FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| AYZ18 v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS | [2019] FCCA 2070 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for review of a decision of a Ministerial delegate – where the delegate found the applicant provided a “bogus document” – whether delegate failed to take into account a relevant consideration – whether delegate made illogical and unreasonable findings – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5, 36, 46A, 66, 91WA, 476, 499 |
| Applicant: | AYZ18 |
| Respondent: | MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
| File Number: | PEG 132 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Kendall |
| Hearing date: | 8 May 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 8 May 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Perth |
| Delivered on: | 31 July 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr D Blades |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Chisholm Law |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms R Graycar |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Sparke Helmore Lawyers |
ORDERS
The applicant have leave to amend particular (b) of ground 1 of the application dated 16 April 2019 to the following terms:
On 1 September 2017 DFAT prepared a report entitled “DFAT Country Information Report Pakistan” (“DFAT Report”) for protection status determination purposes.
The applicant have leave to rely on the affidavit of Shayla Marie Strapps affirmed 5 March 2019.
The application, as amended, be dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PERTH |
PEG 132 of 2018
| AYZ18 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The applicant in these proceedings seeks judicial review under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”) of a decision made by a delegate of the respondent, the Minister for Home Affairs (the “Minister”), to deny the applicant a Temporary Protection (subclass 785) visa (the “visa”).
The applicant filed an amended application in this Court with new grounds on 16 April 2019. It is uncontroversial that for the applicant to succeed in this Court he must demonstrate that one of the grounds in his judicial review application establishes jurisdictional error.
The Court had before it the detailed Court Book (“CB”) spanning 186 pages, written submissions from the applicant dated 24 April 2019 and written submissions from the respondent dated 1 May 2019.
This matter was heard on 8 May 2019. The Court was assisted by Mr Blades of Counsel for the applicant and Ms Graycar of Counsel for the Minister.
Background
The applicant (at [1]-[24]) and the Minister (at [1]-[7]) both…
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- Case
- [2019] FCCA 2070
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The applicant's judicial review application was based on four grounds, but the primary ground considered by the Court concerned an alleged jurisdictional error by the delegate. Specifically, the applicant argued that the delegate failed to take into account a relevant consideration, namely a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) country information report prepared for protection status determination purposes. This failure, the applicant contended, was a breach of Ministerial Direction No. 56, which mandates that such reports be considered where relevant. The applicant argued that paragraph 3.9 of the Pakistan DFAT Report, which suggested it was plausible for Afghans to access identity documentation through the Afghan Consulate in Quetta, was directly relevant to the delegate's finding that the applicant's Taskera was a bogus document because it was purportedly issued in Quetta.
The Court found that while the delegate was required to comply with Direction No. 56, the applicant had not satisfied the Court that the delegate failed to take into account relevant information from the Pakistan DFAT Report. The delegate had indeed referenced the report, although not specifically paragraph 3.9. The Court inferred that the delegate considered the information in paragraph 3.9 but afforded it little weight in light of other, more specific information obtained from the Afghan Consulate in Quetta, which indicated that Taskeras could only be obtained from Afghanistan and not issued by consulates. The Court held that the delegate was not obliged to refer to every piece of evidence or to give specific reasons for not relying on a particular piece of information, provided that the delegate had regard to all relevant materials and provided adequate reasons for the decision. The Court concluded that the delegate had undertaken an evaluative assessment and that the preference for other information over paragraph 3.9 did not constitute jurisdictional error.
Consequently, the Court granted leave to amend the applicant's application to refer to the correct DFAT report and to rely on a specific affidavit. However, the Court dismissed the application as amended, finding no jurisdictional error on the part of the delegate. The final orders reflected these decisions, including the dismissal of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The applicant have leave to amend particular (b) of ground 1 of the application dated 16 April 2019 to the following terms:
On 1 September 2017 DFAT prepared a report entitled “DFAT Country Information Report Pakistan” (“DFAT Report”) for protection status determination purposes.
2.
The applicant have leave to rely on the affidavit of Shayla Marie Strapps affirmed 5 March 2019.
3.
The application, as amended, be dismissed.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT PERTH
PEG 132 of 2018
AYZ18
Applicant
And
MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
1.
The applicant in these proceedings seeks judicial review under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”) of a decision made by a delegate of the respondent, the Minister for Home Affairs (the “Minister”), to deny the applicant a Temporary Protection (subclass 785) visa (the “visa”).
2.
The applicant filed an amended application in this Court with new grounds on 16 April 2019. It is uncontroversial that for the applicant to succeed in this Court he must demonstrate that one of the grounds in his judicial review application establishes jurisdictional error.
3.
The Court had before it the detailed Court Book (“CB”) spanning 186 pages, written submissions from the applicant dated 24 April 2019 and written submissions from the respondent dated 1 May 2019.
4.
This matter was heard on 8 May 2019. The Court was assisted by Mr Blades of Counsel for the applicant and Ms Graycar of Counsel for the Minister.
Background
5.
The applicant (at [1]-[24]) and the Minister (at [1]-[7]) both provided a summary of the background to this matter in their written submissions. The Court has considered those summaries and cross-checked them with the materials in the Court Book. Those summaries are detailed and accurate. The Court adopts them (with some minor amendments) as follows.
6.
The applicant arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival on or around 31 March 2013 (CB 161). The applicant was interviewed by representatives of the Minister’s department on 26 April 2013 and 25 May 2013 (CB 1-6 and 8-25).
7.
By letter dated 18 February 2016 (and another sent on 25 February 2016) , the Minister “lifted the bar” pursuant to s.46A of the Act (CB 26-37).
8.
The applicant applied for the visa on 25 August 2013 (CB 38-80). Attached to that application was a statement of claims which provided as follows:
a) the applicant claimed to be a citizen of Afghanistan, of Hazara origin, but has lived in Pakistan since he was a small child (CB 77 at [15]);
b) he claimed to fear harm if returned to Afghanistan on the basis of his Shia religion (CB 79 at [27]) and Hazara ethnicity as his “appearance is distinctly Hazara” and he does not have protection from any family or friends in the Hazara community in Afghanistan (CB 78 at [20]);
c) he claimed not to know anyone who lives in Afghanistan (CB 79 at [28]) and does not believe he is able to relocate in Afghanistan because the risk of harm extends throughout the whole country; and
d) he claimed he cannot relocate to Pakistan where he has lived most of his life and where his family (including his wife and young child) resides, as he is not a citizen of Pakistan (CB 80 at [31]).
9.
By letter dated 7 September 2016, a Ministerial delegate requested that the applicant provide documentary evidence of his identity, nationality or citizenship (CB 81).
10.
The applicant did not respond to that request.
11.
On 15 November 2016, the applicant was invited to attend an interview with a Ministerial delegate (CB 91).
12.
The applicant attended an interview with a delegate on 7 December 2016. At the interview, he provided a copy of an Afghan Taskera (Identity card) purportedly issued in Quetta Pakistan in 2012 (the “Taskera”) (CB 102), what he claimed was a handwritten marriage certificate or “Mullah’s Certificate” (CB 103-106) and a translation of a marriage certificate that he said was issued from the Afghan Consulate in Quetta (the “Afghan Marriage Certificate”) (CB 144-145).
13.
By letter dated 7 December 2016, the applicant was invited to comment on the fact that the delegate reasonably suspected that the Taskera he had provided to the Department was a “bogus document” (as that term is defined in s.5(1) of the Act) (CB 107). The delegate invited the applicant to provide a reasonable explanation about why he produced a bogus document and was given an opportunity to either produce documentary evidence of his identity or take reasonable steps to produce that evidence (CB 108).
14.
The applicant’s representative provided a response to the delegate on 20 January 2017 indicating that the document was not bogus and was issued in Quetta. Attached to the response was a copy of what was described as the applicant’s father’s taskera and relevant translation (the “Father’s Taskera”) (CB 118-119).
15.
In February and August 2017, the delegate made a number of enquiries to a Forensic Document Examiner and to the Australian High Commission in Islamabad concerning the documents the applicant had provided (CB 120-132 and 135-141).
16.
On 8 August 2017, the delegate wrote again to the representative seeking responses in relation to various identified inconsistencies and discrepancies in the documents and evidence provided by the applicant (CB 133). These inconsistencies pertained to the Afghan Marriage Certificate provided by the applicant and inconsistencies between certain details on the Taskera and the Father’s Taskera. The delegate also asked for an explanation as to why, if it were found that Pakistan was the receiving country, the applicant feared returning there and, if he did, why he could not relocate within Pakistan to another area to avoid persecution (CB 133-134).
17.
By letter dated 30 August 2017, the applicant’s representative responded and provided a copy of the Afghan Marriage Certificate, a copy of an identity verification form (purportedly from Afghan authorities) and an amended translation of the Father’s Taskera (CB 144-155). The responses to the questions asked by the delegate provided as follows:
a) in response to the question about why the details were different between the Taskera and the Father’s Taskera, the agent responded that the applicant was not literate and was not aware of the processes implemented by the Afghan Consulate in Quetta for issuing taskeras. It was explained that the applicant took his Father’s Taskera with him to obtain his own taskera and did not notice any discrepancy. He also indicated, for the first time, that he had obtained a second taskera after his marriage as the first one was lost and that is why it is dated after the date of his marriage; and
b) as for why he could not return to Pakistan, he reiterated that he was a citizen of Afghanistan and made submissions about the dangers of returning to Afghanistan (CB 149-151). The applicant concluded by stating that he feared harm in Pakistan from Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and other insurgent groups and reiterated that he “cannot relocate in Pakistan” (CB 155 at [19]).
18.
The delegate’s decision to refuse the visa was made on 30 January 2018. As the applicant had been found to have provided a “bogus document” by the delegate, the operation of s.5(1)(a)(vi) of the Act meant that he became an “excluded fast track review applicant”. As a result, the applicant had no right of review by the IAA or any other merits review body.
The Delegate’s Decision
19.
The delegate’s decision is lengthy. It runs to 26 pages and is divided into 7 parts with two attachments (CB 166-191). The Court is satisfied that the Minister’s submissions at [8]-[15] accurately summarise the delegate’s decision. That summary was not disputed by the applicant and the Court adopts it as its own. It provides, relevantly, as follows.
20.
The delegate rejected the application as the delegate found that there was no credible evidence to support the applicant’s claim that he was an Afghan citizen born to undocumented refugees who live in Pakistan (CB 168).
21.
In relation to the applicant’s claim to be Afghani, rather than Pakistani, the delegate:
a) noted that the applicant demonstrated no knowledge of his family’s Hazara tribal/clan roots in Afghanistan (CB 163);
b) referred to the applicant having claimed to have not had an identity card in Pakistan, although country information indicated that Proof of Registration (“PoR”) cards are available to Afghans living in Pakistan (CB 163). The applicant had claimed that, despite not having any identification documents, he regularly commuted daily, which included passing through a number of checkpoints. He had claimed that he bribed his way through those checkpoints. When asked why he did not have a PoR card, the applicant said that his family had missed their opportunity to obtain them;
c) relied on country information to find that the applicant could have obtained a PoR card in Quetta, noting that he had attended school in Quetta. The delegate also noted that as he had rented accommodation in Quetta and had access to mobile phones and contacted his family daily via the internet, this further supported the view that the applicant did not originate from a family of undocumented Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The delegate concluded that the fact that the applicant had not applied for a PoR supported the view that the applicant did not originate from the Afghan community in Quetta (CB 164). The delegate considered that had the applicant been a member of that community, he would have applied for a PoR card (CB 163-164); and
d) found that the applicant was a Pakistani citizen who left Pakistan using his own genuine (Pakistan) passport (CB 168).
22.
In relation to the finding that the applicant’s Taskera was a bogus document, the delegate dealt with this issue as follows:
a) the delegate set out a list of the documents provided by the applicant at the interview on 7 December 2016 (CB 165);
b) the delegate found that the applicant had provided conflicting and inconsistent information throughout his dealings with the Department about the Taskera and how he had obtained it. This included stating at the interview that he had provided his family details to the Afghan authorities in Quetta, who then checked their records and issued the Taskera. However, after it had been put to him that country information challenged the availability of taskeras in that way (and he would at the very least require his father’s taskera), his representative told the delegate (in the submission of 30 August 2017) that he used his Father’s Taskera to obtain his own taskera. That submission also attached a copy of the Father’s Taskera. It was noted that no explanation was provided for this conflicting account (CB 165-166);
c) the visa application indicated that the applicant was issued with his Taskera and marriage certificate when he married his wife. It was noted that at the interview the applicant gave different information and the delegate noted that the documents he had provided at interview contained different dates. The applicant responded by stating that the Afghan Marriage Certificate had been recently issued and explained that the date on it was simply the date of the marriage. The delegate noted that the applicant gave different responses, and no explanation for the conflicting evidence, as to when his Taskera was issued (CB 165); and
d) when the applicant provided his Father’s Taskera it was noted that the registration details on that document were different from those identified on the Taskera where the father’s identity information was provided. The applicant was asked for an explanation. His agent responded by stating that there was a translation error and a further translation was provided which had the same details as those on the applicant’s Identity Verification Form purportedly issued by Afghan authorities in Canberra (CB 147). No explanation was provided for the difference between that information and the information on the Taskera, other than that the applicant was illiterate (which the delegate rejected) (CB 168).
23.
The delegate then considered whether the applicant had provided a reasonable explanation for providing the bogus document. After considering the information provided at interview and in the representative’s submissions, the delegate found that the applicant’s Taskera was a counterfeit document and did not accept it had been genuinely issued by the Afghan authorities in Quetta (CB 166-167).
24.
The delegate referred to country information about the prevalence of fraudulent documents that originate from Quetta (CB 167). The delegate placed no weight on the Identity Verification Form as the details on that form were inconsistent with those on the Taskera, including that the name on the Taskera was different from the name on the Identity Verification Form.
25.
The delegate summarised his findings and concluded that the weight of evidence indicated that the applicant was a member of the indigenous Hazara community in Pakistan, reiterating that there was no credible evidence that the applicant was an Afghan citizen born to undocumented Afghan refugees who live in Pakistan. In support of that finding, the delegate made adverse credibility findings, including a finding that the applicant demonstrated a willingness to mislead, obscure the truth and change his accounts of his identity (CB 168).
26.
The delegate also noted that the concerns raised were not about “simple inconsistencies or gaps in evidence that can be explained by stress, fear, misunderstanding, a differing recollection or interpreting error”.
27.
The delegate concluded that the applicant had provided false and misleading information about his biography and identity (CB 168).
28.
Against this background, the delegate determined that the applicant had provided a bogus document and had no reasonable explanation for having done so. On that basis, the delegate concluded that the applicant’s visa should be refused pursuant to s.91WA(1) of the Act (CB 167).
29.
Notwithstanding those findings, the delegate proceeded to examine the applicant’s claims for protection as if Pakistan were his receiving country (CB 168).
30.
The delegate accepted that there were continuing attacks against Hazara Shia in the western city of Quetta targeting Hazara who travel outside Hazara enclaves (which the applicant claimed to do for work) (CB 173) but noted that there was no evidence that the applicant had ever come to the adverse attention of extremist groups (CB 174).
31.
The delegate accepted that there was a real chance that the applicant would experience sectarian violence in Quetta, on account of his race, religion and perceived political opinion (CB 174).
32.
The delegate then found that the real chance of harm did not apply to all areas of the country and considered the reasonableness of the applicant relocating within Pakistan: (CB 174-176).
33.
The delegate concluded, in relation to the refugee assessment, that the applicant was “not a high profile Shia Hazara in respect of his political, religious or social status” and did not accept that there was a real chance that insurgents would target him as a consequence of his physical appearance in Karachi, Lahore or Islamabad (CB 176). For that reason, it was determined that the applicant did not meet the refugee criterion for the grant of a protection visa (CB 177).
34.
The delegate then considered the complementary protection criterion and found, pursuant to s.36(2B)(a) of the Act, that it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Islamabad, Karachi or Lahore in Pakistan (CB 180). On that basis, the applicant was found not to meet the complementary protection criteria. His application was, accordingly, refused.
35.
Finally, the delegate determined that the applicant was an “excluded fast track review applicant” as he had, without reasonable explanation, provided a bogus document in support of his visa application (CB 182-183).
Judicial Review Application
36.
The applicant relied on four grounds of review in an amended application filed 16 April 2019.
37.
In relation to the amended application, the Court notes that the applicant, in support of ground one, initially sought to rely on a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (“DFAT”) country information report from Afghanistan dated 18 September 2017. However, as was later acknowledged by the applicant in his submissions filed on 24 April 2019, the reference in ground 1 was not intended to be a reference to the Afghanistan report. Rather, it was intended to be a reference to a DFAT country information report for Pakistan of 1 September 2017 (the “Pakistan DFAT Report”).
38.
At the hearing of this matter on 8 May 2019, the applicant sought leave to amend particular 1(b) to refer to the Pakistan DFAT Report of 1 September 2017. The Minister did not object to the applicant amending particular 1(b). The Minister addressed the amendment in written submissions and the Court was satisfied that leave to make the amendment to particular (b) of ground 1 should be granted. An order to that effect will be made.
39.
An affidavit of Shayla Marie Strapps affirmed 16 April 2019 annexed a copy of the incorrect report. It also annexed a copy of the transcript of interview before the delegate (“Transcript”). On 3 May 2019, a second affidavit affirmed by Shayla Marie Strapps was filed. This affidavit annexed a copy of the Pakistan DFAT Report. Leave to rely on the affidavit was not opposed. There will be a further order accordingly.
40.
In preparing these reasons for judgment the Court has had regard to the materials referred to in the Court Book, all affidavits, the extensive written submissions filed by both parties and the transcript of the hearing before the Court on 8 May 2019.
Ground 1
41.
Ground 1, as amended, reads as follows:
The Delegate made a jurisdictional error by failing to take into account a country information assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes.
Particulars
a. On 21 June 2013, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship gave a Direction under s 499 of the Act (Direction No. 56) requiring decision makers to take into account a country information assessment prepared by DFAT expressly for protection status determination purposes.
b. On 18 September 2017 DFAT prepared a report entitled “DFAT Country Information Report Pakistan (sic.)” (“DFAT Report”) for protection status determination purposes.
c. In the DFAT Report, it was stated at paragraph 3.9: “Credible sources told DFAT that Afghans are typically able to access Afghan identity information, including Taskeras, from the Afghan Embassy in Islamabad. DFAT was unable to obtain specific information about whether Afghans, including Hazaras, can access formal documentation through the Afghan Consulate in Quetta, but DFAT considers it plausible that they can.”
d. In finding that he did not accept that the applicant’s Taskera was genuinely issued by the Afghan authorities in Quetta (CB 167), the Delegate failed to take into account relevant information in the DFAT Report at paragraph 3.9 concerning the issue of Afghan identity information through the Afghan Embassy in Islamabad and the Afghan Consulate in Quetta.
Applicant’s submissions
42.
In relation to ground 1, the applicant submitted as follows in written submissions:
a) the delegate made a jurisdictional error by failing to take into account the Pakistan DFAT Report;
b) section 499(2A) of the Act requires a person or body (which includes the delegate) to comply with ministerial directions made under s.499(1) of the Act. Ministerial Direction No. 56 of 21 June 2013 (“Direction No.56”), which is made under s.499(1) of the Act, requires a decision-maker to take into account a country information report prepared by DFAT for the purposes of protection status determination;
c) the delegate took the view from the outset that country information indicated it was not possible to obtain a taskera outside Afghanistan in the manner that the applicant had described. The delegate did not waiver from this view despite:
i) the finding of the Forensic Document Examiner that there were no irregularities regarding the Taskera (CB 120). The Examiner did qualify their finding by saying the examination was “limited as the method of manufacture cannot be checked, and only an examination of the original document will determine this”. It does not appear, however, that the delegate or case officer instigated any further independent inquiries as to the genuineness of the Taskera;
ii) the statement from the Australian High Commission in Islamabad Pakistan that a marriage certificate can be obtained from the Afghanistan Consulate in Quetta provided that the four requirements regarding documents and witnesses are met (CB 138-139); and
iii) the country information cited by the delegate at CB 167, fn.24, that: “…all Afghans are ‘required to return to their family’s place of residence, or to Kabul, to apply for [a] Tazkera’”. In this case, the applicant did apply for the Taskera in his family’s place of residence, which was Quetta, a town located near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and which is a trade and communication centre between the two countries;
d) the DFAT Country Information Report Afghanistan of 15 September 2015, which was referenced by the delegate at fn.27 (CB 167), stated at [5.37], “… Nonetheless, Afghan documentation including Taskeras, handwritten passports or other official Afghan documentation originating from Quetta in Pakistan should be independently verified due to the high incidence of fraud.” This report does not state that the Afghan Consulate in Quetta did not have the authority to issue taskeras. As noted above, the independent verification process of the Taskera copy produced the finding that it contained no irregularities of concern (CB 120);
e) the information in [3.9] of the Pakistan DFAT Report came from a credible source. It was in contrast to the other non-DFAT information cited by the delegate to the effect that taskeras were not issued outside Afghanistan; and
f) under s.499 of the Act and Direction No.56, the information at [3.9] of the Pakistan DFAT Report was a mandatory relevant consideration for the delegate in deciding whether or not the Taskera was genuine and the delegate’s failure to take this information into account constituted a jurisdictional error.
43.
In oral submissions Mr Blades for the applicant added the following in support of ground 1:
a) the delegate must take into account [3.9] of the Pakistan DFAT Report because the objective of Direction No.56 is to guide decision-makers performing functions or exercising powers and it requires the decision-maker to take into account the actual information that is given in the report that is relevant to the decision under review;
b) the delegate must reference [3.9] of the Pakistan DFAT Report as the content is right on point and it could not be any clearer on the issue about whether the Quetta Consulate issues documents to Afghans who are living in Pakistan;
c) the delegate is required to reference that particular paragraph, otherwise a direction under s.499 would be meaningless. If a country report deals with a particular subject matter and there is a point that goes directly to a question that the delegate is considering in deciding whether or not to grant a visa, then the delegate must reference the actual paragraph of the country information report that is specific and on point;
d) paragraph 3.9 is a specific reference to whether the Quetta Consulate issues taskeras, and there was information in the Pakistan DFAT Report that squarely addressed that question and it was not sufficient for the delegate to merely globally reference that report;
e) the two paragraphs of the Pakistan DFAT Report that the delegate did reference relate to other issues and concerned the levels of violence in Pakistan and whether the applicant could relocate there within Pakistan. Hence, to the extent that the delegate did refer to country information in the Pakistan DFAT Report that information had no bearing at all on the question of whether the Quetta Consulate issued taskeras;
f) in the wording of Direction No.56, the objective is to guide decision-makers in performing functions. Direction No.56 is grounded in the language of rationality and the only rational approach for a decision-maker to take is to consider DFAT information that is on point. If this means referencing a specific paragraph the logical approach has to be for it to reference that specific paragraph;
g) in this case, if the delegate had referenced that paragraph, it still might have resulted in the same decision. Nonetheless, the delegate was duty bound to take that paragraph into account to;
h) administrative decision-making should be based on the most up-to-date information. In this case, the information that the delegate did reference on the question of whether the Quetta Consulate issues taskeras predated the Pakistan DFAT Report. Hence, the delegate was duty bound to take that into account the Pakistan DFAT Report – not only because of s.499, but also because of it being the most up-to-date information; and
i) the country information could have led to a different outcome because it indicated that the Quetta Consulate did or may issue taskeras. While the delegate still might have decided that the Taskera was a bogus document, had [3.9] of the Pakistan DFAT Report been considered, it could have led to a different outcome.
Minister’s submissions
44.
In relation to Ground 1, the Minister submitted:
a) it is apparent from fnn.49-50 at CB 174-175, fn.75 at CB 176 and fn.92 at CB 178 that, contrary to the ground as pleaded, the delegate did, in fact, reference the Pakistan DFAT Report. On that basis alone, the pleaded ground cannot succeed;
b) the obligation that arises pursuant to Direction No.56 is to take the Pakistan DFAT Report into account. It is not to decide any issue in any particular way. Nor can any particular statement in a report be treated as something that a decision-maker is bound to take into account unless, for example, it can be shown that the particular matter was determinative;
c) nothing in Direction No.56 affects the established role of the decision-maker as the trier of fact in relation to the evaluation and assessment of the information in a report that the decision-maker takes into account;
d) the weight to be given to country information (including country information taken into account pursuant to a direction made under s.499) is a matter for the decision-maker;
e) the mere fact that the delegate did not refer to the specific comment at [3.9] of the Pakistan DFAT Report, while doubting the applicant’s account of how he obtained his Taskera, cannot of itself give rise to jurisdictional error;
f) that finding of fact, subject to considerations of legal unreasonableness, was a matter for the decision-maker. It is also well established that there is no obligation on a delegate, where there is no statutory obligation to provide reasons in any particular form, to set out in a statement of reasons a reference to, much less a finding on, every aspect of each item of evidence before it; and
g) the delegate gave a number of cogent reasons for finding that the Taskera was a bogus document. There was substantial evidence before the delegate for that finding and the mere fact that the information in [3.9] of the Pakistan DFAT Report was different to other information before the delegate does not establish jurisdictional error, particularly in circumstances where the factual matter it goes to could not be said to have been determinative.
45.
In oral submissions, Ms Graycar for the Minister reiterated the Minister’s submission that:
a) what is required by Direction No.56 is that the delegate consider what is “relevant”. This does not enliven an obligation to refer to any particular paragraph concerning a matter that may be in issue before the delegate;
b) had the delegate acknowledged what was said in [3.9] the outcome would have been no different because the real basis for the finding that the Taskera was bogus was the inconsistency in the applicant’s accounts; and
c) there were a number of elements of the applicant’s story about how he obtained the Taskera that the delegate found not credible. Hence, had it been acknowledged that it was possible to have obtained the Taskera at the Consul in Quetta, it would not have made any difference.
Consideration
46.
There is no dispute that the delegate was required to comply with Direction No.56 and that a failure to do so can amount to jurisdictional error: Act, s.499(2A).
47.
Direction 56 stated:
Where the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has prepared a country information assessment expressly for protection status determination processes, and that assessment is available to the decision maker, the decision maker must take into account that assessment, where relevant, in making their decision.
48.
As outlined by the Minister, it is clear here that the delegate referenced the Pakistan DFAT Report. Counsel for the applicant acknowledged this in oral submissions. The issue the Court must consider is whether the delegate failed to take into account “relevant information” in that report, specifically [3.9], and whether this “failure” constitutes a breach of Direction No.56, resulting in jurisdictional error.
49.
Paragraph 3.9 of the Pakistan DFAT Report reads:
3.9 The majority of Hazaras in Pakistan have lived there for decades, are Pakistani citizens and can access formal identification such as Computerised National Identity Cards (CNICs). Hazara children born in Pakistan also have Pakistani citizenship. More recent Hazara arrivals from Afghanistan typically do not have citizenship, but tend to have access to formal documentation in the form of immigration cards, which provides some rights such as access to drivers’ licences. Credible sources told DFAT that Afghans are typically able to access Afghan identity documentation, including Taskeras, from the Afghan Embassy in Islamabad. DFAT was unable to obtain specific information about whether Afghans, including Hazaras, can access formal documentation through the Afghan Consulate in Quetta, but DFAT considers it plausible that they can.
50.
The delegate stated as follows (CB 166):
After carefully considering all the available evidence which includes concerns regarding his claimed identity and nationality discussed throughout this Identity Assessment, I reasonably suspect that the applicant’s Taskera is a counterfeit document as defined by s5(1)(b) of the Act – I do not accept it was genuinely issued by the Afghan authorities in Quetta. Information before the Department (located in document ‘ISU124-Advice from Islamabad Post’) indicates that Afghan Consulates do not hold the authority to issue Taskeras. I am also aware that all Afghans are required to ‘return to their family’s place of residence, or to Kabul, to apply for [a] Tazkera’. As country information indicates Taskeras are only issued inside Afghanistan and the applicant claimed he was issued with a Taskera from the Afghan Consulate in Quetta, Pakistan, I find his Taskera is not a genuine document.
(Footnotes omitted)
51.
The delegate referred to two country information sources. One was a report from the “Country of Origin Information Section” dated 22 December 2016. The other was a report compiled by the “Canadian IRB: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada” dated 20 February 2017. Both reports specifically addressed the issuance of taskeras and, in relation to the former report, whether they could be issued in Quetta.
52.
It appears that the basis for the applicant’s assertion in this ground is the fact that the delegate does not specifically reference or footnote a particular paragraph of the Pakistan DFAT Report when making the finding that the Taskera was not a genuine document; hence, the applicant asserts, it can be inferred that the delegate did not consider relevant information.
53.
To succeed in relation to this ground of review, the applicant must satisfy the Court that, having regard to all of the evidence and other material before the delegate, it can be inferred that relevant information was not taken into account: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Khadgi (2010) 190 FCR 248 at [71].
54.
Here, the applicant has failed to satisfy the Court that this is the case.
55.
The delegate expressly referred to the materials in the Pakistan DFAT Report. At CB 174 the delegate states as follows:
There are reports that Pakistani Hazaras may have their identity documents arbitrarily cancelled as part of a campaign more generally to cancel fraudulent documents. DFAT has assessed that there is no credible evidence of this and assess, in their latest Country Information Report, that such cancelations are unlikely to occur based on the ethnicity or religion of Hazaras
56.
The delegate footnotes page 14 of the Pakistan DFAT Report in relation to the above statement. The Court has had regard to page 14 of the Pakistan DFAT Report and cannot ascertain where the material the delegate refers to is identified on that page. However, on page 13 of the Pakistan DFAT Report, and relevantly [3.10] of the Pakistan DFAT Report, the following information is detailed:
3.10 DFAT is aware of some news reports claiming that Pakistani Hazaras are having their CNICs systematically cancelled, effectively removing their rights to citizenship and residency in Pakistan. DFAT is not aware of any credible evidence to support these claims. The National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) is currently engaging in a campaign to target fraud in relation to CNICs. This campaign targets fraud in a general sense rather than in relation to any particular ethnic group. DFAT understands that that NADRA has identified several thousand fraudulent records in this process, including examples of Afghans who had been added to household registration lists without authorisation. DFAT assesses that Hazaras who are Pakistani citizens are unlikely to have their CNICs cancelled based on their ethnicity or religion.
57.
This information was on the same page as, and immediately following, [3.9], the paragraph alleged not to have been taken into account by the delegate.
58.
In these circumstances, the Court is not prepared assume that the delegate did not have regard to [3.9]. Rather, the Court infers that the delegate simply did not afford that particular paragraph any weight.
59.
There is no dispute that the information in [3.9] was relevant; however, it was for the delegate to decide what weight it would attach to that information in light of the other materials before it: NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11] (“NAHI”). The Court does not accept that as [3.9] was “directly” relevant to the question before the delegate that that meant that the delegate was required, by virtue of s.499(2A), to specifically refer to it.
60.
Direction No.56 was a “guide”. It was not intended to dictate what findings should or should not be made: Tran v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 297 at [5]. Nor does it suggest that DFAT information should be given higher credence than any other information. The delegate clearly had regard to the Pakistan DFAT Report. The fact that the delegate did not refer to or rely on a specific paragraph that is “relevant” to one aspect of its decision was entirely a matter for the delegate in light of all the evidence before the delegate.
61.
The Minister also submits that there is no statutory obligation obliging the delegate to provide reasons about why a particular piece of evidence is not relied on.
62.
Section 66(2) of the Act states that, where an application is refused, the delegate must specify the criterion that was not met or the provision which prevented the applicant from being granted the visa. Section 66(2)(c) states that the delegate must give “written reasons” unless subsection (3) applies (which it does not in this case). The term “written reasons” is not defined. However, bearing in mind the content of the “written statements” required from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and Immigration Assessment Authority, it can be concluded that a delegate’s decision should generally:
a) set out the reasons for the decision; and
b) set out the findings on any material questions of fact; and
c) refer to the evidence or any other material on which the findings of fact were based.
63.
The Minister operated on this assumption. The Court has done the same.
64.
In the circumstances, the delegate is not required to refer to every piece of evidence – only the evidence that was relied upon in making the relevant finding of fact. Here, the delegate did that. It referred to “ISU124 – Advice from Islamabad Post” and the report by the Canadian Immigration Review Board and the Country of Origin Information Section. Paragraph 3.9 of the Pakistan DFAT Report, while of some evidential value, can be reasonably inferred not to have been material to the conclusion the delegate reached in light of all the inferential evidence. It cannot be said on the evidence that it simply was not considered. An assessment as to the weight was inferably undertaken and other information was preferred. There is no error in this regard.
65.
The material that was deemed relevant and material to the delegate’s conclusion was explicitly referenced. That is, “ISU124 – Advice from Islamabad Post” and the reports.
66.
The information in ISU124 – Advice from Islamabad Post was information directly obtained from a source at the Afghan Consulate in Quetta. The information provided as follows:
According to the information obtained from our contact in Afghan Consulate General Quetta. Tazkira’s can only be obtained from Afghanistan. Consulates never issue Tazkiras. Tazkira number should be identical doesn’t matter on which document it is written. It always remains the same.
NOTE:
If Tazkira was issued from Afghan Consulate General Quetta then it does not hold any authenticity as we have confirmed it previously that they does not hold any authority to issue Tazkiras as they can only be issued from Afghanistan.
(CB 136)
67.
This information was obtained for the specific purpose of conducting the applicant’s review. It was thus relevant, and specific, to the delegate’s consideration. The fact that the delegate placed more weight on it was a matter for the delegate: NAHI at [11]. So too was the delegate’s reliance on other sources, as these sources corroborated the more specific evidence the delegate had obtained in the ISU124 – Advice from Islamabad Post.
68.
In relation to the footnoted sources, the applicant referred to Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114 at [73] (“MZYTS”) to suggest that the delegate had regard to out-of-date country information and that, as such, the delegate “erred”.
69.
The applicant is correct when he notes that the country information cited does predate the DFAT Pakistan Report. The ISU124 – Advice from Islamabad Post was dated 10 August 2017. This too was prior to the DFAT Pakistan Report.
70.
The Court notes what was stated at [74] in MZYTS:
That is not to say decision-makers cannot rely on information which is several years old. They may do so lawfully as part of a weighing process after considering all information available to them, and deciding which information best and most reliably supports the prediction of future risk they are called on to make. Perhaps more recent information simply confirms older and more detailed information. Perhaps the older information is more specific to the visa applicant’s circumstances. Perhaps more recent information is from less reliable, or tainted, sources. There are many possibilities about why a decision-maker may choose, lawfully, to rely on older information and still perform the task required by s 36(2)(a) and Art 1. In such cases, one would expect the Tribunal’s reasons to disclose this kind of evaluation process, and the conclusion it reached would be within its jurisdiction.
71.
Here, it is noted that the Pakistan DFAT Report stated that “DFAT was unable to obtain specific information” but considered it “plausible” that the documents could be obtained for the Quetta Consulate. In contrast, the delegate had specific information that appeared to confirm the country information in older and more detailed reports (being those cited in fn.24) that documents could not be obtained from the Quetta Consulate.
72.
In these circumstances, there is no error evident in the delegate relying on information which pre-dated the Pakistan DFAT Report.
73.
The Court has not overlooked the final sentence of [74] in MZYTS which states that one would expect an evaluation process of some sort.
74.
It is clear here from the delegate’s decision that an evaluative assessment has been undertaken. The delegate refers to ISU124 – Advice from Islamabad Post and then cites the country information that supports that advice. That the delegate did not refer to [3.9] does not suggest the delegate did not evaluate the information in that particular paragraph. Rather, it suggests that the delegate was simply of the view that [3.9] was of little or no weight and that other information available was to be afforded more weight.
75.
Further, insofar as the applicant contends that the DFAT information was a credible source and that the other information (being non-DFAT information) impliedly was not, this argument also fails. This amounts to no more than a disagreement with the country information relied upon: NAHI at [11].
76.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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