AVILA & HODGES

[2020] FCCA 3255

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AVILA & HODGES [2020] FCCA 3255

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Interim parenting – where expert’s report available and recommends progression of the father’s time including unsupervised time – further interim orders made.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975(Cth), ss.60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61DA, 65DAA.

Cases cited:

Goode & Goode [2006] FamCA 1346
MRR v GR [2010] HCA 4

Applicant: MR AVILA

Respondent: MS HODGES

File Number: WOC 508 of 2020

Judgment of: Judge Altobelli

Hearing date: 2 November 2020

Date of Last Submission: 2 November 2020

Delivered at: Wollongong

Delivered on: 17 November 2020

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Grew

Solicitors for the Applicant: DGB Lawyers

Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Kennedy

Solicitors for the Respondent: The Norton Law Group

ORDERS PENDING FURTHER ORDER

1. The Child X (born 2016) (the Child’) shall spend time with the Applicant Father as follows:

   (a)On 21 and 22 November 2020 and 12 and 13 December 2020 in accordance with Order 2a of consent Orders dated 2 June 2020.

   Thereafter on an unsupervised basis as follows:

   (b)On 19 and 20 December 2020 in the Mother’s town of residence, for a period of 3 hours each day being from 2:00pm until 5:00pm on Saturday and 9:00am until 12:00pm on Sunday;

   (c)On 2 and 3 January 2021 in Wollongong, for a period of 3 hours each day being from 2:00pm until 5:00pm on Saturday and 9:00am until 12:00pm on Sunday;

   (d)On 16 and 17 January 2021 in the Mother’s town of residence, for a period of 3 hours each day being from 2:00pm until 5:00pm on Saturday and 9:00am until 12:00pm on Sunday;

   (e)On 30 and 31 January 2021 in Wollongong, for a period of 3 hours each day being from 2:00pm until 5:00pm on Saturday and 9:00am until 12:00pm on Sunday;

   (f)On 13 and 14 February 2021 in the Mother’s town of residence, for a period of 5 hours each day being from 12:00pm until 5:00pm on Saturday and 9:00am until 2:00pm on Sunday;

   (g)On 27 and 28 February 2021 in Wollongong, for a period of 5 hours each day being from 12:00pm until 5:00pm on Saturday and 9:00am until 2:00pm on Sunday;

   (h)On 13 and 14 March 2021 in the Mother’s town of residence, for a period of 5 hours each day being from 12:00pm until 5:00pm on Saturday and 9:00am until 2:00pm on Sunday;

   (i)On 27 and 28 March 2021 in Wollongong, for a period of 5 hours each day being from 12:00pm until 5:00pm on Saturday and 9:00am until 2:00pm on Sunday;

   (j)On 10 and 11 April 2021 in the Mother’s town of residence, for a period of 5 hours each day being from 12:00pm until 5:00pm on Saturday and 9:00am until 2:00pm on Sunday;

   (k)On 24 and 25 April 2021 in Wollongong, for a period of 5 hours each day being from 12:00pm until 5:00pm on Saturday and 9:00am until 2:00pm on Sunday;

   (l)On 8 and 9 May 2021 in the Mother’s town of residence, for a period of 5 hours each day being from 12:00pm until 5:00pm on Saturday and 9:00am until 2:00pm on Sunday;

   (m)On 22 and 23 May 2021 in the Mother’s town of residence, for a period of 5 hours each day being from 12:00pm until 5:00pm on Saturday and 9:00am until 2:00pm on Sunday

   (n)Commencing on 5 June 2021 and continuing thereafter, each alternate weekend from 11:00am Saturday until 3:00pm on Sunday, with such time to occur firstly in the Mother’s town of residence and secondly in Wollongong on an alternating basis.

FURTHER ORDERS:

1. The matter be adjourned to 25 February 2021 at 2:00pm for Mention before Registrar Whitten.

NOTATIONS:

(A)  The purpose of the Mention is to;

(B)     Review the implementation of the interim orders; and

(C)      Consider whether the matter should be allocated Final Hearing dates.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Avila & Hodges is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT WOLLONGONG

WOC 508 of 2020

MR AVILA

Applicant

And

MS HODGES

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. These Reasons for Judgment were delivered orally. They have been corrected from the transcript. Grammatical errors have been corrected and an attempt has been made to render the orally delivered reasons amenable to being read.

Introduction

1. This case is about a child, X, who is 4 years old.  X currently lives with her mother and maternal grandparents in Town A in New South Wales. Her father, who lives in the Region B area of New South Wales, currently spends time with her on a supervised basis every 3 weeks at his home on Saturday and Sunday afternoons. In short, her father would like to increase his time with X and move to unsupervised. The Mother agrees with this in principle but would like it to happen at a substantially different rate of progression.

2. When this matter came before me for Interim Hearing on 2 November, the parents, capably assisted by their respective Counsel, were able to enter into interim consent orders that dealt with a number of uncontentious issues, for example, the parents agreed that there should be equal shared parental responsibility and that X live with the Mother.  The parents agreed that the Mother is permitted to relocate with X from Town A to live in Canberra or in Sydney, subject to notice.  The Orders also deal with a number of issues relating to how X’s time with her father is to be implemented, drug-testing and the consequences thereof, and a number of other important but peripheral issues.  The fact that the parents were able to reach agreement about these issues is very positive and encouraging, from X’s perspective.

3. The orders sought by the Father are contained within the Orders contained in the document that I marked “A” on the date of the Interim Hearing. In short, he proposed that there would be one weekend of supervised contact in accordance with the existing orders, and thereafter his time would become unsupervised, and over a period of weeks gradually increase in terms of the amount of time, with the venue alternating between where the Mother was living and where the Father was living.  It would progress from 3 to 5 hours and then ultimately by May 2021 would become alternating weekends from 11:00am on Saturday until 3:00pm on Sunday, with the venue again to alternate between where the Mother and Father was living.

4. The notable feature of the Father’s proposal was that it progressed almost immediately to unsupervised time. 

5. The orders proposed by the Mother provided for an almost immediate increase in time to 3 hours on each day, with the venue alternating between the Mother’s hometown and the Father’s hometown, but on the basis that it continued to be supervised by the maternal grandparents when in the Mother’s hometown, and by a supervised contact worker when in the Father’s hometown. Unsupervised time would not commence until May for a maximum of 3 hours.

6. The Mother made a number of alternative proposals, depending on whether she continued to live in Town A or in fact had relocated to Canberra, but the substance of her proposal was the same – that is, that time would continue to be supervised until May 2021, and even then progress to unsupervised time in excess of 3 hours was contingent on a further Interim Hearing.

The evidence

1. In the Father’s case, he relied on the following documents:

   a)Amended Initiating Application filed 26 October 2020;

   b)Affidavit of Mr Avila sworn and filed on 26 October 2020;

   c)Financial Statement filed 26 October 2020;

   d)Case outline document filed 28 October 2020.

2. In the Mother’s case, she relied on the following documents:

   a)Amended Response filed 23 October 2020;

   b)Affidavit of Ms Hodges filed 26 October 2020;

   c)Affidavit of Ms Hodges filed 26 May 2020;

   d)Affidavit of Ms Hodges filed 25 May 2020;

   e)Notice of Risk filed 25 May 2020; and

   f)Case outline document filed 28 October 2020.

3. The following material was tendered as evidence during the course of the proceedings:

   a)Report of Dr C dated 2 September 2020;

   b)Correspondence received by consent by Chambers on 4 November 2020 from DGB Lawyers.

The applicable law

1. The applicable law is found in Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (hereafter referred to as ‘the Act’). In determining parenting matters under Part VII of the Act the Court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration: s.60CA.

2. The objects and principles of Part VII are set out at s.60B:

   60B  Objects of Part and principles underlying it

   (1)  The objects of this Part are to ensure that the best interests of children are met by:

   (a)    ensuring that children have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child; and

   (b)    protecting children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence; and

   (c)    ensuring that children receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential; and

   (d)    ensuring that parents fulfil their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of their children.

   (2)  The principles underlying these objects are that (except when it is or would be contrary to a child’s best interests):

   (a)    children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together; and

   (b)    children have a right to spend time on a regular basis with, and communicate on a regular basis with, both their parents and other people significant to their care, welfare and development (such as grandparents and other relatives); and

   (c)    parents jointly share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children; and

   (d)    parents should agree about the future parenting of their children; and

   (e)    children have a right to enjoy their culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture).

   (3)    For the purposes of subparagraph (2)(e), an Aboriginal child’s or Torres Strait Islander child’s right to enjoy his or her Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture includes the right:

   (a)    to maintain a connection with that culture; and

   (b)    to have the support, opportunity and encouragement necessary:

   (i) to explore the full extent of that culture, consistent with the child’s age and developmental level and the child’s views; and

   (ii)    to develop a positive appreciation of that culture.

3. At the very core of Part VII of the Act is the creation of a presumption of equal shared parental responsibility in s.61DA. Section 61DA provides:

   61DA  Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility when making parenting orders

   (1)  When making a parenting order in relation to a child, the court must apply a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child.

   (2)  The presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent of the child (or a person who lives with a parent of the child) has engaged in:

   (a)    abuse of the child or another child who, at the time, was a member of the parent’s family (or that other person’s family); or

   (b)    family violence.

   (3)  When the court is making an interim order, the presumption applies unless the court considers that it would not be appropriate in the circumstances for the presumption to be applied when making that order.

   (4)  The presumption may be rebutted by evidence that satisfies the court that it would not be in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child.

4. If the presumption applies, the Court is required to consider certain things:

   65DAA Court to consider child spending equal time or substantial and significant time with each parent in certain circumstances

   Equal time

   (1)  If a parenting order provides (or is to provide) that a child’s parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child, the court must:

   (a)    consider whether the child spending equal time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the child; and

   (b)    consider whether the child spending equal time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable; and

   (c)     if it is, consider making an order to provide (or including a provision in the order) for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents.

   Substantial and significant time

   (2)  If:

   (a)    a parenting order provides (or is to provide) that a child’s parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child; and

   (b)    the court does not make an order (or include a provision in the order) for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents; and

   the court must:

   (c)     consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the child; and

   (d)    consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable; and

   (e)     if it is, consider making an order to provide (or including a provision in the order) for the child to spend substantial and significant time with each of the parents.

   (3) will be taken to spend substantial and significant time with a parent only if:

   (a)    the time the child spends with the parent includes both:

   (i) days that fall on weekends and holidays; and

   (ii)    days that do not fall on weekends or holidays; and

   (b)    the time the child spends with the parent allows the parent to be involved in:

   (i) the child’s daily routine; and

   (ii)    occasions and events that are of particular significance to the child; and

   (c)     the time the child spends with the parent allows the child to be involved in occasions and events that are of special significance to the parent.

   (4)  Subsection (3) does not limit the other matters to which a court can have regard in determining whether the time a child spends with a parent would be substantial and significant.

   Reasonable practicality

   (5)  In determining for the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) whether it is reasonably practicable for a child to spend equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of the child’s parents, the court must have regard to:

   (a)    how far apart the parents live from each other; and

   (b)    the parents’ current and future capacity to implement an arrangement for the child spending equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of the parents; and

   (c)     the parents’ current and future capacity to communicate with each other and resolve difficulties that might arise in implementing an arrangement of that kind; and

   (d)    the impact that an arrangement of that kind would have on the child; and

   (e)     such other matters as the court considers relevant.

5. Because s.65DAA refers to the best interests of the child the Court must then go back to consider s.60CC which specifies how the Court must determine what is in a child’s best interests.

   Determining child's best interests

   (1)  Subject to subsection (5), in determining what is in the child's best interests, the court must consider the matters set out in subsections (2) and (3).

   Primary considerations

   (2)  The primary considerations are:

   (a)  the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child's parents; and

   (b)  the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.

   Note:         Making these considerations the primary ones is consistent with the objects of this Part set out in paragraphs 60B(1)(a) and (b).

   (2A)  In applying the considerations set out in subsection (2), the court is to give greater weight to the consideration set out in paragraph (2)(b).

   Additional considerations

   (3)  Additional considerations are:

   (a)  any views expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child's maturity or level of understanding) that the court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child's views;

   (b)  the nature of the relationship of the child with:

   (i)  each of the child's parents; and

   (ii)  other persons (including any grandparent or other relative of the child);

   (c)  the extent to which each of the child's parents has taken, or failed to take, the opportunity:

   (i)  to participate in making decisions about major long-term issues in relation to the child; and

   (ii)  to spend time with the child; and

   (iii)  to communicate with the child;

   (ca)  the extent to which each of the child's parents has fulfilled, or failed to fulfil, the parent's obligations to maintain the child;

   (d)  the likely effect of any changes in the child's circumstances, including the likely effect on the child of any separation from:

   (i)  either of his or her parents; or

   (ii)  any other child, or other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child), with whom he or she has been living;

   (e)  the practical difficulty and expense of a child spending time with and communicating with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child's right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis;

   (f)  the capacity of:

   (i)  each of the child's parents; and

   (ii)  any other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child);

   to provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs;

   (g)  the maturity, sex, lifestyle and background (including lifestyle, culture and traditions) of the child and of either of the child's parents, and any other characteristics of the child that the court thinks are relevant;

   (h)  if the child is an Aboriginal child or a Torres Strait Islander child:

   (i)  the child's right to enjoy his or her Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture); and

   (ii)  the likely impact any proposed parenting order under this Part will have on that right;

   (i)  the attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child's parents;

   (j)  any family violence involving the child or a member of the child's family;

   (k)  if a family violence order applies, or has applied, to the child or a member of the child's family--any relevant inferences that can be drawn from the order, taking into account the following:

   (i)  the nature of the order;

   (ii)  the circumstances in which the order was made;

   (iii)  any evidence admitted in proceedings for the order;

   (iv)  any findings made by the court in, or in proceedings for, the order;

   (v)  any other relevant matter;

   (l)  whether it would be preferable to make the order that would be least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings in relation to the child;

   (m)  any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant.

The case law

1. In MRR v GR [2010] HCA 4, the High Court referred to s.65DAA(1) and said

   9.  Each of sub-ss (1)(b) and (2)(d) of s 65DAA require the Court to consider whether it is reasonably practicable for the child to spend equal time or substantial and significant time with each of the parents.  It is clearly intended that the Court determine that question.  Sub-section (5) provides in that respect that the Court "must have regard" to certain matters, such as how far apart the parents live from each other and their capacity to implement the arrangement in question, and "such other matters as the court considers relevant", "[i]n determining for the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) whether it is reasonably practicable for a child to spend equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of the child's parents".

1. A little later in the judgment the High Court said:

   13.    Section 65DAA(1) is expressed in imperative terms.  It obliges the Court to consider both the question whether it is in the best interests of the child to spend equal time with each of the parents (par (a)) and the question whether it is reasonably practicable that the child spend equal time with each of them (par (b)).  It is only where both questions are answered in the affirmative that consideration may be given, under par (c), to the making of an order.

2. At [15] the High Court emphasised the need for a practical approach:

   15.    Section 65DAA(1) is concerned with the reality of the situation of the parents and the child, not whether it is desirable that there be equal time spent by the child with each parent. The presumption in s 61DA(1) is not determinative of the questions arising under s 65DAA(1). Section 65DAA(1)(b) requires a practical assessment of whether equal time parenting is feasible.

3. The Full Court’s decision in Goode & Goode [2006] FamCA 1346 provides some guidance about the interpretation of Part VII and the way to proceed in interim hearings.

   68. In our view some of the comments of the Full Court in paragraph 18 are still apposite. For example, the procedure for making interim parenting orders will continue to be an abridged process where the scope of the enquiry is “significantly curtailed”. Where the Court cannot make findings of fact it should not be drawn into issues of fact or matters relating to the merits of the substantive case where findings are not possible. The Court also looks to the less contentious matters, such as the agreed facts and issues not in dispute and would have regard to the care arrangements prior to separation, the current circumstances of the parties and their children, and the parties’ respective proposals for the future.

   …

   72. In our view, it can be fairly said there is a legislative intent evinced in favour of substantial involvement of both parents in their children’s lives, both as to parental responsibility and as to time spent with children, subject to the need to protect children from harm, from abuse and family violence and provided it is in their best interests and reasonably practicable. This means where there is a status quo or well settled environment, instead of simply preserving it, unless there are protective or other significant best interests concerns for the child, the Court must follow the structure of the Act and consider accepting, where applicable, equal or significant involvement by both parents in the care arrangements for the child.

   …

   82. In an interim case that would involve the following:

   (a) identifying the competing proposals of the parties;

   (b) identifying the issues in dispute in the interim hearing;

   (c) identifying any agreed or uncontested relevant facts;

   (d) considering the matters in s 60CC that are relevant and, if possible, making findings about them (in interim proceedings there may be little uncontested evidence to enable more than a limited consideration of these matters to take place);

   (e) deciding whether the presumption in s 61DA that equal shared parental responsibility is in the best interests of the child applies or does not apply because there are reasonable grounds to believe there has been abuse of the child or family violence or, in an interim matter, the Court does not consider it appropriate to apply the presumption;

   (f) if the presumption does apply, deciding whether it is rebutted because application of it would not be in the child’s best interests;

   (g) if the presumption applies and is not rebutted, considering making an order that the child spend equal time with the parents unless it is contrary to the child’s best interests as a result of consideration of one or more of the matters in s 60CC, or impracticable;

   (h) if equal time is found not to be in the child’s best interests, considering making an order that the child spend substantial and significant time as defined in s 65DAA(3) with the parents, unless contrary to the child’s best interests as a result of consideration of one or more of the matters in s 60CC, or impracticable;

   (i) if neither equal time nor substantial and significant time is considered to be in the best interests of the child, then making such orders in the discretion of the Court that are in the best interests of the child, as a result of consideration of one or more of the matters in s 60CC;

   (j) if the presumption is not applied or is rebutted, then making such order as is in the best interests of the child, as a result of consideration of one or more of the matters in s 60CC; and

   (k) even then the Court may need to consider equal time or substantial and significant time, especially if one of the parties has sought it or, even if neither has sought it, if the Court considers after affording procedural fairness to the parties it to be in the best interests of the child.

Discussion

1. As foreshadowed, in this case a privately funded Family Report dated 2 September 2020 was produced by Dr C, a forensic and clinical psychologist.  There was some doubt about whether Dr C had been provided with all of the relevant documents and accordingly the parties were given the opportunity to clarify this matter with her.  The relevant correspondence was forwarded to my chambers after the Interim Hearing. It includes an email from Dr C dated 14 November 2020 in which she confirms that she has had regard to an Affidavit of the Father dated 28 May 2020 that had not previously been provided to her. She indicated that she had taken this material into account and would not seek to change her recommendations. 

2. Dr C makes a number of important observations in her Report.  X was observed to have a clearly warm and affectionate relationship with her mother, the maternal grandmother and with her father.  Based on Dr C’s observations of the interaction between X and her father, she expressed the view that X clearly enjoys spending time with him and there was nothing to suggest that the relationship was anxious in any way. 

3. In response to concerns raised by the Mother about aspects of X’s behaviour when she comes home from spending time with her father, all Dr C could say was that there was no objective evidence to support the Mother’s concerns in this regard i.e. that the Mother’s contention that it was related to the Father’s time with the Father. Dr C observed that even if X was bedwetting, as contended by the Mother, Dr C did not think it was surprising that she might still have accidents at this age. In this regard the court notes that Dr C’s observations are consistent with the evidence before the Court.

4. Dr C was concerned about the frequency of changes in X’s life and thought it was preferable that this be avoided, especially once she started formal school in 2022. There was no evidence before her to suggest that any of X’s behaviour, referred to by the Mother as being psychological difficulties associated with her relationship with the Father, was in fact this.  Indeed, Dr C could not even see any basis for X having ongoing psychological intervention. 

5. At paragraph 100 of her report, Dr C refers to the concerns about the Father’s drug use. She made it clear that regular testing over a long period with only 1 lapse suggested a move to longer and unsupervised time between X and her father.  She noted, however, that the purpose of supervision was, at least in part, to provide reassurance to the Mother, thus making that a relevant consideration. 

6. Dr C did not believe that there was an ongoing risk of family violence between the parents provided face-to-face contact was avoided.  She recommended equal shared parental responsibility, but if the Court were to grant the Mother sole parental responsibility there would be obligations to share information and consult. X would continue to live with her mother and would have further period of supervision with her father’s time until the end of November, during which time drug tests would be undertaken. If these drug tests were clear then the time he spends with X would move to unsupervised and be gradually extended so that he is spending a whole day with her. This could be extended further to include overnights and more time in the school holidays. 

7. The Court accepts Dr C’s Report and the recommendations made therein.  It is the only independent and expert evidence in this case.  The   Court accepts that the evidence has not been tested but consistent with authority that does not necessarily detract from its forensic value at an Interim Hearing. This is especially the case when there are no obvious factual discrepancies in terms of the matters jointly presented by the parties to Dr C, and where her observations both about X and the parents are not matters in respect of which there can be significant factual difference.

8. There certainly were factual differences between the parties of which Dr C was plainly aware. For example, Dr C was aware of the Mother’s family violence allegations against the Father.  She was made aware of the full nature and extent of the Father’s past drug issues and the fact that he had plainly misled the Court in his evidence about his drug abuse. The fact that the Mother does not trust the Father is palpably obvious, not just in what she told Dr C but in her own evidence. 

9. Notwithstanding all of that, Dr C made the recommendations that she did. Thus the Court is unable to accept the submissions made by Counsel for the Mother as to why it was necessary for Dr C’s Report to be tested in cross-examination before her recommendations could be accepted.

10. It is important to recognise that the Orders consented to by the parents contain an important safeguard against the Father relapsing into drug use, namely drug testing. Moreover the Mother agreed, for example, that when X’s time occurs with her father in Wollongong she would be responsible for delivering her to the Father’s home, and that likewise the Father would be responsible for delivering X to the Mother’s home when he returns her to the Mother’s home. 

11. The Mother’s concerns about family violence are somewhat inconsistent with the order which she herself has agreed to.  Notwithstanding this, the Court recognises that the Mother might feel understandably apprehensive about X’s time moving to unsupervised and then eventually progressing to overnight time. The Mother’s potential anxiety in this regard is something that the Court takes into account.  Moreover the Court takes into account that this will be a substantial change for X, particularly in circumstances where she is going to be moving home once again. 

12. Accordingly, whilst the Court accepts the recommendations made by Dr C by way of a framework, the Court is of the view that the Father’s proposal seeks to implement the spirit of the recommendations at a slightly accelerated pace.  Indeed, the real challenge in drafting the Orders in this case is to how to implement Dr C’s recommendations without moving at a pace that is too much for X and indeed for her mother.

13. The Father’s minute is the template that the Court adopts in its interim orders, but the rate of the progression is slowed down.  Unsupervised time will occur before Christmas.  There will then be an increase from 3 to 5 hours and then overnight starts by 5 June 2021. 

14. Rather than read these Orders onto the record, these can be provided to the parties within a relatively short period of time. 

15. I note that there is an agreement about equal shared parental responsibility.  I am thus required to consider equal time or substantial and significant time, provided the same are reasonably practicable and in the best interests of X.  I am not satisfied that either for the time being is either reasonably practicable or in the best interests of X, but rather that the Orders that are framed will be in her best interests. 

16. Accordingly, I make orders in terms of the draft that I have in front of me and that will be published shortly.

I certify that the preceding thirty-five (35) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Altobelli

Associate: 

Date: 2 December 2020