Ayton v City of Armadale

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   AYTON -v- CITY OF ARMADALE [2020] WASCA 39

CORAM:   MAZZA JA

BEECH JA

VAUGHAN JA

HEARD:   14 AUGUST 2019

DELIVERED          :   1 APRIL 2020

FILE NO/S:   CACR 213 of 2018

BETWEEN:   LEONA YVONNE AYTON

Appellant

AND

CITY OF ARMADALE

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   KENNETH MARTIN J

File Number            :   SJA 1067 of 2018


Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against order in a single judge appeal - Occupational safety and health - Failure to maintain safe work environment - Failure to ensure safety and health of non-employee - Whether judge erred in characterising respondent's behaviour as vicarious failure - Whether judge erred in assessment of mitigating factors - Whether judge erred in failing to find that fine of $30,000 imposed by magistrate was manifestly inadequate

Legislation:

Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 (WA), s 5, s 21(2), s 21A(2), s 49(5)

Result:

Appeal allowed
Respondent resentenced to a fine of $110,000

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : C J Thatcher SC & N John
Respondent : M H Zilko SC & G C Northmore

Solicitors:

Appellant : State Solicitor's Office
Respondent : Gilchrist Connell

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Ayton v City of Armadale [2018] WASC 393

DPP v Amcor Packaging Pty Ltd [2005] VSCA 219; (2005) 11 VR 557

Elias v The Queen [2013] HCA 31; (2013) 248 CLR 483

Gaskell v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 8

Ibbs v The Queen [1987] HCA 46; (1987) 163 CLR 447

Kirwin v Laing O'Rourke (BMC) Pty Ltd [2010] WASC 194 (S)

Kirwin v Laing O'Rourke (BMC) Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 117

Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 92 ALJR 713

Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120

Munda v The State of Western Australia [2013] HCA 38; (2013) 249 CLR 600

The Queen v Kilic [2016] HCA 48; (2016) 259 CLR 256

WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Penfold) v Fernz Construction and Materials Ltd [No 2] [2000] NSWIR Comm 99

WorkCover Authority of New South Wales v Profab Industries Pty Ltd (2000) 49 NSWLR 700

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal from a single judge of the Supreme Court, pursuant to pt 2 div 3 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA): Ayton v City of Armadale [2018] WASC 393 (the primary decision).

  2. On 10 August 2014, Mr Kyle Booth was severely injured at a waste facility operated by the respondent.  Mr Booth, a member of the public, was in the green waste area when he was struck by a reversing front‑end loader, which was being driven by Mr Neil Woodenberg, an employee of the respondent and supervisor of the facility.  Mr Booth's injuries required him to undergo several operations and…

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Details
Case
[2020] WASCA 39
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Ayton v City of Armadale, the appellant sought to appeal a decision made by a single judge in relation to an occupational safety and health matter. The appellant argued that the City of Armadale had failed to maintain a safe work environment and had not ensured the safety and health of non-employees, and that the judge had erred in characterising the respondent's behaviour as a vicarious failure, assessing mitigating factors, and in not finding that the fine of $30,000 imposed by the magistrate was manifestly inadequate. The decisive issue for this court was whether the fine imposed by the magistrate was manifestly inadequate, which is a question this court determines for itself according to the correctness standard.

The court considered the general principles applicable to an allegation that a sentence is manifestly inadequate. Sentencing is a discretionary exercise, and an appellate court can only intervene if the appellant demonstrates either an express or implied material error. An allegation of manifest inadequacy is an example of implied error, that is, where the end result is so unreasonable or plainly unjust that the court must conclude that a substantial wrong has occurred. In order to determine whether a sentence is manifestly inadequate, the offence should be viewed in light of the maximum sentence prescribed by law, the standards of sentencing customarily imposed with respect to it, the place that the criminal conduct occupies in the scale of seriousness of offences of that type, and the offender's personal circumstances. The court found that the range of sentences customarily imposed for an offence does not establish the range of a sound exercise of a sentencing discretion, but rather provides a yardstick or reference point for ensuring broad consistency in sentencing.

The court held that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that the fine of $30,000 was manifestly inadequate. Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent's failure to comply with the duty imposed upon it by s 21(2) of the OSH Act was a serious breach, having regard to various factors including the obvious hazard and potential for serious harm caused by a reversing front-end loader in circumstances where other persons, including members of the public, were nearby. However, the court found that the fine was not manifestly inadequate when viewed in light of the maximum sentence prescribed by law, the standards of sentencing customarily imposed, the place that the criminal conduct occupied in the scale of seriousness of offences of that type, and the offender's personal circumstances. The court found no error in the decision of the single judge and dismissed the appeal.

The court did not make any final orders in the case as the appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The parties accepted that the decisive issue for this court is raised by ground 3, that is, whether the fine imposed by the learned magistrate was manifestly inadequate.[61] Whether the fine was manifestly inadequate is a question this court determines for itself according to the correctness standard. In this respect, the position is analogous to an appeal concerning whether an administrative decision was legally unreasonable.[62] Consequently, whether the primary judge erred in the specific respects alleged by grounds 1 and 2 is of no moment. [61] Appeal ts 3 - 4, 20.[62] As to which, see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 92 ALJR 713). The general principles applicable to an allegation that a sentence is manifestly inadequate are well‑established. Sentencing is a discretionary exercise. An appellate court can only intervene if the appellant demonstrates either an express or implied material error. An allegation of manifest inadequacy is an example of implied error, that is, where the end result is so unreasonable or plainly unjust that the court must conclude that a substantial wrong has occurred. Thus, an appellate court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the sentencing court merely because the appellate court would have exercised a sentencing discretion differently. In order to determine whether a sentence is manifestly inadequate, the offence should be viewed in light of the maximum sentence prescribed by law, the standards of sentencing customarily imposed with respect to it, the place that the criminal conduct occupies in the scale of seriousness of offences of that type and the offender's personal circumstances. The range of sentences customarily imposed for an offence does not establish the range of a sound exercise of a sentencing discretion. Sentences customarily imposed provide a yardstick or reference point for ensuring broad consistency in sentencing, bearing in mind that there is no single correct sentence. What is important are the unifying principles that sentences imposed in comparable cases reveal and reflect. Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent's failure to comply with the duty imposed upon it by s 21(2) of the OSH Act was a serious breach, having regard to the following:[63](1)The obvious hazard and potential for various serious harm to be caused by a reversing front‑end loader in circumstances where other persons, including members of the public, were nearby. (2)The hazardous activity in question took place on a regular basis in an area frequented by the public and other employees of the respondent. (3)The respondent knew of, or understood, the risk of harm arising from the operation of the front‑end loader in the facility, but failed to ensure proper training, supervision and management of its staff.(4)The respondent failed to take the reasonable practicable measures identified in the statement of agreed facts (and repeated at [22] in these reasons).(5)The serious injuries suffered by Mr Booth and their consequences.[63] Appeal ts 8 - 16.