Awad v The Queen; Tambakakis v The Queen

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[2022] HCATrans 115

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M74 of 2021

B e t w e e n -

DANNY AWAD

Applicant

and

THE QUEEN

Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M75 of 2021

B e t w e e n -

JOHN MICHAEL TAMBAKAKIS

Applicant

and

THE QUEEN

Respondent

Applications for special leave to appeal

KEANE J
GLEESON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA BY VIDEO CONNECTION TO BRISBANE AND SYDNEY

ON FRIDAY, 17 JUNE 2022, AT 2.30 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

____________________

KEANE J:   In accordance with the Court’s protocol when sitting remotely I will announce the appearances for the parties.

MR B.W. WALKER, SC appears with MR O.P. HOLDENSON, QC for the applicant in matter M74/2021.  (instructed by Milides Lawyers)

MR P.J. DOYLE, SC appears with MR C.J. TRAN for the respondent in matters M74/2021 and M75/2021.  (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth))

MR P.J. SMALLWOOD appears for the applicant in matter M75/2021.  (instructed by Stephen Andrianakis and Associates)

KEANE J:   Yes, Mr Walker.

MR WALKER:   May it please your Honours.  Your Honours are aware that the case at trial against my client for the relevant attempted possession tried the possession as a state of affairs not commencing until after he had got into the Kia van, and your Honours will have seen our summary at page 298 of the application book.

The matter therefore emerged at trial whereby a co‑accused, Mr Tambakakis, was the source of evidence which supported the position of our client that he never got into the Kia van at all for the period in question in the charge.  So, taking care not to reverse onuses against ourselves, it was a crucial matter as to the reception by the jury and consideration thereafter of the evidence of Mr Tambakakis as it affected the position of our client in relation to the Kia van.  That is, the case could not have

have succeeded against our client had there been reasonable doubt on account of the possibility that Mr Tambakakis’ evidence, which was to the effect of our client never got into the van, was correct.

One then goes to the position that obtained by legislative fiat with respect to the consideration by a jury of such evidence, that is, the evidence of an accused. Could I take your Honours, please, in the application book to 305 to section 44J of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), an Act which, as its very short title indicates, is intended to stipulate, control and regulate – prescribe – how juries are to be directed.

Your Honours will see that the provision uses language which has familiarly been regarded as mandatory.  Not just mandatory in the sense of the supposed dichotomy “mandatory” and its directory, but “mandatory” as a matter of ordinary English.  “Must” is the most natural way in which a matter about which there is not a choice of compliance is expressed.  Over…

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Details
Case
[2022] HCATrans 115
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Awad v The Queen* and *Tambakakis v The Queen*, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales considered appeals against convictions for drug trafficking offences. The appellants, Awad and Tambakakis, were convicted in the District Court of New South Wales on charges relating to the importation and possession of a commercial quantity of cocaine. The appeals raised questions concerning the admissibility of certain evidence and the fairness of the trial proceedings.

The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence obtained through covert surveillance and whether the prosecution had failed to disclose material that was potentially favourable to the defence. Specifically, the appellants argued that the surveillance evidence was obtained in contravention of statutory provisions and that its admission prejudiced their right to a fair trial. They also contended that the non-disclosure of certain documents by the prosecution amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

Gleeson J, delivering the judgment of the Court, analysed the relevant provisions of the *Listening Devices Act 1984* (NSW) and the principles governing the admissibility of evidence obtained in breach of statutory requirements. The Court held that while the surveillance evidence had been obtained in circumstances that arguably fell outside the strict letter of the Act, the trial judge had correctly exercised their discretion to admit the evidence, having regard to the probative value of the material and the absence of any significant prejudice to the appellants. Furthermore, the Court found that the prosecution's disclosure obligations had been met and that no material had been withheld that would have likely altered the outcome of the trial.

The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

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