Awad v Department of Ageing, Disability and Home Care
[2008] NSWWCCPD 49
•14 May 2008
WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR
CITATION:Awad v Department of Ageing, Disability and Home Care (NSW)
[2008] NSWWCCPD 49
APPELLANT: Joseph Awad
RESPONDENT: Department of Ageing, Disability and Home Care (NSW)
INSURER:Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd
FILE NUMBER: WCC7997-07
DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION: 6 December 2007
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION: 14 May 2008
SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION: Extending time to appeal; leave to appeal; weight of evidence; application of Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305; (2001) 52 NSWLR 705.
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER: Deputy President Bill Roche
HEARING:On the papers
REPRESENTATION: Appellant: Carroll & O’Dea Lawyers
Respondent: McLean Lawyers
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL: Leave to appeal is refused.
No order as to costs of the appeal.
BACKGROUND
Mr Joseph Awad (‘the Appellant/Mr. Award’) is currently 54 years of age. He has worked for the Department of Ageing, Disability and Home Care (NSW) (‘the Respondent /the Department’) for approximately 21 years: first, as an assessor for about three years; then, as a service co-ordinator for some 18 years. He continues to be employed by the Department.
Mr Awad’s position as a service co-ordinator is mainly sedentary. For his first three years in that position he spent 80% of his time in the office, rostering 12-14 staff daily on a manual system, which required him to bend his head and neck for long periods. For the next 15 years he used a keyboard to enter and retrieve data. He states that this required him to lean his body and head forward, bending his neck down to type and then to look up to check the screen (see document headed “Injury details” attached to Mr Awad’s claim form dated 7 December 2006). His job also required him to turn his head left and right when answering the phone, writing messages and reaching for files. He worked full time, 35 hours a week, with only infrequent breaks in the day due to work pressures and tight deadlines. He states that work pressures, deadlines, and infrequent breaks “caused constant tension and pressure on” his neck and shoulders gradually “causing frequent headaches and nausea to emerge”. He feels that his prolonged bent posture exacerbated the problem he now has. His claim form describes his injury or condition as “cervical disc lesion. Aggravation of degenerative disease”.
Mr Awad first experienced pain in his neck and left shoulder when he woke up at his home on Sunday, 27 August 2006. He massaged the area and applied cream. However, on 28 August 2006 the pain worsened and he developed pins and needles in the thumb and fingers of his left hand resulting in him attending Dr. Zaki (a general practitioner), and seeking hospital treatment.
Mr Awad alleges that he sustained a cervical strain in association with early degenerative changes as a result of the nature and conditions of his employment with the Department from January 1991 to 28 August 2006. By an ‘Application for Expedited Assessment’ (‘the Application’) lodged in the Commission on 22 October 2007, he claims medical expenses and weekly compensation for total incapacity for work from 28 August 2006 to 7 November 2006.
The Respondent, by ‘Reply to Application for Expedited Assessment’ (‘the Reply’) filed on 30 October 2007, argued that the Appellant did not sustain an injury arising out of or in the course of his employment; his employment was not a substantial contributing factor to his injury; and that the incapacity and medical treatment claimed did not result from the injury, but rather from an underlying non work-related condition.
The matter proceeded to arbitration. Consistent with a noticed served by the Respondent on 13 November 2006 under section 74 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW) (‘the 1998 Act’), the Arbitrator identified the only issue in dispute to be whether the Appellant’s employment was a substantial contributing factor to his injury under section 9A of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (‘the 1987Act’).
In a reserved decision delivered on 6 December 2007, the Arbitrator made an award in favour of the Department.
By an appeal filed out of time on 4 February 2008, Mr Awad seeks leave to appeal the Arbitrator’s decision of 6 December 2007.
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Section 354(6) of the 1998 Act provides:
“(6)If the Commission is satisfied that sufficient information has been supplied to it in connection with proceedings, the Commission may exercise functions under this Act without holding any conference or formal hearing.”
Having regard to Practice Directions Numbers 1 and 6, the documents that are before me, and the submission by the parties that the appeal can proceed to be determined on the basis of these documents, I am satisfied that I have sufficient information to proceed ‘on the papers’, without holding any conference or formal hearing, and that this is the appropriate course in the circumstances.
LEAVE TO APPEAL
Before proceeding to deal with an appeal the Commission must determine whether the application meets the thresholds in section 352 of the 1998 Act. Thresholds as to time and money must be addressed, and satisfied, before leave to appeal is granted.
Monetary Threshold
Section 352(2) of the 1998 Act provides:
“(2) The Commission is not to grant leave to appeal unless the amount of compensation at issue on the appeal is both:
a) at least $5,000 (or such other amount as may be prescribed by the regulations), and
b) at least 20% of the amount awarded in the decision appealed against.”
The quantum in issue on the appeal is in excess of $5,000.00 and therefore the threshold in section 352(2)(a) of the 1998 Act is satisfied. No award of compensation has been made in respect of the claim for weekly compensation for the neck or left shoulder and the Arbitrator’s finding will result in the Appellant receiving no compensation in respect of the claim and, therefore, the second limb of section 352(2) does not apply (see Mawson v Fletchers International Exports Pty Ltd [2002] NSWWCCPD 5).
Time
Section 352(4) of the 1998 Act provides:
“(4) An appeal can only be made within 28 days after the making of the decision appealed against.”
The appeal was filed out of time on 4 February 2008. The last day for filing the appeal was 3 January 2008 and the Appellant seeks an extension of time in which to appeal.
An extension of time in which to appeal is governed by Part 16 Rule 16.2(11) of the Workers Compensation Commission Rules 2006 (‘the Rules’). Rule 16.2(11) provides:
“(11) The Commission constituted by a Presidential member may, if a party satisfies the Presidential member, in exceptional circumstances, that to lose the right to seek leave to appeal would work demonstrable and substantial injustice, by order extend the time for making an appeal.”
The question of extending time to appeal was considered by Justice McHugh in Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479 (‘Gallo’) where his Honour said at 480:
“The discretion to extend time is given for the sole purpose of enabling the court or justice to do justice between the parties: see Hughes v National Trustees Executors & Agency Co of Australasia Ltd [1978] VR 257 at 262. This means that the discretion can only be exercised in favour of an applicant upon proof that strict compliance with the rules will work an injustice upon the applicant. In order to determine whether the rules will work an injustice, it is necessary to have regard to the history of the proceedings, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation, and the consequences for the parties of the grant or refusal of the application for extension of time: see Avery v No 2 Public Service Appeal Board [1973] 2 NZLR 86 at 92; Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 at 194-5; 70 ALR 185. When the application is for an extension of time in which to file an appeal, it is always necessary to consider the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the appeal: see Burns v Grigg [1967] VR 871 at 872; Hughes at 263-4, Mitchelson v Mitchelson (1979) 24 ALR 522 at 524. It is also necessary to bear in mind in such an application that, upon the expiry of the time for appealing, the respondent has ‘a vested right to retain the judgment’ unless the application is granted: Vilenius v Heinegar (1962) 36 ALJR 200 at 201.”
Having initially instructed Messrs W. G. McNally Jones Staff at the arbitration, Mr Awad changed his solicitors and engaged Messrs Carroll & O’Dea on 18 December 2007 in respect of an unrelated matter.
In support of his application to extend time to appeal, the Appellant sets out the following chronology:
a)on 10 December 2007 his previous solicitors received the Arbitrator’s decision and subsequently forwarded it to him;
b)on 18 December 2007 he first instructed his current solicitors (Carroll & O’Dea) in relation to a separate and unrelated matter;
c)on 2 January 2008 he instructed his current solicitors to appeal the Arbitrator’s decision. On the advice of his current solicitor, the Appellant sent a facsimile to the Commission on 2 January 2008 in which he requested “from the registrar, the granting of an extension of time, to appeal the Arbitrator’s decision” (see the Appellant’s letter dated 2 January 2008);
d)in his letter of 2 January 2008, Mr Awad outlined the following matters:
(i)he’d had a disagreement with his former solicitor about the way his case was handled in the Commission;
(ii)his recent mental breakdown at work in November 2007 affected his capacity to function properly;
(iii)it had been difficult to find a new solicitor, especially in the Christmas and New Year holiday period, and
(iv)he needed help from his wife in writing the letter of 2 January 2008.
e)on 8 January 2008 Mr Award forwarded a copy of the 2 January 2008 letter to the Commission, having been advised that the Commission had not received the facsimile;
f)by letter dated 15 January 2008 the Commission informed him that an extension of time could not be granted prior to the lodgement of the appeal;
g)on 22 January 2008 he forwarded the letter of 15 January 2008 to his current solicitor who, on the same day, requested the previous solicitors to forward their file, and
h)on 24 January 2008, Carroll and O’Dea received his file from the previous solicitors.
Having regard to the above chronology, the Appellant submits that “it is reasonable and in the interests of justice for the Appellant to be granted an extension of time in which to lodge this appeal” (the Appellant’s submissions 6 February 2008, paragraph 2.1).
The Department submits:
a) the Appeal was lodged some 4 weeks after the time to appeal had expired;
b) the Appellant failed to notify it, or its insurer or solicitor, of his intention to appeal, as required by Rule 16.2 (12)(a) of the Rules;
c) the Appellant does not rely on the correspondence with the Commission in support of the request for an extension of time;
d) changing solicitors is not out of the ordinary;
e) the Appellant’s solicitor did not contact Mr Awad’s previous solicitors until 20 days after taking instructions to appeal the Arbitrator’s decision;
f) the Appellant’s solicitor should have known that an extension of time cannot be granted before the appeal is lodged;
g) the Appellant has not demonstrated “a reasonable prospect for success” as the Arbitrator has adequately considered and given proper weight to the evidence before him and it was open to him to make a decision in its favour, and
h) the Appellant has not demonstrated any “exceptional circumstances” (Yacoub v Pilkington (Australia) Ltd (2007) NSWCA 290 (‘Yacoub’), as cited in Roads & Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Cormick [2007] NSWWCCPD 220) (‘Cormick’), or that to lose the right to appeal would work “demonstrable and substantial injustice”.
The following factors support a determination that “exceptional circumstances” exist that may justify an extension of time in which to appeal in this matter:
a) the 28 day period after the Arbitrator’s determination coincided with the Christmas and New Year holiday period, which made it difficult for the Appellant to obtain legal advice in respect of any potential appeal;
b) when the Appellant first instructed his current solicitor he was within time to appeal but the solicitor did not have access to the file because it was still in the possession of his previous solicitor;
c) Mr Awad acted on the advice from his solicitor in seeking an extension of time with the Commission prior to lodging an appeal. It was not his fault that that advice was incorrect;
d) as a result, his attempt to seek an extension of time in his letter of 2 January 2008 was misguided and futile, and has contributed to the delay in lodging the appeal, and
e) no prejudice has been identified by the Department in the event that time to appeal is extended.
However, before time to appeal can be extended it is necessary for the putative appellant to establish that to lose the right to appeal will result in a “demonstrable and substantial injustice”. In considering whether this test is satisfied it is necessary to consider the putative appellant’s prospects of success in the appeal if time to appeal is extended. This requires a careful consideration of the merits of the proposed appeal.
The Appellant argues that the Arbitrator erred in that he:
a) failed to take into consideration the weight of the medical opinions in support of his case;
b) gave undue weight to the opinion of Dr Assem, the medical expert on behalf of the Department,;
c) failed to give sufficient consideration to the Appellant’s statement and other evidence, in particular, the Kairros report;
d) failed to consider or, in the alternative, failed to place sufficient weight on relevant matters when making his decision, and
e) misapplied section 9A of the 1987 Act.
The Arbitrator carefully considered all of the relevant evidence and concluded that Mr Awad’s employment was not a substantial contributing factor to his injury (Statement of Reasons for Decision (‘Reasons’), at paragraph 21). For the reasons set out below, this conclusion was open to him and discloses no error of fact, law or discretion.
It is not disputed that Mr Awad first developed neck and upper left arm pain at home on Sunday 27 August 2006. On Monday 28 August 2006 (before returning to work), Mr Awad developed severe pain in his neck and left shoulder as well as pins and needles in the thumb and fingers of his left hand. He attended Dr Zaki at the Regency Medical Centre who provided a non-WorkCover medical certificate dated 28 August 2006 declaring Mr Awad to be unfit on that day because of “L. shoulder pain”. At about 2.00pm Mr Awad’s wife drove him to Westmead Hospital where he was given a sickness certificate for 28 August 2006 because of “cervical spasm”.
Mr Awad again attended the Regency Medical Centre on 29 August 2006 when he saw Dr Mahendravarman who gave him a further non-WorkCover certificate for that day because of “neck pain”. A neck X-ray and cervical CT scan were performed on 29 August 2006, revealing disc protrusions at C4/5 and 5/6.
Dr Huynh, general practitioner, first saw Mr Awad on 11 September 2006 and took a history that he woke up with pain two weeks prior, but there was no obvious injury that could be accounted for. As Mr Awad’s condition failed to improve, Dr Huynh referred him to Dr Mahony, orthopaedic surgeon. In his referral letter dated 4 October 2006, Dr Huynh stated that in his opinion the pathology revealed on the CT scan was consistent with “the injury caused by the nature of his work (computer administration)” and therefore the condition was work related.
Dr Mahony examined Mr Awad on 26 September 2006 and reported on 7 June 2007. He recorded that on 27 August 2006 Mr Awad woke up and noticed pain in his neck and left shoulder, which he massaged with cream. Dr Mahony also recorded that Mr Awad normally worked as a welfare services co-ordinator and the majority of his work involved computer work and rostering staff. Mr Awad also taught Kung Fu, but ceased that activity due to his pain.
An MRI scan performed on 9 October 2006 revealed cervical spondylosis and a protrusion at C5/6 with an annular tear at C6/7.
Dr Mahony concluded at page three of his report:
“Mr Awad has developed symptoms referable to a cervical strain in association with early degenerative changes with nerve root irritation affecting the left upper limb, and there is evidence of discogenic lesions at C4/5, C5/6 and C6/7 levels with left C6 nerve root irritation.
It is consistent that the nature of his work has aggravated a potentially irritable spine and produced left upper limb symptoms.”
In his report of 7 July 2007, Dr Huynh concluded that the nature of Mr Awad’s work over time “contributes significantly to the wearing out of the particular C5/6 disc (i.e. neck rotation while in flexion)”.
The Arbitrator referred to the reports from Drs Mahony and Huyhn at paragraphs 13 and 14 of his Reasons. At paragraph 15 the Arbitrator wrongly observed that both doctors considered work to be a substantial contributing factor to Mr Awad’s injury. In fact, neither doctor expressed an opinion on this issue in accordance with the terms of the legislation. This fact alone may well have justified a finding in favour of the Respondent. Leaving this issue to one side (as neither party has addressed on it) and assuming that Drs Mahony and Huyhn did provide the opinions suggested by the Arbitrator, the Arbitrator felt that neither doctor explained the mechanism by which Mr Awad’s work substantially contributed to his injury and, on the application of the principles in South Western Sydney Area Health Service v Edmonds [2007] NSWCA 16; (2007) 4 DDCR 421 (‘Edmonds’), the mere expression of opinion by a doctor is not itself sufficient to find for a worker. This conclusion is consistent with the principles discussed by the Court of Appeal in Edmonds and discloses no error.
The weight to be attached to a bare conclusion expressed by an expert was considered by the Court of Appeal in Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305; (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 (‘Makita’) and in Hevi Lift (PNG) Ltd v Etherington [2005] NSWCA 42 (‘Hevi Lift’). In Makita, Heydon JA (as he then was) referred to and applied the principles set out in Davie v The Lord Provost, Magistrates and Councillors of the City of Edinburgh (1953) SC 34 at 39-40 where Lord President Cooper said:
“...the bare ipse dixit of a scientist, however eminent, upon the issue in controversy, will normally carry little weight, for it cannot be tested by cross-examination nor independently appraised, and the parties have invoked the decision of a judicial tribunal and not an oracular pronouncement by an expert.”
Heydon JA added at [85] that:
“...so far as the opinion is based on facts ‘observed’ by the expert, they must be identified and admissibly proved by the expert, and so far as the opinion is based on ‘assumed’ or ‘accepted’ facts, they must be identified and proved in some other way; it must be established that the facts on which the opinion is based form a proper foundation for it; and the opinion of an expert requires demonstration or examination of the scientific or other intellectual basis of the conclusions reached: that is, the expert’s evidence must explain how the field of ‘specialised knowledge’ in which the witness is expert by reason of ‘training, study or experience’, and on which the opinion is ‘wholly or substantially based’, applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion propounded. If all these matters are not made explicit, it is not possible to be sure whether the opinion is based wholly or substantially on the expert’s specialised knowledge. If the court cannot be sure of that, the evidence is strictly speaking not admissible, and, so far as it is admissible, of diminished weight.”
In Hevi Lift, the worker suffered extreme pain in his back after getting up from a couch in staff quarters in which he resided for the purpose of carrying out his employment. An MRI scan revealed a central prolapsed disc at L4/5 associated with lumbar spinal stenosis. At the time of the injury the worker was employed as a helicopter pilot and was on call 24 hours a day. He argued he had sustained a “nature and conditions” injury as a result of his work as a pilot and that he sustained a frank injury as he got up from the couch. The employer conceded that the injury had been sustained in the course of Mr Etherington’s employment but argued that there was no evidence explaining how the employment substantially contributed to an injury, which occurred during a period of rest. The worker’s medical case consisted of a medical specialist who concluded, without explanation, that his employment had been a substantial contributing factor to his condition. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge’s conclusion that the doctor’s opinion met the requirements of the Makita test was “plainly wrong” (per McColl JA at [80], Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing) because the doctor’s opinion did not go beyond a bare ipse dixit.
McColl JA added at [84] and [85] that:
“It is not, in my view, necessary to consider for present purposes whether Heydon JA’s judgment in Makita set too high a standard for the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. The critical parts of Doctor Selby Brown and Doctor Khoo’s reports fell short, even by pre-Makita standards, of the standard required for admissibility. It has long been the case that a court cannot be expected to, and should not, act upon an expert opinion the basis for which is not explained by the witness expressing it: see Cross on Evidence at [29065]; R v Jenkins; Ex parte Morrison (No 2) [1949] VLR 277 at 303; R v Hally [1962] Qd R 214; Steffen v Ruban [1966] 2 NSWR 622; Perry v R (1990) 49 A Crim R 243 and, of course, the principal authorities examined by Heydon JA in Makita (at 729 - 741 [59] - [82]).
In my view, the primary judge should not have accorded the respondent’s medical reports any weight. They were incapable of constituting evidence capable of satisfying the s 9A requirement that the respondent’s employment was a substantial contributing factor to either of the mechanisms of injury upon which he relied.” (emphasis added)
In Edmonds, the Court of Appeal held that the above principles apply to proceedings in the Commission (per McColl JA at [130] and [131]). In that case the worker injured her right knee in a frank injury in May 1993. In August 2002 she sought lump sum compensation for continuing problems with her right knee and for problems with her back and left knee. At the suggestion of the Arbitrator, Ms Edmonds amended her claim to rely on the disease provisions of the 1987 Act. The Arbitrator relied on the evidence from Dr Rivett that “in general all the problems are work related” and found in the worker’s favour. McColl JA (Giles and Tobias JJA agreeing) held that this opinion, without any explanation, amounted to a bare ipse dixit and offered no probative support for the Arbitrator’s conclusion (at [132]). Whilst Ms Edmonds thought that favouring her right leg threw strain onto her left side and her back, Dr Rivett did not indicate whether that was a valid proposition (at [138]).
Mr Awad’s position is even weaker as the evidence falls well short of establishing that his employment is a substantial contributing factor to his injury. As was the case in Hevi Lift, Mr Awad’s experts have made no attempt to explain the basis for their conclusions or to set out the history on which their opinions were based. They ignored the fact that Mr Awad’s neck and arm symptoms started at home on a Sunday, two days after he ceased work. In these circumstances the Arbitrator was correct in concluding that “the mere expression of opinion by the doctors is not in itself sufficient to find for the applicant” (Reasons, paragraph 15). The first ground of appeal has no merit.
Having regard to the lack of evidence dealing with the section 9A issue (substantial contributing factor), it is of no assistance to Mr Awad to argue that the Arbitrator placed undue weight on the report of Dr Assem dated 3 November 2006. The Appellant’s claim failed because of a lack of an explanation for the conclusions expressed by Mr Awad’s medical experts, not because of Dr Assem’s evidence. The Arbitrator merely considered Dr Assem’s evidence and noted that the doctor acknowledged that prolonged static neck flexion may provoke symptoms, however, he added that Mr Awad’s neck and arm symptoms developed at home and not at work (Dr Assem’s report, page five). Dr Assem also observed that Mr Awad engaged in martial arts, an activity which would have substantially contributed to the progression of the degenerative pathology. The Arbitrator’s reference to Dr Assem’s report discloses no error.
The argument that the Arbitrator failed to give sufficient weight to Mr Awad’s evidence and to the report from Kairros fails to acknowledge that this evidence does not overcome the fatal flaw in the Appellant’s medical case outlined above. The Arbitrator referred to the Kairros report and the deficiencies it identified in Mr Awad’s workstation. Taking that evidence into account the Arbitrator concluded that the work Mr Awad performed was capable of aggravating his cervical spondylosis (Reasons, paragraph 18). That finding did not overcome the fact that Mr Awad’s neck and arm symptoms did not occur at work, but commenced at home on a Sunday. Nor did it overcome the fact that the Kairros report was never provided to any of the medical experts for comment.
It is argued that the Arbitrator erred in failing to place sufficient weight on or refer to the cranial CT dated 27 January 2006, which was requested by Dr Yuan because Mr Awad experienced headaches. This scan, it is argued, supports Mr Awad’s contention that he suffered from neck pain prior to August 2006. I do not accept this submission. First, there is no report in evidence from Dr Yuan. Second, the only evidence attempting to link the January 2006 CT scan with the alleged work injury is from Mr Awad who, in his statement of 17 August 2007, alleges that Dr Yuan requested the scan because Mr Awad experienced headaches. This evidence provides no support for the claim currently made that Mr Awad’s employment was a substantial contributing factor to his neck injury. There could have been many explanations for Mr Awad’s headaches and without a report from a properly qualified expert this submission is baseless. The Arbitrator made no error in not referring to this scan, which, on its own, carried no weight.
Last, it is argued that the Arbitrator erred in misapplying section 9A of the 1987 Act. The submission in support of this ground merely states that had the Arbitrator properly taken into account the Appellant’s medical evidence, statement and claim form he should have decided in favour of the Appellant on the section 9A issue. This submission has no merit as it ignores the critical defect in the Appellant’s medical case, namely, that the expert evidence in support of the claim failed to explain the basis for the conclusions expressed.
The evidence satisfied the Arbitrator that “the work carried out by the Applicant was capable of aggravating the spondylosis suffered by the Applicant and could cause an onset of symptoms from that condition” (Reasons, paragraph 18). However, he also noted that the onset of Mr Awad’s symptoms did not occur at work or immediately thereafter but were first experienced on a Sunday morning when he was at home, having ceased work on the previous Friday (Reasons, paragraph 19). The Arbitrator correctly observed that neither Dr Mahony nor Dr Huynh explained how work could have resulted in an onset of symptoms two days after Mr Awad last worked. This conclusion discloses no error and I agree with it.
Conclusion
Having regard to the above analysis of the issues sought to be argued on appeal, I am firmly of the view that the appeal has no merit and would fail, if time to appeal were extended. In these circumstances, the refusal to extend time to appeal will result in no injustice to Mr Awad let alone a substantial injustice. Therefore, the application to extend time to appeal must be and is refused.
DECISION
Leave to appeal is refused.
COSTS
No order is made as to the costs of the appeal.
Bill Roche
Deputy President
14 May 2008
I, EMMA LETHBRIDGE-GILL, CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE REASONS FOR DECISION OF BILL ROCHE, DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
ASSOCIATE
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