Axis (Aust) Pty Limited v Flight Centre Travel Group Limited

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Axis (Aust) Pty Limited v Flight Centre Travel Group Limited [2022] QDC 097

PARTIES:

Axis (Aust) Pty Limited
ACN 133 452 427

(plaintiff/applicant)

v
Flight Centre Travel Group Limited
ACN 003 377 188

(defendant/respondent)

FILE NO:

2372/16

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Brisbane District Court

DELIVERED ON:

4 May 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane District Court

HEARING DATE:

11 April 2022.

JUDGE:

Byrne QC DCJ

ORDERS:

1.   The plaintiff’s application to strike out the counterclaim is refused.

2.   By consent, the parties are to undertake mediation, in terms of the draft order provided 13 April 2022.

3.   The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the strike out application, on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

LEGISLATION:

CASES:  

PROCEDURE – BREACH OF CONTRACT – APPLICATION TO STRIKE OUT A COUNTERCLAIM - where the plaintiff entered into an agreement for the supply of goods with the defendant – where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant improperly terminated the agreement and otherwise acted unconscionably – where the plaintiff commenced proceedings and the defendant pleaded a counterclaim in response – where the counterclaim ultimately alleged that a separate agreement by a third party with the  plaintiff had been entered into by the third party as an agent of the defendant - where that agreement had been reached one month before the third party entered into an agreement with the defendant wherein they were stated to be contractors independent of each other – where the plaintiff has applied to strike out the counterclaim on the basis that there could not have been an agency between the third party and the defendant – whether the doctrine of privity of contract applied.

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999

Coco v Ord Minnett Ltd [2012] QSC 324, [18] – [19]

Equititrust Limited v Tucker(No. 2) [2019] QSC 248

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] 112 CLR 125

Parberry and Ors v QNI Metals Pty Ltd [2018] QSC 240

Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Palmer [2014] QSC 259

Teheran Europe Co Ltd v S. T. Belton (Tractors) Ltd [1968] 2 QB 545

COUNSEL:

Mr. S. McCullough (director of the plaintiff) for the plaintiff.
Mr M.J. Kollrepp (sol) for the defendant.

SOLICITORS:

Self-represented.

Kollrepp Law for the defendant.

Introduction

  1. On 17 June 2016 the plaintiff commenced proceedings against the defendant, and another, for breach of contract and other claims. The proceedings have not moved swiftly, and the present application is to strike out the entirety of a counterclaim pleaded by the defendant in its Second Amended Defence.

    Legal Principles

  2. The application is brought pursuant to rule 171 of the UCPR. Although not clearly articulated, it appears that the plaintiff, who was represented by its sole director, relies primarily on paragraph (a), but also paragraphs (d) and (e) of the rule.

  3. The nature of the discretion to be exercised differs depending on the paragraph relied on.[1] Where reliance is placed on paragraph (a), that paragraph and…

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Details
Case
[2022] QDC 97
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Axis (Aust) Pty Limited filed a lawsuit against Flight Centre Travel Group Limited for the improper termination of an agreement for the supply of goods and other alleged unconscionable conduct. Flight Centre responded with a counterclaim, asserting that a third party, AllClear, had entered into an agreement with Axis as its agent, and that Flight Centre was therefore not liable for the amount owed under that agreement. Axis then applied to have the counterclaim struck out, arguing that there could not have been an agency relationship between AllClear and Flight Centre because the doctrine of privity of contract prevents a party to a contract from enforcing the rights of a third party who is not a party to the contract.

The court had to determine whether the counterclaim disclosed a reasonable cause of action, under rule 171(1)(a) of the UCPR. The court noted that the existence of an agency relationship between AllClear and Flight Centre was not necessarily barred by the doctrine of privity of contract, as the issue was whether there was an agency in place before the order was placed and the deposit paid. The court found that the counterclaim was reasonably arguable, as there was no material to suggest otherwise, and that the existence of the services agreement between Flight Centre and AllClear was of marginal relevance. The court also noted that the issue of agency would be litigated as part of the plaintiff’s second claim and the response to it by the defendant.

The court refused the plaintiff’s application to strike out the counterclaim and ordered the parties to undertake mediation. The court also ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs of the strike out application, on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The plaintiff’s application to strike out the counterclaim is refused.

2. By consent, the parties are to undertake mediation, in terms of the draft order provided 13 April 2022.

3. The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the strike out application, on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The defendant has also pleaded a counterclaim in respect of the earlier mentioned sum of $91,250 (plus GST) it says was paid by AllClear as its agent.Evidence on the application Affidavits from the plaintiff’s sole director, the solicitor for the defendant and the in-house legal counsel for the defendant, Mr Gavras-Moffat, were read. The latter deponent was also cross examined. The affidavits of the first two deponents deal with aspects of the course of the long history of this matter. I need not detail their contents presently, but will make brief reference to them later. The affidavit of Mr Gavras-Moffat asserted that the services agreement with AllClear was to the affect that AllClear would “act as a supplier and agent of the defendant in relation to the supply of marketing and associated products… to the defendant”.[6] It also stated, in effect, that notwithstanding the clause defining the parties as independent contractors, the defendant and All Clear expanded the scope of the contractual arrangement “to one of agency in their dealings with the plaintiff, which the plaintiff was fully aware of at the time”.[7][6]Affidavit of Christopher Gavras-Moffatt filed 10 January 2022, paragraph 4[7]Affidavit of Christopher Gavras-Moffatt filed 10 January 2022, paragraph 12. This affidavit also exhibited a copy of the services agreement between the defendant and AllClear. A provision therein[8] provides that the agreement, “supersedes any prior agreement or understanding between the parties”. It also provides that any amendment of the agreement will be of no force unless in writing and signed by an authorised representative of each party.[9] [8]Clause 21.4.[9]Clause 21.6. Of relevance for present purposes, under cross-examination Mr Gavras-Moffatt:(1) stated there was no written variation or amendment to the services agreement (with AllClear);(2) asserted that the statement at paragraph 4 of his affidavit was evidenced by a course of conduct and was not in writing;(3) asserted that the fact that AllClear was refunded the deposit monies was not required by the written agreement, but was in accordance with standard practice;(4) understood that prior to refunding the deposit to AllClear, an email had been received by the defendant requesting that occur; and(5) the fact that the refund had been made caused the pleading of the counterclaim.Consideration The primary contention advanced by the plaintiff is that the counterclaim cannot succeed because the defendant is not a party to the contract, as evidenced by the agreement between it and AllClear, and hence the doctrine of privity of contract defeats the counterclaim. This clearly raises the sufficiency of the allegation of an agency agreement as pleaded by the defendant. That issue falls for determination in the context of rule 171(1)(a) of the UCPR, thus requiring consideration of whether the counter claim discloses a reasonable cause of action. That is a less demanding standard than satisfaction that the counter claim has no real prospect of success, as would be required by an application under rule 293.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Of relevance for present purposes, under cross-examination Mr Gavras-Moffatt:(1) stated there was no written variation or amendment to the services agreement (with AllClear);(2) asserted that the statement at paragraph 4 of his affidavit was evidenced by a course of conduct and was not in writing;(3) asserted that the fact that AllClear was refunded the deposit monies was not required by the written agreement, but was in accordance with standard practice;(4) understood that prior to refunding the deposit to AllClear, an email had been received by the defendant requesting that occur; and(5) the fact that the refund had been made caused the pleading of the counterclaim.Consideration The primary contention advanced by the plaintiff is that the counterclaim cannot succeed because the defendant is not a party to the contract, as evidenced by the agreement between it and AllClear, and hence the doctrine of privity of contract defeats the counterclaim. This clearly raises the sufficiency of the allegation of an agency agreement as pleaded by the defendant. That issue falls for determination in the context of rule 171(1)(a) of the UCPR, thus requiring consideration of whether the counter claim discloses a reasonable cause of action. That is a less demanding standard than satisfaction that the counter claim has no real prospect of success, as would be required by an application under rule 293. Put another way, it is not my function here to determine finally if an agency agreement was in place, but rather to determine if there appears to be a reasonable cause of action available to the defendant. Much energy was expended at the hearing about whether an agency did, or could, exist in light of the terms of the services agreement. But, in my view, that is all of marginal relevance at best. The order was placed and the deposit paid about one month before the defendant and AllClear entered into the services agreement. The issue is whether there is a reasonable cause of action alleging that there was an agency in existence between the defendant and AllClear about one month prior to the entry into the services agreement. There is no material in the application to make that not a reasonably arguable assertion. It is convenient to note that, although not on oath or affirmation, the plaintiff denied knowledge of any agency arrangement from the Bar table. If AllClear was an agent, it does not matter in the present circumstances if the arrangement was disclosed to the plaintiff, or not.[10][10]Teheran Europe Co Ltd v S. T. Belton (Tractors) Ltd [1968] 2 QB 545. I accept that aspects of Mr Gavras-Moffatt’s testimony potentially puts the attitude of the defendant as to its compliance with the terms of the services agreement in a bad light, particularly as to its apparent belief it can vary the agreement contrary to its express terms. However, for the reasons stated, I consider that the existence of the services agreement is of marginal, if any, relevance in a practical sense. Even if it were otherwise, I would not strike out the counter claim as the issue material to the counter claim will in any event be litigated as part of the plaintiff’s second claim and the response to it by the defendant.