Averala Pty Ltd v Valuer General (No 2)

[2006] NSWLEC 342

Land and Environment Court

of New South Wales

CITATION:	Averala Pty Ltd v Valuer General (No 2) [2006] NSWLEC 342
PARTIES:	APPLICANT Averala Pty Ltd RESPONDENT Valuer General
FILE NUMBER(S):	30897 and 30898 of 2005
CORAM:	Moore C
KEY ISSUES:	Valuation of Land :- Valuation process to be undertaken by the Court
LEGISLATION CITED:	Land and Environment Court Act 1979 Valuation of Land Act 1916
CASES CITED:	Averala Pty Limited & anor v Valuer-General [2006] NSWLEC 258; Maurici v The Commissioner for State Revenue 211 CLR 111; Western Australian Planning Commission v Arcus Shopfitters Pty Limited, WASCA (unreported - 4 December 2003); AMP Henderson v The Valuer-General 134 LGERA 426; Brewarrana Pty Limited v The Commissioner of Highways (No 1) 32 LGR 170
DATES OF HEARING:	4 and 5 May and 18 July 2006
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE:	07/19/2006
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES:	APPLICANT Mr A Hyam, barrister INSTRUCTED BY Rosier Partners RESPONDENT Ms A Pearman, barrister INSTRUCTED BY NSW Crown Solicitor

JUDGMENT:

THE LAND AND
ENVIRONMENT COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES

Moore C

19 July 2006

30897 of 2005 Averala Pty Ltd v Valuer General
30898 of 2005

This decision was given as an extemporaneous decision. It has been revised and edited prior to publication.

JUDGMENT

1 These are two appeals pursuant to s 37(1) of the Valuation of Land Act 1916 (the Act). The first of the appeals relates to a property known as 23 Norfolk Place at North Richmond and is an appeal against the value of the land entered on the valuation roll as at 1 July 2004 of $313,000, that being a valuation which had not been altered on objection. The property is Lot 2 in Deposited Plan 1057127.

2 The second appeal concerns the property immediately adjacent, which is 23A Norfolk Place - as at the same base date but with a valuation entered on the role of $300,000 after an objection had been allowed by the Valuer General thus lowering the originally entered value of $313,000. This property is Lot 1 in Deposited Plan 1057127.

3 The applicant’s contentions, through its expert witness Mr Dobrow (in his statement of evidence), contended for a valuation to be entered for 23 Norfolk Place of $177,000 and for 23A Norfolk Place of $168,000.

4 On 4 May 2006 I had the opportunity to inspect these two properties and another property, which was then the subject of a previously determined element of theses proceedings (at 28A Norfolk Place – see Averala Pty Limited & anor v Valuer-General [2006] NSWLEC 258).

5 That view took place with the legal representatives of the parties and the then expert valuers Mr Dobrow and Mr Brogan advising them.

6 During the course of the inspection of Norfolk Place, I had the opportunity to inspect the properties at 23 and 23A in some detail; to walk around the cul-de-sac at the head of Norfolk Place; walk along Norfolk place towards what it is convenient to regard as the south; and to walk down a road to the sporting fields that are immediately adjacent and (conventionally) to the east of these two sites. It is convenient to set out in a little detail the topography of the area.

7 Both allotments face towards the Hawkesbury River in a direction which can conveniently be described as to the east. They have views across the intervening sporting fields to the river. They are supported, on their eastern aspects, by a substantial retaining wall several metres high which is comprised of very large squared sandstone blocks.

8 Number 23 is also substantially retained, along portion of its northern boundary, in a similar fashion – although, as is obvious from the contour map, which was in evidence, the northern boundary of 23 rises from the sporting fields up the side of that allotment.

9 At the northern end of 23, that block has a boundary with a large allotment of what was apparently rural land and there is no evidence before me in these proceedings that would cause me to conclude that any more intensive development will take place on that land than presently exists on it.

10 The consequence of that is that 23, in addition to enjoying significant (and it is agreed un-developable) views toward the river, also enjoys a significant aspect across the rural land to the north and enjoys the benefit of the solar access that flows from it.

11 Both 23 and 23A were owned by the applicant, Averala Pty Limited, as at the base date.

12 Mr Tchadovich, who was the applicant in the earlier element of the proceedings (noted at [4] above) is a director of the applicant company.

13 During that earlier element of these proceedings, the applicant was assisted by Mr Dobrow, an expert valuer, whilst Mr Brogan, also an expert valuer, gave evidence on behalf of the Valuer General.

14 After I gave my decision in the earlier appeal, two matters of significance occurred in the proceedings.

15 The first, which warrants no comment rather than merely noting it, was that, although that extemporaneous decision was given in order to see if it would assist the parties settle these remaining two matters, settlement was not able to be achieved and hence arose the need for the proceedings to continue.

16 Secondly, of greater impact in these proceedings, is the fact that Mr Brogan, the Valuer General’s expert, became seriously ill and was unable to continue.

17 As a consequence of that latter event, the parties came before me on 23 June when a number of directions were made.

18 The relevant two were to permit the Valuer General leave to adduce further expert evidence in these proceedings through a new expert valuer, Mr Carr, and, secondly, that Mr Carr was to provide information enabling the respondent to inform the applicant by 30 June if Mr Carr proposed to rely on any other comparable sales other than those previously discussed in the statement of evidence of Mr Brogan.

19 It is conceded by the applicant’s representatives that they were in fact notified by 30 June that Mr Carr did propose to rely on further sales information. However, arising from that notification, no joint report was produced as there was a fundamental difference in methodology between the valuers.

20 Having described Norfolk Place and its surrounds it is convenient to provide a little further information concerning numbers 23 and 23A. They share an access – in that each of these has a dedicated access handle with a dogleg in it and a splay at the end of each of them closest to the dwellings now erected on the allotments. These access handles have mutual rights of way over them creating, in effect, a common shared driveway.

21 Number 23A has a commonality with its topography of the majority of the other allotments on its side of Norfolk Place. It enjoys the views to the river; it has elements of fill on its eastern side and it does not have the additional northerly aspect earlier noted for 23. It has an area of 450.6 sq m and an area, excluding the right of way, of 327 sq m.

22 Number 23 has the additional aspect to the north; has, as is evident from the contour map, substantially more fill across essentially the whole of the building platform of the site (although to differing depths); has a substantial retaining wall along a significant portion of its northern boundary; and, in addition, has the additional aspect, across the rural land, as earlier observed, arising from it being the end block in the subdivision.

23 This allotment has an area of 537.1 sq m and, excluding the right of way, has an area of 382 sq m.

24 The decision I gave in the earlier proceedings involving 28A Norfolk Place resulted in an altered value being entered on the roll of $255,000as at the same base date.

25 However, in these proceedings, Mr Carr, in his statement of evidence, provided material concerning two further properties that were not in evidence in the earlier stage of the proceedings – those properties being 2B Charles Street, North Richmond, and 24 Norfolk Place. Mr Carr’s evidence concerning 24 Norfolk Place involved a detailed analysis of it on a time basis and then a single, comprehensive adjustment, that being the method he prefers, to distinguish the characteristics of 24 Norfolk Place from each of the other allotments.

26 Mr Dobrow’s evidence was that he was aware of the sale of 24 Norfolk which had taken place some years earlier than the base date but had not used it for the following reasons.

• First, he considered that it was too remote in time; and
• Second, he considered that, following his inquiry of the purchasers – they being a pensioner couple whose daughter lived some six doors away in Norfolk Place – they had purchased for a special purpose or value; and
• Third, that there had been no negotiation down from the asking price.

27 However, Mr Carr, who undertook a time adjustment for the purchase by the present occupants of 24 Norfolk Place (based on the sale and resale of 26A Michael Street, North Richmond), arrived at a deduced time adjusted price for 24 Norfolk Place of $355,000.

28 When Mr Dobrow was asked to undertake the same exercise during the course of his giving evidence, he did so and, although not simply doing a uniform time adjustment, undertook an analysis based on two separate periods of time in which he considered that the market had moved in differing fashions.

29 These were from the date of contract for 24 Norfolk of 28 August 2001 until toward the end of 2002 - that is a period of some 15 months to the end of November 2002 (during which he considered that the market in that area moved by only 4%) – then for the 20 month period from 1 December 2002 to the base date (where he considered that it had moved by 32%), giving a total movement of 36%. The adjustment arrived at by Mr Carr was an adjustment of 39%.

30 In the course of these proceedings the burden of proof pursuant to s 40(2) of the Act falls on the applicant.

31 It falls, in my view, not only in a global sense but with respect to each and every element during the path of consideration.

32 Although Mr Dobrow expressed a view about the differing rates of movement of the market, I accept, based on the extensive experience evidenced by Mr Carr in the witness box with respect to the local market in the Hawkesbury local government area, that the applicant has not discharged its onus pursuant to s 42(2) with respect to time adjustment for 24 Norfolk.

33 I therefore accept that the appropriate time adjustment as derived from the sale and resale of 26A Michael Street should be $355,000 for 24 Norfolk as at the base date.

34 It is appropriate to note, as earlier adverted to, that Mr Carr has extensive valuation experience as an officer of the Valuer General’s Department and now, as an officer of the State Valuation Office, with valuations of the Hawkesbury local government area whilst Mr Dobrow’s experience, nonetheless extensive, is not as focussed in the Hawkesbury as is Mr Carr’s.

35 However, I am satisfied, having observed both of them in the witness box (not only on this occasion for Mr Dobrow but on an earlier occasion), that each of them honestly and openly gave their evidence as they are required to under the expert witness practice direction in order to assist the Court.

36 Mr Carr, in addition to 24 Norfolk Place, gave evidence in his statement of evidence concerning three other properties.

37 They are, first, 26A Michael Street, which is a property that is located on the other side of the main road which effectively bisects North Richmond. This site has a differing aspect and is a battleaxe block located in the settled older urban area of North Richmond and is entirely surrounded by other development. It does not have views over the park and it does not have the degree of aspect over nor access to the playing fields that these two objection properties have.

38 In the earlier proceedings, I had inspected 26A Michael Street (from the street) and had determined that it was not appropriate to be included. I did so for reasons that are set out at [8] and [9] in Averala Pty Limited & anor v Valuer-General [2006] NSWLEC 258, that is, as expressed there, derived from some material put to me by Mr Hyam that the property was not appropriately comparable because the same buyer would not stand in the market for 26A Michael Street as would stand in the market for the two properties in Norfolk Place.

39 I am comforted in the view that I took, based on the material described in that decision, that the approach that I took was correct as in Maurici v The Commissioner for State Revenue 211 CLR 111 (at p 121 in para 18), the High Court accepted that sales of properties of a different character are likely to attract a different class of buyer and are unlikely to provide a reliable indication of value.

40 I am satisfied, again, that 26A Michael Street falls precisely within that description of property, and, consistent with what the High Court said in Maurici, should be excluded.

41 A similar position arises with respect to 2B Charles Street, which is in general terms, from Mr Carr’s report, of a similar nature – although I did not have the opportunity of inspecting it during the course of the earlier views as it had not been discussed or pressed by either Mr Brogan or Mr Dobrow.

42 With respect to 38 Norfolk, which is a dual occupancy at the southern end of Norfolk Place (but on the same side as the objection properties), there was no particular discussion nor evidence taken beyond the material contained in Mr Carr’s report as it is a dual occupancy property capable of being (and subsequently becoming) two separate allotments. However, I do note that, based on Mr Carr’s adjustment process, the adjusted time value for that land is $500,000 – giving a resultant value of $250,000 for each of its subdivided dual occupancy allotments.

43 Mr Carr took a significantly different approach to evaluating the qualitative differences between 24, 23A and 23 Norfolk. He simply undertook a single global adjustment for each of them and he agreed in evidence that he did so by determining what he considered was an appropriate monetary adjustment and translating it into a percentage.

44 Although the tables in evidence with respect to 23 and 23A Norfolk show the adjustment percentage prior to the dollar value, contrary to the processes outlined by Mr Carr, I am satisfied that nothing turns on that nor do I reject the approach taken by Mr Carr is being an inappropriate one.

45 Mr Carr described his adjustments in each of the instances as being for location, size, shape and views and, when questioned, indicated that matters of topography were also encompassed in that global adjustment.

46 Mr Dobrow undertook an approach which was based on making separate percentage adjustments for each of the elements that he considered appropriate. He adjusted for size, topography, area, location and views – being all of the elements that Mr Carr had encompassed in his global adjustment figure. Therefore, I am satisfied, although the end points in dollar terms at which each of them arrived in broad and although described differently and intellectualised differently, that the approaches each of them undertook, in an underlying sense, were absolutely consistent one with the other.

47 Ms Pearman, counsel for the Valuer General, urged me not to reject Mr Carr’s methodology. She did so relying on a decision of the full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Western Australian Planning Commission v Arcus Shopfitters Pty Limited, an unreported decision of 4 December 2003. She took me to the decision of McClure J in that matter, in which the other members of the bench concurred, particularly to para 72 where his Honour said,

Further, there can be no requirement that a valuer quantify adjustments affecting values. Mr Elliott properly declined to quantify particular adjustments where he had not done so as part of his analysis because of the lack of sales or empirical evidence to support a specific figure.

As I understand his methodology, he considers and mentally processes all of the variables affecting values and makes a judgment as to the relativities of the comparison sales in his basket with the subject land and may, after the collective analysis, make a judgment based adjustment to arrive at an opinion on value.

48 I accept that that is an appropriate and acceptable process and I declined earlier and continue to decline to reject Mr Carr’s approach.

49 In the earlier proceedings, absent the evidence concerning 24 Norfolk Place, adjustments were made to sales at North Richmond (at Flinders Place) and at McGrath’s Hill (in Ivy Street) as the available and appropriate and comparable properties to be considered.

50 In these proceedings, I now have the evidence concerning 24 Norfolk Place. It is clearly relevant given that it is immediately adjacent to both of the objection properties. Given that, to all practical intents and purposes, the two experts have agreed on an appropriate and near identical outcome for time adjustment, 24 is, as Mr Carr properly conceded in the witness box, a primary if not the dominant sale to which I should have regard.

51 Although not put as expressly, I understood the similar position arises from Mr Dobrow’s evidence.

52 However, each of the valuers suggested that I should use their other comparable sales as a check method to determine whether the approach I was taking was correct.

53 I am satisfied that it is both possible, in general principle, and appropriate, in the specific case, to determine these appeals simply by having regard to the sale of 24 Norfolk Place and how that should be regarded with respect to the subject property.

54 In this regard I am satisfied that the stricture of the Court of Appeal in AMP Henderson v The Valuer-General 134 LGERA 426 at p 440 where Tobias JA says at para 68, (when referring to the High Court’s decision in Maurici):

That case is not authority for the proposition that if there be only one comparable sale and it is a sale of scarce vacant land it is required to be discarded in the comparable sales method of valuation rejected.

55 I am satisfied that, in the market for which a purchaser would stand for 23 and 23A, a similar standing in the market would exist for 24 and that that is sufficiently specific to set aside the consideration of all the other various sales that were put as comparable.

56 Ms Pearman submitted to me that I ought not exercise the powers that are conferred on me by substituting my own opinion for that of either or both of the valuers.

57 She did so by particular reference to a decision of Wells J in the Supreme Court of South Australia in Brewarrana Pty Limited v The Commissioner of Highways (No 1) 32 LGR 170 and, in particular, she took me to passages on pp 174 and 175 of his Honour’s decision. The first of those is where his Honour said,

I have always taken the view and shall continue to do so, until directed by a superior court to do otherwise, that the creation of a special division in a court to deal with a particular class of case is not intended to turn the presiding judge into an independent expert in the very field in which testimony will be tendered to him that he will be called on to evaluate.

58 At p 175 his Honour said,

In the Land and Valuation Court I seek to be informed and, as best I can, to evaluate. I do not seek to use such acquired knowledge of valuation principles as I have acquired in order to confirm or to condemn.

I must act on the evidence and if any of it is in anywise defective, incomplete or irreconcilable then I must make such use as I can of whatever other evidentiary material is available to correct, complete or reconcile.

59 Further in the page his Honour continued,

But it remains true that the foundation of his submission was as I have described it and no amount of rationalisation can disguise its essential character. It was an invitation to the Court to piece together from the several valuations placed before it what would be, in effect, a paramount valuation of its own. In my opinion, that invitation must be refused because to accept it would necessitate my accepting pro tanto the role of an expert.

60 However, I am of the view that this submission is fundamentally misconceived as to the nature of my role in these proceedings. My jurisdiction to hear and determine these objections comes from two statutory provisions. The first is contained in s 37(1) of the Act which says:

Any person entitled under pt 3 to object to a valuation may appeal to the Land and Environment Court if the person is dissatisfied.

61 The second element of my jurisdiction arises from the provisions of s 19 of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 where s 19B specifically repeats that the jurisdiction pursuant to s 37(1) of the Act is to be regarded as an appeal in class 3 of the Court’s jurisdiction.

62 My powers on appeal are conferred by s 40(1) of the Act which reads as follows,

On an appeal the Land and Environment Court may do one or more of the following,
(a) Confirm or revoke the decision to which the appeal relates.
(b) Make a decision in place of the decision to which the appeal relates.
(c) Remit the matter to the Valuer General for determination in accordance with the court’s finding or decision.

63 My powers, when exercising those functions, are derived from ss 39(2) and (3) of the Land and Environment Court Act. They read as follows,

(2) In addition to any other functions and discretions that the Court has, apart from this subsection, the Court shall, for the purposes of hearing and disposing of an appeal, have all the functions and discretions which the person or body whose decision is the subject of the appeal had in respect of the matter the subject of the appeal, and,
(3) An appeal in respect of such a decision shall be by way of re-hearing and fresh evidence or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence given on the making of decision may be given on the appeal.

64 Further, the processes that I am obliged to follow are set out in ss 38(1) and (2) of the Land and Environment Court Act. They read as follows,

(1) Proceedings in Class 1, 2 or 3 of the court’s jurisdiction shall be conducted with as little formality and technicality and with as much expedition as the requirements of this Act and of every other relevant enactment and as the proper consideration of the matters before the Court permit.

(2) Proceedings in Class 1, 2 or 3 of the court’s jurisdiction. The Court is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks appropriate and as the proper consideration of the matters before the Court permits.

65 I am therefore satisfied that, standing in the shoes of the Valuer General, my discretion is unfettered, subject only to my observing procedural fairness and the rules of natural justice.

66 As a consequence, I expressly and explicitly reject the proposition that the strictures set out in Brewarrana fetter me in the manner that Wells J considered himself to be fettered.

67 Wells J was exercising the jurisdiction of a court bound by the rules of evidence. I am exercising an administrative decision making function in which I am not fettered by the rules of evidence. My role is to determine, pursuant to the provisions of s 6A of the Act, what is effectively the value of the land for its highest and best use to which an appropriately informed voluntary purchaser would purchase from an appropriately offering vendor and subject only to other matters not significantly presently relevant relating to land improvements.

68 I turn, therefore, to the process of standing in the shoes of the Valuer General and determining what is an appropriate valuation for each of 23 and 23A Norfolk Place based on a time adjusted valuation of $355,000 as at the base date for 24 Norfolk Place.

69 With respect to the matters that require adjustment, both valuers agreed that there was, based on 24 Norfolk Place, no need to adjust either of the objection properties for the purpose of location.

70 I then turn to deriving a value for 23 Norfolk Place.

71 Mr Carr, in his statement of evidence, contended for a value of $320,000.

72 In the witness box, when asked if he would go through an adjustment process paralleling that undertaken by Mr Dobrow for the remaining four elements which they agree are potentially capable of requiring adjustment (namely, views, size, topography and shape), Mr Carr suggested that there was no adjustment required for views, that there was a 10% adjustment required for size, no adjustment for topography and a 5% adjustment required for shape, giving a total downward adjustment of 15%.

73 If one applies that to the $355,000 value it gives a resultant, in the witness box, assessment by Mr Carr of the deduced value for 23 of $330,150.

74 Mr Dobrow went through a similar adjustment process for 23.

75 He suggested that 23 had superior views for which he would adjust upwards by 2% but, with respect to size, he proposed a 20% downward adjustment; for topography a 10% downward adjustment; and for shape a similar 10% downward adjustment.

76 These adjustments would result in a derived value of $220,100.

77 At this point it is relevant to note that Mr Carr explained that part of his consideration process was that analogous to the flag fall and running component for a taxi fare. There was a significant, in his view, I understood it, dominant element that attached to any residential allotment which derived from the fact that it had a residential building entitlement to it to which one would then add, for the differing curtilages that might arise between differing allotments, some additional value – but that there was a significant if not, in his opinion, dominant value to be attached to the building entitlement.

78 That, as I understood it, was his principal reason for the modest degree of adjustment that he made from the $355,000 to give his adjusted values in each instance.

79 He specifically rejected the approach taken by Mr Dobrow of deriving a rate per square metre by taking a time adjusted figure, adjusting out the usable area and the right of way, attributing a lesser value to the right of way and then simply deducing a per square metre value.

80 If Mr Dobrow’s approach had been taken, according to the material tendered in these proceedings, based on a usable area for 23 Norfolk of 382 sq m, there would be, based on a square metre rate for that plus a modest value for the right of way, a deduced value of $196,000.

81 I am satisfied that the approach taken by Mr Carr of saying that there is a significantly higher element to be attributed to a building entitlement is an appropriate one and that is, on my understanding, consistent with the valuation process that ends up with, contrary to that which might intuitively be expected, a higher rate per square metre for smaller allotments than for the larger ones.

82 I accept that there is significantly less usable area on 23 Norfolk Place compared to 24.

83 I accept that there would be a deal of difficulty in obtaining construction access in the hypothetical instance of that allotment being vacant as at the base date.

84 I accept that there would be a significant difficulty in construction because of the necessity to provide additional or greater piering because of the size of the site and the degree of fill that has been required to it, as was evidenced on the view – not merely on the eastern side towards the playing fields but along the northern side.

85 Contrary to that and adding to its utility or value is the additional aspect over the rural area and the significant additional solar access benefit that would apply to the north facing windows or other areas of that property.

86 I do not accept that either Mr Dobrow or Mr Carr accurately reflects the differences between the two allotments, that is 24 and 23 adjusted to reflect 24. I am satisfied that a significantly higher adjustment is required, in a global sense adopting Mr Carr’s approach, than is offered by him in his statement of evidence. However, I do not believe and could not be satisfied that the degree of adjustment required by Mr Dobrow is so great as to be acceptable.

87 Adopting the approach taken by Mr Carr and taking into account the matters relating to usable area; construction access difficulties, construction difficulties; and discounting that for the added value of views and aspect, I am satisfied that there should be an $80,000 deduction made from the time adjusted value derived from 24 Norfolk to arrive at a value, as at the base date, on the roll of $275,000 for 23 Norfolk Place.

88 I turn to number 23A.

89 Mr Carr’s statement allowed a global adjustment of fifteen per cent, giving a deduced value from the $355,000 base of $300,000. In the witness box, setting aside the question of location upon which there was agreement, Mr Dobrow and Mr Carr both agreed that there was also no need to adjust 23A for views. That is clearly self-evident from the inspection that was undertaken.

90 For the other elements, Mr Carr postulated an adjustment for size of 4%; no adjustment for topography; and an adjustment for shape of 3% – applying those to his $355,000 start, would arrive at a deduced value of $330,000 for 23A.

91 Mr Dobrow’s per square metre basis arrives at $167,000. His original statement of evidence was $168,000 as the contended value and, in the witness box, he concurred that there would be no need for an adjustment for views but contended for an adjustment of 25% for size; 12% for topography; and 13% for shape – giving a total adjustment of 50% or a resultant value of $177,500. In those processes, Mr Dobrow suffered from the same fault as I have earlier discussed concerning the building entitlement element providing a significant but not entirely dominant starting point.

92 I accept, however, the evidence of both of them that 23 is qualitatively a little or somewhat better and therefore more valuable then 23A. I, however, accept, as I think follows from the evidence of each of them, that this difference is only marginal in each instance.

93 Having determined that the appropriate adjusted value for 23 is $275,000, using Mr Carr’s approach to take account of the fact that there is not the additional solar access and that there are other but minor disadvantages between 23A and 23, I would allow a further $15,000, giving a value to be entered on the roll as at the base date for 23A Norfolk Place of $260,000.

94 In this regard, I draw some comfort from the evidence contained in Mr Carr’s statement of evidence concerning 38 Norfolk. 38 Norfolk was not pressed extensively during the course of evidence and I have not relied upon it. I am, however, satisfied that if I have regard to the fact that Mr Carr’s time adjusted land value would be $500,000 with two building entitlements for what were, from the memory that I have of that end of the street on the view, essentially identical two allotments to be created, as to their attributes (if not precisely as to their shape, size, topography and other matters), that an approximately $250,000 land value for each of them is not so out of kilter with the conclusion that I have reached in these proceedings as not to allow me to draw comfort from it.

95 I am similarly comforted by the earlier proceedings (although the process that I undertook in the earlier decision relied on comparable sales in Flinders Place some distance away in North Richmond and Ivy Street in McGrath’s Hill) as they also deduced a value for 28A Norfolk which is not out of step with the conclusions that I have reached in these proceedings. Therefore, they do not cause me any concerns that the conclusions that I have reached in these proceedings are not appropriate. The Court will therefore issue orders substituting those two valuations for those presently entered on the roll for the base date, and the exhibits are returned.

Tim Moore
Commissioner of the Court