AWH16 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AWH16 v Minister For Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1005

Appeal from: AWH16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3246
File number: NSD 2125 of 2018
Judge: O’CALLAGHAN J
Date of judgment: 29 May 2019
Date of publication of reasons: 27 June 2019
Legislation cited: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2)
Date of hearing: 29 May 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 27
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person (with the aid of an interpreter)
Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms Perotti of Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

NSD 2125 of 2018
BETWEEN:

AWH16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

O’CALLAGHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 MAY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs to be agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)

O’CALLAGHAN J:

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment and orders of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) made on 29 October 2018 dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (the Tribunal). 

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh.  He arrived in Australia on 3 January 2013 as a so-called “irregular maritime arrival.” 

  3. In May 2013, the appellant applied for a Protection (Class XA) Visa.  That application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 28 October 2014.  The appellant then applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) for review of the delegate’s decision. 

  4. The appellant appeared at a hearing before the Tribunal in February 2016, and on 28 March 2016 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse the grant of the visa. 

  5. Before the delegate and the Tribunal, the appellant relevantly made a number of claims.  He said that he claimed to fear harm from the Awami League (AL), a political party in Bangladesh.  He said that he had returned to Bangladesh in August 2012, having lived and worked in Malaysia for the previous 13 years.  The appellant claimed that on 26 August 2012 he was home alone when four masked men entered his house at 2:30am with guns, and that a gun was held to his head, and that he was told to do everything they said.

  6. The appellant claimed that those masked men demanded keys to the “valuables cupboard”, which he gave them, and that the men then took everything out of the cupboard.  The appellant said that the men took USD65,000 in cash, together with gold, valuable wallets and jewellery.  He claimed that it was the AL who robbed him.  He also claimed that the day after that incident he received a threatening letter from the men who had robbed him, telling him…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1005
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of AWH16 v Minister for Home Affairs, the applicant, a Bangladeshi national, sought to appeal the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which had dismissed his application for a protection visa. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with examining the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant, specifically whether the AAT had erred in its consideration of the evidence and application of the law in denying the applicant's application for a protection visa.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the AAT had committed jurisdictional error in its assessment of the applicant’s claims for a protection visa. The applicant argued that the AAT had failed to correctly apply the test for determining 'significant harm' as outlined in section 36(2)(A) of the Migration Act 1958, and that the Tribunal had denied him natural justice and procedural fairness. The court needed to determine if the AAT had correctly applied the legal standards and whether there were any procedural failings that warranted setting aside the AAT’s decision.

The court found that the AAT had properly applied the complementary protection test and that its findings were reasonable and supported by the evidence. The court held that the applicant's argument that the Tribunal had erred in its application of the law was misdirected as it amounted to an impermissible review of the merits. Regarding the claim of procedural unfairness, the court determined that there was no evidence to suggest the Tribunal had acted biasedly or failed to provide procedural fairness. The Tribunal's adverse findings against the applicant did not indicate bias or procedural error. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal, finding no jurisdictional error or procedural unfairness in the AAT’s decision.

The court's final orders were that the appeal be dismissed and that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs. This decision was in line with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, which governs the entry of orders in such appeals.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs to be agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The submission continued: I submit that in my application I have pointed out my circumstances in Bangladesh, and the second respondent have failed to apply the correct test as mentioned in section 36(2)(A) of the Migration Act 1958. Section 36(2A) stated chronologically what constitutes ‘significant harm’ and my evidence suggests that I was subject to torture by the ruling Bangladesh Awami League Party… In my view, the primary judge was correct to conclude that ground one rises no higher than seeking impermissible merits review. Insofar as the ground refers to the complementary protection test in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act, his Honour was also correct to say that the Tribunal did set out the test for complementary protection in its decision record and made specific findings in relation to it. In my view, those findings are unimpeachable. There was no error in the primary judge’s findings that there was no evidence before the court to support any argument that the Tribunal mistook or misconstrued the facts, and the Tribunal’s conclusions were reasonably open to it. It follows that ground one does not establish any jurisdictional error in the reasons of the Tribunal. Ground two, which is set out above, claims that the appellant was denied natural justice and procedural fairness by the Tribunal, and was regarded by the primary judge as also constituting an allegation that the Tribunal was biased. The particulars also allege that the Tribunal’s decision was “preoccupied” or had “a preoccupied view” of the appellant’s claims. In his written submission relied on in this appeal, the appellant says this:In assessing my claims in relation to whether the robbery was politically motivated or not the tribunal asked himself a wrong question. The AAT discredited my evidence without giving a reason why my claims are not accepted. The AAT before questioning my credibility as a witness did not put me on notice. As the primary judge found, there was nothing in the reasons of the Tribunal to suggest that it did not bring an open mind to the appellant’s application. The primary judge was, in my view, correct to find that the mere fact that the Tribunal had made adverse findings against the appellant cannot found an inference of bias, as ground two and its particulars may be taken to suggest. As the primary judge also observed, the appellant is, in fact, seeking to take issue with the fact that the Tribunal did not accept his claims. Such a rejection of claims cannot constitute a denial of natural justice or procedural fairness. In circumstances where, on the basis of its credibility findings, which were reasonably open to the Tribunal, it rejected that the appellant was ever robbed, and that nothing in the material reveals the remotest suggestion that the Tribunal had prejudged the matter or denied the appellant procedural fairness, ground two must be rejected. The appeal must therefore be dismissed, with costs.