JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: AVSAR -v- WESTLAND HEALTHCARE LTD [2007] WASCA 28
CORAM: PULLIN JA
BUSS JA
HEARD: 31 JANUARY 2007
DELIVERED : 31 JANUARY 2007
FILE NO/S: CACV 153 of 2006
BETWEEN: JENNIFER PATRICIA AVSAR
Appellant
AND
WESTLAND HEALTHCARE LTD
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :SLEIGHT DCJ
File No :CIV 3175 of 1997
Catchwords:
Applications for leave to appeal - Joinder of defendant - Capacity in which appellant sues - Programming orders - Turns on own facts
Applications for a stay of programming orders and springing order made by primary Judge - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 21 r 5
Result:
Applications for leave to appeal refused
Applications for stay refused
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: In person
Respondent: Ms F C E Davis
Solicitors:
Appellant: In person
Respondent: SRB Legal
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268
Morgan v Banning (1999) 20 WAR 474
Skahill v Kestral Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) [2000] WASCA 185
The State of Western Australia v Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd (1991) 5 WAR 40
Westland Healthcare Ltd v Avsar [2006] WASCA 230
Wilson v Metaxas [1989] WAR 285
PULLIN JA: I agree with Buss JA and I have nothing to add.
BUSS JA: By appeal notice dated 4 December 2006, the appellant applied for leave to appeal from the decisions of Judge Sleight, in pending District Court action CIV 3175 of 1997, to dismiss:
(1)the appellant's application, by chamber summons dated 18 October 2006, for leave to add Fremantle Hospital as a defendant to the pending District Court action; and
(2)the appellant's application, by chamber summons dated 20 November 2006, for leave to amend the capacity in which she sues as plaintiff in the pending District Court action, to enable her to sue in her personal capacity.
Further, by the appeal notice dated 4 December 2006, the appellant applied for leave to appeal against various programming orders made by Judge Sleight, in the pending District Court action, on 27 November 2006.
Also, by an interim application dated 21 December 2006, the appellant applied for a stay of the programming orders made by Judge Sleight on 27 November 2006, and a stay of a springing order made by his Honour on 19 December 2006 as a result of the appellant having failed to comply with some of the programming orders made on 27 November 2006. The date fixed by the springing order for compliance with the programming orders in question was 8 January 2007. There is a dispute between the parties as to whether the springing order has sprung.
The background facts relating to the pending District Court action are recounted in the reasons of Pullin JA in Westland Healthcare Ltd v Avsar [2006] WASCA 230, which were published…
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- Case
- [2007] WASCA 28
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principle that leave to appeal is a matter of discretion and that an appellant must demonstrate that the appeal has a reasonable chance of success. The court found that Avsar had not met this burden in relation to the decisions regarding the joinder, the capacity in which Avsar was suing, and the programming orders. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no basis for granting a stay of the programming orders or the springing order. Additionally, the court noted that the time for compliance with the programming orders had elapsed, and any dispute over whether the springing order had come into effect should be resolved in the District Court. If the springing order had indeed come into effect, and Avsar wished to seek an extension of time to comply with it, such an application should be made in the District Court.
In light of the above, the court dismissed all of Avsar's applications. The court emphasised that the decisions on leave to appeal and the stay of programming orders turn on their own facts, and the principles established in previous cases such as FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL and Skahill v Kestral Holdings Pty Ltd were applicable. Consequently, the court upheld the decisions of Judge Sleight and the programming orders made on 27 November 2006 and the springing order made on 19 December 2006.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant has failed to obtain a grant of leave to appeal in respect of Judge Sleight's decisions relating to the joinder of Fremantle Hospital, amending the capacity in which the appellant sues and the programming orders made on 27 November 2006. In those circumstances, there is no basis for the granting of a stay of the programming orders made on 27 November 2006 or the springing order made on 19 December 2006. Further, the time for compliance with those orders has passed. As I have mentioned, the springing order made on 19 December 2006 required the appellant to comply with the programming orders the subject of the springing order by 8 January 2007, and there is a dispute between the parties as to whether the springing order has sprung or not. That dispute should be resolved in the District Court. If the springing order has sprung and the appellant wishes to make application to extend the time for compliance with the springing order, that application should be made in the District Court. Generally, see FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268 at 286; Skahill v Kestral Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) [2000] WASCA 185 at [4]. In summary, for the reasons I have given, I would dismiss all of the appellant's applications.