AYT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AYT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1444

Appeal from: AYT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2018] FCCA 688
File number(s): VID 382 of 2018
Judge(s): BURLEY J
Date of judgment: 21 September 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – refusal of a protection visa application – whether the Tribunal failed to consider the appellant’s claims cumulatively – whether the Tribunal failed to assess deprivation of freedom of worship - appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), clause 866.221

Immigrants and Emigrants Act 1948 (Sri Lanka)

Cases cited:

AYT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 688

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd & Anor v Dart Industries Inc. [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 83 ALJR 1123

Date of hearing: 21 August 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 27
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr A Cunynghame of Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 382 of 2018
BETWEEN:

AYT15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BURLEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 SEPTEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BURLEY J:

1.                 INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He arrived on Christmas Island as an irregular maritime arrival in June 2012 and has applied for a Protection (Class XA) Visa (Visa). The appellant claims protection, in broad terms, on the basis that he is an ethnic Tamil and a Sunni Muslim. He claims that he was arrested by the Sri Lankan police after being found near the location of a bomb blast in his home town in 2006 and since then has faced regular harassment. He also claims that in 2011 he ran as a candidate in local elections for the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC) party and was further harassed by the police and others. In 2012 a local mosque was burnt down, inciting demonstrations in the streets and resulting in the Criminal Investigation Department taking many young men and many others leaving the area. He fears that if he returns to Sri Lanka he will be abducted or killed.

  2. A delegate (delegate) of the Minister for Home Affairs (Minister) considered the appellant’s visa application and on 29 July 2013 decided that it should be refused because he was not satisfied that Australia owes protection obligations to the appellant pursuant to s 36…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1444
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a Tamil Muslim from Sri Lanka, appeared before the court to appeal against the Tribunal's decision to refuse his application for a protection visa. He appeared with the assistance of a Sinhalese interpreter and represented himself. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection was represented by its solicitors Sparke Helmore. The Tribunal had previously dismissed the appellant's application for a protection visa, finding that he did not face a real chance of serious harm in the future due to his race, religion, or political beliefs.

The court was required to decide whether the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the appellant's claims. The appellant argued that the Tribunal failed to consider his claims cumulatively and did not assess his claim that he would be deprived of his freedom of worship due to the destruction of mosques in Sri Lanka. The court noted that the appellant had not raised these grounds of review before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, and therefore leave was required to advance them for the first time on appeal.

The court found that the Tribunal had considered the appellant's claims both individually and cumulatively, and had formed the view that he did not face a real chance of serious harm in the future. The court also found that the Tribunal had considered the appellant's claim regarding the destruction of mosques, but had determined that it was speculative that he would be deprived of his freedom of worship as a result. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was not illogical or irrational, and therefore the appellant's grounds of review were without merit.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant appeared at the hearing with the assistance of a Sinhalese interpreter and represented himself. He filed no written submissions. The Minister was represented by its solicitors Sparke Helmore and filed written submissions in advance of the hearing.2. THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL The appellant attended the hearing before the Tribunal and gave evidence with the assistance of an interpreter. He was represented in relation to the review by a registered migration agent. The Tribunal summarised the several claims for protection advanced by the appellant as involving; a claim that he was harmed in the past by the Sri Lankan authorities on suspicion of involvement with the LTTE because of a bomb blast; a claim that he was harmed by paramilitary and the Sri Lankan authorities because he stood as a candidate in local elections for the SLMC in 2011; a claim to fear harm from extremist Sinhalese Buddhists and the Sri Lankan authorities because he is a Muslim; a claim that the Sri Lankan authorities have continued looking for him; and a claim that he will be harmed by the Sri Lankan authorities because he is a Tamil, applied for asylum in Australia and departed Sri Lanka illegally. In relation to his claim that he was a candidate for the SLMC, the Tribunal considered the appellant’s oral evidence and documents that he had supplied in support, and found that it is plausible that he was once a member of that party and that he had assisted in the past with low level campaigning. However, on the basis of his apparent ignorance of basic aspects of the operation of the party and his claimed role in it, the Tribunal rejected his claim that he was a candidate for the SLMC, rejected that he had been threatened or beaten because of his role as a candidate, and found that he had fabricated these claims in order to create a profile upon which to base his application for protection. In relation to his claim to have suffered harm as a result of his Tamil ethnicity and imputed pro-LTTE political opinions, the Tribunal was willing give the applicant the benefit of the doubt for his claim that he had been detained by the police in 2006 after the bomb blast, but considered that he fabricated his claims that the police continued to contact him about that event after he was freed by the court, and that the case remained open against him. The Tribunal found that on the basis of country information to which the Tribunal had regard, the appellant would not be imputed with any anti-government or pro-LTTE opinion because he is a Tamil or because he lived or worked in a Tamil area or was previously released by the court. It considered that it was only speculative (and therefore not a real chance) that he would be questioned, detained, assaulted, abducted or killed or suffer any serious harm by the Sri Lankan authorities because of his race, membership of a social or political group or for any other Convention reason. In relation to the appellant’s claim that he would suffer harm as a failed asylum seeker, the Tribunal noted the available country information and concluded that he did not have a profile of someone with links to the LTTE and that he would not be targeted for harm upon his return to Sri Lanka as a result of applying for asylum in Australia. The Tribunal considered the appellant’s claim that he would be harmed because he departed Sri Lanka illegally. It considered that any period that the appellant spends on remand as a result of the application of the Sri Lankan Immigrants and Emigrants Act would be as a result of the general application of that law, and would not therefore amount to persecution. The Tribunal found that, since prison sentences enforced under the IEA are routinely suspended, there is no real chance that he will face a term of imprisonment for the offence of illegally departing Sri Lanka.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At [61] of its reasons, the Tribunal states that it has considered the claims of the appellant individually and cumulatively, and formed the view that he faced no serious harm in the past. It was not satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm in the future. It then proceeded to consider the appellant’s claims further in relation to complementary protection pursuant to s 36(2)(aa) of the Act and determined that it was not satisfied that he met the criterion in that section.3. CONSIDERATION OF THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL 3.1 The grounds of appeal and grounds relied upon in the FCCA The appellant appeared before the FCCA with the assistance of an interpreter and represented himself. He relied on the following grounds of review:1.The Tribunal has erred and fell into jurisdictional error by not assessing the applicant’s integer claims cumulatively being of a Tamil Muslim of Islamic faith, associated with LTTE and a candidate of a political party known as SLMC.2.The Tribunal has not assessed his claim that he will be deprived his freedom of worship in the foreseeable future due to many Mosques being destroyed in Sri Lanka.3.The Tribunal’s finding that a relatively short period of remand or incarceration of the applicant on his return is not amount to serious harm under 91R of the Migration Act is contrary to recent Federal Court finding in WZAPN-V-MIBP [2014] 947. I have in [4] above set out the grounds advanced in the present appeal. It will be seen that ground 1 before the primary judge is related to ground 1 in the present appeal, in that in the latter the appellant similarly contends that the primary judge erred by failing to find that the Tribunal had not assessed the appellant’s claims cumulatively having regard to his faith, his association with the LTTE and his candidacy as a member for the SLMC. However, in this appeal, the appellant also contends that the assessment by the Tribunal was also illogical and irrational so as to result in jurisdictional error. That ground was not advanced before the FCCA and leave is required to advance it for the first time on appeal; Decor Corporation Pty Ltd & Anor v Dart Industries Inc. [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397. I turn to consider this ground in Section 3.2 below. It will be noted that grounds 2 and 3 as advanced before the FCCA are not agitated in the present appeal. However, ground 2 in the present appeal was not advanced below. In it, the appellant asserts that the Tribunal operates in an inquisitorial manner and that the Tribunal failed to assess whether the appellant will be deprived the freedom of worship in the foreseeable future due to many mosques being destroyed in Sri Lanka. Leave is required before this ground can be advanced. In oral submissions the appellant contended that in Sri Lanka, Muslims are still persecuted, that last year there was still unrest in the country and that the police are still looking for him in Sri Lanka. Although he advanced no specific criticism of the decision of the Tribunal or the FCCA, it is apparent from these submissions that the appellant wishes to challenge the merits of the decisions below.