsor. The fact that she works not more than 25 hours a week indicates that her children do not require her presence at all times. It is noted that Youseff, at 19 years of age, is an adult and would not need supervision from his mother. Her two daughters attend school and Muntaha Azeez would be available during school hours to provide the assistance required by the sponsor. There is nothing to indicate that the sponsor would not be able to live with Muntaha Azeez, which would enable her to provide all her care overnight as well as during the day.
42. The Tribunal finds that the assistance required by the sponsor could reasonably be provided by Muntaha Azeez, including living with the sponsor to provide all the assistance and care requirements of the sponsor including any hygiene or toiletry assistance. Apart from when she is working for 25 hours a week, she would also be able to provide any daytime assistance for the sponsor.
The Tribunal’s findings in respect of which relatives could (or would be able to) reside with the sponsor, have the sponsor reside with them or provide overnight supervision, followed similar lines of reasoning. The Tribunal considered the evidence before it regarding the personal circumstances of each of the sponsor’s relatives, which informed its findings about what assistance that relative could reasonably provide to the sponsor and, in the absence of satisfactory evidence to the contrary, the Tribunal found that some of those relatives could cohabit with (or provide overnight supervision to) the sponsor and provide the assistance she required. It cannot be said that the Tribunal failed to engage with the circumstances of the sponsor’s relatives.
This is not a case like El Chahini, where the Tribunal failed to explore and assess the reasonableness of other relatives providing the required assistance to the sponsor by reference to her actual needs.
In the absence of satisfactory evidence as to why the sponsor’s other children and/or grandchildren were unwilling or unable (as claimed) to provide the required assistance to the sponsor, the Tribunal in this case obtained as much information as it could at the hearing about the circumstances of each relative for the purposes of its assessment.
Based on the information before it (as to the circumstances of each relative) and the assistance required by the sponsor, and having regard to the task it was required to undertake (as stipulated in reg 1.15AA(1)(e)), the Tribunal made an assessment about whether the assistance (needed by the sponsor) ‘cannot reasonably be provided’ by any other relative.
The Tribunal considered, for the detailed reasons it gave, that the assistance required by the sponsor could be met by a combination of relatives living in Australia. The Tribunal ultimately concluded that it could not be satisfied that the assistance required cannot reasonably be provided by a relevant relative or obtained from a care/community service.
The Tribunal’s findings were not without foundation, and I have not been persuaded that the Tribunal failed to explore the reasonableness of the assistance being provided by various relatives, including the reasonableness of the sponsor cohabiting with (or receiving overnight assistance from) one or more of her relatives. I accept the Minister’s submission that it was open for the Tribunal to make the findings that it did.
There was no failure on the part of the Tribunal to perform (or complete) its statutory task.
The applicants have not established jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. It follows, that the application for judicial review must be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Skaros. Associate:
Dated: 6 AUGUST 2025
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
SYG 784 of 2021 Applicants
Fourth Applicant:
JONATHAN FADI AZIZ
Fifth Applicant:
MICHAEL AZIZ
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